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After the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, advocacy of de jure 
segregation quickly ceased to be an acceptable position within American 
political discourse.  The speed of the political shift left figures who had 
openly supported de jure segregation with a political problem: how would 
they explain their former support for a position which had rapidly become 
not only discarded, but actively disreputable to have held?  This study 
explores the responses to this dilemma through a series of case studies, 
highlighting different characteristic approaches that various figures took.  
George Wallace is examined as an example of a politician who tried -- 
although less effusively than is commonly believed -- to apologize for his 
former position.  Strom Thurmond is examined as an example of a 
politician who, to the greatest extent possible, took refuge in silence about 
his former political stances.  Robert Bork, whose opposition to the 1964 
Civil Rights Act became infamous during the hearings about his 
nomination to the Supreme Court, is considered as someone who wrote 
off his former position as a technical (and therefore reasonable) mistake.  
The case of Herman Talmadge is used as an example of a politician who 
took refuge in a thin veneer of technical denials.  Political commentator 
William F. Buckley's inconsistent and evasive answers present yet another 
 strategy.  And one politician who refused to accede to the new political 
consensus, Lester Maddox, is used to explore what happened to those who 
failed to shift with the times.  A final chapter explores the attempts of 
later self-identified conservatives to grapple with the oft-overlooked roots 
of the conservative movement's political successes in segregationist 
ideology and Jim Crow's former supporters. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION: 
A PROBLEM OF POLITICAL POSITIONING 
 
In 1954, when a unanimous Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in the historic case of Brown v. Board of Education, opposition 
to their decision was immediate, fierce and sustained.  In response to 
Brown, southern politicians devised the policy of "massive resistance," 
hoping to undermine and ultimately reverse what they saw as an 
overreach by the Court.1 Two years later, the infamous "Southern 
Manifesto," signed by an overwhelming majority of the southern 
congressional delegation, "commend[ed] the motives of those States 
which have declared the intention to resist forced integration by any 
lawful means," and "pledge[d]... to use all lawful means to bring about a 
reversal of this decision which is contrary to the Constitution and to 
prevent the use of force in its implementation."2  Opposition to de jure 
integration of schools, as well as the numerous other institutions to which 
the basic principles of Brown were soon extended, continued for more 
than a decade, both in practical terms—the struggle of integrationists to 
get the principles of Brown put into practice was arduous—and in 
ideological terms, as white southerners, joined by conservatives from 
                                                
1 The classic study is Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: 
Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s.  (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1969).  For more contemporary studies, 
see Clive Webb, ed., Massive Resistance: Southern Opposition to the 
Second Reconstruction.  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
2 The Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs at 
Clemson University reprints the Southern Manifesto on its web site, 
available at http://www.strom.clemson.edu/strom/manifesto.html. 
2 
around the country, argued against the basic principle that "the doctrine of 
'separate but equal' has no place" in American law.3 
But by the thirtieth anniversary of the Brown decision in 1984, the 
landscape had changed dramatically.  While there were ongoing concerns 
about the practical success of desegregation,4 there was almost universal 
agreement as to the justice of its underlying principles.  The Warren 
Court's position about the immorality of segregation—"the doctrine of 
"separate but equal""—had become the default position across the 
American political spectrum, opposed only by the smallest and most 
marginal of fringe groups.  Even if academics or judicial theorists 
criticized the grounds of Brown's decision, they would typically try to find 
other ways to achieve the same result—at the very least, would protest 
loudly that they thought that the result would be worth keeping.  An open 
avowal of the principles of de jure segregation—such as that made by 
nearly the entire southern congressional delegation in 1956—would have 
been a politically disastrous move, one which would result in the 
speaker's immediate marginalization.  So clear was this, however, that the 
preceding sentence must remain hypothetical: no politician was so 
careless of their career that they decided to test the matter. 
This nearly unanimous acceptance of both the specific judicial 
decision and the broader principles behind it is hardly the normal course 
of events with controversial topics.  In contrast to Brown, many of the 
other controversial decisions of the Warren Court—on school prayer, on 
                                                
3 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
4 See for example Walter Goodman, "Brown v. Board of Education: 
Uneven Results 30 Years Later", The New York Times, May 17, 1984, p. 
B18. 
3 
the rights of the accused and many other topics—remained controversial.  
Perhaps the best contrast with Brown, however, is the most controversial 
decision of the Burger Court: Roe v. Wade.  Roe v. Wade is an obvious 
parallel to Brown in that, just as Brown played a central role in the 
struggle for civil rights, Roe was the legal case which played the biggest 
role in the women's movement in late-twentieth century America (albeit 
not as central a role as Brown played in the Civil Rights Movement).  
Thirty years after the Supreme Court decided Roe, however, both the case 
itself and the issue which they purported to decide (the legality of 
abortion) remained one of the most contested issues in American politics.  
On the broader issue, both extremes—that abortion should be legal 
throughout a term of pregnancy in all cases, subject only to the control of 
the pregnant woman, and that abortion should be illegal in all cases 
regardless of circumstances—had advocates in every major branch of the 
government, as did many positions in-between.5  Many observers thought 
                                                
5 A year after that three-decade anniversary, the two major political parties 
would take diametrically opposite positions on the issue.  The Republican 
party platform stated that "the unborn child has a fundamental individual 
right to life which cannot be infringed. We support a human life 
amendment to the Constitution and we endorse legislation to make it clear 
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections apply to unborn children. 
Our purpose is to have legislative and judicial protection of that right 
against those who perform abortions", whereas the Democratic party 
platform said that "Because we believe in the privacy and equality of 
women, we stand proudly for a woman's right to choose, consistent with 
Roe v. Wade, and regardless of her ability to pay ".  (2004 Republican 
Party Platform, at http://www.gop.com/media/2004platform.pdf; 2004 
Democratic Party Platform, at 
http://a9.g.akamai.net/7/9/8082/v002/www.democrats.org/pdfs/2004platfo
rm.pdf.) 
4 
that, notwithstanding the issues of terrorism, war and the economy, the 
so-called "culture wars" were the issue which most fundamentally defined 
the politics of the day—and all agreed that disagreements over abortion 
and the Roe v. Wade decision were fundamental to the culture wars.  
Despite the decision of the Supreme Court three decades prior, abortion 
continued to be among the most contested issues in American politics.6 
Brown's universal acceptance was not specific to the decision itself; 
indeed, it had comparatively little to do with the details of the legal 
proceedings or of Earl Warren's oft-maligned decision.  Rather, Brown's 
changed reputation was a result of the larger social, cultural and political 
changes wrought by the Civil Rights Movement.  For all the remaining 
problematics of race in twenty-first century America, positions once 
widely held—that public segregation, or de jure segregation, was one of 
the options for American society—had been removed as an option. 
Jim Crow was not simply dismantled by the Civil Rights 
Movement; it was discredited—taken down not only in practical terms, 
but removed as an ideologically defensible position in American life.  
Indeed, if anything the dismantling was far more complete in ideological 
                                                
6 The contrast between the subsequent history of Roe and Brown has been 
made before—often in the opposite direction, as Brown is used to 
illustrate the ongoing contentiousness of Roe.  The thirtieth anniversary of 
Roe, for example, produced articles such as Columbia Law Professor 
Michael Dorf's " The Thirtieth Anniversary of Roe v. Wade: Was It 
Rightly Decided? Will It Be Overruled?" (Findlaw, January 22, 2003, 
online at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20030122.html) and Yale Law 
Professor Jack Balkin's essay "Thoughts on Roe, Part 1" (online at 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2003/01/thoughts-on-roe-v_13.html), both of 
which contrast the nearly universal acceptance of Brown with the ongoing 
debate over Roe. 
5 
than practical terms: ongoing segregation of public life was a persistent 
reality even after the high-water mark of the Civil Rights Movement, but 
open advocacy for segregation was not.  Given the persistent realities of 
racism in American life, this level of ideological success—in which the 
opposing view was decisively removed from the Overton window7—has 
been somewhat underappreciated. 
After all, it is rare, in politics, to have a position so thoroughly 
abandoned as the argument for de jure segregation has been.  It is far 
more typical for support for even long-since hopeless political causes to 
persist for decades after a new political reality had been thoroughly 
integrated into American political life.  (Opposition to the New Deal, to 
mention just a single example, persists to this day.)  And in those cases 
where a position has been thoroughly abandoned—such as isolationism in 
the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor—things changed in such a way 
that the position's erstwhile proponents could quite credibly claim that 
events on the ground had changed their minds.  There is generally little 
sense that having supported a view, rather than simply still supporting a 
view, is in any way disreputable.8 
                                                
7 The "Overton Window" is a concept from political science and public 
policy (named after the late Joseph Overton) describing the range of 
acceptable stands within public discourse.  See Nathan Russell, "An 
Introduction to the Overton Window of Political Possibilities," January 4, 
2006, at http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=7504. 
8 The closest analogy, in fact, may be to an example in European rather 
than American politics, where, in the post-war environment, not only was 
fascism no longer an active political option, but even having supported 
fascism back in its heyday was considered disgraceful; hence former 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's oft-quoted phrase about "the grace of 
late birth"—i.e. one which allowed its subject to have avoided any stance 
6 
But in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement this was the fate of 
those who openly supported de jure segregation.  To have spoken against 
the Civil Rights Movement—a movement increasingly described across 
the political spectrum as a moral triumph, with its most widely known 
spokesman, Martin Luther King Jr., increasingly depicted in hagiographic 
terms—became a mark of racism.  This is not to say that there were no 
excuses that were accepted, nor that former proponents of de jure 
segregation were driven out of American political life; on the contrary, 
this study will attempt to show how little was actually required for 
politicians to climb their way out of perceived culpability for their support 
of Jim Crow.  But that nearly any explanation or political strategy sufficed 
to deal with a segregationist past does not change the fact that some 
explanation, some political strategy, needed to be adopted.  A past as a 
segregationist became something that called for an explanation—even if, 
as shall be argued here, politicians often managed to avoid giving one. 
It is important to emphasize that I do not mean, in the least, to deny 
the ongoing importance of racial divides, and racism, in American 
politics.  Those who so avidly supported Jim Crow did not vanish 
overnight in the mid-sixties; on the contrary, their persistence in politics is 
central to the question I am attempting to examine.  The claim here is a far 
more specific one: that a particular, comparatively well-defined set of 
positions became an anathema in American political life, even as their 
ideological kin remained viable political positions; and, thus, those who 
                                                                                                                                       
from the period.  Quoted in Jay Howard Gellar, "Germany, Federal 
Republic of", in Richard S. Levy, ed., Antisemitism: a Historical 
Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution, Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 
2005, vol. 1, p. 271. 
7 
had once prominently held the now-forbidden views were required to shift 
their political position—a shift that required devising some sort of new 
political stance, even if that was only a refusal to address the obvious 
questions. 
Dan T. Carter's brief but important book From George Wallace to 
Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution: 1963-19949 
is a study of the ways in which the conservative movement (or, to use his 
word, counterrevolution) continued to use race and racially coded 
language to appeal to voters.  Carter focuses on the ongoing use of coded 
racial appeals—appeals to tropes such as Reagan's "welfare queens", or 
political images such as the elder George Bush's use of Willie Horton in a 
political advertisement.  (Carter also discusses the ideological links 
between pro-segregationist politics and contemporary conservative 
political positions.)  Nothing in the present study is intended to deny the 
reality of the phenomenon that Carter describes.  On the contrary, its 
reality is central to the issues discussed here. 
Accepting Carter's argument, after all, means seeing that for all that 
racial appeals retained their importance in American politics, they were 
no longer the open appeals of the previous decades.  For all that Carter 
convincingly traces ideological links between pro-segregationist politics 
and later conservative political positions, the lack of the central 
organizing tenet in the former to play any role in the latter is itself 
noteworthy and important.  Towards the conclusion of his study, Carter 
                                                
9 Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the 
Conservative Counterrevolution: 1963-1994.  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1996.) 
8 
says that "racism—though it continues as a subtext in American politics—
no longer wears the rhetorical garments of earlier generations."10  While 
fully accepting Carter's argument about the continuities of racial appeals 
in the post-Civil Rights Movement world, this study is premised on the 
notion that there is a flip side of these continuities—the fact that the 
rhetoric of racism has had to change, since not only the raw racial rhetoric 
of pre-Movement politics but also the open embrace of legalized 
segregation has now become politically anathema. 
The abridged version of Carter's argument can be found in an 
admission from conservative strategist Lee Atwater, who described the 
evolution of the political uses of race thusly: 
 
You start out in 1954 by saying, 'Nigger, nigger, nigger.' 
By 1968 you can't say 'nigger' - that hurts you. Backfires. 
So you say stuff like forced busing, states' rights and all 
that stuff. You're getting so abstract now [that] you're 
talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you're 
talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct 
of them is [that] blacks get hurt worse than whites.11 
Atwater, like Dan Carter, is speaking of the emotional appeals to racism 
as a political strategy.  But the same trajectory held for the political 
positions supported.  It was not only the rhetoric that changed; the 
conservative fight against busing and affirmative action replaced the fight 
                                                
10 Ibid., p. 122. 
11 Quoted by Bob Herbert, "Impossible, Ridiculous, Repugnant", The New 
York Times, October 6, 2005.  Herbert used the same quote in his 
September 25, 2007 column, "The Ugly Side of the G.O.P."  Atwater 
himself played a crucial role in working to reverse this trend, at least to a 
limited extent, through the infamous "Willie Horton" ad he devised to 
attack Democratic nominee Dukakis during the 1988 Presidential 
campaign (see Carter, op. cit., chapter three.) 
9 
against integration not only as a matter of political rhetoric, but as a 
matter of expressed political goals.  Politicians who wished to appeal to 
conservative whites—particularly but not exclusively conservative white 
southerners—now spoke of their opposition to busing and affirmative 
action, because support for de jure segregation was no longer a political 
option. 
This left a problem for those who had supported segregation—
whether out of expediency or conviction hardly mattered—back in the 
days in which such support had been a politically tenable position.  Many 
of its supporters, naturally, left political life before, or during, the change 
in the political climate, such that they never had to deal with the reality of 
a newly embarrassing past.  But this was hardly true of all of them.  The 
struggle for the social acceptance of de jure integration—inextricably 
linked to the legal, political and cultural struggles for it—was, from the 
viewpoint of the activists fighting for it (and the African Americans living 
under Jim Crow) a long one; but measured by the span of a political 
career, it was comparatively short.  It was certainly possible to be 
speaking and writing at a time when segregation seemed well within the 
political mainstream of American life, and then to still be speaking and 
writing after segregation, with comparative speed, ceased to be an 
acceptable option. 
Political figures—by which I mean to include not only candidates 
for electoral office, but also writers and intellectuals with a desire to shape 
the American political dialogue—whose career bridged this gap thus 
faced a political problem.  They would have to explain a past that had 
rapidly come to seem to be disgraceful. 
10 
This was a challenge even more complicated than it appeared at 
first glance.  After all, the speed of the change in the political culture left 
such political figures with constituencies (intellectual or electoral) 
composed of people who had quite recently supported de jure 
segregation—often fervently.  And while some of those constituents 
might have had changes of heart due to the intervening events, some 
clearly had not.  For that matter, even those who had changed their minds 
could easily be alienated by describing a past they shared in the wrong 
way.  At the same time, other constituents (having more thoroughly 
reevaluated their views, or perhaps come of age in the post-Jim Crow era) 
would require a convincing articulation of a political figure's past in terms 
acceptable within the new civic framework. 
This study will examine a number of different figures, and discuss 
how they met this particular challenge.  Those discussed will include 
Robert Bork, William F. Buckley, Lester Maddox, Herman E. Talmadge, 
Strom Thurmond and George C. Wallace.  In differing ways, and to 
differing degrees, all six of those men supported some aspect of the legal 
structure of Jim Crow; and all six continued in political life long enough 
that they were forced to confront that past.  In addition, other sections of 
this study will focus on figures who, through ideological identification, 
linked themselves with supporters of de jure segregation even if they did 
not personally support it; this will include an examination of Senator 
Trent Lott's retrospective endorsement of Strom Thurmond's 1948 
Presidential bid, and a broader examination of the place of the struggle 
over Civil Rights in historical memory for those avowedly identified with 
the conservative movement. 
11 
The choice of case studies represents an attempt to capture a variety 
of different approaches that former supporters of de jure segregation took 
in dealing with their increasingly controversial pasts.  In this study I have 
conceptualized the different figures as utilizing different strategies.  Those 
strategies included repentance, denial, equivocation, and silence.  (Lester 
Maddox is included as the equivalent of an experimental control: someone 
who refused to back away from his avowedly segregationist beliefs in any 
fashion, and who suffered marginalization as the price for sticking to his 
political guns.)  It would be convenient for the intellectual historian—
whose task has been aptly likened to "nailing jelly to the wall"12—if these 
strategies were consistently and purely held; but in the mess of reality it 
turns out not to be the case.  While certain figures emphasized different 
strategies in their later careers—Strom Thurmond using above all the 
strategy of silence, and George Wallace famously adopting the strategy of 
repentance—a closer look at their records shows that almost all these 
figures adopted multiple strategies at different times—often, indeed, at the 
same time, weaving from denial to avoidance to apology, sometimes 
within a single sentence. 
Other considerations have affected the selection of case figures too.  
Bork and Buckley are discussed in part to emphasize that support for de 
jure segregation was not simply a southern phenomenon, and thus the 
need to deal with that past was not either.  They also help tie together an 
important secondary theme in this work, namely, the underappreciated 
                                                
12 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: the "Objectivity Question" and the 
American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), p. 7. 
12 
role that former supporters of de jure segregation played in the post-
Sixties rise of the conservative movement to a dominant role in American 
politics. The successes of the Civil Rights Movement were among the 
chief triumphs of the left in post-war America—and perhaps the only such 
triumph to now be openly celebrated across the political spectrum.  Given 
the dominant role of the political right since the 1960s—in particular, 
given the fact that this dominant role was crucially enabled by the very 
successes of the Civil Rights Movement—it is worth both remembering 
the political genealogy of today's conservative movement, and exploring 
the ways in which conservatives conceptualize going from defeat on the 
chief domestic issue of the immediate post-war era to their subsequent 
political dominance.  This is also one of the rationales for the chapter 
exploring the way that avowedly conservative figures who were too 
young to personally confront the Civil Rights Movement look back on the 
past of their ideological forebears. 
 
This study sits at the intersection of several different lines of 
historical research, and it is hoped that it will shed light on all of them.  
First and foremost, this study is part of the ongoing research into white 
reactions to the Civil Rights Movement.  For obvious and important 
reasons, most histories of the Civil Rights Movement have focused on 
telling the story of the Movement itself, highlighting the efforts, successes 
and failures of the African Americans who worked to secure themselves 
an equal place in American life.  But there have always been works which 
sought to tell the other side of the story: to understand the actions of 
whites in response to the Movement, with particular focus on those who 
13 
resisted the fight for integration.  These works range from Numan V. 
Bartley's classic study The Rise of Massive Resistance to important recent 
works like Jason Sokol's There Goes My Everything : White Southerners 
in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945-1975.13 
These histories, generally, have tended to focus on the actions and 
statements of white southerners during the movement.  To the extent that 
they have dealt with the post-Movement environment, they have either 
been focused on single figures (as in the many biographies of principal 
opponents of the Civil Rights Movement), or they have focused, as Sokol 
does, on larger social changes.  This study will attempt to deal with a 
larger set of figures, while still focusing on individual political actors.  In 
a related vein, earlier studies have also tended to focus on social and 
cultural history or political history.  While those areas are important in 
this study too, the primary focus here will be on the intersection of 
political and intellectual history: I shall examine issues ranging from 
political rhetoric (how to explain one's past) to the effect of the changing 
political culture on the articulation of political ideas.  I hope that this 
somewhat different focus will provide a useful addition to an ongoing, 
important and rich area of research. 
Secondly, this study also fits within the increasingly active area of 
research focusing on the roots of the successes of the conservative 
movement over the past several decades.  As was the case with the 
previously mentioned area, studies of the history of the conservative 
                                                
13 Bartley, op. cit.; Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything : White 
Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945-1975. (New York : Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2006.) 
14 
movement reach back several decades.  But in recent years, largely in 
reaction to ongoing political events, the conservative movement has 
received an increasing amount of study.  This additional attention comes 
in many forms.  In some cases, such as Lisa McGirr's important study 
Suburban Warriors: the Origins of the New American Right, this has 
taken the form of specific studies exploring the topic directly.  In other 
cases, however, broader histories have simply given an increased amount 
of attention to the issue of conservative history, such as in Maurice 
Isserman and Michael Kazin's recent history of the 1960's, America 
Divided, where an increased amount of attention has been devoted to 
conservative developments, in contrast to earlier studies which have 
focused more on the better-known liberal tendencies of the decade.14  In 
either case, the enduring power of the conservative movement in 
American political discourse has encouraged scholars to focus more 
directly on its roots and its development.  In that area, too, this study 
hopes to contribute to an important ongoing conversation. 
These two areas, naturally, overlap, and this is not the first study to 
try and draw connections between them.  One important precursor in this 
field is Kevin M. Kruse's White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern 
Conservatism.15  Kruse's focus differs from that of the present study in 
multiple ways, however; Kruse examines the ways in which the shifting 
political culture directly affected the creation of a social and political 
                                                
14 Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001); Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, American Divided: 
the Civil War of the 1960s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
15 Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern 
Conservatism.  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
15 
milieu in which the new conservative politics could flourish; this study 
shall focus on the way that transition was explained and conceived after 
the fact.  Nevertheless, the present study, like Kruse's work, might serve 
to further draw together these two important areas of historical inquiry, 
casting further light on their ultimately inextricable nature. 
Finally, this study is in some sense an examination of the uses and 
abuses of the past in American political life.  As such, it is in dialogue 
with the extensive literature about American memory, of which the 
founding text is Michael Kammen's now-classic work Mystic Chords of 
Memory.16  Even more than the aforementioned areas, which are limited in 
chronological scope, the potential explorations of historical memory are 
endless.  While the present study is, in comparison to a sweeping 
overview such as Kammen's work, a microhistory, it may still provide 
some insight into the ways in which a specific aspect of the American 
past—the Civil Rights Movement and the social, cultural and political 
changes it engendered—was remembered, or at least portrayed, within a 
political culture that was descended from its opponents; which, in turn, 
might cast light on some of the broader dynamics through which 
Americans relate to their past—even (or perhaps especially) to their 
comparatively recent past. 
 
Before turning to the case studies, a few specific caveats and 
terminological explanations are in order. 
                                                
16 Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory : The Transformation of 
Tradition in American Culture.  (New York : Knopf, 1991). 
16 
In the course of working on this dissertation, I have encountered a 
great deal of enthusiasm when I first described this project.  Gratifying as 
this has been, it has also been somewhat disconcerting as further 
conversation has almost inevitably revealed that that excitement focused 
on an issue which I have not been concerned with, namely, with the inner 
feelings of segregation supporters—or, as it was often put to me, what 
they "really" thought and felt. 
Given the strong inclination towards this misunderstanding, it is 
worth emphasizing that this will not be the subject of my inquiries.  My 
purpose here is to look at what former supporters of segregation said 
about their pasts—not what they thought about them.  In some cases, to be 
sure, these two issues may be synonymous; but to the extent that the word 
"really" has force in the phrase "what they really thought", it is in 
precisely those cases that the inner feeling departed from the spoken 
word.  For that matter, to what degree these two diverge is fundamentally 
unknowable; historians are not mind readers.  But even to the degree that 
there exists evidence to probe this gap—private letters and diaries, for 
instance, which might be contrasted with public statements—this has not 
been my focus.  I have not attempted to explore what my subjects "really" 
thought, to distinguish their public articulations from their private views. 
Rather, this study is attempting to study the various public stances taken 
by political figures who supported—in one fashion or another—the legal 
edifice behind Jim Crow.  The interest here has been the public grappling 
(or lack thereof) with a newly-untenable political past.  In the end, even if 
they were knowable, a private individual's "real" feelings would remain 
precisely that, private.  But their public utterances reveal something not 
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only about those who made them, but about their conception of those who 
listened.  Such is the topic of the present study. 
I also wish to make a few remarks on some of the terminology used 
in this study.  "Racism" and its various derivatives is, naturally, a 
recurring term -- this discussion will touch on both its presence and its 
absence, and forms of racism from overt to implicit to hotly denied.  As 
such it is perhaps important to note that the term itself is not only a 
contested and problematic one, but it is contested along precisely the 
ideological fault lines which are explored in this study.  Liberals -- from 
politicians to intellectuals -- tend to see racism as a social problem, one 
which is manifested in inequities in social, political, economic and other 
realms of life.  From a liberal point of view, the racism in the system of 
Jim Crow was bound up with the economic, social and political effects 
suffered by African Americans living under it.  Conservatives, in contrast, 
tend to define racism as a matter of personal feeling.  Racism, from this 
perspective, is a matter of "dislik[ing] a man for his color," to use the 
1964 words of George Wallace.17  It is in the latter sense that many of the 
proponents of segregation, including many of the figures in this study, 
hotly denied being racists at all -- even while supporting a system of legal, 
social and political inferiority based explicitly upon race. 
To be sure, these areas are inevitably intermingled.  Many of the 
mechanisms of social inferiority used within the Jim Crow system 
depended upon the personal feelings of the system's supporters; the 
violence that was integral to its maintenance, for instance, was certainly 
spurred by personal feelings.  In this analysis, racial animosity can be a 
                                                
17 George C. Wallace, "Hear Me Out" (Anderson, S.C.: Droke House, 1968), p. 120. 
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part, even a crucial part, of a racist system without racism being reducible 
to merely "dislik[ing] a man for his color," or for that animosity to be a 
necessary component of any particular individual's support for, and 
participation in, a racist system.  Nor would liberals discount the 
importance in subtle perceptions of bias in the persistence of racially 
charged politics; liberals certainly recognize, perhaps even more than 
conservatives, the reality of so-called "dog-whistle" appeals to racism, in 
which racially categories are implicitly drawn upon but not explicitly 
referred to.  Liberals, however, do not see the success of these implicit 
racial appeals as depending upon any explicit, acknowledged bias; rather, 
they often understand racial appeals to work through cultural categories 
which are not only not consciously racist, but which may not even be 
recognized by those whose knowledge is structured by them. 
On the flip side, even conservatives who tend to equate racism with 
personal feelings of racial animosity will recognize the broader effects of 
a racist social system (although this is more often true in the days since 
the demise of Jim Crow than in its heyday, since before its end 
conservatives were more concerned with a denial of the system's negative 
effects).  They will simply ascribe the social, economic and political 
effects as being fundamentally caused by -- fundamentally about -- racial 
animosity as such.  Hence the argument frequently made against Civil 
Rights Bills that 'the law can't change a man's heart': if a racist system is 
reducible to the content of people's hearts than this is a plausible 
argument, whereas if racism is seen as a larger social structure than that 
argument is a non sequitur.  Conservatives will often discount implicit 
racial undertones in a particular sample of political rhetoric as long as the 
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core element of racial animosity was not present; for conservatives, the 
lack of an intentional appeal to racial stereotypes or categories will render 
them, if not innocuous, then at the very least not properly describable as 
racist. 
This study will most often use a conception of racism that is closer 
to the liberal than the conservative view.  It assumes that the nature of Jim 
Crow was racist, not simply because of the negative feelings that whites at 
the time had for blacks, but because African Americans were treated as 
second class citizens in numerous ways, many of which do not require 
any sort of direct negative intent on the part of (many of) those who 
uphold it.  But it is worth recognizing that this very notion of racism is 
itself a contested issue, and that many of the figures in this study would 
and did dispute the use that will be assumed herein. 
And not every use of the term will fit easily into one or the other 
conception of what racism is and how it works.  Thus, when I claimed 
above that, in recent takes, to have spoken against the Civil Rights 
Movement came to be regarded as a mark of racism, this is true across the 
political spectrum, but what this means is contested.  Conservatives 
tended to see the contemporary advocacy of such positions to be a mark 
of personal racial animosity, even if they didn't ascribe those motives 
universally to past supporters of Jim Crow; liberals will see advocacy for 
de jure segregation as a racist position regardless of motives.  Thus the 
details of precise cases will be hotly contested.  In one case, to be 
examined in chapter two, Senator Trent Lott's retroactive endorsement of 
Strom Thurmond's 1948 Dixiecrat presidential campaign, which caused a 
media firestorm, and while all participants agreed that advocating the 
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principles of Thurmond's 1948 campaign in 2002 would be a racist stance, 
there was intense disagreement about whether there could be any 
acceptable nostalgia for that campaign, about whether it had been racist to 
have supported it in 1948, and so forth.  In such cases, the debate about 
the meaning of the term "racist", and its derivatives, will be precisely the 
issue under examination, and seeming points of agreement -- that Jim 
Crow was racist, and therefore wrong -- will, under examination, be 
shown to be very differently understood by different parties. 
Another key pair of terms that will recur throughout this study are 
the notions of 'strategies' and 'narratives'.  In discussing the political 
predicament of de jure segregation's former supporters, I shall use the 
term "strategy" to refer to the specific, personal approaches with which 
each figure customarily responded to the shifting the political climate.  
While these responses were always taken with a certain amount of 
deliberation -- all of the figures examined are politicians and writers, and 
are well aware of the effect that their choice of words can have -- I do not 
mean to imply with this term that the overall strategy of any of these 
figures was purely a product of deliberation or calculation.  The strategies 
by which the examined figures confronted a newly-discreditable past were 
the result of a complex and usually shifting mix of calculation, 
happenstance, political necessity, moral reflection, verbal flailing and 
many other factors.  Nor were these strategies perfectly consistent; a 
figure who generally adopted an apologetic tone might (for any number of 
reasons) have moments of defensiveness, evasiveness, or other quite 
different strategies.  I use the term largely to highlight that, regardless of 
the factors that went into their responses, all of these figures faced a 
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political problem caused by the changing political consensus, and that the 
solutions they devised often had quite different natures from those devised 
by other figures in similar situations. 
In contrast, the related term "narratives" refer to more widely held 
cultural beliefs and patterns, ones which transcend the specific situation of 
any given individual.  Naturally, since narratives are more broadly shared, 
they are inevitably more amorphous even than the individual strategies 
under discussion.  But the two terms do relate to each other in complex 
ways.  To say that a figure employs a strategy of repentance is to say that 
he or she invokes a common cultural narrative.  At other times, a figure's 
strategy will itself create a narrative, that is, a common understanding of 
that figure's political transformation and history (one which may or may 
not be accurate).  In turn, the existing (and developing) cultural narratives 
-- for instance, the widely-held political belief that the reality of Jim Crow 
was negative, but that America, to its credit, has transcended it to become 
a post-racial society -- will shape the possible strategies available to 
individual political figures in describing their own history.  For all their 
theoretical (and empirical) complexity, an invocation of these common 
narratives is essential to understand the various strategies available to, and 
chosen by, the figures studied herein as they sought to articulate their 
shifting political positions. 
Finally, the present study makes a sharp distinction between 
support for legal segregation and social or economic segregation—
between, in other words, de jure and de facto segregation.  De jure 
segregation was largely dismantled by the end of the 1960s, with its legal 
underpinnings stripped away (both by the series of court cases descending 
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from the Brown ruling and by the various acts of Congress, in particular 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act), and by the 
intense, multifaceted efforts of the Civil Rights Movement to ensure the 
implementation of those legal changes.  In contrast, de facto segregation 
continues to the present as a major feature of American life, with many 
studies showing that (for example) schools are more segregated today, 
fifty years after the Brown decision, than they were at the time "separate 
but equal" was held to have no place in American education.  The 
remedies for de jure segregation are by now uncontroversial—no major 
political figures still hold that restaurants should be allowed to exclude 
African American customers, or that public schools should be allowed to 
segregate by race.  In contrast, however, the remedies for de facto 
segregation—busing, which tries to remedy the effects of segregated 
residential patterns by mixing student bodies from diverse areas, or 
affirmative action, which tries to remedy the effects on remaining social 
divisions by deliberately increasing minority presence in schools or 
jobs—remain distinctly controversial, with no political consensus in sight. 
Admittedly, the lines between de jure and de facto segregation are 
not always clear.  For example, the 1974 Supreme Court decision Milliken 
v. Bradley, which ruled that busing could not be legally required across 
city lines, certainly ruled against a method for dismantling de facto 
segregation, but it was also providing legal tools for anyone who wished 
to maintain such segregation, namely, the city lines themselves, which 
could serve (in concord with zoning laws and other legal structures) to 
legally perpetuate what was seen (in political terms) as de facto 
segregation.  The Court may have seen "evidence of de jure segregated 
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conditions only in the Detroit schools",18 and not in the surrounding 
suburbs, but it did not consider whether white flight to those suburbs was 
an attempt to use the legal existence of city lines to recreate now-
forbidden de jure segregation.  What the Court saw as merely de facto 
segregation is easily conceived of as simply a subtler form of de jure 
segregation. 
Yet the lines between de jure and de facto segregation, for all their 
theoretical complexity and arguable blurriness, are nevertheless crucial 
for this study because those are the lines that have been drawn within 
American political discourse.  Scholars might well argue that some 
seemingly de facto segregation was in fact upheld only through the use of 
legal tools, but this is not how the matter was understood in the broader 
American political conversation. By the end of the 1970s, if not before, 
these lines dividing the politically acceptable from the politically 
indefensible were well understood.  Segregation enforced explicitly as 
such—even by private parties—was anathema in most American political 
communities in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement; but segregation 
which arose out of past discrimination, or as the result of factors which 
were even arguably non-racial (such as income), was still well within the 
bounds of acceptable political discourse.  Efforts to overturn de facto 
segregation—or segregation which was at least popularly understood to 
be the result of private acts and which (unlike the professedly private 
segregation of public accommodations outlawed by the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act) was at least, on its face, describable in non-racial terms—remained 
within the bounds of the American political spectrum.  Indeed, efforts to 
                                                
18 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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dismantle such segregation, which included the busing of school children 
to increase racial diversity in public schools, and a broad spectrum of 
affirmative action programs, remained key points of political contestation 
throughout the 1970s and indeed through the rest of the twentieth century.  
In contrast, efforts to uphold de jure segregation, or even supposedly 
private segregation which was explicitly based upon race (such as white-
only public accommodations) were no longer acceptable positions in 
public discourse. 
In fact, the shift in political rhetoric was even more profound than 
this would suggest.  For the political assaults on proposed remedies for de 
facto segregation were usually couched in terms which derived from 
earlier battles against de jure segregation.  Those who argued against 
busing did to some degree keep old segregationist rhetoric about local 
control (transferred from the state level to that of the local school district), 
but there was also a newly expressed concern about racial categorization 
on the part of the state by those who had in the near past fought fiercely in 
favor of allowing those categorizations.  Opponents of Affirmative Action 
did not excoriate integration, but rather seized upon some of the most 
famous words of integration's most widely-known champion, and claimed 
that the imperative "not be judged by the color of their skin but by the 
content of their character" rendered Affirmative Action an immoral—
indeed, a discriminatory—remedy. 
In short, efforts to overturn de facto segregation were now attacked 
in terms derived from the Civil Rights Movement's incredibly successful 
assault on de jure segregation.  This may be the single most powerful 
indication of the magnitude of the shift in the political discourse brought 
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about by the Civil Rights Movement: so complete was its transformation 
that its latter-day opponents were obliged to argue against its ongoing 
moves by using the very rhetoric that the Movement itself had 
legitimized.  The Movement had won, at least in one small yet significant 
corner of the conversation; but those who opposed the proposed remedies 
for de facto segregation learned to express their new opposition in the 
terms established by the new political order. Instead of fighting over the 
propriety, legality and morality of legal segregation, the fight came to be 
framed in terms of what counted as legal segregation.  (Was an 
affirmative action program an attempt to counter segregation, or was it an 
example of it?)  The success of the Civil Rights Movement was such that 
all participants in the American political dialogue had come to agree that 
racial discrimination was wrong; the success of the conservative 
movement was to reframe proposed solutions to enduring racism as 
themselves racially discriminatory. 
It is the boundaries of this shift-- in which open expressions of 
support for racial segregation, undisguised by any alternate explanations 
providing plausible deniability—which the present study seeks to explore.  
For all the theoretical connections between de jure and de facto 
segregation that might be drawn, the distinction is at the very least held to 
be clear in American political discourse.  Proponents of Civil Rights 
might quite rightly bemoan the ongoing reality of segregation; scholars 
such as Dan Carter might unveil the subtle appeals to persistent racial 
stereotypes; but there nevertheless remained a distinct realm in which the 
efforts of the Civil Rights Movement were successful.  De jure 
segregation (as, despite the complexities referred to above, I shall 
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continue to term it) was no longer a political option for anyone who 
wished to remain within the mainstream of American political life.  
However small that success might seem to those studying the continued 
inequalities of American life, it nevertheless persisted, and posed a 
challenge to those who had formerly been on the wrong side of that now 
unbridgeable divide. 
Regardless of the unfinished nature of the journey, a certain 
distance has been definitively traveled.  Those late in making the trip were 
left to make their excuses, or to escape that necessity in one of various 
ways.  And it is to that squirming in the face of history's powerful, glacial 
movement that this study shall now turn. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
REPENTANCE, REALITY AND MEMORY: THE LONG AND 
WINDING RHETORICAL ROAD OF GEORGE C. WALLACE 
 
On January 14, 1963, George Wallace gave the most famous 
gubernatorial inaugural address of the Twentieth Century.1  Standing on 
the steps of the Alabama state capitol, George Wallace uttered the words 
that would catapult him to the status of the most prominent defender of 
segregation in the country:  
 
Today I have stood, where once Jefferson Davis stood, 
and took an oath to my people. It is very appropriate then 
that from this Cradle of the Confederacy, this very Heart 
of the Great Anglo-Saxon Southland, that today we 
sound the drum for freedom as have our generations of 
forebears before us done, time and time again through 
                                                
1 The literature on George Wallace is vast.  For my purposes, the two 
most useful biographies have been Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: 
George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the 
Transformation of American Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1995; Second Edition, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
2000), and Stephan Lesher, George Wallace: American Populist 
(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1994).  Jeff Frederick's Stand Up for 
Alabama: Governor George Wallace (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama 
Press, 2007), while admirably fulfilling its stated intension of addressing 
Wallace's governance as a balance to earlier emphases on his opposition 
to the Civil Rights Movement and his national political ambitions and 
influence, has been less useful to the present project.  Lloyd Rohler's 
George Wallace: Conservative Populist (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 
2004), in addition to providing a brief overview of Wallace's career, also 
reprints many of Wallace's important speeches and provides a useful 
chronology (albeit one covering thoroughly only dates up to the mid-
1970s). 
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history. Let us rise to the call of freedom-loving blood 
that is in us and send our answer to the tyranny that 
clanks its chains upon the South. In the name of the 
greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the 
line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of 
tyranny, and I say segregation now, segregation 
tomorrow, segregation forever!2 
Forever, for George Wallace, turned out to be approximately a decade.  In 
the early Seventies Wallace began retreating from his forceful stand 
supporting Jim Crow.  He moved by fits and starts from a position of 
aggressively advocating de jure segregation to one of apologizing for the 
harm he had caused by doing so.  At the end of his life, Wallace had gone 
farther than almost any other prominent pro-segregation politician in 
trying to articulate his regrets, expressing, ultimately, both his sorrow for 
the harm his stance and actions had caused, and support for the goals of 
those he had so forcefully opposed. 
But Wallace's transition to a rhetoric of apology was a long and 
slow one, a process filled with hedging, justifications and excuses.  
Wallace did not simply wake up one day and decide he had been wrong 
on the issue upon which he had staked his political career.  Rather, 
Wallace went through several different stages in dealing with his own 
past—stages which blurred into each other, early ones at times showing a 
prefiguration of later ones and later ones at time slipping into earlier 
                                                
2 Reprinted in Rohler, pp. 111-20; the cited passage is at p. 113.  The 
complete speech is also available on the official Alabama web site at 
www.archives.state.al.us/govs_list/inauguralspeech.html.  Interestingly, in 
the prepared version Wallace's infamous phrase begins with the words 
"segregation today" instead of the words he actually said, "segregation 
now".  I have cited the speech as delivered rather than as prepared. 
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modes—ending up at a strategy of forthright repentance, or at least 
something close to it. 
At the same time, Wallace's reputation for having apologized raced 
ahead of his actual articulations of regret.  This is not simply a case, such 
as will be seen with other figures examined in this study, of journalists 
and politicians describing a change of heart (or at least of rhetoric) in far 
more extravagant terms than the words and deeds of the figure actually 
warrant.  In Wallace's case, this distortion of memory occurred among the 
very people whom he had harmed, and to whom he had made his excuses.  
The desire to believe in Wallace's redemption was strong enough that 
people heard—or remembered—apologies of a type he had not (yet) 
made.  And since Wallace did move towards a position of apology (albeit 
slower, later, and with more caveats than he was credited for) his 
statements were in fact aided by the desire of his listeners to hear what he 
wanted them to.  Small hints were grasped as full-throated articulations; 
Wallace was soon seen as repentant—just as he, ultimately, wished to be 
seen. 
It is therefore too simple to say that Wallace apologized for having 
supported segregation, let alone that he in fact regretted doing so.3  
                                                
3 Even more than for other figures in this study, the question of whether 
Wallace was "really" sorry has been a recurring and pressing one—often 
linked with the question of whether or not Wallace was "really" a racist or 
supporter of segregation at all, or simply posed as one to achieve political 
power.  (Wallace's early record as a comparative liberal on race is 
frequently cited in this context.)  As always, this study will focus on the 
public words and deeds, not the unknowable hearts, of its case studies—
which is to say, that I don't know, and can't know, what Wallace "really" 
thought.  But it is notable that Wallace has inspired more curiosity and 
speculation on this front than most former segregation supporters—
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Wallace came to apology by way of many other rhetorical positions—
ones which continued to inform the specific articulations of his regrets.  
Wallace's position, in other words, remained, for many years, complex—
far more complex than either people wished to believe, or than he himself 
(ultimately) wished them to believe. 
One way to look at the various stages of Wallace's evolution is to 
see them as connected with the various campaigns he ran later in his life.  
In this understanding, Wallace's first stage is linked with his aborted 1972 
campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, as he sought to 
play down his past in preparation for a new run for national office.  
Wallace's second stage was linked with his two mid-seventies runs—those 
which occurred after Wallace's crippling shooting but before he 
abandoned his national political ambitions—namely, his successful race 
for re-election as Alabama governor in 1974 and his unsuccessful race for 
the Democratic presidential nomination in 1976.  The third stage of 
Wallace's regrets seemed to develop after not only his injury but also after 
it became clear to him that—because of various factors including not only 
the changed political climate of the mid-1970's but his own changed 
fortunes after Bremer's attempted assassination landed him in a 
wheelchair—he would never succeed in attaining national political office.  
(His considered but ultimately rejected notion of running for the Senate in 
1978 was the true last gasp of those ambitions.)  This stage is associated 
above all with Wallace's final (and, once again, successful) run for the 
                                                                                                                                       
presumably because repentance is always questionable, always suspect, 
being something that is both easily and profitably faked, whereas the other 
strategies used—denial, ambiguity, silence and so forth --- are ones where 
issues of sincerity do not naturally arise. 
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Alabama Governorship in 1982.  A fourth and final stage includes 
Wallace's post-political life, as his articulations of regret lost some of their 
hedging and caveats, as his historical reputation and looming mortality 
began to make their presence felt in his apologetics. 
This reality is at odds with the narrative as it has come to be 
remembered.  Wallace is remembered simply for repentance: this is often 
portrayed as a full, sudden conversion, the result of a road-to-Damascus-
style seeing of the light; even more, it is portrayed as a total conversion, a 
complete repudiation of his earlier positions.  Often in this telling 
Wallace's conversion is believed to be a result of the life-altering injuries 
that Wallace sustained during the attempt on his life by Arthur Bremer on 
May 15, 1972. 
This narrative arose from a collaborative effort on the part both of 
Wallace and his listeners, particularly sympathetic ones in the African-
American community, who found it easier to hear a narrative of fast 
conversion than slow and unsteady revision.  In fact, the primary "author" 
of this narrative was in fact an audience so eager to see repentance and 
grant absolution, since Wallace himself, in actually expressing his sorrow 
and regrets, never really told a story of sudden and overwhelming regret.  
That the narrative of sudden repentance fit nicely into the cultural model 
of Christianity shared by both Wallace and his sympathetic audience 
simply enhanced this easy, if overly simplistic, embrace.  
In truth, Wallace's turn away from his defiant cry in favor of 
"segregation forever!" did not fit comfortably into this narrative of 
Christian repentance.  Contrary to popular memory, Wallace's attempts to 
justify (rather than reiterate) his support for segregation did not begin with 
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the 1972 attempt on his life and the lifelong disabilities that resulted from 
it.  Rather, the first stage of Wallace's retreat in fact began more than a 
year earlier, after Wallace's 1970 gubernatorial election campaign—which 
was perhaps the nastiest that Wallace ever waged—and lasted up until his 
May 15, 1972 shooting.  This earliest stage of Wallace's distancing 
himself from his past was not couched in the language of regret, but rather 
in a denial of his past's true nature.  At first, rather than apologizing for 
his segregationist past, Wallace denied that it was racially motivated or 
hurtful.  In other words, at first, while admitting that he no longer 
supported segregation, Wallace continued to defend the reasonableness of 
having done so. 
Yet even saying that these denials were the first stage of Wallace's 
retreat is somewhat misleading.  For even while Wallace was still a 
professed segregationist he denied both that he was a racist and that his 
pro-segregationist stance was in any way racially motivated.  This was, of 
course, a time-honored move for pro-segregation politicians in the final 
decades of Jim Crow, once racism had become sufficiently widely 
questioned that simply professing it had become impolitic.  A whole 
arsenal of standard non-racial reasons for supporting segregation had been 
assembled, from a support for "states' rights" and federalism to the 
supposed Communist roots of the push towards integration, and Wallace 
indulged in all of these defenses. 
There is, in other words, a continuum between the kinds of things 
Wallace was saying—at least to a national audience—in the late Sixties 
and the sorts of things he began saying after his 1970 election as 
governor.  In the earlier period he claimed to support segregation, but 
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denied that his motives were racial; in the latter period he (generally) 
claimed to no longer support segregation, and denied that his motives for 
having formerly supported it were racial.  (As will be discussed below, he 
did on occasion deny ever having supported segregation at all, but usually 
he simply claimed to have done so out of benevolent motives, and to have 
changed his mind.) 
This does not mean that his stance from 1970 to 1972 was simply 
identical to his earlier stance—hence the importance of seeing it as the 
first stage in Wallace's attempt to distance himself from his past.  Wallace 
was beginning to try to move away from his image as a proponent of 
racial divide in contrast to earlier, when he was simply trying to justify 
that image.  But it is important to keep his early 70's views as part of a 
rhetorical continuum with his pro-segregationist stance.  In the early 70's, 
Wallace denied he had been a racist, and said he no longer supported 
segregation; a few years earlier Wallace had denied he was a racist, and 
supported segregation.  Much of his vaunted new rhetoric in the early 70's 
was simply a case of him altering the emphases in otherwise similar 
statements. 
Similar to some of his rhetoric, the sort that he used when putting 
the best face on his record for the national press: Wallace had always been 
notable for the vehemence and anger in his speeches, and that did indeed 
wane after the 1970 gubernatorial election.  That part of Wallace's 
rhetorical shift was very real indeed.  But what he said was continuous 
with other things that he had said before, even if it was not continuous 
with all the sorts of things he had said before.  Wallace's first move was to 
more loudly trumpet long-held rhetorical positions, adding to them a 
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small—and, as he presented it, almost technical—detail, that he no longer 
supported de jure segregation.  Wallace's distortions of his past, in brief, 
began long before he attempted to distance himself from his segregationist 
position at all. 
A good example of the sort of denial Wallace practiced even before 
he gave up advocating for segregation as a specific political stance can be 
found in the 1968 assemblage of his positions on various issues, "Hear 
Me Out".4  The book consisted of quotes from earlier in Wallace's 
career—largely from the previous few years—grouped under headings 
ranging from "Alabama" to "Wealth".  Obviously, in crafting this attempt 
to promote his views to a national audience, Wallace selected the quotes 
that he wished to be most widely known; thus this book is a good example 
of the presentation which he felt put a positive face on his record to date. 
It is therefore unsurprising that in his 1968 book Wallace reprinted 
some of his repeated denials that he was a racist.  Under the heading 
"racism", for instance, Wallace reiterated three separate denials of his own 
racism, one from 1967 and two from 1964: 
 
I've never made a racist speech in my life.  (1967)5 
 
Life is too short to dislike people because of their race, 
color, creed or national origin and I would feel sorry for a 
person who dislikes a man for his color if he were to die 
                                                
4 George C. Wallace, "Hear Me Out".  (Anderson, S.C.: Droke House, 
1968).  The quotation marks in the title are in the original. 
5 Wallace, 1968, p. 119.  As in all further citations from this work, I have 
substituted a simple date for Wallace's fuller citation of the quotation's 
original source. Additionally, in the original every quotation in the book is 
preceded by an ellipsis, which I have in most cases omitted. 
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at this moment because I think he wouldn't have a nice 
after-life. (1964)6 
 
No one voted for me in the 1964 Presidential primary 
who is anti-Negro.  I am not myself, and I ran no such 
campaign, nor have I ever run a campaign that was anti-
Negro. (1964)7 
Similar remarks can be found elsewhere in the book; Wallace's denial of 
his own racism (as well as denials of any hatred, bigotry and similar 
characteristics) was a major theme in this work.  It is perhaps worth 
noting that in addition to denying his own racism, he in fact denied that 
any of his 1964 supporters were motivated by racism.  As was typical of 
this particular sort of defense of segregationist views, Wallace ended up 
defining racism so narrowly—and refusing so resolutely to see what 
would fit under even so restrictive a definition—that he more or less 
denied its existence. 
But these denials of both his own racism and that of his supporters 
does not mean that Wallace had given up open advocacy for segregation; 
quite the contrary.  Indeed, just below the three quotes under the "racism" 
heading cited above, Wallace gave a fourth quote—once again from 
1964—under a subheading for "racism ...and segregation."  On the 
relation of racism to segregation, Wallace quoted himself as follows: 
 
A racist is one who despises someone because of his 
color, and an Alabama segregationist is one who 
conscientiously believes that it is in the best interest of 
                                                
6 Ibid., p. 120. 
7 Ibid., p. 120. 
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Negro and white to have a separate educational and 
social order.  (1964)8 
This is, as noted, in line with the broad rhetorical shift in which (largely 
post-war) segregationists found it expedient to defend their policy not 
simply as favoring whites, but as best for African Americans as well.  Nor 
was Wallace shy about describing himself as one of those (supposedly 
non-racist) Alabama segregationists: 
 
Of course I believe in segregation.  Everybody does 
when you get right down to it.9 
 
...I am an Alabama segregationist because we have 
found, as have others in other parts of the nation and 
world, that race-mixing where there are large numbers of 
each race simply does not work in the interest of 
anyone.10 
In other sections, however, Wallace emphasized that his segregationist 
beliefs were not ones he intended to export: 
 
I believe in segregation all right, but I believe in 
segregation here in Alabama.  What New York wants to 
do, that's New York's business.  Same for Ohio.  Same 
for Louisiana.  Let folks decide for themselves.  I don't 
care whether the owner of a restaurant serves Negroes or 
doesn't serve them.  It's his business.  Just don't make him 
look after customers in his own place against his will.11 
Similar remarks pepper the book.  Wallace returned to these themes—
often in nearly-identical wording over and over, reiterating his claims that 
he's not a racist, that segregation is best for both races—at least in 
                                                
8 Ibid., p. 120. 
9 Ibid., p. 132. 
10 Ibid., p. 132; ellipsis mine (I have omitted the first half of the passage). 
11 Ibid., p. 131. 
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Alabama.  In addition to this overt support for segregation, Wallace 
devoted a lot of his book to forthright attacks on the instruments of de 
jure integration.  More pages were devoted to the topic "Civil Rights 
Bill"—more than ten pages of various denunciations—than practically 
any topic in the book.  While parading his claims of racial benevolence, 
Wallace was simultaneously emphatic about both supporting de jure 
segregation and decrying the legal means of its dismantling. 
The point is that while Wallace was still aggressively defending 
Alabama's right to a segregated society in 1968, and still vigorously 
attacking the legal instruments of de jure integration (as well as those of 
de facto integration such as busing), Wallace already was busy 
emphasizing the purity of his motives and denying any racial motivation 
not only to himself but to his supporters. 
Thus after his 1970 gubernatorial race, when Wallace began to 
openly support (de jure) integration in schools—or, rather, to accept the 
change that had occurred as permanent—this was not as big a shift as it 
might at first blush appear.  This is not to deny that Wallace's rhetoric 
changed significantly.  As biographer Dan Carter related, 
 
Less than a month before his inauguration in early 1971, 
[Wallace] told the National Press Club that he had 
"always been a moderate" and no longer believed 
segregation was desirable.  The nation, he told his 
audience, "ought to have non-discrimination in public 
schools" as well as "public accommodations open to 
all."12 
                                                
12 Carter, p. 417. 
 38 
Obviously Wallace had already begun changing his proclaimed views: as 
early as 1971 he disclaimed support for the segregation that he recently 
championed.  But there is little sign that Wallace saw anything wrong 
with his recently-abandoned stances.  He was still far from saying that 
what he had said and done was wrong.  He had changed his fundamental 
position—but in a way that bowed to the inevitable, rather than signaled 
any regret.  If Wallace was moving towards a stance of remorse—whether 
for political reasons, personal reasons, or both—he was doing so slowly.  
As of his 1972 run for the presidency, Wallace no longer called for 
"segregation forever", but he made no apologies for having done so, 
either.  He had simply accepted the changed political reality. 
And this was made easier by the fact that the political effects he had 
created—the anger he stirred up and transmuted into political support—
were now achievable by other means.  Wallace's 1972 campaign turned its 
focus away from the issues of de jure segregation, whose appeal was 
regionally limited, which for all its attraction to some whites turned off 
many white voters as well, and which was hard to defend on the 
purportedly non-racial grounds which Wallace increasingly sought to 
articulate; in its place, however, Wallace's campaign focused on 
opposition to measures designed to remedy de facto integration—
primarily the busing of school children to prevent segregated residential 
patterns from leading to de facto segregated schools.  Opposition to 
busing provided Wallace many of the political benefits of his earlier 
segregationist stances, with few of the downsides: it was still respectable, 
it appealed to white voters across the country (and even to some non-
white ones), and it could be more convincingly argued for in rhetoric of 
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local power and anti-big-government stances which Wallace had earlier 
used to try to justify (to less friendly audiences) his segregationist stances.  
And, indeed, Wallace had considerable political success with this issue; 
Wallace's crucial success in the Florida primary was based largely upon 
his opposition to busing.13 
Wallace formally abandoned de jure segregation in the early 1970's 
because he had found something just as effective for his political career, 
something which retained respectability in far more quarters: opposition 
to de facto integration.  His rhetoric in support of one slid easily into his 
rhetoric in opposition to the other.  Had not Arthur Bremer's assassination 
attempt effectively ended Wallace's 1972 campaign, Wallace would 
probably have had continued success with the rhetoric he had employed 
for the previous decade. 
 
In later years, Wallace would often trace his repentance of his prior 
record on segregation to his crippling wounding at the hands of Arthur 
Bremer.  But as we have just seen, Wallace ceased proclaiming his 
support for segregation even before the attack.  And conversely, in the 
early years following Bremer's assassination attempt—particularly in the 
years between that and Wallace's last run for national office, in the 1976 
Democratic primary race—Wallace's regrets were expressed in a much 
more measured way than they would be in later years.  Wallace's claims 
about segregation in the mid-seventies at times included a certain 
                                                
13 Jody Carlson, George C. Wallace and the Politics of Powerlessness: the 
Wallace Campaigns for the Presidency, 1964 - 1976.  (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books, 1981), p. 160.  See more generally Carlson, chapters 
ten to twelve. 
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measured expression of regret, but they were far more focused on 
defenses of having held that position than apologies for it.  As was true in 
his articulations of his position in the pre-Bremer years, Wallace was still 
engaged in a sort of denial—denying not the fact of his earlier pro-
segregationist stances, but rather the racism behind them.  Bremer's 
bullets did not influence his position—at least not in the first few years 
after they lodged in his spine.14 
To be sure, many of Wallace's acts were unspoken 
acknowledgments of a change in stance.  He met with interracial school 
groups; he crowned an African American as homecoming queen of the 
University of Alabama.15  He began appointing African Americans to 
governmental positions in Alabama, and making a larger effort to be 
responsive to his African-American constituents.  To a large extent 
Wallace did not need to say he was sorry, because his changed behavior 
communicated that to people without his needing to say it—indeed, 
regardless of whether, asked directly, he would have said it. 
                                                
14 The fact that Wallace's change in rhetoric did not occur until a number 
of years after his shooting does not mean, of course, that the latter had no 
role in it.  In addition to the daily difficulty of life in a wheelchair, 
Wallace had to endure daily pain due to the effect of Bremer's bullets.  So 
his attribution of his change of heart to his suffering, and the increased 
empathy it brought him, is certainly believable, even if delayed, since the 
suffering continued.  After it played a role in ending his national political 
ambitions (which, of course, might have been curtailed even without it by 
the change in the political culture—but this is, naturally, a hard thing for a 
politician to admit to himself), after his divorce from his second wife, 
perhaps Wallace's ongoing pain and consciousness of his own mortality 
turned his mind to mistakes of the past.  But they certainly did not do so 
right away, nor all at once. 
15 Carter, p. 417; Lesher, caption to photo page (between pp. 365 - 365). 
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Still, it is instructive to look at what Wallace did say about his past 
in the mid-1970's on those occasions when he was asked directly. 
One telling example of Wallace's stance as of the mid-1970's is the 
1974 interview conducted with him as part of the "Documenting the 
American South" series of oral histories, housed at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.16  In many ways, this would seem to be a 
forum designed to emphasize any expression of Wallace's regrets—
particularly if those regrets had become a recurring part of his articulated 
world view, and not a one-off expression brought on by the contingencies 
of a particular moment.  It was an interview declaredly aimed at history; it 
was a setting conducive to reflection and measured words; it was without 
the pressures of a campaign appearance.17  But despite a great many 
questions about his past words and actions regarding segregation and race, 
Wallace did not express any regrets about his pro-segregation stances in 
that interview, and he expressed only extremely mild regret about any of 
the specifics of his record on the issue. 
For the most part, Wallace's stance in the interview continued to be 
one of denial—not in the sense of denying having supported segregation 
at all, but rather denying that there was any racial component to the 
                                                
16 George Wallace, interviewed by Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, 
Documenting the American South, University Library, The University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, July 15, 1974.  Accessible online at: 
http://docsouth.unc.edu/sohp/A-0024/A-0024.html. 
17 To be sure, it was during Wallace's re-election campaign for Governor.  
And certainly certain campaign settings—specifically, appearances before 
primarily African American audiences—would be even more conducive 
to apologies, albeit of a different sort and in a different mode.  (One such 
circumstance will be examined shortly.)  But this was close to ideal for 
careful, reflective regrets. 
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stances he took.  For example, in response to the question of whether he 
was surprised by getting some black support in his 1974 gubernatorial 
race, Wallace replied: 
 
...there was nothing I ever said during the times of '63 or 
'64 that would offend anybody because of his race. 
Unless, being for the system that had existed for so long, 
our school system . . . if that offended you, being for that, 
then you'd be offended. But as far as getting up and 
talking about people. . . . I've never talked about 
inferiority. I never talked about anybody had less rights 
than others. Talked about every citizen's entitled to equal 
rights under the constitution of Alabama and under the 
constitution of the United States. And I was not 
surprised.18 
Wallace not only did not apologize for or regret his earlier stances, not 
only said that no one should have been offended by his words, but he 
came very close to saying that no one was offended by his words.  Surely 
even if Wallace (at the time or in 1974) thought that they were right, he 
had to know that things he said in '63 and '64 were offensive on racial 
grounds?  Similarly, Wallace simultaneously dismissed people who were 
offended by "our school system", and claimed to have "talked about every 
citizen's entitled to equal rights under the constitution of Alabama and 
under the constitution of the United States", as if there weren't the obvious 
contradiction that, according to the Supreme Court, an integrated school 
system was integral to those equal constitutional rights.  Far from 
expressing regrets, Wallace's claim that "I've never talked about 
inferiority" was, in fact, continuous with standard defenses of 
                                                
18 Wallace interview, op. cit., p. 11.  All ellipses save the first in the 
original. 
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segregation—not least his own earlier ones—in taking "separate but 
equal" at face value.  Wallace was not apologizing here, but rather 
offering a continued defense of Jim Crow. 
A second example shows a similar dynamic at work.  Wallace 
replied to a question about whether racial politics in Alabama had 
changed during his political career by denying that the politics he had 
practiced was racial at all: 
 
And just like in 1963, my opposition to the take over of 
the public school system and the University of Alabama 
was not motivated as much by race as you think, but by 
big government. Actually the taking over of the 
Congressional district, redistricting, and legislative 
districts. That's not racial. That's purely political because 
I have no objections. I think it's good for blacks to serve 
in the legislature. But nobody could get elected to office 
in Alabama during the time that I ran getting up talking 
against people because of their color. He could get up 
and be elected talking about the [federal] government 
trying to take over and run everything in your state when 
the good white and black people of this state ought to 
make some of the decisions themselves. Now you can 
call that race if you want to and it probably did have a 
racial tinge, but for a man to get up and say "I am against 
people because of this race," you didn't get anywhere in 
politics in the days that I was coming up in politics.19 
Admittedly there is a slight hedge to this that Wallace might not have 
offered a few years before, when he conceded that his stance "probably 
did have a racial tinge" (although note that even here Wallace distanced 
himself from this by talking of an abstract, hypothetical "he"—referring 
back to how someone in general might get elected).  And he expressed 
                                                
19 Ibid., p. 14. 
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support for the Warren Court's redistricting decisions and the increased 
African American presence in the legislature that they engendered, which 
he probably would not have done a few years before. 
Nevertheless, the dominant tone in Wallace's answer was to retreat 
to the claim that his actions were about big government, not segregation.  
He claimed that "nobody could get elected to office in Alabama during 
the time that I ran getting up talking against people because of their 
color," as if he had not himself been elected on strategies of racial 
backlash.  Granted, it is quite possible that, under the most generous 
possible interpretation of Wallace's words—understanding "talking 
against people because of their color" as equivalent to "for a man to get up 
and say 'I am against people because of this race,'"—that Wallace didn't 
do, precisely, that.  But this is simply to so narrowly and so tendentiously 
define racism as to all but define it away in the post-war period.  "I am 
against people because of their race" was simply not the typical language 
used by those who spoke in favor of Jim Crow, nor who appealed to 
voters on a racial basis, in the decades following World War II.  It 
required a studied ignorance, a deliberate blindness, to imagine that that is 
all that might be said. 
And, indeed, define away racism was precisely what Wallace tried 
to do in this interview.  At one point, Wallace sought to characterize 
himself as non-racist by equating himself with some of the most forceful 
proponents of Jim Crow from the era.  (It is worth noting that this comes 
in response to a question about the infamous incident from 1965 in which 
Alabama State Troopers beat and gassed Civil Rights protesters 
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attempting to cross the Edmund Pettus Bridge out of Selma, and not about 
his general reputation or attitudes.)  Wallace complained: 
 
You people all consider Sen[ator] Richard Russell and 
Spessard Holland and Farris Bryant and Kenneth 
McKeller and Walter George and Herman Talmadge and 
and [sic] Fulbright and you name them. Hooey, Sam 
Ervin. You all consider them non racist types of southern 
politicians. And everything that I have ever said, they 
said it before I did. And many of the things I said, I got it 
from them. So why is it that I am the one who is 
something that they aren't when they are the ones that 
started it and said it first? And even stronger.20 
But most of those who complained about Wallace's history would have 
considered those men to be quite culpable, even if not all of them were 
quite at Wallace's level.  Wallace clearly felt he was being singled out 
here—which was, seemingly, the motive for this answer; yet it showed a 
willful ignorance of the larger context of the Civil Rights struggle.  
Wallace listed prominent supporters of segregation as "non racist types of 
southern politicians," and presumed that his interviewers would agree.  
Whatever his actions, Wallace continued to insist that he wasn't a racist.  
(It was this sort of claim that caused a "white Alabama politician" to say, 
a year later, that "If George Wallace ain't a racist, then thank God we got 
nothing to worry about, 'cause there just ain't any in this whole country. In 
fact, there ain't any such thing as a racist—they don't exist, like 
unicorns."21)  The implication of this particular claim of Wallace's is that, 
as of 1974, he did not see support for segregation as anything to apologize 
                                                
20 Ibid., pp. 15 - 16 
21 Cited in Marshall Frady, "The Return of George Wallace", The New 
York Review of Books, October 30, 1975. 
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for—and didn't even see it as anything that others would regard as 
requiring apology. 
At one point, in fact, Wallace questioned the degree to which the 
South was segregated at all.  Asked if he thought the days of segregation 
were over, Wallace replied: 
 
Well, we never had segregation in the sense that we had 
separation ever. We had segregation in the school system 
but we didn't have it in working conditions. We didn't 
have it in where we lived. Always did live close together 
but they did have. . . . Yes, there will be no more 
segregated schools in the sense of compulsory 
segregation. There may be segregation by choice in some 
places. That is, some blacks may want to go to schools 
that are for blacks and some whites vice versa and all of 
that. But no, no more legal. . .22 
Wallace was claiming that segregation was essentially a matter of 
schools—and not working or living conditions—an assertion that would 
certainly have been challenged by those who lived under Jim Crow in its 
heyday.  It is difficult to reconcile this level of denial (or ignorance) about 
the reality of segregation with any meaningful sense of regret about 
supporting it.  For that matter, in Wallace's rather disjointed claim that 
"There may be segregation by choice in some places. That is, some blacks 
may want to go to schools that are for blacks and some whites vice versa 
and all of that," one can hear an echo of his 1968 claim that "everybody" 
believes in segregation "when you get right down to it"—itself a version 
                                                
22 Wallace interview, op. cit., pp. 40-41.  Both ellipses are in the original; 
in both cases the sentence fragments are due to Wallace's leaving a 
thought unfinished. 
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of the old segregationist claim that segregation was natural and desired by 
both races. 
It is important to emphasize the fact that Wallace had, in fact, 
changed his position somewhat.  "There will be no more segregated 
schools in the sense of compulsory segregation" is a far cry from 
"segregation forever", even if Wallace is not quite articulating an apology 
for the latter.  Wallace in 1974 recognized the reality of the end of de jure 
segregation in a way that he had not done even half a decade before, and 
did not call for its return.  But he showed no remorse for his past support 
of it, and clearly did not recognize the social reality of the system that he 
had so prominently fought for. 
Nor had Wallace yet arrived at the idea that the suffering brought 
upon him by Arthur Bremer's gun had changed his mind about his support 
for segregation.  Tellingly, though, that notion was around, since it was 
raised by the interviewers.  One of the interviewers said to Wallace: 
 
Some people have said that you, having undergone an 
experience very, very few people go through, and have 
survived it and have overcome a great deal of adversity, 
that that has resulted in some change in your own 
outlook, particularly on racial matters.23 
Thus in 1974 the story of Wallace's redemptive suffering was already 
widespread enough for him to be asked about.  It was not yet, however, a 
story that Wallace himself had embraced, since his response to the 
question was not to speak of how his injuries had changed his mind, but 
rather to once again deny that he had anything in particular to apologize 
for: 
                                                
23 Ibid., p. 27. 
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Well, I don't know where people. . . . I'm not a 
psychologist or psychiatrist and all of that. So it's hard 
for me to tell what's on your subconscious mind or my 
subconscious mind. My conscious mind . . . I never have 
been, prior to being shot, anti-anybody. In fact I was 
raised in the religious atmosphere. And even though I 
admit that when I was a youth the attitude toward certain 
people was paternalistic because they needed help. Lack 
of education and so forth. They needed help. Of course 
now we have the government trying to be paternalistic to 
everybody. I don't know which is better. But there never 
was any. . . . And I can understand how people today 
would reject the paternalism. It's not needed any more 
because of the advent of educational opportunities for 
people of all races and the economic upsurge in the South 
that's brought about opportunities for more than a few. 
But I wasn't raised that way. I was raised with black and 
white people living and playing together, close to one 
another. We had a different social order, no question 
about that. But it wasn't hypocritical. It was honest. 
That's the least you can say about us. It was honest. It 
wasn't dishonest, like it is in Washington today, where 
they all get up and spout children over to an exclusive 
private school in Montgomery county, Maryland.24 
The closest Wallace got to an apology in this answer was his admitting 
that "when I was a youth the attitude toward certain people was 
paternalistic because they needed help": he "admits", in other words, that 
the attitude towards African Americans in his youth was too helpful.  And 
said that he "can understand how people today would reject the 
paternalism".  This is not an apology for segregation, but a defense of it.  
(Paternalism was, in fact, one of the rather standard defenses of 
segregation.)  It is a defense which argues that segregation's time has 
                                                
24 Ibid., p. 28. 
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passed—"it's not needed any more"—but a defense none the less.  He 
presented the world of his childhood as a sort of prelapsarian racial 
paradise, talking about how he "was raised with black and white people 
living and playing together, close to one another."  Granted, this lacks the 
anger of Wallace's 1960's defenses of segregation; but it is nevertheless 
decidedly in the mainstream of post-war defenses of Jim Crow.  Wallace 
recognized that the system is gone—"We had a different social order, no 
question about that"—but he turned this around to mount an attack on the 
hypocrisy of liberals who simply won't admit their own racial biases. 
After speaking for a while about the hypocrisies of liberals and his 
efforts to help African Americans, Wallace returned to the question of 
whether his injuries had changed his views: 
 
I do know that when you get shot and face death and 
almost die that you do understand the frailty of human 
life. And it makes you more compassionate toward those 
who suffer. And you understand now, today, better than I 
did before what a fellow goes through when he's short of 
money and he's a paraplegic or quadriplegic or when he's 
a tubercular. When he's crippled and when he can't get a 
job. So I've started some programs. I started a program 
quietly in 1973 in the legislature for teams to go out and 
teach people how to look after folks in my shape. You 
know, because they've been sort of neglected because 
there's so few of them, comparatively speaking. But 
black ministers prayed for me in Alabama just like white 
ministers prayed for me. And they were upset, too, about 
my being shot. And I appreciate that very much because I 
probably got as many prayers from black churches as 
white churches. And I won't say that that changed my 
attitude, because my attitude never was anti. Because 
that's contrary to my religious upbringing. But I suppose 
that I can better sympathize with the plight of anybody 
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that happens to be unfortunate better than I used to. I 
used to see a man in a wheel chair. I knew he suffered, 
but I didn't know . . . I just knew it abstractly, you know. 
In my mind. But I didn't feel it.25 
Wallace here admitted that he now empathizes more with "a man in a 
wheel chair" than he did before; but the emphasis was on the support he 
received from African Americans when he was injured, and the fact that 
"I won't say that that changed my attitude, because my attitude never was 
anti."  Rather than a question about his own suffering eliciting empathy 
for the suffering of African Americans under Jim Crow, Wallace instead 
repeated many elements of his standard defenses of segregation.  Aside 
from his own sense of mortality, the empathy expressed in this passage 
was for people in situations parallel to Wallace's own—"paraplegic[s] or 
quadriplegic[s] or when he's a tubercular," with the added compassion for 
the 'little guy'—someone who's "short of money" or "can't get a job"—a 
compassion that in Wallace's earlier career had always been limited to 
poor whites.  As of 1974, Wallace's injuries were used to confirm more 
than change his old views.  
A more specific interplay of denial and (extremely limited) apology 
can be seen in Wallace's account of the 1965 clash at the Edmund Pettus 
Bridge.  After his off-topic opening (cited above), Wallace addressed the 
incident as follows: 
 
But the Selma bridge. The Selma bridge was an 
unfortunate incident. No use to talk about it now. It 
wasn't handled the way I wanted it handled. My only 
concern about marching at that time was the distance 
between here and Selma and the report I got informed me 
                                                
25 Ibid., p. 29. 
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that I did not have enough personnel to guarantee 
maximum safety, including the numbers and vehicles and 
so forth and the cars. And I wanted to delay until I could 
get sufficient forces. And I had to get them from the 
federal government. To guarantee absolute safety. 
Because I did not want anybody hurt on that march. In 
the Selma bridge incident nobody got hurt. Nobody had 
to go to the hospital.26 
Informed by one of the interviewers that people were indeed hurt at the 
Selma Bridge, Wallace (who failed to recognize the name of John Lewis) 
expressed his surprise.  He then concluded: 
 
. . . the bridge confrontation could have been handled 
differently exactly like it was. But actually the troopers 
were worried about them getting across the river where 
there was a group of . . . people . . . antagonists on the 
other side and were trying to keep them from getting over 
there. Because they thought if they did get over there and 
got tied up, they couldn't get them separated.  27 
Wallace said that the "Selma bridge... wasn't handled the way I 
wanted it handled"; but he nevertheless focused on a defense of his 
actions—one that is based in part on a fundamental ignorance of the 
actual events as they played out.  Wallace's regrets here were limited, and 
clearly lack the expressed force of his defense of his actions, upon which 
he spends far more verbal energy.  The errors were largely others' doing; 
he was simply trying to protect people.  The reality of his attempt to stop 
what was (it was clear by 1974 if not at the time) the climactic march of 
the Civil Rights Movement was lost in his defense of his actions. 
                                                
26 Ibid., p. 16. 
27 Ibid., p. 17.  Ellipses in the original. 
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As if to cement Wallace's lack of regrets about his past stances on 
segregation, one of the interviewers asked him, towards the end of the 
interview, if he had any regrets about his past, broadly speaking.  
Wallace—after first quipping that he regretted getting shot—replied as 
follows: 
 
Oh yes . . . when I say regrets . . . I don't have any 
regrets. I have made mistakes. I haven't been perfect and 
there would be things I would do differently. I don't 
know that I could categorize them all now. I've been a 
human and I've made errors and I've made mistakes. If 
hindsight . . . if foresight was as good as hindsight, I 
would have made a better governor. 
Pressed further to name some mistakes, his sole example was "maybe not 
carrying the press around with me in '68 in the presidential campaign.  
Maybe not letting them go on the airplane with me."  In other words, 
support for segregation was simply not among Wallace's regrets in 1974. 
 
Wallace's remarks in the oral history interview support historian 
Dan Carter's interpretation of Wallace's famous 1974 visit to the Dexter 
Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, the church for which Martin 
Luther King was pastor.  Carter notes that there is a real disjunction 
between people's memories of Wallace's visit, and contemporary press 
accounts.  Carter describes the popular memory of Wallace's visit as 
stemming from the fact that "most Alabamians—most Americans—willed 
[Wallace's] redemption".28 Carter writes: 
 
                                                
28 Carter, p. 462. 
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In later years, that historic occasion still echoed in the 
memories of those present and those who had only heard 
of the event secondhand.  The Charlotte Observer 
described what it called the former governor's 
"impromptu" appearance at Martin Luther King's old 
church in Montgomery and described how Wallace had 
related his own suffering to the sufferings of black people 
and asked for their forgiveness. 
 "When he came in, in his wheelchair, it was an event 
that I shall never forget," remembered Dr. Dickerson 
twenty years after the event.  "He [Wallace] said some 
things there that some thought he would not ever say... 
People stood—blacks and whites—and cried.... I thought 
it was a time of healing." 
 Such is the power of memory.29 
If, indeed, Wallace had made such a plea, it would have been a real 
departure from his otherwise quite measured remarks on his own 
segregationist past from the time.  Yet as Carter notes, there is every 
reason to think that this event has been distorted by popular memory: 
 
Contemporary newspaper accounts tell a somewhat 
different story.  Far from being unannounced, the 
Wallace visit was a carefully choreographed media event 
with print and television reporters present.  John Cochran 
covered the occasion for NBC.  News accounts gave no 
hint that Wallace explicitly asked for forgiveness.  He 
simply stated what was, at that time, his standard line: 
His remarks about segregation had all been 
misunderstood.  He had stood in the schoolhouse door 
because of his commitment to states' rights, not because 
of any racist feelings.30 
Carter is, if anything, understating the matter.  The news reports in local 
newspapers were brief—one a squib, the other a page-thirty story of 
                                                
29 Ibid.  First ellipses in the original. 
30 Ibid., pp. 462 - 463. 
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merely a few paragraphs.  The former described Wallace as merely 
"giving a welcoming address."31  The latter describes Wallace as having 
"attended services", been the "keynote speaker" at the Progressive Baptist 
State Convention (which was the event which the Dexter Avenue Baptist 
Church was hosting during Wallace's visit), and quotes him directly as 
saying that he was the "governor of all Alabamians."32  It is almost 
unimaginable that if Wallace had asked for forgiveness, even in a cursory 
way (let alone in the dramatic fashion that some present later recalled) 
that these reporters would have failed to mention it.  The articles were 
clearly describing what was—for Wallace at the time—a fairly ordinary 
speech. 
Which is not to deny that Wallace's speech was made in a rather 
extraordinary venue.  This is, unsurprisingly, the focus of the news 
articles at the time—the longer of which is centered around the history of 
the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church, the political fortunes of, and the 
violent attacks upon, both King and Wallace, and the visit itself as a sign 
of changing times.  And it is certainly true that the symbolism of 
Wallace's visit was stark.  It is even arguable that his mere presence 
conveyed as powerfully as words could—certainly more powerfully than 
his actual words from the time did—his changed position as of the mid-
70's.  But it seems that it was his presence, not his words or deeds while 
there, that was remarkable. 
                                                
31 The Montgomery Advertiser, November 7, 1974, p. 2. 
32 Ralph Holmes, "Dexter Avenue Church Has Seen Big Changes in 18 
Years", The Birmingham News, November 7, 1974, p. 30. 
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It is worth noting in this context Wallace's own description of the 
event, as recorded two years later in his campaign memoir Stand Up For 
Alabama.  Wallace mentioned the visit in the context of a passage 
defending his consistency over time (see below)—citing it as an example 
of continuity, not change.  In describing the event, Wallace wrote: 
 
The pastor of the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in 
Montgomery invited me to speak.  It was not a civil-
rights meeting but a worship service.  I expressed my 
thanks to the pastor and to the congregation for their 
prayers when my condition was delicate.  In order to 
avoid turning the meeting into a press show, I 
deliberately did not notify the press.33 
Certainly, if Wallace had asked for, and received, forgiveness, this is 
something he would have wished to trumpet to a national audience whose 
suspicions of his racist past formed one of the central barriers to Wallace's 
national political ambitions—a national audience which was the target of 
this 1976 work; it is nearly unimaginable that Wallace would have instead 
downplayed such an event.  Wallace's own account supports that of the 
newspapers of the time: his words at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church 
were unremarkable; he did not apologize for his earlier actions on that 
occasion. 
It's worth noting that Wallace's visit occurred the day after his 1974 
reelection to the Alabama governorship.  This timing was presumably 
                                                
33 George C. Wallace, Stand Up For America.  (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday & Co., 1976), p. 177. Wallace's claim that he "did not notify 
the press" is doubtful in the light of the coverage of the events in 
newspapers and on television, although it is at least possible that the press 
was notified by someone connected with Dexter Avenue Baptist Church 
rather than Wallace himself. 
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dictated by the scheduling of the Progressive Baptist State Convention—
the event which occasioned Wallace's visit to the Dexter Avenue Baptist 
Church—rather than by any political calculations on Wallace's part.  
Nevertheless, the timing affects the meaning of his presence in 
contradictory ways.  On the one hand, Wallace could not be accused of 
staging his visit simply to pander to newly enfranchised (and increasingly 
active) African-American voters, since the visit could not have affected 
the election.  On the other hand, a cynic might argue that the visit also 
was conveniently timed to avoid any impact on Wallace's base among 
voters who still appreciated his once-fiery segregationist rhetoric.  Either 
way, the event's timing largely eliminated any electoral impact that its 
symbolism might have had. 
In later years Wallace would more explicitly ask for forgiveness, as 
will be discussed below.  But it was simply not his rhetorical stance in 
1974, when he went to the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church, and Carter's 
argument that the memories people related years later are exaggerated 
because "Black Alabamians wanted Wallace to be forgiven" is 
persuasive.34  The available evidence indicates that while the forum for 
Wallace's statements the day after his reelection was quite notable—and, 
indeed, arguably itself carried a dramatic admission of a change of heart if 
not quite an apology—the words he spoke at that forum were 
substantively similar to his other remarks in 1974, and conveyed none of 
the penitence that some memories have ascribed to them. 
(A brief detour into a seemingly spurious account of a later Wallace 
apology is necessary here, since while it is a powerful enough—and 
                                                
34 Ibid., p. 463. 
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frequently repeated enough—story to require mention, the balance of the 
available evidence indicates that it is, in fact, a myth based upon this 1974 
visit to the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church.  One of Wallace's other 
biographers, Stephan Lesher, reports a spontaneous visit by Wallace to the 
Dexter Avenue Baptist Church as occurring in the late 1970's—either in 
late 1978 or in late 1979.35  This visit is described as unannounced, and 
Wallace is quoted as fervently apologizing for his support of segregation; 
"Amazing Grace" is, movingly, sung.  Lesher cites no contemporary 
sources, however.36  This story far more powerfully serves the redemption 
narrative that both Wallace and Americans of both races wanted to 
believe (it was used as the template for the climactic scene in John 
Frankenheimer's 1997 televised dramatization of Wallace's life), but given 
the story's uncertain timing, thin sourcing—almost all from far later 
interviews—and oddly repetitive qualities with the well-documented 1974 
                                                
35 Lesher's account changed between the hardback edition of his book 
(Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, copyright 1994, published December 
1993) and the paperback edition (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1994, 
published November, 1994); the former gave the event as occurring "late 
in 1979, almost a year after [Wallace] had left office" (Lesher, Addison-
Wesley edition, p. 502), where the latter gave the event as "late in 1978, 
shortly before he was to leave office" (Lesher, Da Capo edition, p. 502.) 
36 The story in the Addison-Wesley edition is cited to an "unpublished 
essay" by Dan Carter (p. 567, note 13).  Dan Carter (personal 
communication, 2008) explains that this work was in fact a proposal for 
his own eventual biography, and that he later came to believe (as noted in 
his own biography of Wallace and cited above) that the events described 
to him by witnesses were, in fact, misremembrances of other occasions.  
In the Da Capo edition of Lesher's biography the story is cited to 
interviews with Wallace from the late 80's and early 90's, and to two 1994 
interviews with purported witnesses, Cecilia Evans and Ed Wesson (p. 
567, notes 12 & 13.) 
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visit—did Wallace make two pilgrimages to the Dexter Avenue Baptist 
Church, one in 1974 and another in the later 70's?—it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the visit Lesher describes, however vividly portrayed and 
adorned with supposed quotes—was, in fact, a product of ex post facto 
memory.) 
 
In 1976, prior to his final campaign for the Democratic presidential 
nomination, Wallace published a memoir, titled Stand up For America.37  
His concluding chapter is entitled "With Malice Towards None"—a 
telling reference from the man who thirteen years earlier was comparing 
himself to Jefferson Davis.  While the chapter deals with many subjects 
(including Wallace's thoughts concerning his would-be assassin, Arthur 
Bremer38), he did prominently discuss his position on racism and 
segregation. 
On the issue of race, Wallace again repeated many of his by-then 
familiar claims not to be a racist, to have made the stands he did on the 
basis of a states' rights philosophy and not any appeal to racist 
constituents.  Of his famous stand in the school door, Wallace wrote that 
"The issue did not involve the color of the students... For me, the issue 
was whether local and state institutions could survive"39—which is to say, 
                                                
37 Op. Cit., Wallace, 1976. 
38 Wallace said that "it has been no easy task to dig deep into my Christian 
faith to forgive the culprit.  Nevertheless, I have come along way toward 
this goal." (p. 173)  Interestingly, he also supported a Congressional 
inquiry into the "gnawing questions" around not only his own shooting, 
but those of John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, 
which he grouped with his own.  (p. 175)  
39 Ibid., p. 76. 
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Wallace repeated his familiar disingenuous claim about the issue in his 
most famous defense of Jim Crow.  More generally, he repeated his 
standard insistence that he not only wasn't, but had never been, a racist: 
 
For years my political foes and the mass media have tried 
to stereotype me as a Southerner who dislikes people 
because of race.  But it's a brand that won't stick... We 
have racial peace in Alabama because the good people of 
both races make a sincere effort to get along with each 
other.40 
It is worth noting here not only Wallace's claim to never having been 
racist (and his flattening of racial inequality into the question of whether 
or not one "dislikes people because of race"), nor Wallace's claim of 
"racial peace" without any sense of the dynamic of the historical 
movement he opposed.  It is also worth noting that Wallace portrayed his 
career trajectory as one of continuity, not change.  Wallace depicted an 
ongoing, unchanged attempt by "my political foes and the mass media" to 
portray him as a racist, without the slightest indication that his own stance 
on racial issues had changed at all during those years.  Wallace saw the 
battle as continuous, which makes sense only because he portrayed 
himself as unchanged, at least in any important sense.  
On the issue of segregation, Wallace wrote the following: 
 
Times have changed.  Segregation in public facilities is 
now out of the realm of discussion, and I certainly have 
no intention and no desire to turn back the clock.  
Segregation has been outlawed by legislative and judicial 
action, and people have accepted these changes, because 
they are basically law-abiding.  Racial harmony in our 
                                                
40 Ibid., p. 176. 
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region comes as no surprise to me.  The two races have 
lived side by side for hundreds of years.41 
In his 1976 book, Wallace accepted the demise of segregation; but he 
quite blatantly did not apologize.  He accepted—and portrayed others as 
accepting—the demise of de jure segregation "because they are basically 
law-abiding"; but he did not say anything to indicate that that change was 
a positive one, or that he regretted in the least his role in trying to hold it 
back.  Wallace portrayed himself not as embracing the end of segregation, 
but as acquiescing to it. 
Just as in his paragraph on his lack of racism, in this passage 
Wallace implicitly focused on his own lack of change, rather than on his 
changed stance, in this case on legalized segregation—a change that he 
therefore suggests, by own implication, was comparatively trivial.  Nor 
was it only his own personal continuity that he emphasized over any 
changes; he did the same for the South as a whole.  In the context of the 
demise of Jim Crow, Wallace emphasized the fact that "the two races 
have lived side by side for hundreds of years"—as if the changes within 
his own lifetime (to say nothing of slavery!) were simply minor 
alterations of an ongoing status quo.  Wallace in the end portrayed the 
demise of segregation as a minor change in mores, one that law-abiding 
people acquiesced to, but which ultimately changed little.  Wallace here 
admitted to changing his position on segregation, but at the same time 
very clearly implied that it hardly matters. 
                                                
41 Ibid, p. 177. 
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Wallace's denials of any change in stance were not merely implicit; 
in his 1976 memoir, Wallace quite blatantly claimed not to have changed.  
Rather he defended, somewhat indignantly, his consistency: 
 
Many newsmen accuse me of trying to change my 
image.... I frankly don't care too much about what 
journalists write.  My conscience, not the mythmakers, 
tells me who I am.... Newspapers and TV people would 
have it appear that I have deliberately courted black 
favor.  In one sense they are right, because as a politician 
I court favor wherever I think I can find it.  But I am not 
trying to give a face-lift to my image.  The media wrote 
that I "dropped in" on the black mayors conference in 
Tuskegee.  Both times I was invited... I told them—as I 
have told all—that I am still opposed to big government.  
I pointed out that "Big Brother" government is just as 
much a threat to blacks as to whites.  We should all unite 
to curtail federal power in Washington.42 
This is consistent with his rhetoric of the previous years: he was never a 
racist, and his message was always against big government rather than for 
segregation; his actions were for the good of African Americans as well as 
whites.  Wallace invoked his conscience not in any attempt to apologize, 
but rather in a denial that he has anything to apologize for.  He was 
indignant about attempts by the media to present him as a changed man; 
rather, he insisted, he remained who he has always been.  This bound him, 
of course, to a different rhetorical strategy than the rhetoric of repentance 
he would eventually adopt: to repent one must, necessarily, see oneself 
has having changed.  As of 1976, Wallace emphatically denied that he 
had. 
                                                
42 Ibid., p. 177. 
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Finally, Wallace continued to see no connection between the 
violence of his rhetoric and actual violence in Alabama.  In his memoir, 
he told the following anecdote—not in the context of the event it 
describes, but in the context of discussing his overall record on race and 
segregation.  Wallace related: 
 
I don't get cables like that any more.  But if I did I have 
the maturity just to ignore them. 
 When Mrs. Liuzzo was tragically killed in Alabama, I 
received a cable from some official in Alaska, blaming 
me for the senseless murder.  In anger I wired back, "I 
hold you personally responsible for the earthquake in 
Alaska.  By running off at the mouth you set off the earth 
tremors."43 
It hardly needs saying that the equivalence between angry speech 
inspiring violence and speech causing earthquakes is absurd.  But it is 
worth noting what Wallace did and did not express regret for here.  He 
did—implicitly—acknowledge immaturity in sending the memo.  But 
Wallace showed no sense of any personal responsibility about the Liuzzo 
murder here.44  Indeed, he told the anecdote as if, whether sending the 
                                                
43 Ibid., p. 176. 
44 Nor, for that matter, elsewhere.  In his original accounting of the 
incident, Wallace wrote "Nothing could have made me sadder than this 
senseless shooting, after all our efforts to prevent this sort of thing from 
happening.... I was no more responsible for the shooting of Mrs. Liuzzo 
than Governor Rockefeller was for the death of Malcolm X in New York, 
or Governor Reagan for the killings in Watts, or the governor of Michigan 
for riots in his state.... Two days later, the whole unpleasant episode was 
behind us."  (Wallace, 1976, pp. 105 - 106.)  Wallace was, if anything, 
proud of his handling of the episode (just prior to this, he said that "the 
real heroes of the [Selma to Montgomery] march were the average 
citizens of Alabama, black and white, who remained calm and peaceful 
despite strong provocation from many of the agitators." (Ibid.)  Despite 
 63 
cable was immature or not, the line itself was still a reasonable, and 
amusing, comeuppance to an outrageous slander—not as if he had since 
come to see that the Alaskan official might have had any sort of a point. 
As of 1976, Wallace still felt he had nothing to apologize for. 
 
In the late 1970's—following his final run for national office, both 
towards the end of and after his third term as governor (and probably 
before he envisioned a fourth), Wallace began to apologize directly to 
various of the figures in the Civil Rights Movement.  As reported by those 
he spoke with, Wallace was more effusive in these interviews than he was 
in public at the time or for a number of years to come.  But reports of 
these meetings filtered out—as, presumably, Wallace wished them to—
and began to serve their role in crafting his new image. 
It is unclear how many people Wallace contacted privately in order 
to apologize for his earlier conduct; while several sources imply the 
number is high, only a few names are listed.  Wallace met with Civil 
Rights Movement legend Rosa Parks—but photographers were present, 
and she felt, resentfully, as if she were being used as a prop for a photo 
op.45  
A far more significant meeting took place with future congressman 
John Lewis (whose name Wallace had failed to recognize in an interview 
only a few years before, as noted above).  This was not a meeting at 
                                                                                                                                       
his token inclusion of black as well as white in that sentence, Wallace in 
1976 still saw a lack of violence against Civil Rights marchers as a heroic 
level of restraint. 
45 Carter, p. 471. 
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which photographers were present.46  In an op-ed Lewis wrote in the New 
York Times almost two decades later (it was published a few days after 
Wallace's death in 1998), Lewis recalled their meeting: 
 
Although we had long been adversaries, I did not meet 
Governor Wallace until 1979. During that meeting, I 
could tell that he was a changed man; he was engaged in 
a campaign to seek forgiveness from the same African-
Americans he had oppressed. He acknowledged his 
bigotry and assumed responsibility for the harm he had 
caused. He wanted to be forgiven.47 
It is hard to know how to interpret Lewis's memory that Wallace 
"acknowledged his bigotry."  Certainly Wallace insisted often—both 
before and after Lewis's meeting with him—that he was not, and never 
had been, a bigot.  Possibly Lewis, having lived under the system of 
segregation, saw an acknowledgment of supporting segregation as 
tantamount to an acknowledgment of bigotry—missing Wallace's self-
serving insistence upon distinguishing them.  Or perhaps Lewis simply 
remembered Wallace's asking for forgiveness and acknowledgment of his 
mistakes, and the power of that experience combined with the inevitable 
distortions of memory added a dimension to Wallace's plea that it did not 
originally posses.48  Or, just possibly, Wallace was able to acknowledge in 
private what he never quite articulated in public: his own racist past.  This 
                                                
46 Carter, p. 471. 
47 John Lewis, "Forgiving George Wallace", The New York Times, 
September 16, 1998. 
48 Or, in a combination of these two possibilities, Lewis heard in 1979 an 
acknowledgment of support for segregation which he, nearly twenty years 
later, took as equivalent to an acknowledgment of bigotry, forgetting in 
the meantime the nuances of Wallace's apologetics. 
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final interpretation seems dubious, with some combination of 
misunderstandings and misrememberings the more likely explanation; but 
because no record of the meeting exists, it is impossible to say for sure. 
Regardless of these specifics, however, Wallace was clearly 
emotional, and approached Lewis in a far more penitent spirit than he 
displayed in public.  Lewis again described the meeting for a PBS 
Television special which aired after Wallace's death: 
 
He was very candid, very frank, I thought. He literally 
poured out his soul and heart to me. Uh, it was almost 
like a confession, like I was his priest. He was telling me 
everything. That he did some things that was wrong, and 
that he was not proud of. He, he kept saying to me, 
"John, I don’t hate anybody. I, I don’t hate anybody."49 
It is easy to imagine (if hard to confirm) that the experience of a man in 
constant pain, out of office for what he might well have thought was the 
final time, might have a dark night of the soul in private in a way that he 
wouldn't while actively campaigning in public.  Certainly Lewis's 
memories were specific enough—and consistent enough over time—to 
confirm that Wallace spoke to Lewis in a way he did not speak in public.  
Wallace spoke here as a supplicant, as one not just excusing his past or 
seeking a clean political slate, but as one seeking absolution.  The 
atmosphere was apparently more religious than political; more about the 
soul than the ballot. 
                                                
49 American Experience: George Wallace: Settin' the Woods on Fire, 
produced & directed by Daniel McCabe and Paul Stekler.  (Washington: 
PBS Video, 2000); transcript online at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/wallace/filmmore/transcript/transcript1.ht
ml 
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Even at this private extreme, however, Wallace at least began with 
his usual defenses.  The words that Lewis recalled Wallace repeating—"I 
don’t hate anybody"—are, in fact, a version of his long-standing defense: 
he wasn't a racist.  To be sure, said in a penitent context, the words take 
on a different resonance; said in supplication to John Lewis, even more 
so.  But it nevertheless remains a defense, and a long-standing one.  
Indeed, Wallace's biographer notes that  
 
Wallace opened the conversation with the argument that 
had become routine for him.  It was simply a matter of 
states' rights, "standing up and defending the state of 
Alabama against the national government," 
Yet this defensiveness did not last.  The passage continues: 
 
...but it was clear to Lewis that Wallace was concerned 
about more than his place in history; their dialogue was 
more like a "confession, like I was his priest," said 
Lewis.... [Wallace] asked for absolution.  "I've come to 
ask your forgiveness," he told Lewis.  "I want to ask your 
forgiveness for anything I've done to wrong you.... As 
Lewis prepared to leave, Wallace once more turned to his 
plea for forgiveness.  If "I hurt anyone or caused anyone 
harm, I want people to forgive me," said Wallace.  "I 
want to get right with my... maker."  At the end of their 
meeting, the two men grasped hands and prayed 
together.50 
Here, at last, is the full-throated repentance that some had credited 
Wallace for years before.  Admittedly these were private words.  That 
fact, however, cuts both ways.  Those interested in the state of Wallace's 
soul are likely to credit him with far more sincerity here precisely because 
they were private, were not offered during a campaign or at any moment 
                                                
50 Carter, pp. 461 - 462. 
 67 
when Wallace was likely to get anything out of them.  Of course even 
here cynicism is possible; perhaps Wallace (despite Lewis's denial) was 
worried about his place in history, or perhaps, as civil rights advocate 
Virginia Durr would claim later, Wallace was "just afraid he's going to 
hell."51  This motive does not change the fact of his apology, however. 
Similar scenes—it is, again, unclear how many—seemed to play 
themselves out at various points in Wallace's later life.  After the 
conclusion of his final term as Alabama governor, for example, Wallace 
had a similar meeting with Jesse Jackson, then preparing for his own 
second run at the Democratic presidential nomination.  As he had with 
Lewis, Wallace asked Jackson to pray with him apart from the presence of 
the press or public, or anyone save a few aides.52 
As these were private meetings, generally unrecorded save by long-
after-the-fact interviews with the participants, it is hard to know the 
details of what Wallace said.  Nor does it bear on the question of 
Wallace's public strategies for dealing with his segregationist past (save 
insofar as he wanted these private meetings to seep into the public 
discourse—itself unknown and probably unknowable). 
It was Wallace's final campaign for the Alabama governorship in 
1982 that propelled Wallace towards a more public articulation of 
regret—one that was, as yet, less fully penitent than Wallace was in his 
meeting with John Lewis, but one that was nevertheless apologetic in a 
                                                
51 Lesher, p. 502; Durr added, "He ought to be." 
52 The meeting is described in Lesher, p. 505; Lesher himself, who at that 
time was acting as Wallace's official biographer (although his final book 
was not published under that rubric), was apparently at this meeting as 
well. 
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way that Wallace had not been, publicly, before.  Wallace's 1982 
campaign certainly pushed him to the next stage in his slow shift: instead 
of simply saying, as he had in the mid-70's, that he no longer supported de 
jure segregation, Wallace now went on to say frankly that it was a mistake 
to have done so.  He even—glancingly—began publicly asking for 
forgiveness for this mistake, albeit not yet in the gushing terms that he 
apparently did in private conversations. 
As part of his 1982 campaign for a fourth term as Alabama 
Governor,53 Wallace made one of his most dramatic pilgrimages on his 
journey of regret when he attended the 25th annual convention of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference at St. Joseph's Baptist Church 
in Birmingham. 54  Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a surviving 
recording nor text of Wallace's remarks.55  But contemporary press 
accounts show Wallace as having expressed forthrightly that his earlier 
stance had been a "mistake", but otherwise maintaining something close 
to his mid-1970s line—namely, insisting that it had been a mistake made, 
as it were, in good faith. 
This is not to deny the rather stunning symbolism of Wallace 
attending a meeting of the SCLC at all.  As SCLC President Reverend 
Joseph Lowery said to a reporter, "it was a historic event 'that Wallace 
would come, and we would have him.'"56  Interestingly, it does not appear 
                                                
53 Or, if you count Lurleen Wallace's governorship in his column—which 
it was de facto if not de jure—for a fifth term. 
54 Julia Cass, "SCLC Hears Old Foe: George Wallace", The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, August 12, 1982, p. A3. 
55 Rohler, p. 86. 
56 Cass, op. cit. 
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that the SCLC sought him out specifically, nor even particularly wanted 
him to come; Reverend Lowery was quoted in the same paragraph as 
saying that the SCLC "had invited all the gubernatorial candidates 
running in the September primary to appear and didn't think it would be 
right to eliminate Wallace."  Lowery sounded almost taken aback that 
Wallace had accepted the invitation; and Wallace's decision to do so 
unquestionably demonstrates a powerful change in his political stance, 
whatever the content of Wallace's remarks. 
Lowery was not the only one to be disconcerted by Wallace's 
presence.  Reporter Julia Cass, writing for the Philadelphia Inquirer, 
described the scene: 
 
...the atmosphere in the St. Joseph's Baptist Church, 
where the meetings were held, was one of polite hostility.  
Most of the 300 or so people in the sanctuary sat quietly 
as Wallace spoke, although one man muttered under his 
breath, "Get that man out of here," and two young men at 
the back were engaged in a heated debate.  "I can't 
believe we're letting this man in here," one said.  "He's 
got a right to speak. You don't have to vote for him," the 
other said. 57 
Wallace was hardly received as a welcome penitent.  His presence was 
tolerated out of politeness; but if, as some have speculated, this meeting 
was part of what fed the myth of Wallace's unannounced "Amazing 
Grace" visit to a Baptist Church, the actual atmosphere was clearly rather 
different. 
                                                
57 Ibid. 
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Cass summarized the content of Wallace's speech as "say[ing] that 
he had made a mistake, that he had always liked black people and that he 
hoped he'd have their support in the governor's race."  She elaborated: 
 
Wallace was undaunted by the cool reception. He said 
that he was always for the average man, "black and 
white." And as governor he had gotten free textbooks for 
Alabama's schoolchildren, "black and white." He also 
said that the door of his office had always been open to 
anyone, "black and white." 
 He mentioned the past, just briefly, saying that he 
didn't expect the audience to like what he had done then, 
and that he now thought his opposition to integration was 
a "mistake."58 
As Cass reported the matter, Wallace's speech sounded similar to his 
earlier stances: the reiteration of his record of always trying to help "the 
average man, 'black and white,'" and his insistence that "he had always 
liked black people" are very similar to the sort of protestations he made in 
the mid-70's.  The admission that "his opposition to integration was a 
'mistake'" was, of course, new.  But as Cass described it, it was not an 
effusive apology, nor one done for redemption so much as for votes. 
A few days later, SCLC President Lowery recalled the speech in 
somewhat different terms, describing the scene as Wallace "began to 
confess his mistakes and ask, almost beg, for votes."59  Lowery's 
recollection portrayed more emotion on Wallace's part than Cass's does—
although, of course, the majority of that emotion went towards his 
solicitation of votes rather than forgiveness.  Nevertheless, Lowery's 
description of Wallace's apology as a "confession" was notable. 
                                                
58 Ibid. 
59 Quoted in Rohler, p. 86. 
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Nevertheless, Wallace's speech was obviously not an extended mea 
culpa; his mention of the past was "brief" according to Cass, and the term 
"mistake" (recalled by both Cass and Lowery) hardly carried the weight 
of repentance that many other terms might.  The word "mistake" is 
naturally applied to an error which is both understandable (everybody 
makes mistakes) and non-essential, one that does not speak to a person's 
core.  It is not a term weighted with emotional repentance (compare 
confessing to a crime, or a sin, or a terrible deed).  It is a term which, 
while apologetic, also implies that the error was comprehensible and 
normal. 
And for all his acknowledging of mistakes, Wallace continued to 
maintain the core of his long-term defenses: he had always cared for, and 
worked for, his African American constituents.  Cass reported one more 
exchange that is telling in this regard: 
 
During the question and answer session, one man said 
that he'd never tried to go to Wallace's office but that 
Wallace had called out federal troops to keep his children 
out of a white school when integration was ordered. He 
wanted to know whether Wallace "still cared about black 
children."  Wallace ignored the sarcasm in the question. 
"I've always cared about black children. You know that," 
he answered.60 
Wallace's response was not to say he's sorry, or to reiterate his 
acknowledgment of mistakes; rather, he insisted not only on his current 
good will but his long term good will: he has "always" cared about black 
children.  Further, he insisted that "you know that"—as if he could not 
even understand how an African American could have gotten the opposite 
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impression.  If Wallace was willing to acknowledge a mistake, he had not 
integrated that mistake deeply enough into his world view to see that a 
very natural (indeed, arguably inarguable) interpretation of his self-
described mistake would be precisely to see him as not caring about black 
children at all.  He had verbally conceded error; he had not fully 
understood the depth of that error, at least as it appeared to its victims. 
Further evidence that, during the 1982 gubernatorial race, Wallace's 
public statements had only taken a single step away from his earlier 
rhetoric—that he acknowledged error while retaining many of his old 
defenses—can be found in Wallace's other statements from the time.  (At 
the very least, they imply that this interpretation is consistent with his 
other statements from the time, which provides supporting evidence for 
it.) 
One of the more interesting expressions of Wallace's stance during 
the 1982 race came in an interview with Roy Reed, then a professor of 
journalism at the University of Arkansas, which was published in the New 
York Times.  In the midst of a lengthy profile, Reed described an 
exchange in his interview with Wallace in which Reed asked "whether 
[Wallace] regretted the pain he had brought to black people and the ill 
will that he created during the 1960's and 70's."61  Reed described 
Wallace's response as follows: 
 
''Yes,'' [Wallace] said, ''and I was to blame for a lot of it.'' 
But he was reluctant to talk about it in any depth. He 
moved away to his old defensiveness, saying he had 
never held any personal animosity toward black people, 
                                                
61 Roy Reed, "George Wallace's Bid for the New South", The New York 
Times, September 5, 1982, Section 6; Page 14, Column 3. 
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that he had never made a speech expressing dislike or 
hatred toward them, that he had always made it clear that 
his fight was not against blacks but against Government 
control from Washington.62 
Wallace's expression of regret and his admission of fault—"I was to 
blame for a lot of it"—were stronger than his mid-70's public statements.  
At the same time, Reed noticed the same defensiveness in Wallace's 1982 
response that we have seen as a frequent component of his earlier 
explanations; indeed, this defensiveness manifests itself in nearly identical 
rhetoric.63  Nor was Wallace aggressive about articulating his regrets, as 
those who have experienced a road-to-Damascus-style conversion can 
often be; Wallace was, Reed reported, "reluctant to talk about" his regrets 
"in any depth."  Wallace acknowledged his wrongdoing; but he wanted 
to—and felt he could—put it behind him. 
One interesting twist in Reed's interview was that Wallace here 
denied quite explicitly the oft-made interpretation that his support for 
segregation was not honestly felt, and that he had taken the stances he did 
only for political gain: 
 
Mr. Wallace also resisted any suggestion that his 
previous stand might have been based on expediency. It 
is well known, if slightly faded by time, that he began his 
political career as a racial liberal, and that, beaten by a 
racist, he changed because the times seemed to require a 
change. 
He said to me with a flash of heat, ''I was for school 
segregation in those days. I've had black leaders say to 
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63 So far as can be gleaned from Reed's summary—he does not quote 
Wallace verbatim on this point—Wallace gave his absolutely standard 
lines. 
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me, 'We know why you said what you said.' And I tell 
them, 'No, you're wrong. I wasn't saying that for 
expediency. I believed in segregation.' '' 
Mr. Wallace put down his cigar and turned in his 
wheelchair to face me squarely. ''Now,'' he said, ''I 
believe that segregation is wrong. And I don't want it to 
come back. I see now that we couldn't live in a society 
like that. In those days, I thought segregation was best for 
both races. But a short time after that, I came to see that 
this society can't exist with a dual system.''64 
Wallace was no longer saying that segregation was right at the time, nor 
that it was an attempt at uplift, or any of the similar excuses he had used 
in the 1970's.  In 1982 he was saying quite clearly that it was not only 
wrong in the present (when he is speaking) but that it was wrong back 
when he was supporting it too.  He also was no longer denying that he 
actually supported segregation—he was no longer claiming never to have 
supported segregation at all, and to have fought only against the power of 
big government; rather, he stated frankly that "I was for school 
segregation in those days.... I thought segregation was best for both 
races." 
At least here he did.  But it appears—although given Reed's 
mediation of Wallace's words, it is hard to be certain—that Wallace did 
make (some version of) those claims earlier in the interview; that is how I 
read Reed's summary that Wallace claimed, with his "old defensiveness" 
that "he had always made it clear that his fight was not against blacks but 
against Government control from Washington".  Wallace, in other words, 
hedged in the very moment he admitted blame; he claimed—perhaps even 
with a touch of pride—that he was not, at least, pandering in his 
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segregationist views, while also saying that he was fighting against 
government (a still-popular target) and not blacks (a no-longer popular 
one). 
None of this, perhaps, is surprising.  It is true that in the evangelical 
Christian tradition to which Wallace belonged, a position of proclaimed 
depravity is possible—in which a penitent's self-description as "a wretch 
like me" is preparatory to a narrative of conversion.  But in the majority of 
human apology the standard position is a thorough blending of regret with 
defensiveness and justification.  It is a hard thing to do to admit, fully and 
without a trace of defense, one's wrong-doing; most people who come to 
see that they were wrong about something significant do not reach that 
stage.  (It is certainly common not to reach it immediately, for early 
articulations of apology to be less fully felt than later ones.)  Still, for all 
of Wallace's self-proclaimed attachment to the Christian tradition of 
repentance, he had not yet brought himself to the point where he 
described his own actions in the terms that his listeners willed him to 
have. 
 
Over the years, however—particularly after he left the Alabama 
governorship for the final time, once all that he had left to do was 
contemplate his legacy—Wallace began to sound more and more penitent 
in his public statements. 
In a 1994 profile in the New York Times (on the occasion of the 
publication of Stephan Lesher's comparatively sympathetic biography), 
Wallace was described as "contrite" and quoted as saying, at a book 
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signing, "I was wrong, and I'm sorry."65  In an interview he did for the 
Times profile, he repeated the sentiment, saying, "Segregation was 
wrong... It's gone, and I'm glad it's gone. It's so much better to see people 
together the way they are now."  He even went so far as to say that he was 
concerned that "much of this country is turning away from trying to 
overcome our differences and is retreating to resegregation.... If it was 
wrong when I was supporting it, it's no less wrong now."66  Wallace had 
become a proponent of integration. 
At the same time, however, Wallace had still not lost all his 
defensiveness.  In the ellipsis of the above quotation, after the words 
"segregation was wrong", Wallace in fact added "But I didn't bring 
segregation about. It was there when I got to the Governor's office."  For 
that matter, his defensiveness went past that, as he continued to insist 
upon the purity of his previous intentions, and to defend at least the 
intensions (if not the reality) behind the system of segregation: 
 
"The New York Times, the Eastern establishment 
newspapers never did understand that segregation wasn't 
about hate," [Wallace] said, his eyes watery but clear. "I 
didn't hate anybody. I don't hate the man who shot me. 
When I was young, I used to swim and play with blacks 
all the time. You find more hate in New York, Chicago, 
and Washington, D.C., than in all the Southern states put 
together."... Mr. Wallace maintains that he supported 
segregation not because of racism but because he 
believed—incorrectly he now says—it was best for 
whites and blacks. 
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By the end of his life, Wallace was remorseful, and asked—repeatedly—
for forgiveness.  But he never was quite able to face the rank bigotry 
behind segregation, the hatred that sustained it, nor, indeed, the hatred that 
he himself did so much to inflame.  Wallace increasingly acknowledged 
his mistakes; he sought out many of those he had wronged to tell them so 
personally.  But he never stopped insisting upon the fact of his good will 
even during what he would come to see himself as his time of supporting 
the insupportable.  He continued to insist that the Jim Crow system he had 
grown up under was—in some sense—a period of racial harmony; his 
reminiscing about how he "used to swim and play with blacks all the 
time" continues to romanticize the segregated South whose defense he 
had come to apologize for.  Wallace's insistence that "you find more hate 
in New York, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., than in all the Southern 
states put together" not only denied the past and present racial hatred in 
the South (even if he is all-too-accurate about its existence (if not its 
extent) in the North as well), it also ignored the fact that the problem with 
segregation was not (simply) the hatred behind it but its actual effect on 
the lives of African-American citizens.  Wallace still seemed to think that 
hatred was the extent of the issue—which indicates a fairly basic lack of 
understanding about the nature of the system whose defense he had 
abandoned.  Wallace apologized, and sought forgiveness; but it is far from 
clear that he understood what it was he had done wrong, or precisely what 
he was apologizing for.  
 
Perhaps Wallace's most symbolically significant act of repentance 
was to attend the 1995 commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the 
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climactic march of the Civil Rights Movement from Selma to 
Montgomery.  While the clash at the Edmund Pettus Bridge did not have 
quite the personal symbolism for Wallace that his stand in the school 
house door did—since even though the former was done by troops under 
his command, it was the latter that involved him on the scene—
nevertheless, it was an incident in which he had been intimately involved, 
and one which had become one of the central iconic moments of the 
Movement.  In the story of the 1965 March, Wallace is typically—and 
justly—cast as the main villain, the man trying to prevent both the march 
and, more broadly, the enfranchisement of Alabama's African-American 
citizens.  Thus for Wallace to speak—indeed, to request to speak, not to 
be (as he had been so often before) simply invited, but to himself prompt 
his own inclusion67—was an act of extraordinary symbolic significance, 
the culminating act of Wallace's increasingly vocal and forceful attempt to 
make amends for the politics of his past. 
As it happens, this was not the first time that Wallace met with 
people commemorating the 1965 march which he had tried to prevent; at 
the twentieth anniversary recreation, a decade before, Wallace had met 
with marchers too. Wallace had received praise after that meeting from 
Jesse Jackson, Coretta Scott King and Joseph Lowery.  Then, however, 
Wallace—in the midst of his final term as Alabama's governor—only met 
with the marchers privately, not publicly; and it occurred at the request of 
the marchers, and not Wallace himself.68  A decade later, Wallace actually 
                                                
67 Rohler, p. 86. 
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Protest, Wallace Meets With Group ", The Boston Globe, March 8, 1985, 
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Wallace at the 1995 commemoration in Montgomery, 
holding hands with former SCLC President Joseph Lowery. 
(Photograph by Mark Miller, Montgomery Advertiser69) 
 
joined the marchers at their rally, and did so of his own accord.  The 
thirtieth anniversary march recreated the five-day trek from Selma to 
Montgomery that the original one had made; at the concluding rally in 
Montgomery,  Wallace joined the marchers, appearing on the stage with 
many of the nation's most prominent Civil Rights leaders. 
And he made a speech. 
                                                                                                                                       
The Philadelphia Inquirer, March 8, 1985, p. A1; Billy Bowles, "Black 
Leaders Laud Gov. Wallace", The Detroit Free Press, March 8, 1985, p. 
A11; Rob Levin, "The `dream still lives' for marchers - Group completes 
trek, meets Gov. Wallace", The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, March 
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69 Republished at 
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By the 1995 March, Wallace was too feeble to read his speech 
himself; but he attended the rally in Montgomery, and had a statement 
read for him by an aide.  Wallace's statement, in full, was as follows: 
 
My friends, I have been watching your progress this 
week as you retrace your footsteps of 30 years ago and 
cannot help but reflect on those days that remain so vivid 
in my memory. Those were different days and we all in 
our own ways were different people. We have learned 
hard and important lessons in the 30 years that have 
passed between us since the days surrounding your first 
walk along Highway 80. 
Those days were filled with passionate convictions and a 
magnified sense of purpose that imposed a feeling on us 
all that events of the day were bigger than any one 
individual.  Much has transpired since those days. A 
great deal has been lost and a great deal has been gained, 
and here we are. 
My message to you today is, Welcome to Montgomery. 
May your message be heard. 
May your lessons never be forgotten. 
May our history be always remembered.70 
Wallace's statement was, perhaps above all, the statement of an old and 
sick man.  His references to what has been lost, to the vividness of his 
memory and to the fact that "we all in our own ways were different 
people" thirty years before cannot help but be understood in that context. 
Wallace's statement was filled with profound but always implied 
regret.  He did not, as he seems to have done in private, beg for 
forgiveness.  As one historian noted, "it does not contain the words 
'apology' or 'sorry' or even 'regret'."71  But Wallace's 1995 statement 
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embraced the Civil Rights cause in a way unthinkable thirty years before; 
"May your message be heard.  May your lessons never be forgotten" are 
words that brought Wallace an almost inconceivable distance from his 
stance thirty years before.  Even if one questions the degree to which 
Wallace himself had fully integrated the lessons of the past into his own 
world view, his endorsement of them is no less astonishing.  The man 
who sought to prevent the marchers' protest, who refused to meet with 
them, had come out to welcome them to Montgomery and endorse their 
message.  Eternity has switched sides: it was no longer segregation that 
was to last "forever"; it was instead the message of the Civil Rights 
Movement that should "never be forgotten". 
At the same time, echoes of other themes continued to sound, albeit 
faintly, in Wallace's words.  His statement that "Those were different days 
and we all in our own ways were different people" can be read as apology, 
but it can be equally well read as one of the standard excuses for having 
adopted segregationist politics: that times were different then.  Indeed, it 
is only a slight rephrasing of Wallace's words from his 1976 book: "Times 
have changed."  And the message of unity in the words "we have learned 
hard and important lessons in the 30 years that have passed" disguised the 
fact that one side of the dispute has come to see that it was wrong.  
Wallace's rhetoric here invoked "the technique [of] 'transcendence,"72 a 
move that invokes the historical equivalent of the passive voice in 
shedding any particular responsibility. 
One can even wonder whether there was a slight note of pride at his 
own role in the already mythic events of 1965; his claim that "Those days 
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were filled with passionate convictions and a magnified sense of purpose 
that imposed a feeling on us all that events of the day were bigger than 
any one individual" has almost a touch of nostalgia about it.  And 
Wallace's concluding plea that "our history be always remembered" was 
quite ambiguous: was the "our" those who were involved in the 1965 
confrontation (who made up his audience)?  Was the "our" an inclusive 
one, a call to pride in Alabama's history which encompasses the "lessons" 
of the Civil Rights Movement which he invoked in the previous sentence?  
Or was this in fact a reiteration of a more traditional form of southern 
nostalgia, one which speaks only to whites, and which retains its pride in 
its history despite the fundamental wrongs which his other words served 
to repudiate?  Wallace did not clarify this matter, leaving it is up to his 
audience to decide if his final sentence was a simple continuation of the 
rest of his remarks, or an invocation of a form of historical memory 
typically held to be at odds with the cause Wallace was otherwise 
embracing. 
But if anyone noticed the slight hints of Wallace's long-time 
hedging, they didn't seem to care.  SCLC Joseph Lowery made Wallace's 
transformation the anchor of a hopeful op-ed he published a few weeks 
later (on the anniversary of the original march's arrival in Selma).73  
Lowery wrote: 
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...we did find at the end of our journey one reason to 
hope that the country might change for the better yet 
again.  We found it in the person of George Wallace... 
This year, the message came that Mr. Wallace—now 
weak, crippled and ill—wanted to greet and welcome us 
when we arrived at St. Jude's High School in 
Montgomery.  That he wanted to come and welcome us 
and affirm our purpose was like a flash of lightning that 
blinds and yet shines across a way filled with shadows...  
The arc of the universe bends towards justice.  I thanked 
George Wallace for his act of courtesy.  Marchers could 
not, would not, deny him an act of repentance.  We serve 
a God who makes the crooked places straight, makes the 
desert bloom and makes the lion to lie down with the 
lamb.  There was an air of regeneration and caring in 
those moments!  Isn't that what the world needs now?  I 
think so!74 
Lowery's op-ed sounded themes that many of the leaders of the 
Civil Rights Movement would return to in their reactions to Wallace's 
quest for redemption.  The most prominent of those themes are the 
religious connotations present in the very word "redemption".  A 
significant part of the Civil Rights Movement—particularly the part 
embodied by the SCLC—had been motivated by a Christian effort to 
change the hearts of its enemies, and had been structured around a 
Christian rhetoric of sin and repentance, a classically American call for 
the nation to return to its better self.  Lowery's reaction to Wallace's 
presence quite clearly had far more to do with this tradition than it did 
with any particular thing that Wallace said or did.  Lowery's text was 
filled with the words of Martin Luther King: "The arc of the universe 
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bends towards justice" was, of course, a line from the speech King had 
given in Montgomery thirty years to the day before Lowery published his 
op-ed, and the biblical invocation of "a God who makes the crooked 
places straight..." was rhetorically indebted to King as well. 
Given the Civil Rights Movement's grounding in a rhetoric of sin 
and repentance and redemption, Wallace's request to join them was both 
undeniable and politically useful.  Lowery, for all his praise of Wallace, 
clearly had a certain hesitation in embracing him fully: "I thanked George 
Wallace for his act of courtesy" is not the whole-hearted welcome that 
one gives to a prodigal son.  The undeniability is clear in Lowery's words 
too: "Marches could not, would not deny him..." implied the temptation 
even as it admitted the necessity to resist it.  However dark their memories 
of Wallace were, the marchers—or, at least, their leaders—had to admit 
Wallace, now formally repentant (for whatever his words, his very 
presence ensured that) to their company.  This necessity was made all the 
stronger by Wallace's condition—in Lowery's words, "weak, crippled and 
ill"—which for Lowery (as for so many others) overwrote earlier images 
of rage and hate with the present reality of weakness.  It is easier to 
forgive those who seem already made low. 
And, of course, Wallace's presence was politically (and morally) 
useful too.  It is uplifting to believe that you have changed the minds of 
one of your staunchest enemies.  And it is politically useful to hold that 
out as a pattern for others to follow.  (Much of Lowery's op-ed presented 
Wallace's new stance as contrasting with what he saw as the ongoing 
racism of the then-current political establishment, particularly—by clear 
implication if not by name—the Reagan administration.)  Wallace was 
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old, sick and out of power; what was the use in parsing his words for any 
remaining hesitation?  Far better to embrace him as an example of the 
movement's success, hoping that it would inspire other opponents to 
follow more rapidly in his footsteps. 
If Wallace used the march as a prop in his ongoing quest for 
redemption (however sincere that quest might or might not have been), 
the marchers used him right back as a prop in their ongoing quest to 
present the continuity of their past and current struggles, and to frame 
them in a moral-religious language which had proved triumphant in the 
fight against de jure segregation, but which had not—and to date still has 
not—yet been as broadly accepted in various measures against de facto 
segregation and poverty relief, that the marchers embraced as their current 
cause.  Wallace was as helpful to them as they were to him. 
 
What were the effects of Wallace's attempts to apologize, to 
explain, to put himself finally on the right side of history? 
As far as Wallace's political career went, its effects were somewhat 
complex.  Wallace did, famously, win significant shares of the African-
American vote in his later elections, particularly in his final race for 
governor in 1982.  But he was certainly not supported by the African-
American political establishment in that campaign; indeed, prominent 
African Americans remained somewhat horrified by the support he did get 
from black voters, and Coretta Scott King and Joseph Lowery worked 
hard in a futile effort to prevent Wallace from getting African-American 
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votes in the 1982 Democratic primary.75  And, anecdotally at least, many 
of those African-American voters who did support Wallace did so for 
reasons unrelated to his apologies—his practical support for issues they 
cared about (education being one frequently-cited issue), or simple 
familiarity, always a major force in American politics.  Nevertheless, it is 
hard to imagine that Wallace could have gotten their support even on 
those grounds without at least a token effort towards repentance. 
In that sense, Wallace's caveats and continued defensiveness 
mattered less than the mere fact that he had—or even just that, rightly or 
wrongly, he could be seen to have—changed at all.  Once that threshold 
was passed, other issues were allowed to matter more.  Wallace, it might 
be said, apologized precisely as much as he had to: sufficiently to make 
voters—or enough voters—not care about the details any more.  The 
existence of some sort of apology was more important than anything else. 
But, of course, for all that he devoted his life to politics, Wallace 
did not care only about politics—and neither did those to whom he 
apologized.  Wallace cared also about his place in history—and, even, his 
soul.  While history cannot speak to the latter, it can look at people's 
perception of the latter.  How were Wallace's regrets received? 
As with their political effects, the effects of Wallace's apologies on 
his broader reputation were mixed.  Wallace's regrets were received with 
a mixture of acceptance and refusal, openness and cynicism.  A great 
many of his old opponents welcomed his change of heart with open 
arms—indeed, as we have seen, they may even have willed it more 
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swiftly and more completely than it in fact occurred.  For many, the desire 
to put the past behind them, the eagerness to see a fundamental change in 
American society, seemed to be the decisive factor: as with Wallace's 
political fortunes, people who reconsidered his reputation did so far more 
because he had apologized than owing to the details of what that apology 
was. 
One prominent opponent of Wallace's who accepted his repentance 
fully and publicly was Congressman John Lewis.  Lewis wrote an op-ed 
in the New York Times a few days after Wallace's death entitled 
"Forgiving George Wallace".  After remembering the firebrand 
segregationist from the 1960s, Lewis declared: 
 
But the George Wallace who sent troops to intimidate 
peaceful, orderly marchers in Selma in 1965 was not the 
same man who died this week. With all his failings, Mr. 
Wallace deserves recognition for seeking redemption for 
his mistakes, for his willingness to change and to set 
things right with those he harmed and with his God. 
 Rarely does our country witness such a conversion by 
an elected official. Such a conversion of principle can be 
shaped only by courage and conviction.  
In much of Lewis's op-ed, the acceptance of Wallace's repentance was 
presented as a benefit, not to Wallace, but to the country.  Lewis wrote: 
 
The very essence of the civil rights movement was its 
appeal to the conscience of those who beat us with 
batons, attacked us with dogs and stood defiantly at the 
schoolhouse door... When I met George Wallace, I had to 
forgive him, because to do otherwise—to hate him—
would only perpetuate the evil system we sought to 
destroy. George Wallace should be remembered for his 
capacity to change. And we are better as a nation because 
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of our capacity to forgive and to acknowledge that our 
political leaders are human and largely a reflection of the 
social currents in the river of history.... The civil rights 
movement achieved its goals in the person of Mr. 
Wallace, because he grew to see that we as human beings 
are joined by a common bond.... But our ability to 
forgive serves a higher moral purpose in our society. 
Through genuine repentance and forgiveness, the soul of 
our nation is redeemed. George Wallace deserves to be 
remembered for his effort to redeem his soul and in so 
doing to mend the fabric of American society. 
As had been true for Joseph Lowery three years before, the reasoning 
behind Lewis's forgiving Wallace had far more to do with the nature of 
the Civil Rights Movement, its religious source and goals, than with 
Wallace himself.  Lewis forgave Wallace because "to do otherwise... 
would only perpetuate the evil system we sought to destroy"—not 
because of Wallace's evident sincerity or the power of his regret.  To be 
sure, Lewis also insisted on "genuine repentance"76—a genuineness that 
he, personally, felt Wallace had achieved.  Still, the repentance was 
received not only because it is genuine, but because of what it does for the 
country: that way, "the soul of our nation is redeemed", and that way 
helps "mend the fabric of American society."  Forgiveness was granted 
because it was right—including, perhaps above all, right for us: for our 
souls, and for our country. 
For many of those who forgave him, the religious impulse was 
paramount.  In the week following his death, many were quoted as 
forgiving him in precisely those terms: "Anybody can have my 
forgiveness if they ask the Lord to forgive them," said one black 
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Alabamian the day after Wallace died; "God forgave him," echoed 
another on the day of Wallace's burial.  Others spoke in simple human 
terms; an African American who worked for Wallace in his 1982 
gubernatorial bid said of him that "He has made some mistakes. But 
haven't we all?" 77 
Adding to the national, religious and human impulse towards 
forgiveness was the sheer fact of Wallace's crippled condition.  Whether 
or not his injuries drove him to repentance, they certainly drove others 
towards forgiveness.  References to Wallace's illness, his injuries, his age 
and frailty are all extremely common among those who came to forgive 
him—pity often trumping any other emotion.  As John Lilley, who had 
said that "anybody can have my forgiveness if they ask the Lord to 
forgive them", put it, ''I don't know if George Wallace is in heaven... the 
only thing I know is he's been in hell long enough."78  All the other 
reasons to forgive Wallace were simply magnified by his disabilities. 
In almost every case, however, the imperative—whether religious 
or simply human, whether motivated by pity or mercy or the greater good 
of the country—was more general than specific, predicated at most upon 
some act of contrition, and not upon its nature or details.  Wallace was 
judged upon his record; he was forgiven upon his request, but for reasons 
unrelated to it.  Still, that forgiveness was widespread.  In the end, a great 
                                                
77 Rick Bragg, "A Symbol of Alabama's Past, Indelible to Black and 
White", The New York Times, September 15, 1998; Rick Bragg, "A Flash 
in Time Is Buried in Alabama", The New York Times, September 20, 
1998; Lance Morrow, "Requiem for an Arsonist", Time, September 28, 
1998. 
78 Bragg, September 15, 1998, op. cit. 
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many people—from famous leaders of the Civil Rights Movement to its 
local footsoldiers to those who just observed, or were born after its 
heyday had passed—were prepared to forgive Wallace.  All he had to do 
was ask; precisely how and in what way he asked was not critical. 
(It's worth noting that his contrition was also irrelevant to some 
who continued to admire, even revere, the old Wallace.  A white 
Alabamian was quoted two days after Wallace's death as saying: 
 
I voted for him. Every time. I liked him standing up there 
in that school door, by God... And the Federals had to 
move him... He was a man, by God. He wasn't no boy.... 
I loved that man....  I worshiped the ground he walked 
on.79 
Writing in the New York Times, journalist Rick Bragg noted that this on-
going Wallace supporter did not seem to have assimilated, or at least did 
not seem to care, about Wallace's later acts of apology and contrition.) 
For many, however, forgiveness was a qualified thing—an 
obligation which came out of religious or human motives, but one whose 
emotional force was clearly blunted by the memories of his fouler deeds.  
J. L. Chestnut, an Alabama attorney who remembered Wallace as one of 
the first judges to call him "Mister" in court,80 was willing to forgive 
Wallace, but that forgiveness sounds fairly pro-forma, an obligation 
fulfilled but not felt: 
 
                                                
79 Bragg, September 15, 1998, op. cit. 
80 Interview associated with the PBS Film George Wallace: Settin' the 
Woods on Fire (op. cit.); available online at 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/wallace/filmmore/reference/interview/chestnut0
1.html. 
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I have no problem forgiving George Wallace. I will not 
forget George Wallace because we must deal with the 
reality of Wallace.  How is it that a demagogue, insulting 
twenty million black people daily on the television, can 
rise to the heights that Wallace did? Forgive, yes. Forget, 
never.81 
Similarly, one African-American Alabamian who had been just a child 
during Wallace's heyday said while viewing Wallace's body as it lay in 
state in the Alabama capitol that "You forgive; you don't forget."82  For a 
great many of those who had bitterly opposed his policies, forgiveness 
was a religious imperative, but memory the stronger force: Wallace's soul 
might be forgiven, but the historical memory of his most bellicose days 
had far more ongoing weight. 
And, unsurprisingly, some could not bring themselves to accept 
Wallace's apologies at all.  Ruth Johnson, whose husband was Frank 
Johnson, a judge whose civil rights rulings Wallace had attacked in bitter 
and personal terms, told Wallace that "if he wanted to get forgiveness, 
he'd have to get it from the lord."83  And placing more emphasis upon 
Wallace's foul deeds than his apologetic words was not limited to those 
who had a personal stake in Wallace's career.  The Alabamian musician 
Patterson Hood (a member of the rock group the Drive By Truckers) put 
the following words into the mouth of the Devil in a song, "Wallace", 
written upon the occasion of Wallace's death in 1998: 
 
                                                
81 Interview in the PBS film, George Wallace: Settin' the Woods on Fire, 
op. cit. 
82 Rick Bragg, " Quietly, Alabama Troopers Escort Wallace for Last 
Time", The New York Times, September 17, 1998. 
83 Carter, p. 463. 
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Throw another log on the fire, boys, George Wallace is 
coming to stay 
When he met St. Peter at the pearly gates, I'd like to think 
that a black man stood in his way. 
I know "All should be forgiven", but he did what he done 
so well 
So throw another log on the fire boys, 
George Wallace is a coming…84 
Of course, even if Hood pictured Wallace in hell, he still accepted 
Wallace's repentance at more-or-less face value; in Hood's telling, it was 
simply that Wallace's actions were too severe—"he did what he done so 
well"—to make even a sincere repentance sufficient.  If many of those 
who forgave Wallace did so without regard to the details of his penitence, 
then Hood likewise condemned him without regard to those details.  For 
those who forgave Wallace, any apology was enough; for those who 
didn't, no apology could be. 
And perhaps it was because of this that the depth of Wallace's 
apologies were at times exaggerated, the details overlooked.  To those 
who continued to condemn Wallace, the insufficiency of his apologies 
were unimportant—so why dwell on them?  It is the crimes of the past 
that mattered.  And to those who did forgive Wallace, the details were 
even less important.  Wallace was forgiven—by those who did forgive 
him—far more because people cared about the act of forgiveness, or what 
the story of repentance said about America, than they did about the reality 
                                                
84 Drive-By Truckers, Southern Rock Opera (Soul Dump Records, 2001), 
"Wallace".  Lyrics reprinted at 
http://www.drivebytruckers.com/lyrics_sro.html#wallace; ellipsis in the 
original.  Hood noted on his band's web site that he wrote the song the 
week of Wallace's death. 
(http://www.drivebytruckers.com/writeup_sro.html) 
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of Wallace's story.  John Frankenheimer ended his television drama about 
Wallace's life with the (seemingly spurious) story of Wallace going to the 
Dexter Avenue Baptist Church unannounced, begging for forgiveness, 
and being greeted by the singing of "Amazing Grace" because it made for 
a better story.  As Dan Carter said, "it was precisely the image of himself 
George Wallace had sought to create during the last years of his life."85  
But this in the end mattered less than the fact that it was the image of 
America and American history—our image of ourselves—that we have 
sought to create in the years since the Civil Rights Movement passed into 
history.  It was not only that it was a better story about Wallace: it was a 
better story about us.  So it was the one that many people believed.  For 
them the details, in the end, were just a distraction from the moral. 
Wallace did apologize—and did so far more than most supporters 
of segregation.  Wallace did acknowledge that he had been wrong.  But 
Wallace never quite admitted to the full degree of either the harm he did, 
or the malice it involved (in—at the very least—his supporters).  To that 
admittedly small extent, he kept to his pledge from his first inaugural 
address, and defended the system of segregation forever. 
If he got credit for far more than that, it was most likely because so 
few others were willing even to go that far.  Wallace did not—at least not 
in public, at least not in so many words—fully recognize all the evils of 
segregation; most particularly, he never stopped insisting that it was not 
motivated by racism (a claim which, in addition to being incorrect in its 
                                                
85 Carter, p. 468.  See also Dan T. Carter, "Fact, Fiction, and Film: 
Frankenheimer's George Wallace", Perspectives (American Historical 
Association), January 1998, available at: 
http://www.historians.org/perspectives/issues/1998/9801/9801FIL.CFM. 
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own terms, also deeply misunderstands the nature of racism as a 
phenomenon.)  But very few have noticed, and almost no one has seemed 
to care.  Wallace said he was sorry: in the eyes of many, that was enough 
for Wallace to be granted the absolution he had—finally, and always with 
a small bit of hedging—sought.  The most prominent supporter of 
segregation had become its most prominent repenter as well.  Precisely 
what he did or did not say would not keep people from seizing upon him 
as the symbol of a long-sought and deeply desired reconciliation, a 
powerfully willed burial of an ugly past. 
Whatever else he did, and whatever else he never did, Wallace said 
he was sorry.  Particularly since so few others did, that was—for a great 
many people—enough. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE POLYVALENT SILENCES OF STROM THURMOND (AND 
THE DANGEROUS UNAMBIGUITY OF WORDS ABOUT HIM) 
 
Perhaps the most common reaction of former supporters of de jure 
segregation to its increasing political ineffability was simple silent 
acquiescence.  Supporters of a defeated position will nurse their 
grievances, plot reversals, and celebrate the rightness of a lost cause, often 
for decades; but supporters of a discredited position will rarely wish to 
discuss, let alone trumpet, their former stances.  While a narrative of 
repentance may require such direct confrontation, and a sufficiently 
complete memoir may make some public reconsiderations unavoidable, 
absent these motives it is often easiest to let the matter lie.  This silence 
can cover a wide range of actual responses, from continued private 
adherence to a publicly abandoned position to an actual change of heart, 
and all the many complex (and often conflicted) variants that lie between 
them.  By its very nature we can rarely know for sure precisely what view 
a silent acquiescor holds; that, in fact, is one of the position's chief 
appeals, both for private reasons (avoiding any uncomfortable reckoning 
with one's own changing views or that of the public's), and for public 
ones, since silence allows the projection of a friendly position by parties 
from all over the ideological map. 
Common as this response is, the present analysis needs to address 
it; however, silence, by its very nature, leaves little evidence on which to 
base an analysis.  As politicians and public intellectuals dropped their 
support for a legal and social system that was, by increasingly strong 
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consensus, outmoded if not immoral, they typically left few clues as to 
their thinking, and no reaction to analyze.  Within the domain of the 
various possible responses to the political discrediting of their previous 
positions, silence plays the role of the galaxy's dark matter, clearly a 
majority of its mass, but visible only in its effects. 
Some silences, however, are louder than others.  Those who had 
previously made the most noise become the most conspicuous with its 
sudden absence.  And those who supported segregation most prominently 
were often unable to be as silent as they wished—unable to completely 
dodge the relevant questions even if they tried their best to do so.  This 
means, of course, that they did not remain fully silent; but since they came 
as close as they could politically manage, they can still tell us something 
about the way strategies of silence worked.  Indeed, in practical terms 
they can tell us more than those who managed to dodge all the relevant 
questions, since unlike them, the nearly-silent left evidence for their 
thinking and how their silences were received.  Temperatures a degree 
above absolute zero can still tell us something about how materials 
function at the coldest possible temperature, even if absolute zero itself is 
in practice unattainable. 
Of the silences that ensued after the end of de jure segregation, 
probably the most notable was that of South Carolina Senator Strom 
Thurmond.1  Although his position as segregation's most prominent and 
                                                
1 The best biography of Thurmond is Nadine Cohodas, Strom Thurmond 
and the Politics of Southern Change.  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1993). Jack Bass and Marilyn W. Thompson's Strom: the Complicated 
Personal and Political Life of Strom Thurmond (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2005), is also useful, particularly since its later date leads to its 
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ardent defender had arguably been eclipsed in the early 1960's by 
Alabama Governor George Wallace, Thurmond was post-war America's 
preeminent champion of legal segregation for more than a decade.  His 
1948 presidential run as a Dixiecrat was a harbinger of the intra-party 
stress over support of Civil Rights that would eventually drive so many 
white Southern Democrats to become Republicans—including, as one 
prominent early example, Thurmond himself.  Thurmond was 
instrumental in the creation of the infamous "Southern Manifesto" against 
the Brown decision (signed by nearly the entire Southern delegation to 
Congress in 1956), both originating the idea and writing the initial draft.2  
And his record-setting 1957 filibuster against a largely toothless Civil 
Rights Bill—a filibuster that did not have the support of his colleagues 
and therefore did not have a reasonable chance of success—was an 
extreme example of an obstruction tactic, one which admittedly did more 
to bring its proponent attention than to practically assist in the upholding 
of de jure segregation. 
Given Thurmond's profile as a well-known defender of segregation, 
his eventual abandonment of the issue was especially significant.  
Thurmond was above all a symbol of resistance to integration.  His acts of 
                                                                                                                                       
inclusion of some material omitted from Cohodas, both on Thurmond's 
later career and on the revelations, after Thurmond's death, that the 
rumors about his having fathered an African American daughter (which 
he long denied) were true.  On this topic, see also Essie Mae Washington-
Williams and William Stadiem, Dear Senator : A Memoir by the 
Daughter of Strom Thurmond (New York: Regan Books, 2005.)  A third 
study of Thurmond's career, to which I have also referred, is Joseph C. 
Ellers, Strom Thurmond: the Public Man.  (Orangeburg, South Carolina: 
Sandlapper Publishing, 1993). 
2 See Cohodas, pp. 283 - 287, and Bass and Thompson, pp. 162 - 166. 
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ground-breaking defiance had made him a hero to many white 
Southerners.  One scholar has characterized Thurmond's role in the 
"massive resistance" to integration as being one of four key "tutelary 
geniuses": 
 
The tutelary geniuses of Massive Resistance were those 
men who exercised a kind of guardian authority over the 
movement by determining basic strategy while avoiding the 
involvement with everyday tactical problems.  Four 
southern leaders appear to merit the tutelary genius label, 
and all of them were members of the United States Senate 
in the post-Brown era... [Strom] Thurmond embraced the 
myths of Massive Resistance with a passion that few of his 
colleagues could equal.... Throughout his long career, 
Thurmond has exhibited a positive genius for manipulating 
words that block reasoned argument by arousing racial 
emotions and prejudice.... Thurmond was rarely silent or 
inactive in the decade after Brown... While [Senators 
Henry] Byrd and [Richard] Russell were reluctant to 
address large public rallies of segregationists, Thurmond 
rarely passed up a chance to appear at one.  He pulled out 
all the oratorical stops when he lit into the Supreme Court 
and the "race mixers," and the Massive Resisters loved 
him.... [Thurmond's] racist rhetoric was so extravagant that 
only those who were already true believers took him or his 
message seriously.  The rest dismissed him as a fanatic on 
race—clever but still fanatic.3 
                                                
3 Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York: 
George Braziller, 1973), pp. 76, 80-81.  The other three Senators Wilhoit 
cites as "tutelary geniuses" of massive resistance were Henry Byrd of 
Virginia, Richard Russell of Georgia and James Eastland of Mississippi.  
Thurmond's political career lasted several decades beyond the other three, 
which largely spared them from the sort of dilemma which might have 
secured them a place in the present study, although Eastland (a Senator 
until 1978) had a late career which, in its combination of practical change 
and denial of regret, resembled Thurmond's in some respects. 
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Thurmond was not only a shrewd tactician of Senate parliamentary 
maneuvers, and not only a leader in congressional circles; he was a 
rhetorician of resistance, who spoke to crowds as well as to congressmen.  
This, of course, only served to heighten his public role in the movement—
and hence his potency as the political voice of segregation's supporters. 
And then that voice fell silent.  Thurmond slowly moved away 
from his strident advocacy against integration.  He did not, however, 
speak in any significant way about his past.  Thurmond—unlike others, 
covered in other chapters of the present work—did not explain.  He 
neither defended nor repented his past; he did not apologize, justify or 
deny his past.  He simply let it pass in silence.  However central it was to 
his early political identity, in his later career Thurmond did not address 
the issue of de jure segregation in any notable fashion—save for the 
pronounced absence of his voice on the issue. 
More than speak about his past, Thurmond signaled a change in his 
stance through his actions.  This was, I shall argue, an essential aspect of 
his silence: it allowed the public (particularly newly enfranchised African 
American voters whose support Thurmond soon hoped to woo) to 
imagine their own narrative of regret, conversion or simply practical 
accommodation, as they preferred, without Thurmond's making any 
explicit repudiations of stances still dear to his core supporters.  Actions 
speak louder than words, the platitude holds; but they also speak more 
ambiguously, allowing room in the silent interstices of their possible 
meanings for Thurmond to avoid any explicit reckoning with his past.   
This worked in large part because the explicit segregationist 
arguments were themselves intricately bound up with silence, at least by 
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the post-war period.  As I have discussed previously, segregationist 
arguments were rarely made on the merits in the 1950s and early 1960s; 
rather they were couched in a variety of rhetorics that allowed their 
indirect defense.  The most prominent of these, of course, was the rhetoric 
of states' rights.  It was widely known what rights states' rights advocates 
were defending—the right to maintain a legally and socially (and 
ultimately violently) upheld apartheid system in the American South.  But 
to phrase the issue in terms of "states' rights" allowed segregation's 
defenders to avoid the increasingly thorny issue of whether de jure 
segregation was right by focusing on the issue of whether or not it was, 
right or wrong, within their rights.  Other pro-segregationist arguments 
followed this logic too—by criticizing segregation's opponents for 
seeking to implement a communist program, to take another prominent 
example, segregation's supporters could besmirch integration without 
having to defend it on the merits. 
But this very lack of an explicit defense meant that even so 
prominent a supporter of segregation as Thurmond could take refuge in 
silence once the political climate changed.  Hiring a black staffer was, 
clearly, a tacit admission that his old beliefs (or anyway political 
practices) were no longer sustainable.  But it did not need to be an explicit 
admission, since Thurmond had not spent his Senate years railing against 
integrated congressional staffs.  He, like other segregationists, had spoken 
of tradition and freedom and states' rights, for all that everyone knew that 
he had meant the traditional freedom of states to discriminate among their 
citizens on the basis of race.  So he could pretend—to his long-time 
supporters, and possibly even to himself—that nothing had changed, 
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while in practice admitting to his potential new constituents that the 
opposite was more nearly the case. 
Thurmond's actions—in hiring a black staff member, in eventually 
shifting the way he voted on symbolic issues such as the Martin Luther 
King Birthday holiday and the 1982 renewal of the Voting Rights Act—
were not exceptions to his strategy of silence in dealing with his now-
untenable political past; they were rather a crucial part of that strategy—
essential to its workings.  
Apart from silence, another aspect of Thurmond's strategy in 
dealing with his past might be termed the embrace of contradiction.  It is 
true that Thurmond not only refused to apologize but tried hard to avoid 
the issue entirely, essentially staying as silent on it as so prominent a 
former segregationist could practically be.  Still, ultimately he was forced 
to say something: and what he did was to say that his position hadn't 
changed, while voting (if not exactly leading) in ways directly opposite to 
the stance that he had taken in earlier years.  Alternately, and repeatedly, 
he also denied any regret for his past while blatantly misrepresenting what 
that past was.  This, too, I shall argue, was in essence a continuation of his 
essential strategy of silence, of avoiding the issue.  Thurmond's answers to 
questions about any possible regrets were so terse, so contradictory, that 
they served, in essence, to allow him to use words to say nothing. 
 
In the absence of any public statement of political shift, given the 
lack of any expression of regret or even any admission of a change in 
stance, the present examination will begin with Thurmond's actions.  
Since, as I have argued, Thurmond's shifts were deliberately partial, 
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allowing various constituencies to see different things in his later political 
stances, it will be particularly illuminating to examine how Thurmond 
himself described those actions.  If ambiguity, and a desire to avoid 
explicit regret, were Thurmond's goals, then his words were in some sense 
a threat to both; nevertheless Thurmond managed to speak of his new 
stances in such a way as to maintain his silence on questions of 
contradiction and change, of how his new behavior related to the central 
focus of his political past. 
The first signaling action that Thurmond took to indicate his shift 
on the issue of segregation (and race relations more generally) was his 
hiring of Thomas Moss.  In 1971, Thurmond hired Moss, his first African 
American staff member, to serve as his liaison with the African American 
community.4  Moss's primary job was, in Thurmond's words, "to facilitate 
my service to the black people of South Carolina"5—cynically, to help 
Thurmond win African American votes and to signal a shift on racial 
issues away from his earlier die-hard segregationist stance.  That he 
considered it a signal as well as a practical political move can be seen in 
his bragging about it in Ebony in the very year that Moss was hired.  It 
certainly became the cornerstone of the narrative of the "new 
Thurmond"—rhetoric presumptively borrowed from his political ally, 
Richard Nixon—that came to be the standard media line on Thurmond's 
political trajectory.6 
                                                
4 Associated Press, "Sen. Thurmond Hires a Black", Washington Post, 
Times Herald, Feb 16, 1971 
5 Ebony, August 1971, p. 166. 
6 For instance, in the Time story on Thurmond's 1978 Senate race: 
"Challenging A Southern Legend", Time, October 16, 1978.  A later 
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Notably, however, Thurmond insisted that his hiring of Moss did 
not signal a change in his views—in the very news article that reported 
the hiring as noteworthy.  The brief, unsigned Associated Press piece 
which discussed the matter—headlined "Sen. Thurmond Hires a Black"—
paraphrases Thurmond as saying that "Moss's appointment does not 
change his views about anything," and directly quotes him as saying "I 
wouldn't change my vote on any vote I made in the Senate."7  While 
Moss's hiring might seem on its face to demonstrate a new concern for the 
interests of his African American constituents—which, for the majority of 
his prior tenure, might be seen as practically identical with the ending of 
de jure segregation—not to mention a tacit move towards integration in 
(at least) Thurmond's office—Thurmond insisted that that was not the 
case. 
Perhaps this insistence was a deliberate obfuscation, a way to spin 
the action in two ways: African American voters would see the hiring as 
an implicit admission of a changed view (even if Thurmond couldn't or 
wouldn't admit it), while the still-substantial pro-segregation voters in 
Thurmond's state would see it as a forced concession (that didn't change 
his ongoing essential agreement with their beliefs).  Or, perhaps, 
Thurmond simply didn't want the political hassle of admitting publicly 
that he had changed his mind on the signature stance of his political life, 
and thereby made a pro-forma denial while making a practical change of 
course. 
                                                                                                                                       
example is Maureen Dowd, "On Washington: Old Smoothie", The New 
York Times, October 23, 1994, section 6, p. 26. 
7 Associated Press, op. cit.. 
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But there is a reasonable case to be made that Thurmond was 
right—that the hiring of Moss was not a significant change in his stance 
on de jure segregation.  Thurmond remained a staunch opponent of many 
Civil Rights measures throughout the 1970's, even while he was trying to 
court the African American vote in his reelection campaigns.  His period 
of genuine change on Civil Rights issues dates more properly from the 
early 1980's, when Thurmond—unprecedentedly—voted for the extension 
of the Voting Rights Act, one of the signal pieces of legislation which 
dismantled de jure segregation in the United States.  To be sure, even 
under this interpretation Thurmond's views must be seen to have shifted 
slightly since his halcyon days of being segregation's staunchest 
supporter.  But while the hiring became a standard part of the impression 
that Thurmond had softened his views, it is arguable that this has been 
significantly overstated. 
Thurmond, as is widely acknowledged, hired Moss in a direct effort 
to court African American votes, newly important to him after the Voting 
Rights Act had added many to the rolls.  Indeed, Thurmond was 
(arguably) up-front about it: Moss was hired as a liaison to African 
Americans, not as a more general member of Thurmond's staff such as a 
speechwriter.  Perhaps we should give Thurmond the benefit of the doubt, 
and see Moss's hiring as precisely what he proclaimed it to be: a blatant 
act of political pandering, untainted by any ideological conviction 
whatsoever.  
 
Thurmond's ultimate support of the 1982 extension of the Voting 
Rights Act, however, cannot be seen this way.  Hiring an African 
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American staff member might be reasonably conceived as a personal 
rather than a political act; voting on one of the signature pieces of Civil 
Rights legislation is blatantly and inarguably political.  A staff hiring 
might be thought of as irrelevant to one's political stances; a vote in the 
Senate is as distinctly political an act as one can imagine.  Thurmond's 
vote for the bill was all the more significant because support for its 
passage was hardly assured.  If the vote had been unanimous, or debate 
had been merely a formality, then Thurmond's vote would not necessarily 
have said much.  But in fact the 1982 bill was loudly and roundly opposed 
by some in the Senate.  The opposition, however, was led by Jesse 
Helms—not Strom Thurmond.  That a vocal opposition to the bill—
including an attempted filibuster—was mounted without Thurmond being 
a part of it shows how Thurmond's role in the Senate had changed since 
he was among the leaders of filibusters of civil rights legislation in the 
middle of the century. 
Thurmond said little about the relationship between his original 
opposition to the Voting Rights Act and his 1982 vote to renew it—and 
what little he did say was a defense of his earlier position, and not an 
apology for it.  But Thurmond didn't need to say much: his action spoke 
loudly enough—and was further distorted in its echoing over time.  His 
1982 vote become, inevitably, central to any discussion of the shifting 
trajectory of Thurmond's career.  It is therefore worth examining carefully 
the meaning that he himself gave it at the time, since this was different 
from the meaning so often ascribed to it by others. 
Thurmond's vote for renewal was vocally reluctant.  He spelled out 
at length—and repeatedly—his objections to the renewal: 
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Throughout consideration of this legislation I have 
expressed concern over three important aspects of the bill.  
First, I have sought assurance that the proposed changes in 
section 2 of the act would not result in court-ordered 
establishment of systems of proportional representation by 
race.  Second, I have sought the inclusion of a reasonable 
bailout provision so that jurisdictions subject to the 
preclerance requirements of section 5 would have a genuine 
incentive to rid themselves of any lingering discrimination.  
Third, I have sought a period of extension that is responsive 
to present conditions.8 
Thurmond went on to elaborate each one of these concerns at 
considerable length.  His concerns were, in fact, a muted version of the 
sort of objections that others offered as reasons (or rationalizations) to 
vote against the bill.  The objections were versions of the claims that the 
Voting Rights Act was a form of affirmative action, called 'reverse racism' 
by its opponents (first objection); that a given Senator's particular state—
for Thurmond, South Carolina --was not (or no longer) discriminating 
against African American voters and should therefore be exempt (second 
objection); and that the extension was for too long a period (third 
objection).  Unlike some senators, Thurmond did not use these claims to 
argue against the extension's passage; but he did make them nonetheless. 
Thurmond also did not say much in favor of the bill that he 
nonetheless ended up supporting.  He did say, repeatedly, that he 
supported the right to vote—indeed, he claimed that "throughout my years 
of public service I have unyieldingly sought to protect the right to vote."9  
But Thurmond gave little indication that he saw the importance of the 
                                                
8 Congressional Record, June 17, 1982, p. 14116. 
9 Congressional Record, June 17, 1982, p. 14115. 
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Voting Rights Act in helping to end the political dimension of 
segregation.  He made no mention of the long history of denying the 
franchise to African Americans in the South; he referred to the increased 
numbers of African American voters only as a sign that the extension was 
unnecessary, not as evidence for its importance and effectiveness.10  (He 
even denied that South Carolina had discriminatory voting laws in 1965, 
saying that it had been "caught in that net" of the Voting Rights Act's 
criteria—by clear implication, unfairly so.11) 
Indeed, Thurmond even reiterated some of the constitutional 
objections that he had forcefully raised in 1965 in the debate prior to 
passage of the original Voting Rights Act in regard to the 1982 
extension—albeit in greatly muted form.  Thurmond asserted: 
 
The constitutional foundation of the Voting Rights Act 
rested, in large part, upon its temporary and remedial 
nature.  While recognizing that the act was an "uncommon 
exercise of congressional power, the Supreme Court in 
South Carolina against Katzenbach nevertheless concluded 
that "Exceptional circumstances can justify legislative 
measures not otherwise appropriate."  While recognizing 
the intrusions upon traditional concepts of federalism by 
the Voting Rights Act, the Court upheld the preclerance 
procedure as a purely remedial measure premised upon the 
enforcement authority of Congress under section 2 of the 
15th amendment.  It is difficult for me to understand how 
such circumscribed authority in Congress can justify a 25-
year extension of this "uncommon exercise" of legislative 
power.12 
                                                
10 See the Congressional Record, June 17, 1982, p. 14126. 
11 Congressional Record, June 18, 1982, p. 14295. 
12  Congressional Record, June 17, 1982, p. 14118. Thurmond takes Chief 
Justice Earl Warren's phrase somewhat out of context; at the very least, in 
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Warren's original opinion, the concern is weighted far less than the 
overriding necessity: 
The Act suspends new voting regulations pending scrutiny 
by federal authorities to determine whether their use would 
violate the Fifteenth Amendment. This may have been an 
uncommon exercise of congressional power, as South 
Carolina contends, but the Court has recognized that 
exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not 
otherwise appropriate... Congress knew that some of the 
States covered by § 4(b) of the Act had resorted to the 
extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various 
kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting 
discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees. 
Congress had reason to suppose that these States might try 
similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the 
remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act 
itself. Under the compulsion of these unique circumstances, 
Congress responded in a permissibly decisive manner. 
Warren also writes far more powerfully and sweepingly of the Act's 
importance than Thurmond's citation would imply: 
The Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish 
the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has 
infected the electoral process in parts of our country for 
nearly a century... After enduring nearly a century of 
widespread resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, 
Congress has marshalled an array of potent weapons 
against the evil, with authority in the Attorney General to 
employ them effectively... We here hold that the portions of 
the Voting Rights Act properly before us are a valid means 
for carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Hopefully, millions of non-white Americans 
will now be able to participate for the first time on an equal 
basis in the government under which they live. We may 
finally look forward to the day when truly "[t]he right of 
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 
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This was, to be sure, a far cry from the sort of rhetoric Thurmond 
employed in 1965, when he said that there had been no previous proposal 
to Congress that was "more obviously unconstitutional than the so-called 
voting rights bill," referred to "the tragic experience which will inevitably 
flow from the passage of this bill," claimed that "the effect of the passage 
of the proposed Voting Rights Act of 1965 will be to suspend the 
Constitution" and even said that the Voting Rights act would set "the 
precedent... for establishing a totalitarian form of government which, of 
course, invariably results in a dictatorship."13  Nevertheless, Thurmond is 
still clinging here to some of his previous claims about the 
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act : no longer claiming that it is 
absolutely unconstitutional, he is still arguing that it is constitutionally 
                                                                                                                                       
(Chief Justice Earl Warren, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 
(1966))  Nowhere in his comments about the renewal of the Voting Rights 
Act does Thurmond even approach Warren's descriptions of Jim Crow, 
with its talk of "the blight of racial discrimination in voting" as an "evil", 
13 Congressional Record, May 13, 1965, p. 10447; May 26, 1965, p. 
11730; May 26, 1965, p. 11731 and May 3, 1965, p. 9241.  It is perhaps 
worth noting Thurmond's odd formulation that "a totalitarian form of 
government... invariably results in a dictatorship".  Most people would see 
a totalitarian government as equivalent to—or even a sub-category of—
dictatorship.  Nevertheless, I do not believe that Thurmond's phrase was a 
mere slip of the tongue.  Rather, it reflected a fundamental belief (and 
rhetorical strategy) of pro-segregationist politicians, who had to claim that 
civil rights laws were undemocratic—in Thurmond's extreme rhetoric, 
totalitarian—without actually claiming that an integrated society was 
itself a "dictatorship".  Thurmond is claiming here that the passage of a 
law which overrides state control of voter registration is itself 
"totalitarian", but since even he couldn't straight-facedly claim that it 
would result directly in a dictatorship, he merely claims it will lead to one.  
Such are the rhetorical gymnastics required of a politician arguing against 
democracy-broadening measures on supposedly democratic grounds. 
 110 
exceptional, acceptable only due to extreme circumstances and (therefore) 
for a limited time.  If Thurmond abandoned his views about the 
constitutionality of the bill in 1965, he still retained a sense that it was 
pushing the constitutional envelope in something like the way he 
previously thought.  Even in 1982, Thurmond resisted the straightforward 
notion that Congress was enabled by the Fifteenth Amendment to ensure 
that states did not discriminate by race in their registering of voters. 
Despite these articulated reservations, however, Thurmond did 
nothing to actually stop the renewal from occurring.  It is not simply that 
he voted in its favor; as chairman of the Judiciary committee, he could 
have worked to block it.  Observers expressed surprise that Thurmond did 
nothing; one notable exchange was his questioning of the American Civil 
Liberty Union's Atlanta-based regional director Laughlin McDonald, 
when Thurmond had no questions for him save for some good-natured 
chatting about McDonald's relatives.14  Thurmond not only refrained from 
joining the attempted filibuster of the renewal, he did not even 
aggressively question witnesses who supported it.  Thurmond's 
reservations may have been expressed at great length, but they were then 
dropped. 
So why, given his stated reservations about the renewal of the 
Voting Rights Act, did Thurmond vote for it?  In his own words, 
Thurmond explained his vote this way: 
 
...I must take into account the common perception that a 
vote against this bill indicates opposition to the right to vote 
                                                
14 Details on the exchange can be found in Bass & Thompson, pp. 294 - 
295, and Cohodas, pp. 470 - 471. 
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and, indeed, opposition to the group of citizens who are 
protected under the Voting Rights Act.  I firmly believe that 
this perception is incorrect... a vote against this bill on my 
part would not represent a rejection of the right to vote nor 
a rejection of the civil rights of persons protected under this 
act.  However, I must pay attention to this perception and 
the potential effect on my ability to secure full satisfaction 
of my concerns about this legislation.  Therefore, I have 
decided to support [the bill]... while at the same time 
committing myself to securing necessary relief through 
future legislative action.  In this way, I can make clear once 
and for all, my resolute commitment to the right to vote and 
at the same time gain support for future improvement in 
this legislation.15 
Thurmond voted for the bill explicitly as a symbol.  He denies that a 
negative vote would be anti-black (the plain meaning of his 
circumlocution "the group of citizens who are protected under the Voting 
Rights Act"), but the perception that it would be was enough to change 
his vote.  The symbolic value of "mak[ing] clear" his "resolute 
commitment to the right to vote" trumps what he says are his concerns 
about the bill's fairness and even its constitutionality. 
Thurmond manifestly did not apologize for his earlier positions.  
Indeed, he defended the rationalizations that he had previously used (and 
that other senators used in 1982), reiterating, albeit in a less forceful way, 
some of his "concerns" about the bill that he based his opposition to it on 
in 1965.  He even defended the negative vote he doesn't cast, saying that it 
"would not represent a rejection of the right to vote nor a rejection of the 
civil rights of persons protected under this act."  But he didn't, in fact, cast 
                                                
15 Congressional Record, June 18, 1982, p. 14316. 
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it.  Without apology or explanation, Thurmond changed his vote while 
articulating similar (but far fainter) views). 
Thurmond's rhetorical down-playing of his vote continued his 
studied ambiguity, giving those of his constituents who remained 
uncomfortable with integration something to latch on to.  It also helped 
give rhetorical cover to those senators who opposed the renewal.  But this 
rhetorical cover could not disguise the profundity of the change—if not in 
Thurmond's rhetoric or his politics, then at least in the bottom-line of what 
vote he cast.  Whatever the reasons he advanced for it, Thurmond's vote 
was an epochal change in his politics.  His quibbles and caveats were soon 
forgotten; but his vote would not be.  (Indeed, as we shall see, its meaning 
was eventually inflated beyond any reasonable interpretation of either his 
action or his words.)  While he would not apologize for his past politics, 
he did not continue them either. 
 
Less important as a matter of practical law—but arguably more 
symbolically significant—was Thurmond's 1983 vote in favor of a 
holiday honoring the birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
In the narrowest, most technical sense, a vote for a holiday 
honoring Martin Luther King is not a vote against segregation, just as, 
technically, a vote against it is not a vote for the maintenance of 
segregation.  Certainly, opponents of the holiday offered other reasons for 
their opposition, even if these were frequently seen as rationalizations—
merely the cover-story for dog-whistle politics—by most people.  
Regardless, the symbolism of Thurmond's supporting a national holiday 
honoring Martin Luther King was profound.  However central Thurmond 
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was as a symbol of Southern resistance to integration, King was even 
more central as a symbol of the drive for it.  And the degree to which 
King was seen as the Civil Rights symbol had only increased in the years 
since his death.  Thus whatever meaning Thurmond might have intended 
it to have, for him to vote for a holiday honoring Martin Luther King was 
seen as his admission that the fundamental goals of the Civil Rights 
Movement—integration and the end of Jim Crow—were right; and 
therefore seen as an implicit admission that Thurmond himself had been, 
on the central issues of his early political life, wrong.  He never said that: 
but his vote was seen as having said it, whether he wished it to or not. 
Thurmond's vote took on all the more significance because of his 
long history of disdain for King personally.  It almost goes without saying 
that one of the most prominent segregationists in the country would 
oppose the goals of the most prominent Civil Rights Leader.  But 
Thurmond's opposition to King was not one of respectful opposition.  
Thurmond saw King as a communist dupe, and his anti-communist venom 
was poured out upon not only King's lieutenants—including, famously, 
Bayard Rustin on the occasion of the 1963 March on Washington16—but 
upon King himself.  Also in 1963, Thurmond red-baited King by 
discussing how King "has been a lecturer at the Highlander Folk School 
(in Tennessee) with admitted communists and pro-communist 
characters."17  Two years later, in the debate over the Voting Rights Act, 
Thurmond repeatedly ascribed to King motives both venal and sinister: 
 
                                                
16 See Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 
1954-1963, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988, pp. 861-862. 
17 Cited in Cohodas, p. 345. 
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On the subject of Martin Luther King going to Alabama to 
conduct demonstrations, he went there for a very obvious 
purpose... provocation, designed to produce resistance, 
which almost invariably leads to violence... He got exactly 
what he wished.  There comes to mind at lest two reasons 
for wishing this result: First, to raise money all over the 
Nation... He wanted to raise money.  That was one of the 
reasons for fomenting violence.  The other reason... [was 
that] he wanted to get Congress to enact a law to bring 
more power to Washington. ... Martin Luther King is not 
going to be satisfied.  Martin Luther King wants the 
government to be centralized in Washington.  He wants all 
power to emanate from Washington, along with his 
opportunity to raise money.18 
What I am drawing attention to here is not Thurmond's opposition to 
King's goals, but his clear animus towards King personally, with the 
repeated claims that he was both an opportunist and a seeker after 
centralized power for its own sake. 
In addition to despising—and attacking—King personally, 
Thurmond had long detested King's methods.  Thurmond spoke out often 
and bitterly against civil disobedience, claiming that it bred disrespect for 
the law and, ultimately, violence.  Shortly after King's assassination, 
Thurmond wrote, "Both the assassination of King and the rioting that 
followed his death spring from the philosophy that each man is free to 
obey the laws which please him."19  The phrase "the philosophy that each 
man is free to obey the laws which please him" is Thurmond's dismissive 
description of civil disobedience;20 Thurmond, in essence, blamed King 
                                                
18 Congressional Record, May 3, 1965, pp. 9241-9242. 
19 Strom Thurmond, The Faith We Have Not Kept (San Diego: Viewpoint 
Books, 1968), p. 7. 
20 Thurmond had previously used the phrase in reference to King 
personally, and in regard to civil rights demonstrations specifically.  For 
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for his own assassination, as well as for the riots that followed it.  Later in 
the same work, he spelled out the connection he saw at somewhat greater 
length: 
 
Criminals are men who break the laws for any reason 
whatsoever, even if they are protesting what they conceive 
to be injustice.... "Civil disobedience" is an attack on 
freedom.  It encourages citizens to take the law into their 
own hands.  Even when a "civil disobedience" program is 
aimed at one particular practice, its psychological carryover 
is distributed throughout the entire system of law.  Every 
law, at some point, is going to contradict the desires of 
some citizen.  If each citizen becomes his own judge, then 
impartial justice will disappear.... Most often, the call to 
"civil disobedience" is pressed upon those who suffer 
severely from the depravations of criminals.  It is sad that 
those who are the victims of criminals are also the victims 
of false prophets who come to destroy the law.21 
                                                                                                                                       
instance, Thurmond said three years earlier that "When Martin Luther 
King announced that a mass march on Montgomery, Ala., would take 
place regardless of the decision of the court, that man held himself up as 
being a man who does not favor the rule of law.... One of the leaders of 
the recent demonstrations was not a man who was willing to observe the 
law; and that he was a man willing to observe only laws of which he 
approved, but not the rule of law." (Congressional Record, May 3, 1965, 
p. 9247.) 
21 Thurmond, pp. 26 - 27. It is worth noting the direct ideological and 
rhetorical connection between Thurmond's opposition to the Civil Rights 
Movement (both in his scorn for King's methods and in his trivialization 
of African American concerns about segregation as merely a law 
"contradict[ing]... desires"), and Thurmond's early adaptation of the 
conservative rhetoric about "law and order" which was part of the 
Republican take-over of the South in the later Twentieth Century (a 
takeover for which Thurmond's party-switch was a harbinger, and one 
which Thurmond also aided in his considerable efforts to help Nixon, in 
part on a "law and order" program, win in the South in the year this was 
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Not only did Thurmond not see King as the proponent of a worthy cause, 
he saw him as a force whose means as well as his ends were malevolent.  
Civil disobedience he saw as mere criminality; King he described as a 
lawless man and a "false prophet".  It is no exaggeration to say that 
Thurmond despised everything King was and stood for: the man himself, 
his cause, and his methods. 
Thus the symbolism of Thurmond supporting a holiday to honor a 
man who not only epitomized what he had spent his career fighting, but a 
man whose methods Thurmond had railed against and whose loyalty he 
had questioned, was profound.  In crucial ways, it transcended whatever 
symbolism Thurmond might have wished to promote with it, as it was 
incorporated into the flow of public discourse in ways beyond his control. 
But while the symbolism of Thurmond's vote did not depend upon 
his own construal of it, it is nevertheless illuminating to see how 
Thurmond himself articulated why he voted for the Martin Luther King 
holiday.  In the Senate, Thurmond first defended his previous opposition 
as "center[ing] on the excessive cost", and claiming that he "never 
opposed a day of recognition for Dr. King" apart from that. 22  Claiming 
                                                                                                                                       
written.)  This metamorphosis of segregationist rhetoric into standard 
post-70s Republican rhetoric—which, as I have said earlier, is arguably 
the flip side of my current argument—has been discussed in many places; 
see, for example, Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: 
Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963-1994 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1999). 
22 Congressional Record, October 3, 1983, p. 26880.  Thurmond's claim 
to have previously opposed a Martin Luther King holiday solely on 
financial grounds was false. As Nadine Cohodas points out, four years 
previously Thurmond had opposed a King holiday in the Judiciary 
Committee vote not only on the grounds of cost, but because of his 
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that an alternative means of dealing with this issue was available, 
Thurmond went on to state the heart of his reasons for supporting the 
holiday: 
 
I fully recognize and appreciate the many substantial 
contributions of black Americans and other minorities to 
the creation, preservation and development of our great 
Nation.... [O]ur minority citizens are surely deserving of 
the highest honor and recognition.  Many feel that a Federal 
holiday is a means of annually commemorating those 
significant aspects of American history which are of special 
importance to our minority citizens.  Furthermore, the 
preference of the black leaders with whom I have conferred 
is that the birthday of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., should 
be the focus of such a holiday... the overwhelming 
preference among our minority citizens is for a holiday 
honoring Dr. King, and I respect those views.23 
Thurmond says nothing about the worthiness of honoring King, nor about 
the importance of the work King did nor the cause he fought for.  
Thurmond says nothing about King at all.  For Thurmond, what is worthy 
of "honor and recognition" are "the many substantial contributions of 
black Americans" to the country.  The choice of a federal holiday—and in 
particular the choice of Martin Luther King as the "focus" of it—is put 
down to the preference of those to be honored. 
Thurmond, in other words, is saying that African Americans 
deserve recognition, and that if they want to express that recognition by 
honoring Martin Luther King, he's prepared to go along with that choice.  
                                                                                                                                       
opposition to honoring someone "in the contemporary years following his 
death [with] an official holiday of national recognition"; Thurmond went 
on to list influential people who had never "been honored with a national 
holiday".  (Cohodas, p. 482.) 
23 Ibid. 
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He expresses respect not for the Civil Rights Movement, but for the 
(unspecified) "contributions" of African Americans to the U.S.  He is 
bowing, quite explicitly, to what he sees as the preference in the African 
American community—not saying that he agrees with it.  Indeed, the fact 
that King made his mark on American history by so powerfully (and 
successfully) opposing everything that Thurmond himself stood for 
during King's lifetime is not remarked upon at all.  Certainly Thurmond 
said nothing that would lead one to describe him as being a civil rights 
supporter; this was, presumably, deliberate, in an attempt to mollify those 
of his constituents who might still fervently hold Thurmond's old, 
disdainful views of King and his work.  Thurmond's speech allowed him 
to honor those King sought to help, while avoiding the issue of King's 
goals more or less entirely. 
It is worth noting that there is some evidence for a genuine change 
in Thurmond's views of King—or, rather, his views of African Americans' 
views.  He seems to have been quite genuinely surprised at the powerful 
chorus of African American support for King as the "focus" of a national 
holiday.  Thurmond was taken aback when, in a speech at Voorhees 
College, students applauded King far more than Thurmond's other 
suggested African American leaders to honor with a holiday, George 
Washington Carver or Booker T. Washington; he is said to have told his 
staff "that now he realized how important King was to twentieth-century 
black America."24  At first blush it might be considered surprising that 
Thurmond would fail to grasp the importance of King—and, by 
                                                
24 The speech at Voorhees College is discussed in Cohodas, p. 483, and 
Bass and Thompson, p. 301; the quotation is from Cohodas. 
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implication, the Civil Rights Movement more broadly.  Surely he couldn't 
have failed to notice the passion and commitment of those whom he 
opposed so long?  But this is not the contradiction it may seem.  
Opponents of Civil Rights often claimed that African Americans were 
happy under segregation; movements for change were ascribed to various 
"outside agitators", particularly "communists" (a life-long obsession of 
Thurmond's.)  Blind to the suffering engendered by Jim Crow, many 
opponents of the Civil Rights Movement sincerely believed their own 
rhetoric on this matter.  It was only when Thurmond began genuinely 
listening to his African American constituents that he was able to see past 
the rhetoric of his own cause. 
But as with many of his statements and actions in his latter career, 
both sides could see at least what they wished in his statement: African 
Americans could see the leader they wished to honor recognized, whereas 
those who longed for the days of segregation could console themselves 
that Thurmond was simply bowing to political reality.  In his own telling, 
he was honoring not a leader, and not a cause, but a group of people—
cynically, a voting block—by giving them what they wanted.  For 
Thurmond, the establishment of a national holiday honoring Martin 
Luther King, Jr., was, finally, simply another form of constituent service. 
 
While Thurmond cast other votes on civil rights issues that helped 
perpetuate the sense that he had shifted his views, it was his votes on 
these two issues—the Voting Rights Act extension and the Martin Luther 
King holiday—that established Thurmond's reputation as a changed man.  
It was those two votes that would be repeated in article after article, 
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profile after profile, to balance the facts of his Dixiecrat presidential bid 
and his 1957 filibuster.  His record on civil rights matters was hardly that 
of a liberal; in 1990 he voted (with the majority of his party) against the 
proposed 1990 Civil Rights Act.25  But it was enough to enable the 
narrative of his change—generally unencumbered by Thurmond's own 
explanations for his more recent votes—to become the standard story in 
the American media. 
But there was one other aspect of Thurmond's shift which, while 
less frequently mentioned, was essential to this new image.  The last and 
perhaps most significant thing Thurmond did to change his public stance 
on civil rights issues was simply to fall silent. Thurmond articulated the 
heated opposition to the Civil Rights Movement, and to any suggestion of 
de jure integration, for which he was famous less and less often, until at 
last the issue simply dropped out of his political repertory. 
This silence --- this lack of rhetoric, this absence of passion where 
once he spoke with fiery zeal—is the most difficult aspect of Thurmond's 
shift to elucidate.  Unlike his pattern-breaking votes, or even his 
occasional response to interview questions on his political metamorphosis 
(discussed below), it has left little trace in the historical record.  It is the 
story of things Thurmond failed to say—not even words he didn't use (he 
was never a big user of racial epithets), but ideas he didn't express. 
Ever a political realist, Thurmond's shift can be—and often has 
been—seen as purely expedient, a recognition of the changed political 
climate to which he was willing to adapt.  His silence was an inescapable, 
crucial part of that adaptation.  Did his lack of emotive rhetoric mean he 
                                                
25 Cohodas, p. 495. 
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had changed his mind (but was too ashamed or pragmatic to say so)—or 
that he continued to hold now untenable positions?  No one could know 
for sure.   But if he had continued to speak as he had, he would not have 
had that ambiguity to hide behind.  He would have had to answer for—to 
explain—a past that was increasingly seen as at the very least 
embarrassing. 
Impossible though it is to hear, Thurmond's silences enabled his 
political longevity, and were the foundation upon which his other actions 
and words were based.  The fiery segregationist was gone: whether he had 
been replaced by a quiet one or a reformed one was only able to become a 
question in the absence of the obvious counter-evidence.  Without that 
absence, nothing else Thurmond did or said would have mattered. 
 
Yet while Thurmond may have fallen silent—may have ceased to 
give speeches about the evils and dangers of the Civil Rights Movement 
and all it stood for—he could not fall completely silent on the issue, even 
if he wished to.  Thurmond may never have spoken at the lengths that 
other former supporters of de jure segregation did about his past 
positions; but he could not totally avoid questions about the issue of how 
his past could be reconciled with his (and the nation's) present.  He had 
simply been too prominent a supporter of segregation not to be asked the 
question.  (He is not, therefore, one who strictly and purely held to the 
strategy of silence; but of course, someone who literally says nothing 
about their past leaves nothing to analyze.  Following the lead of the 
Calculus, however, whose key insight is to treat "almost nothing [as] 
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tantamount to nothing",26 perhaps something close to silence, approached 
as a limit, can tell us what silence means.)  However unwilling he was to 
probe the matter, a still-active politician like Thurmond could not avoid it 
entirely. 
But Thurmond's discussions of his segregationist past were 
invariably brief.  They were usually less attempts to answer questions 
about how (or if) he had changed than to dodge them to the greatest extent 
possible.  (Indeed, Thurmond's ability at putting off the obvious questions 
is remarkable, particularly given the centrality of segregation to his earlier 
political persona, as well as his prominence in the ranks of segregation's 
former defenders.)  Unlike other figures, who addressed the issues on 
their own imitative in speeches or memoirs, Thurmond only responded to 
questions he could not avoid.  And those answers—clipped and 
contradictory—were as close to silence as he could come while still 
speaking. 
The following passage is typical of Strom Thurmond's response to 
his past late in his career.  In a 1997 profile of South Carolina's senior 
Senator, Steve Piacente of the Charleston Post and Courier wrote: 
 
Rep. Jim Clyburn, D- S.C., the only black member of the 
delegation and South Carolina's first black congressman 
since Reconstruction, takes a different view... "[Thurmond] 
was symbolic of states' rights and we knew what states' 
rights meant... It meant states had rights and individuals 
didn't." 
Thurmond's response: "At the time, you see, the law of my 
state and most of the states in the South ... provided for 
                                                
26 Robert Kaplan, The Nothing That Is: A Natural History of Zero 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 153. 
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separation of the races. And we merely followed the law 
and followed the custom, that was all." 
"After that, the law changed ... the people of the South 
accepted that," Thurmond said. 
Clyburn agrees that, "Times change and people change. 
Thurmond is the best I know at changing with the times. 
He'll have to tell you what's in his head and in his heart." 
"Certainly his practice of politics changed," Clyburn said. 
Asked if desegregation has helped the nation, Thurmond - 
who became the first Southern senator to hire black staffers 
and who today is an advocate for historic black colleges 
and universities - says, "As a whole, it has worked out 
well." 
Thurmond makes no apologies and says he has no regrets. 
"I only obeyed the law," he said.27 
Thurmond here combines an implicit admission of error, a refusal to 
express regret and a flatly mendacious denial of his past.  The impression 
which resulted from his brief, scattered and contradictory responses was 
continuous with his more general avoidance of the issue: it allowed his 
die-hard pro-segregationist supporters and potential African American 
voters to equally imagine Thurmond's position as according with their 
desires. 
To begin with, Thurmond's claim that he "only obeyed the law"—a 
claim he repeated multiple times over many years—begs the question in 
the most profound possible sense.  None of Thurmond's most famous 
actions in support of legalized segregation—his 1948 run as a Dixiecrat, 
his record-setting 1957 filibuster, his numerous other maneuvers in the 
Senate which delayed or defeated civil rights legislation—had anything to 
do with obeying any laws.  (The Southern Manifesto, which originated 
                                                
27 Steve Piacente, "Thurmond of today looks back on yesterday", 
Charleston Post and Courier, May 25, 1997, p. A1. 
 124 
with Thurmond, was arguably an attempt to support breaking the law, i.e. 
disobeying the Brown decision; but even if one takes it at face value, that 
it was only supporting "lawful" resistance, it was certainly not 'merely 
following' the law in any sense.28)  What Thurmond was doing in each 
and every case was seeking to make laws—or, more precisely, to prevent 
others from doing so.  He became the most famous defender of 
segregation of his age not by obeying any laws, but by doing everything 
in his power to shape the laws that others would be obliged to obey.29 
Indeed, saying that Thurmond is "begging the question" here is 
hardly adequate: he is, by inescapable implication, lying.  He did not 
"only" obey the law: he shaped the law—and worked hard to do so.  His 
claim distances his self—his political views, his actions, his life's work—
from the issue, making it purely external: customs and laws that he 
merely followed.  The essential nature of Thurmond's career—his active 
support of segregation, his embrace of the legal as well as customary 
aspects of Jim Crow—are left out of his explanation.  This is as close to a 
denial of his record as a man with Thurmond's prominent past could come 
without provoking laughter.  The same remarks apply to Thurmond's 
parallel claim that southerners—and, by implication, he himself—"merely 
followed... followed the custom".  Like Thurmond, southerners enforced 
the custom, legally as well as socially (with, in the broader society if not 
in Thurmond's specific case an ultimate underpinning of violent threat).  
                                                
28 The Southern Manifesto has been frequently reprinted; it is 
conveniently available at the web site of the Strom Thurmond Institute at 
Clemson University: http://www.strom.clemson.edu/strom/manifesto.html 
29 Crucially, this was not a single example of Thurmond's use of this 
rhetorical device; it was one of his standard answers to this question. 
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If the words "only" and "merely" are to have any meaning at all, they 
must be seen as falsifying—as proving to be a lie—Thurmond's 
statements here. 
The other parts of Thurmond's statements are equally contradictory.  
To say of something which one sought to prevent that "[a]s a whole, it has 
worked out well" is to say that one was wrong—or that, at the very least, 
one's efforts were in vain.  And in Thurmond's case it is necessarily to say 
a great deal more than that, for he not only sought to perpetuate de jure 
segregation, but he based a great deal of his life and the crux of his career 
on its continuance.  It is hard to reconcile the failure of that large an effort 
with the casual admission that the success of the other side "has worked 
out well": surely he must either be dissembling about his lack of regrets or 
about his admiration of its effects?  At the very least, saying that 
integration "has worked out well" implies—although Thurmond never 
acknowledges the implication—that his earlier dire warnings about its 
consequences were in error. 
In Thurmond's answer one can hear the echoes of an earlier 
rhetoric, the one of the "lost cause" of the Civil War, in which many 
among the later generations of Southerners honored the struggle while not 
regretting its loss.  But it rises to a whole new level of contradiction to 
have such an attitude about one's own self, and not simply one's ancestors.  
It is one thing to have neither apologies nor regrets for another's action, in 
which one can see a misplaced if nevertheless admirable nobility; but it 
requires an alchemical mix of denial and obfuscation to maintain this 
about one's own earlier efforts. 
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A year later, Thurmond gave a different answer to a similar 
question—this time a question which focused specifically on his 1948 
campaign.  As this answer was also characteristic of Thurmond's (few and 
brief) statements on this issue, but displays a different selection of the 
rhetorical tropes Thurmond employed to weave around a real 
confrontation with his past, it is also worth some examination.  In the 
South Carolina newspaper The State in 1998, in an article on the fiftieth 
anniversary of Thurmond's Dixiecrat presidential bid, Thurmond 
responded to a reporter's probing as follows: 
 
Thurmond himself says of the 1948 campaign: "I don't have 
anything to apologize for. I don't have any regrets." 
"I may have said some things that I could have left off," he 
said in a recent interview, "because I favor everybody 
receiving equal treatment. Race should not enter into it. It's 
merit that counts." 
But Thurmond said he still believes the Dixiecrats were 
right. 
"The States' Rights Party addressed a legitimate issue in 
1948 America - whether our states should surrender power 
to the federal government," Thurmond said.30 
As with Thurmond's other answers to questions about his past, this mixes 
regrets with the denial of regrets, and simultaneously distorts and 
celebrates his previous stances. 
Thurmond says in a single breath that he has no regrets, and 
expresses what in any other context would naturally be described as a 
regret—"I may have said some things that I could have left off."  The 
contradiction here is central to Thurmond's strategy: by simultaneously 
                                                
30 Joseph S. Stroud, "Day of the Dixiecrats", The State (Columbia, SC), 
July 12, 1998, p. D1. 
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denying and expressing regrets, a wide constituency can see what they 
wish in Thurmond's statement.  By speaking in such flat contradictions, he 
is in essence saying nothing—as close as speech can come to the "no 
comment" he obviously feels unable to get away with. 
One plausible reading of conjoining "I may have said some things 
that I could have left off" with "I don't have any regrets" is that Thurmond 
is simply minimizing the import of the things he wishes he hadn't said—
that he is saying that while it might have been better not to say some 
things, they were not even important enough to regret (let alone apologize 
for).  This is the point at which the contradiction about his regrets turn to a 
denial of the plain nature of his 1948 bid—that it was a bid to reverse 
Truman's modest moves towards a Civil Rights stance, and to prevent any 
further movement towards African American equality. 
The denial inherent in Thurmond's description of his own past is 
actually a continuance of a sort of denial often articulated by pro-
segregationist advocates at the height of the Civil Rights Movement.  
States' rights was, of course, one of the classic rationalizations for 
segregationists—a way of avoiding the merits of the issue of Jim Crow by 
discussing instead the proper forum for settling the matter.  (This arose, as 
I have discussed elsewhere, by the discrediting of more forthright pro-
segregationist arguments by the early 1950's—a discrediting that was 
itself one of the key preconditions for the success of the Civil Rights 
Movement.)  Thurmond here retreats behind this thin alibi to claim 
simultaneously that "I favor everybody receiving equal treatment. Race 
should not enter into it" and that the Dixiecrats "addressed a legitimate 
issue in 1948 America - whether our states should surrender power to the 
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federal government."  Of course, the central (if not the only) issue upon 
which the Dixiecrats fought for state over federal power was precisely the 
preservation of the lack of equal treatment among races.  To claim that the 
Dixiecrats "addressed a legitimate issue in 1948" while in the same breath 
saying that "Race should not enter into it" is mendacious.  (Even here, 
however, Thurmond leaves himself some wiggle room: his remarks about 
racial equality are entirely in the present-tense; his claim for the 
Dixiecrats' rightness are in the past.  To read this as an implicit admission 
of a change of heart is certainly a stretch—and the fundamental 
contradiction between the lack of apology and the denial of his own 
political platform remains—but it does show the slipperiness of 
Thurmond's evasiveness once again.) 
Thurmond's answer is all but impossible to paraphrase, for he is 
saying everything at once—and, therefore, nothing.  What he did was not 
what he did; what he said was not wrong, although its converse was right; 
he has no regrets about a battle on which he now agrees with the 
opposition. 
Certainly none of this could be said to be a confrontation with his 
past.  In the face of unavoidable questioning (given the shape of his past 
career), Thurmond makes contradictory, evasive and flat-out untruthful 
statements—a mix which allows him to avoid reply without seeming to do 
so.  Thurmond neither defends nor regrets, neither denies nor apologizes 
for, his past: or, rather, by doing all of the above at once, no single 
element can be taken straight.  As was the case with his Senate votes, 
Thurmond's statements allow supporters of every stripe to see their own 
position reflected in his words.  Fervent supporters of integration—
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including, presumptively, the majority of African Americans and at least 
some number of whites—can focus on his statement that "[a]s a whole, it 
has worked out well" and imagine that he has in fact changed his position, 
even if only passively.  Dead-enders who continue to believe segregation 
desirable can take to heart Thurmond's professed unwillingness to 
apologize and his claimed lack of regret.  Those whose position is 
intermediate can see in Thurmond's contradictory claims an ambivalence 
which mirrors their own. 
Thurmond said almost nothing—certainly nothing of any 
consequence—about his past.  And that silence, finally, spoke volumes. 
 
But if Thurmond said nothing of significance about his past, 
another politician said what turned out to be—for him—too much.  This 
episode in recent American political history does not, of course, speak to 
Thurmond's own confrontation with his past; but it speaks in very telling 
ways about the broader nation's confrontation with it—and, in fact, speaks 
to the nation's confrontation with the overall history of segregation as well 
as more narrowly to the specific meaning of Strom Thurmond's career.  At 
the very end of Thurmond's political career, more than a month after he 
finally decided (at the age of 100) not to run for re-election, Thurmond's 
history of vigorous support for segregation became, briefly, the chief 
historical fact in a recent political tumult, leading to a revealing series of 
media spotlights on both Thurmond's career and the place of segregation's 
erstwhile defenders in American public life. 
The episode I refer to is the now-notorious Trent Lott affair, in 
which then-majority leader Lott's remarks about Thurmond's 1948 
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presidential bid caused an uproar that eventually led to Lott's resigning his 
position as majority leader (although not his Senate seat).31  Unlike 
Thurmond's remarks on his own past, Lott's praise of Thurmond was not 
subtle enough—not ambiguous enough—for him avoid offering an 
explanation for it.  Because of this, Lott's words briefly brought the nature 
of Thurmond's early career into prominent public view—but did so in a 
distorted fashion, a distortion that itself can tell us much about the place 
of segregation's supporters in national memory. 
 
The media furor over Lott's comments began on December 5, 2002, 
at a one-hundredth birthday celebration for Strom Thurmond. 
Thurmond had just declined to stand for re-election to the Senate, 
thereby ending his then-unmatched forty-eight year tenure as a United 
States Senator;32 and while no one could have known for certain that 
Thurmond would die within the year, he was an ill, retiring centenarian 
whose days were clearly numbered.  The celebration was intended as a 
piece of intra-Washington flattery, and Lott had no reason to think that his 
remarks would cause a stir.  A live-action puff-piece, the assembled 
                                                
31 Lott was not, technically, majority leader at the time; he had been 
majority leader until the Republicans lost control of the Senate (due to the 
party switch of Vermont Senator James Jeffords), had remained as 
minority leader since that time, and was, as of December 5, 2002, certain 
to resume the role when the Congress reconvened in January, 2003.  At 
the time, he was referred to as having lost his position as majority leader, 
and that convention will be followed here. 
32 Senator Robert Byrd has since surpassed Thurmond as the longest-
serving Senator. 
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crowd's attention was on the Marilyn Monroe impersonator, not on the 
segregationist foundations of the career of the man she sang to.33 
Trent Lott, leader of Thurmond's party in the Congressional branch 
Thurmond had served in for so long, was naturally one of the featured 
speakers at this celebratory fete.  As part of his remarks at the celebration, 
Trent Lott said, 
 
I want to say this about my state: When Strom Thurmond 
ran for president, we voted for him. We're proud of it. And 
if the rest of the country had followed our lead, we wouldn't 
have had all these problems over all these years, either.34 
Lott's comments were initially unremarked: the celebration itself was little 
discussed in the news (the New York Times, the oft-described newspaper 
of record, did not mention it at all), and most sources that did mention the 
birthday bash didn't note Lott's comments.35  It took several days for 
reports from the internet, in particular in the then-new medium of web 
                                                
33 Mark Leibovich, "Strom of the Century: The Hill Sings 'Happy 
Birthday' As Sen. Thurmond Turns 100", The Washington Post, 
December 6, 2002.  Leibovich did not mention Lott's soon-controversial 
remarks in his article, and while he did mention Thurmond's 
segregationist past, he did so with less prominence than he did the 
"chocolate-covered strawberries and bowls of banana and butter pecan ice 
cream" that was served.  He also paired the description of Thurmond's 
past with the standard repentance narrative of Thurmond's career, 
claiming that he "became a supporter of civil rights, whether a signal of 
personal change or political pragmatism." 
34 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Under Fire, Lott Apologizes for His Comments 
at Thurmond's Party", The New York Times, December 10, 2002. 
35 Oliver Burkeman, " Bloggers catch what Washington Post missed", The 
Guardian, December 21, 2002.  Accessed at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2002/dec/21/internetnews.usnews. 
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logs (or "blogs"), to percolate into the mainstream media.36  Lott himself 
seemed surprised when his comments began to be more and more 
aggressively questioned, and his initial apologies were short and sounded 
perfunctory; a few years later, even he conceded that his initial response 
was "not good enough".37 
One reason why Lott might have expected his remarks to pass 
without comment is that he had said nearly the same thing before.  At a 
1980 campaign rally for then-presidential candidate Ronald Reagan in 
Jackson, Mississippi, both Lott (at the time a member of Mississippi's 
delegation to the House of Representatives) and Thurmond spoke.  
Thurmond, speaking first, spoke of his belief that those in the "federal 
government... [should] keep their filthy hands off the rights of the states."  
After Thurmond's speech, Lott took the stage and said of him that "if we 
had elected this man 30 years ago, we wouldn't be in the mess we are 
today."38  While reported at the time in the Mississippi papers, this 
statement did not make national headlines, and was only remembered 
once Lott's 2002 reiteration of the sentiment became a political 
embarrassment. 
Lott himself repeatedly denied that he had meant to endorse 
Thurmond's 1948 segregationist positions, but given the historical facts 
                                                
36 The incident is often cited as the first notable influence of blogs on 
mainstream politics; see ibid.; see also Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: 
How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and 
Control Creativity.  (New York: the Penguin Press, 2004), pp. 43 - 45. 
37 Trent Lott, Herding Cats: A Life in Politics (New York: Regan Books, 
2005), p. 255. 
38 Thomas B. Edsall and Brian Faler, "Lott Remarks on Thurmond 
Echoed 1980 Words", The Washington Post, December 11, 2002. 
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about Thurmond's Dixiecrat run, no other interpretation was plausible.  
The maintenance of segregation was the raison d'être of Thurmond's 
presidential bid; to be proud of a vote for Thurmond was necessarily to be 
proud of a vote to uphold a Jim Crow society.  Lott was unable—even in 
the favorable context of his own apologetic memoir—to state what 
"problems" he might have referred to (given his contention that he was 
not speaking, as he seemed to be, about the "problems" of the Civil Rights 
Movement and the broader moves towards integration). 
Lott's attempts to explain his statement tacked between two 
approaches.  At times Lott sought to give a different substantive meaning 
to his claim that "if the rest of the country had followed our lead, we 
wouldn't have had all these problems over all these years."  For example, 
when asked point-blank by an interviewer on Black Entertainment 
Television what problems he had alluded to, Lott replied: "I was talking 
about the problems of the defense and communism and budgets and 
governments sometimes that didn't do the job."39  But, of course, defense, 
communism and budgets were not the central issue in Thurmond's run—
they were certainly not the reason that he broke (in an unprecedented 
move for a Southern Democrat in the 20th Century) from his party to 
launch an independent bid for President.  Even a rudimentary knowledge 
of the history of Thurmond's bid—one that hardly required a personal 
memory of the era (which Lott repeatedly pointed out he lacked)—would 
have told Lott this.  Nevertheless, caught in his praise for a campaign 
founded on its support for segregation, Lott tried to claim that he had in 
                                                
39 Transcript of Trent Lott's BET Interview, December 17, 2002, available 
at: http://www0.eurweb.com/printable.cfm?id=8182. 
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fact been praising Thurmond as a standard post-Goldwater conservative, 
concerned with budgets, anti-communism and the problems of 
malfunctioning government. 
This explanation coexisted uneasily with Lott's other defense, 
which boiled down to the notion that he hadn't really meant what he said 
at all.  This explanation, while certainly offered by Lott at the time, is 
most clearly presented in Lott's memoir, which was entitled Herding 
Cats: A Life in Politics,40 and published three years after he stepped down 
as majority leader.  Lott's book is framed by the furor over his nostalgia 
for Thurmond's presidential campaign, which forms the subject of both 
the first and the final two chapters; it was clearly intended, in significant 
measure, as a final attempt to explain and justify his comments (it is also 
an expression of his not inconsiderable bitterness towards those—
particularly within his party—who did not support him at the time).  In 
this most generous of contexts, Lott portrayed his words as a piece of 
insincere—and therefore harmless—flattery of a man who, in Lott's own 
words "had treated me almost like a son."41  Lott explained his praise of 
Thurmond's Dixiecrat run as a frequently-told in-joke.  He writes: 
 
As the years went by, and Strom grew more feeble, my 
affection for him increased... the years weighed upon him 
as he neared one hundred, and he slipped easily into bouts 
of depression.  I often rushed over to lighten his mood.  
One way to brighten his spirits instantly was to spin jokes 
about his run for president in 1948 on the breakaway 
Dixiecrat ticket, which opposed integration in any form.  I 
was only seven when Strom was barnstorming the South, 
                                                
40 Lott, op. cit. 
41 Lott, p. 243. 
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and I remembered nothing about the election or the furor 
that surrounded it.  So I'd kid him, "You know, you would 
have made a great president."  His eyes would light up, and 
you could sense that he savored the compliment.  I never 
mentioned the segregation platform he supported half a 
century earlier, and neither did he.42 
In this telling, Lott's remarks on December 5, 2002, were simply the latest 
iteration of an ongoing joke, one without the slightest political content at 
all: telling an old, "feeble" man that he would have been "a great 
president". 
Unfortunately for Lott, this version does not persuade.  It is difficult 
to reconcile his portrayal of his birthday praise as the outgrowth of a 
private relationship with the fact that he had said almost precisely the 
same words in 1980, long before he and Thurmond had grown close (and, 
indeed, before Thurmond had taken most of the actions that would later 
be used as evidence that he had put his segregationist views behind him).  
Further, the difference in wording between "you would have made a great 
president" and "if the rest of the country had followed our lead, we 
wouldn't have had all these problems over all these years" is significant: 
the former is far more credible as a piece of insincere but harmless 
flattery; the latter is more inescapably a political sentiment. 
Finally, as noted, Lott's two explanations coexisted uneasily; the 
former seemed to belie the latter.  Perhaps if Lott had immediately 
abandoned the former in favor of the latter he might have had better luck 
at riding out the political storm.  As it was, any attempt at a substantive 
defense of his words linked Lott more and more tightly with the 
                                                
42 Lott, p. 245. 
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sentiments which, on their face, his words expressed—namely, nostalgia 
for the lost cause of Jim Crow. 
Worse still for Lott's political fortunes, his 2002 words began to be 
put in the context of his earlier actions and words on racial issues—a 
context that did not cast them in a favorable light.  The precise list of 
previous indications of Lott's questionable history on racial issues varied 
with each media story, but the following can be considered representative 
of the litany of facts (and the reportorial tone) which served to deepen his 
political woes: 
 
The Senator from Mississippi appeared as recently as the 
1990s before a white-supremacist group, the Council of 
Conservative Citizens, telling its members that they stand 
for "the right principles and the right philosophy." When 
confronted over the remarks later, he denied any "firsthand" 
knowledge of the group's beliefs... TIME reported on its 
website that in college Lott had led the fight to keep his 
fraternity all white, not just in Mississippi but in chapters 
across the U.S. In Congress he had voted against nearly 
every contentious civil rights measure, including some that 
most in his party had supported. He had filed a friend-of-
the-court brief to argue for maintaining the tax-exempt 
status of Bob Jones University, despite its discriminatory 
policies and its ban on interracial dating.43 
Much of this history, such as Lott's actions as a college student, his 
relationship with the Council of Conservative Citizens and his brief in 
support of Bob Jones University was personal to Lott himself, and did not 
allow for ready comparisons with his fellow Senators.  But Lott's voting 
                                                
43 Dan Goodgame and Karen Tumulty, "Tripped Up By History" Time, 
December 15, 2002.  Accessed at 
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,399922,00.html. 
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record lent itself to ready comparisons, and his votes—unusually strong 
against Civil Rights bills even by the standards of Southern 
Republicans—were raised repeatedly in the weeks that followed his praise 
of Thurmond's Dixiecrat Presidential bid. 
Unsurprisingly, given the nature of the scandal, one of the most 
frequent comparisons was of Lott's record with that of Thurmond himself.  
Two votes in particular—on the 1982 renewal of the Voting Rights Act, 
and on the establishing of Martin Luther King's birthday as a national 
holiday—made for particularly poignant contrast.  In both cases, Lott—
then in the House of Representatives—had voted with the minority, 
against the (respectively) practical continuance and symbolic honoring of 
the Civil Rights Movement's legacy.  Whereas Thurmond, as discussed 
above, had actually used those two votes to (ambiguously, and partially) 
signal his political shift away from the politics of his earlier career.  That 
Lott had voted against these Civil Rights bills when even the once-ardent 
segregationist Thurmond had voted for them made him seem all the more 
die-hard in his nostalgia for Jim Crow.  The narrative pleasures of this 
contrast led to its frequent repetition during the height of the scandal.  To 
take one example among many, at Lott's press conference following his 
fourth apology for his remarks, one reporter said, as part of his question: 
"Strom Thurmond voted for a Martin Luther King holiday. You voted 
against it."44 
In reporters' delight in the nettlesome contrast, however, they ended 
up distorting the nature and extent of Thurmond's own transformation.  As 
will be discussed below, the media's descriptions of Thurmond's 
                                                
44 From the transcript in The New York Times, December 14, 2002. 
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turnaround simplified a complex, and at best partial, shift into a full 
reversal of his views. 
 
Given the ever-lengthening list of impolitic words and actions 
exhumed by the media from Lott's past as the scandal mounted, it is 
unsurprising that Lott's early apologies were received as typical beltway 
back pedaling.  His words convincingly conveyed neither genuine 
contrition nor a genuine empathy for the suffering of African Americans 
during segregation: 
 
My remarks were a poor choice of words that conveyed the 
impression that I embraced the discarded policies of the 
past, and I apologize to anyone who was offended by my 
statement.45 
The inadequacy of these words was captured by blogger Josh Marshall, 
who was one of the online voices which pushed the story into the 
mainstream media despite its initial apathy about it: 
 
...frankly this strikes me as a pretty feeble apology. He 
won't say what 'policies' he's talking about. He won't say 
they're wrong, just that they were 'discarded'.  It's probably 
too much to ask for him to get down on his knees and 
confess his sins. But given Lott's history of flirtation with 
neo-segregationist politics and the seriousness of the 
original statement, something a bit more explicit and 
specific was and is in order.46 
                                                
45 Lott, op. cit., p. 252. 
46 Josh Marshall, Talking Points Memo, December 9, 2002; available at: 
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/000484.php. 
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And in a good example of the way in which powerful political voices 
echoed online writers in this scandal, those words were echoed two days 
later by Lott's fellow Senator, Joe Lieberman: 
 
The policies of the past that Senator Lott's initial statement 
appeared to embrace—specifically, racial segregation—are 
not just "discarded," as his apology put it. They are deeply 
offensive, morally wrong, and wholly contrary to our 
nation's most important ideal.... I would urge Senator Lott 
to come forward with a specific renunciation and 
repudiation of the indefensible days of segregation, which 
are a painful stain on our history, and which either ruined 
the lives or compromised the freedom of millions of our 
fellow Americans.  It's not enough to say his words may 
have been misinterpreted. He needs to speak from his moral 
center and make clear his commitment to racial equality.47 
                                                
47 Joe Lieberman press release, December 11, 2002, available at: 
http://lieberman.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=208178&&.  It is 
worth noting that one politician who does not seem to have commented 
upon Lott's remarks was Thurmond himself.  Of course, any direct 
comment by Thurmond would have threatened his long-term strategy of 
silence about his past.  Most likely, however, Thurmond did not comment 
because he was not able.  By the time of his retirement in 2002, questions 
were being openly asked about his mental state.  As the New York Times 
noted in an article about Thurmond's retirement that predated Lott's 
remarks,  
The matter of his mental acuity is a delicate one. Mr. 
Thurmond is surrounded by a protective coterie of aides who 
will not let him be interviewed and who publicly insist that 
his mind remains sharp. But it is well known in the Capitol 
that the senator's chief of staff, Robert Short, makes the 
decisions in his office. Privately, Mr. Thurmond's friends 
confess that the senator is often confused. 
(Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Thurmond, Set to Retire, Awaits a 100-Candle 
Cake," The New York Times, November 22, 2002.)  Given this situation, 
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One apology was clearly insufficient for Trent Lott to put his praise of 
Thurmond's past behind him.  Two more equally bloodless apologies did 
not improve the situation.  In an attempt to defuse the growing uproar, 
Lott decided to hold a press conference, and issue his most extensive 
apology to date.  
Eight days after he made his remarks at Thurmond's birthday 
celebration, Trent Lott gave his fourth apology, this time in the form of a 
speech to the press (rather than a printed press release or a radio 
appearance), followed by a press conference.  In contrast to his earlier 
reactions,   Lott's fourth apology was more effusive and more direct; in 
his memoir he calls it "as close to a manifesto on racism as I would ever 
give."48  Lott opened by saying:49 
 
Segregation is a stain on our nation's soul. There is no other 
way to describe it. It represents one of the lowest moments 
in our nation's history. And we can never forget that.  I 
                                                                                                                                       
Lott's aides probably worked to avoid having Thurmond comment upon 
Lott's controversial remarks.  
48 Lott, p. 261.  In the index the term is used without the qualifier. 
49 Lott reprints an edited version of his prepared statement (unlabeled as 
such) in Herding Cats, pp. 262 - 263; a longer version, plus excerpts from 
his press conference afterwards, was printed in the December 14, 2002 
edition of the New York Times.  Apart from omitted passages, the version 
in Lott's memoir differs slightly from the version in the Times; for 
example, in one of the sentences discussed below, the version in Lott's 
memoir reads "...the wrongness of his own, early views" while the version 
in the times simply reads "the wrongness of his own views". This may 
reflect the difference in the prepared versus the delivered remarks, or it 
may simply reflect the more general redaction of Lott's statement in his 
memoir.  Lott's editing of his own statement in his memoir does not 
change its basic message or tone; nevertheless, in the discussion that 
follows, I have followed the version from the Times. 
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grew up with segregation here in these communities. But I 
want to note that in these communities of Pascagoula and 
Moss Point and Gautier and Ocean Springs, Miss., we 
worked hard to overcome that and to bring about 
reconciliation and to work together. I grew up in an 
environment that condoned policies and views that we now 
know were wrong and immoral, and I repudiate them. 
 Let me be clear. Segregation and racism are immoral. I 
feel very strongly about my faith. I grew up in a local 
church here. I actively participated. And as I've grown 
older, I have come to realize more and more that if you feel 
strongly about that you cannot in any way support 
discrimination or unfairness for anybody. It's just not 
consistent with the beliefs that I feel so strongly about.  I've 
seen what that type of thing in the past can do to families, 
to schools and to communities. I've seen personally the 
destruction it's wrought on lives, good people. I've known 
many of them personally and I know that there are terrible 
harms that have come out of that era. 
For a self-proclaimed "manifesto on racism," Lott's statement spoke little 
about it.  Each statement about racism's immorality is followed quickly by 
a bromide about Lott's past.  He spends more energy on platitudes about 
his faith than he does on his condemnations of racism.  (The two 
sentences—"Segregation and racism are immoral. I feel very strongly 
about my faith."—are oddly paired: as if most of segregation's defenders 
were not strongly faithful churchgoers!)  And much of the focus is about 
how racism is past—how Mississippi communities have overcome it, and 
how Lott himself has learned better—instead of on the "stain on our 
nation's soul", which Lott barely alludes to formerly supporting.  Even 
Lott's description of segregation as "one of the lowest moments in our 
nation's history" (emphasis added) minimizes what was a period of nearly 
a century.   
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It is also worth pausing for a moment on Lott's description of 
Thurmond's own change in views in his December 13 apology.  Lott's 
description of Thurmond's political evolution was an extreme version of 
the narrative repeated in the national media, but it was very much in the 
same vein.  In his prepared remarks, Lott said of Thurmond that he "came 
to understand the evil of segregation and the wrongness of his own views. 
And to his credit he said as much himself." A few paragraphs down, Lott 
adds: 
 
By the time I came to know Strom Thurmond some 40 
years after he ran for president—I knew of him when I was 
in the House of Representatives, I didn't really get to know 
him till I started running for the Senate and moved over to 
the Senate—he had long since renounced many of the 
views of the past, the repugnant views he had had. And he 
made that public himself. 
As discussed above, the notion that Thurmond "came to understand the 
evil of segregation and the wrongness of his own views" is at best a 
generous reading of Thurmond's later position.  And as for Lott's repeated 
claim that Thurmond "said as much himself," my research has not 
uncovered any such statement.  To term segregation "evil", and to speak 
of "wrongness" inherent in his once-signature political stand, would be to 
deal with his past very differently than Thurmond in fact dealt with it.  It 
would be to embrace not a largely silent, all-but-unacknowledged shift, 
but rather to explicitly apologize.  There are politicians and political 
writers who did just that; but Thurmond was not one of them.50 
                                                
50 Nor was this simply a casual gaff of a politician in the midst of a 
scandal; Lott repeated the claim in different words in his memoir: "Over 
the years, [Thurmond] had transformed himself from one of the nation's 
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Lott's most desperate attempt to quell the furor was an appearance 
on the cable channel Black Entertainment Television, for a half-hour 
interview with journalist Ed Gordon.  In that interview, Lott sought even 
more than in his previous four apologies to remake himself as a champion 
of black America.  Among other things, he said "I would vote now for a 
Martin Luther King holiday," disavowing one of the main items in the 
litany of past actions which were being repeated to give context to his 
birthday remark about Thurmond's Dixiecrat bid.  Lott also, in a highly 
unusual move for a Republican in the early Twenty-First Century, 
declared "I am for affirmative action."51  CNN characterized Lott during 
the interview as "abjectly contrite and apologetic"; Lott himself later 
characterized himself as having "groveled through yet another 
confession".  It is hard to argue with Lott's later characterization of the 
interview as having "achieved absolutely nothing."52   
Lott's groveling did not avail him.  Even after all five of Lott's 
apologies, the media furor around Lott's words continued to build, until it 
finally became clear to him that apologies would not suffice to dissipate 
it: he had to resign his position as majority leader.53  With considerable 
reluctance, Lott stepped down. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
leading defenders of segregation to an unalloyed supporter of civil rights 
legislation." (Herding Cats, p. 244.) 
51 Lott, BET Interview, Op. Cit. 
52 Lott, Herding Cats, p. 270. 
53 In his memoir, Lott attributes this less to the media scandal than to his 
lack of support among his fellow Republicans, particularly within the 
Bush administration. 
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And that—as it turned out—was the scandal's end.  Lott kept his 
Senate seat; few questioned the propriety of his doing so.  Lott continued 
in the Senate another five years without further censure or consequences, 
even considering a bid to regain his leadership among Senate Republicans 
in the wake of his party's 2006 electoral losses.  After his resignation 
symbolically ended the scandal, his praise of Thurmond's segregationist 
presidential bid was largely forgotten.54 
This raises the question of why Lott's resignation of his leadership 
was seen as necessary, whereas his retaining his Senate seat was regarded 
as completely appropriate.  Having examined both why what he said 
became a scandal and Lott's reaction to it, what is to be made of precise 
way in which the scandal played out? 
                                                
54 Indeed, it was even remembered by some as an injustice.  On December 
18, 2007, upon the occasion of his resigning his Senate seat to pursue 
work as a lobbyist, Lott was honored by his colleagues in the Senate.  No 
less than three Senators—Gordon Smith or Oregon, Orrin Hatch of Utah 
and Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania—included defenses of Lott's remarks 
in the course of their encomia.  (See information at the Talking Point 
Memos web site: http://talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/061328.php, 
~/061330.php and ~/061336.php.)  Ironically, Senator Smith's comments 
contradicted his remarks in 2002 condemning Lott's praise of Thurmond.  
(Greg Sargent, "GOP Senator Smith Defends Lott's Segregationist 
Comments—But He Condemned Them At The Time", at 
http://tpmelectioncentral.com/2007/12/gop_senator_smith_defends_lotts_
segregationist_comments_but_he_condemned_them_at_the_time.php.)  
This second-hand praise of Thurmond's segregationist bid does not seem 
to have produced any political problems for any of the three Senators; 
indeed, it seems to have been barely noted in the media apart from 
mentions on various blogs (the same venues, of course, that propelled 
Lott's original remarks into the national conversation.)  
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At the time some presented Lott's retaining of his Senate seat as 
evidence of the lack of concern that the American political establishment 
had with the issue of segregation—evidence, that is, that in American 
political culture, the support of segregation was simply not such a big a 
deal: worth ousting someone from a leadership position over, but not from 
a Senate seat.55 I would argue, however, that this is a misinterpretation.  It 
is not that the political culture of early Twenty-First Century America 
sees support of segregation as trivial; it is that it sees it as easy to make 
amends for.  Indeed, it necessarily sees it as easy to make amends for, 
given the continued power of race (and the prevalence of the political 
descendents of segregationists in American politics). 
Partly, to be sure, the nature of the end of the Lott Affair is a 
function of the social rituals that surround contemporary American 
political scandals: for scandals of a certain type, one level of "demotion" 
is implicitly held to be sufficient, and termination of a person's career is 
not pushed for (this is a strong tendency among Washington reporters and 
pundits who are frequently friends with, and certainly of a social class 
with, the politician at the center of the political scandal.56)  But this simply 
                                                
55 Other interpretations focused upon Lott's likely replacement in the 
Senate by a Democrat, and argued that support for Lott's remaining in the 
Senate was pure partisan politics.  Indeed, Lott himself describes this as 
his primary rationale in Herding Cats (op. cit., p. 274). 
56 Journalist Andrew Sullivan argued at the time that this was why Lott's 
remarks initially were more widely condemned on the internet than in 
more traditional media: "...the media bigwigs really do operate socially in 
Washington and find it hard to pounce on people they know, like, respect 
or need as a source... [that] people like David Broder or Bob Novak 
simply brushed this one aside is a sign, I think, less of their craven politics 
than of their DC socialization."  (from his web log; available at: 
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explains the (ultimately ritualistic) nature of the scandal, Lott's apologies, 
and his ultimate resignation; it does not explain why that particular ritual 
pattern came about. 
American political culture could not ultimately take Lott's remarks 
too seriously, lest Americans be forced to reckon with the living nature of 
segregationist politics, and the powerful legacy of segregation affecting 
every aspect of American politics.  Those realities are commonplaces in 
academic history and political science, but they are truths best left 
unspoken in the world of actual politics.  For Lott's remarks to have had 
graver consequences than they did would force the reexamination of too 
many still-living politicians and, even more, the ideology that many 
politicians have been elected on. 
In his memoir Lott expresses considerable bitterness that members 
of his own party did not lend him greater support—an ire that focuses 
especially upon President George W. Bush and his staff, whom Lott felt 
played a key role in his political fall.  For the most part this bitterness was 
dependent on Lott's unconvincing interpretation of his own remarks, and 
his tendentious presentation of his own overall record on racial issues. 
There is one sense, however, in which Lott's bitterness was 
justified.  The roots of so many contemporary conservative political 
positions and rhetorical commonplaces—to say nothing of the Republican 
coalition as a political entity, based as it is in the post-Jim Crow white 
South—lie unmistakably in the era of segregation: stances in favor of 
                                                                                                                                       
http://time-
blog.com/daily_dish/index.php?dish_inc=archives/2002_12_01_dish_arc
hive.html#390036241) 
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"state's rights" and "law and order," attacks on welfare dependency, and 
much more, have been lifted wholesale from the fight to preserve a 
segregated society.57 
By linking his views so explicitly with the segregationist past, Lott 
—as the third-highest ranking Republican in the country—risked pushing 
these roots into the mainstream of the national political conversation.  
Lott's words stripped away the polite fiction that the supporters of Jim 
Crow had vanished without a political trace—a fiction that at times 
extends into barely imagining them at all, as Martin Luther King is 
reimagined as a fighter without enemies, the leader of a struggle not 
against specific people and powerful ideologies, many of whom remained 
strong even after their political defeat, but against comfortably vague and 
unnamed forces. 
Lott had a certain right to his bitterness: Thurmond was in some 
ways far more the forerunner of contemporary Republicans than the 1948 
Republican candidate, Thomas Dewey.  Lott might legitimately wonder 
why he was to be punished for speaking that basic truth—that a 
significant portion of the supporters of the contemporary Republican party 
do in fact wish Thurmond had been elected president in 1948, and that 
that fact shapes their contemporary political attitude.  Lott was thrown 
overboard, at least in part, to maintain a polite fiction.58  It is 
                                                
57 See Carter, op. cit. 
58 This was noted at the time by former President Bill Clinton, who said of 
the Lott scandal that the Republicans were being "hypocrites", adding: 
"How do they think they got a majority in the South anyway?... I think 
what they are really upset about is that he made public their strategy."  
("Clinton calls GOP 'hypocritical' on Lott", no author listed, CNN web 
article, December 19, 2002, available at: 
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understandably galling to be sacrificed for a public hypocrisy, however 
politically necessary. 
Lott may have felt he was doing nothing more than praising a 
amiable old man; but in truth he was rattling a skeleton that many want 
desperately to keep in the closet. 
 
Even more than Thurmond's death sixth months later, the Lott 
affair gave the country a chance to publicly grapple with the meaning of 
Thurmond's career. 
One noteworthy aspect of the Trent Lott affair was the media's 
embrace of the narrative of Thurmond's change.  Thurmond's voting 
record in the 1980's—particularly his votes on the 1982 renewal of the 
Voting Rights Act, and the Martin Luther King holiday—was cited 
repeatedly as an indication of his changed political position; Thurmond's 
refusal to apologize, or his prevaricating about his earlier motives, were 
rarely if ever mentioned.  To be sure, Thurmond's 1980's voting record 
was mentioned in a specific context, for the purposes of a dual contrast.  
The contrast was not only between earlier in Thurmond's political career 
(particularly his 1948 presidential bid) and his later career, but also 
between Thurmond's voting record and Lott's.  In both cases the natural 
tendency is to focus on Thurmond's changed voting pattern rather than the 
degree to which he equivocated about it; it simply makes for more 
compelling journalism. 
                                                                                                                                       
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/12/18/clinton.lott/index.htm
l). 
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At the same time, in highlighting the contrast with Lott's own 
record, journalists would go beyond the truth of Thurmond's record and 
invent apologies that never existed.  For example, in his interview with 
Lott on Black Entertainment Television, interviewer Ed Gordon asked:  
 
Why didn't you come out, as Strom Thurmond did at one 
point, and say, "Look, I'm a changed man, I was wrong in 
the past, this is how I'm going to right it now"? 
Perhaps a fair question to Lott in the abstract, but as asked, the question is 
premised on a falsehood, for Thurmond never said those words, nor 
anything that could reasonably be paraphrased with them.  Similarly, 
journalist Clarence Page said on PBS's Newshour that "Strom Thurmond 
has renounced the Strom Thurmond that Trent Lott has endorsed."59  This, 
too was a gross distortion of Thurmond's record.  Such remarks by 
Republican politicians were even more common (including, as cited 
above, Lott himself.) 
As we have seen, Thurmond never apologized for his vigorous 
support of segregation; indeed, without ever flatly denying it, he 
mendaciously downplayed what was for decades the center of his political 
life.  But the American media was eager not to taint a prominent politician 
with what had come to be a political sin, and was even more eager to 
forget how recent was segregation's existence as a live issue—and thus to 
cover through the celebration of a whiggish progress narrative the 
lingering and powerful effects of that longstanding American system of 
injustice and brutality.  Thus Thurmond's weak acquiescence to the 
                                                
59 PBS Newshour, December 16, 2002; transcript available at: 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec02/lott_12-16.html. 
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political reality of de jure integration was built up into a full acceptance 
of—or even, at times, being a full-blown advocate for—civil rights. 
Trent Lott, in contrast, had said something which could not be spun 
as being within the political consensus, and thus, despite his multiple 
apologies, he was forced to enact a repentance narrative by resigning his 
leadership position.  Maintaining the myth that the Civil Rights 
Movement overcame opposition without enemies, that segregation's 
proponents all became enthusiastic proponents of a race-neutral 
philosophy, required that anyone who punctured that myth be forced to 
confess his sins. 
Thurmond managed to avoid a confrontation with his past through 
artful silence, ambiguous actions and clever dodging of questions.  Had 
Lott not blundered into a media storm, he would probably have never 
been questioned about his stance on racial issues either: American 
political discourse remains fairly tolerant for voting against key civil 
rights measures (such as the 1982 extension of the Voting Rights Act) or 
powerful symbols of the national embrace of the civil rights movement 
(such as a national holiday for Martin Luther King).  Only an explicit 
embrace of segregation calls for an explicit defensive strategy by its 
proponents.  Lott's making such a statement in favor of segregation (even 
if he denied it was such) put him beyond the reach of strategies that 
Thurmond used.  He was forced—verbally, and with a limited 
renunciation of his power—to enact out a ritual of repentance.  But since 
Americans also do not want to probe too deeply into the persistence of the 
segregationist past, that was held sufficient.  The same desire to believe 
that things have changed—to smooth things over—that enabled 
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Thurmond's silence to be so effective ultimately enabled Lott's repentance 
to be so readily accepted.  America's political culture no longer tolerates 
explicitly pro-segregationist sentiment: but it does not ask of its 
politicians much effort to hide any such lingering sentiments.  A small 
effort will do. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
ROBERT BORK: OPPOSITION TO CIVIL RIGHTS AS A 
TECHNICAL ERROR 
 
A common segregationist argument was that segregation, 
regardless of its merits, must be allowed as a matter of freedom, either 
individual or federal (i.e. as a matter of states' rights).  This defense 
became increasingly common among segregationists as more substantive 
defenses of segregation became harder to maintain, both politically and 
socially.  Yet in a great many cases this defense was combined with others 
which did defend segregation in a substantive way; in many such cases it 
was combined with specific approval, whether in action or words or both, 
of segregation as a social system.  (One example which will be looked at 
later is the case of Lester Maddox, the owner of a segregated restaurant 
who latter became governor of Georgia.) 
One version of the argument, however, might be distinguished: the 
argument in which the individual admits, even proclaims, segregation's 
immorality—claiming personally to oppose it, whether simply socially or 
politically as an individual voter—but nevertheless maintains that 
segregation must be legally permitted.  The most prominent advocate of 
this position was probably 1964 Republican presidential candidate Barry 
Goldwater, who in fact had a record of opposing segregation in some 
instances but voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Bill as a matter of 
political principle (on the grounds of states' rights)—an argument from 
which he never retreated.  Although this argument was often formally 
identical to the parallel arguments from segregationists who additionally 
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advocated on more substantive grounds (that is, the legal or philosophical 
reasons why segregation must be permitted were the same), it was quite 
different as a matter of political rhetoric.  In cases where proponents 
claimed to oppose segregation notwithstanding their defense of it 
(particularly common among defenders of segregation who were not from 
the South), the argument from principle generally stood as the only 
defense offered: the claim that overt segregation was personally 
disapproved of but must, for reasons of principle, be permitted in some 
fashion or another did not mix well with most other arguments for 
segregation, since those depended, generally, on some form of personal 
agreement with the policy. 
Denials of racist motivations were generally an important part of 
the rhetoric of Goldwater-style arguments, since the claim that although 
segregation is wrong (morally) it must be permitted (legally) lent itself to 
suspicion of ulterior motives.  These denials were all the more heated 
since, as previously noted, a great many people who made legalistic 
arguments for permitting segregation actually were in favor of it for other 
reasons as well; still others, doubtlessly, were in fact hypocritical about 
their motives for espousing what was presented as a purely formal defense 
of segregation.  In any given case there is usually no reason to suspect 
hypocrisy; the most that can be said is that the argument was far more 
widely held, and far more heatedly made, than most purely formal legal 
arguments, and that those who propounded the purely formal arguments 
could thereby appeal to those whose belief in segregation arose from very 
different sources—as Goldwater clearly did as demonstrated by his 1964 
electoral bid's then-unprecedented success in the former confederacy. 
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Robert Bork, the former Solicitor General and Appeals Court 
Justice who was nominated to the Supreme Court by Ronald Reagan in 
1987 but was, in a highly contentious political process, rejected by the 
Senate,1 is another of those who, like Goldwater, defended de jure 
segregation on the grounds that it must be permitted for the sake of 
individual liberty while simultaneously avowing his personal disapproval 
of the system.  Indeed, Bork would argue that in his case the phrase "de 
jure segregation" is inappropriate, since he claims that he has always 
opposed state-imposed segregation (supporting the ruling of Brown, for 
example, even if he critiqued its reasoning); what he defended was simply 
the right of individuals to legally discriminate on the basis of race if they 
chose to do so.  Yet if the sort of segregation that Bork defended was not 
strictly de jure—that is, was not mandated by law—it was not strictly de 
facto either, since it did not come about due to non-racial factors (such as 
income or previous patterns of housing), nor did it even have non-racial 
factors serving as a thinly-disguised cover for racial discrimination.  The 
segregation which Bork defended was based explicitly and openly on race 
(unlike typical de facto segregation which arrives at racial separation 
through a purportedly non-racial mechanism), but was not imposed by the 
state at any level (unlike situations that can be strictly termed de jure).  
                                                
1 Although there has not yet been a comprehensive biography of Robert 
Bork, a number of books were written about the nomination battle, often 
from a highly tendentious, partisan perspective.  I have found the most 
useful account to be Ethan Bronner, Battle for Justice: How the Bork 
Nomination Shook America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1989).  Bork's own account can be found in the final section of his book 
The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the Law (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1990). 
 155 
Say, then, that Bork defended maintaining the legality of explicit, 
unapologetic segregation—de jure segregation where the law in question 
was not the law of the state but the rule of a restaurant or hotel. 
It is perfectly true that Bork never defended segregation as a good 
idea or one he personally approved of, rather than simply a practice which 
he felt was and should remain legal (at least in part).  Nor is there any 
conclusive basis upon which to ascribe to Bork any personal racial 
animosity as the motivation for those views—a motivation he has always 
denied, at times angrily.2  What makes Bork interesting as an example of 
the defenses of segregation purely as a matter of law and individual rights 
is that (unlike, for example, Goldwater) Bork changed his mind on the 
technical merits in later years.  Despite prominently opposing the Civil 
Rights Act in late 1963 and 1964, Bork declared that he had changed his 
mind on the matter in 1973—a declaration he elaborated on during and 
after the political controversy over his nomination to the Supreme Court.  
Further, Bork's change of position was not founded on an evidence-based 
recalibrating of the pros and cons—he did not say that, in retrospect (or 
given the new evidence), the need was sufficiently great or its feared 
impact sufficiently benign that the balance shifted in its favor.  Rather, 
Bork's change of position was presented as being as technical as his 
opposition had been.  He had, Bork said, simply made a technical 
                                                
2 At the time of his 1987 Supreme Court nomination, some opponents of 
his confirmation argued that his ongoing pattern of opposition to 
measures intended to help minorities indicated an undisclosed bias; Bork's 
reply was that this opposition was, like his opposition to the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, based on legal principle not racial animus.  Unless some 
evidence of his personal feelings turns up (a letter or a diary, for instance), 
this is not a matter that can be definitively settled one way or another. 
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mistake—an error in his reasoning.  Once he saw the error, he changed his 
position.  By his own account, Bork's professed disapproval of 
segregation had no more to do with his latter support of the Civil Rights 
Act than it had to do with his earlier opposition to it. 
Bork thus serves as not only an interesting example of the 
formalistic defense of segregation but also as an example of one who 
abandoned it—while defending his earlier position as well-intentioned 
and (therefore) unembarrassing, albeit mistaken.  Bork first defended 
segregation as a matter of legal form rather than on the merits; he then 
defended this defense as having been simply a matter of legal form, rather 
than a substantive position.  After presenting a formal defense, he then 
defended the notion of such a formal defense—a formal defense of the 
second degree, one might say.  This highlights in an especially 
illuminating way the issues surrounding the notion of defending what one 
claims to despise, particularly in an era when the very notion of defending 
segregation at all had become political anathema. 
 
Robert Bork first made his opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
public with an article in the August 31, 1963 issue of The New Republic 
entitled "Civil Rights—A Challenge."3  He was invited to do so by his 
friend and colleague Alexander Bickel, a contributing editor at The New 
Republic and professor at Yale Law School where Bork was teaching at 
                                                
3 Robert Bork, "Civil Rights—A Challenge", The New Republic, August 
31, 1963, pp. 21 - 24. 
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the time.4  The New Republic, a liberal journal, took the unusual step of 
publishing an editorial rebuttal to Bork's essay immediately after it; the 
editors declared, however, that since Bork's "fears about the proposed 
legislation are shared by many Americans, including many readers of The 
New Republic," they therefore merited "both a forum and an answer."5  
Bork's piece was, therefore, presented as representative of a common 
view, and as a stalking-horse for refuting that view. 
Throughout his essay opposing the proposed civil rights legislation 
Bork carefully expressed his own disapproval of racial discrimination.  He 
referred to the motive behind the impending legislation as a "justifiable 
abhorrence of racial discrimination."6  Later in the piece he wrote: 
 
Professor Mark DeWolf Howe, in supporting the 
proposed legislation, describes southern opposition to 
"the nation's objective" as an effort "to preserve ugly 
customs of a stubborn people."  So it is.  Of the ugliness 
of racial discrimination there need be no argument...7 
Bork further began his concluding paragraph by noting that "the trouble 
with freedom is that it will be used in ways we abhor."8  Bork was 
evidently at pains to made it clear that he was not defending segregation 
on its merits—that his was a formal, not a substantial, defense.  At the 
same time, Bork expressed that abhorrence only in a rather clinical 
                                                
4 Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the 
Law.  New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990; quotations from Touchstone 
edition, New York 1991; p. 80. 
5 "Civil Rights—A Reply" (unsigned editorial), The New Republic, 
August 31, 1963, p. 24. 
6 Bork, 1963, p. 21. 
7 Ibid., p. 22. 
8 Ibid., p. 24. 
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fashion.  He began by noting that "passions are running so high over 
racial discrimination...",9 but did not give any sense that he felt those 
passions, nor even any particular sense that he understood the passionate 
urgency of others.  He did not exhibit any sense of what Martin Luther 
King, only a few months before Bork's article was published, termed the 
"legitimate and unavoidable impatience" of supporters of the Civil Rights 
Movement.10  Bork's essay conveyed little if any sense that its author 
appreciated the actual, lived experiences of African Americans under Jim 
Crow; what passion was displayed was for the freedom to discriminate.11 
Given Bork's later history as a self-proclaimed advocate for the 
sacrosanctity of the constitution, it is worth noting that Bork's objections 
to the proposed Civil Rights Act were not, in his 1963 article, 
constitutional; they were based primarily on arguments about political 
principle.  Indeed, Bork says as much explicitly: 
 
Heretical though it may sound to the constitutional sages, 
neither the Constitution nor the Supreme Court qualifies 
as a first principle.  The discussion we ought to hear is of 
the cost of freedom that must be paid for such legislation, 
                                                
9 Ibid., p. 21. 
10 Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from a Birmingham Jail", April 16, 
1963; online at http://www.nobelprizes.com/nobel/peace/MLK-jail.html. 
11 Some commentators at the time went so far as to read Bork's statements 
as equivocal on the underlying issue of segregation's morality.  Stephen 
Gillers, in "The Compelling Case Against Robert H. Bork" (Cordozo Law 
Review, vol. 9, no. 1 (October 1987), pp. 33 - 62), for instance, focuses on 
Bork's phrase that opposition to segregation was "said to be rooted in the 
moral order" (Gillers' emphasis) to cast doubt on this point.  I do not think 
this is a fair reading of Bork's piece; I suspect that what Gillers is hearing 
is less doubt about the fact of segregation's immorality than simply Bork's 
lack of concern about that fact. 
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the morality of enforcing morals through law, and the 
likely consequences for law enforcement of trying to do 
so. 
Bork's argument was not that the proposed law would be unconstitutional.  
Rather, he made a three-part case, with two of his objections relying upon 
basic political principles, "the cost of freedom" and a question of a law's 
"morality", and the third being a consequentialist argument about the 
enforcement of the measure.  And of the three, the first two form the bulk 
of his essay.  Bork objected to the law, not on constitutional or legal 
grounds, but primarily as a matter of principle. 
Bork's arguments rested upon framing the Civil Rights Act as an 
imposition of a majority's moral beliefs upon a minority.  He said that the 
"danger" in the legislation was that it would result in "the morals of the 
majority [being] self-righteously imposed upon a minority"; he went on 
add that this "has happened before in the United States—Prohibition 
being the most notorious instance".12  The rhetorical invocation of 
Prohibition is telling.  First, by 1963 the vast majority of the country had 
rejected the notion of banning alcohol; thus Bork was comparing the 
banning of formal segregation to a moral cause which, in the eyes of his 
audience, would seem puritanical if not quaint (rather than to a cause that 
they would agree was a worthy one, whether or not they would wish those 
preferences inscribed into law).  In addition, there is no way that 
Prohibition can be seen as an advance of freedom, or even as an issue in 
which liberty claims exist on both sides of the debate: it was a 
straightforward case of restrictive legislation.  But, of course, in speaking 
of the ending of segregation, this could hardly be said: the proponents of 
                                                
12 Bork, 1963, p. 21. 
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integration were acting in the name of freedom—in this case, the freedom 
of African American citizens to eat at the same restaurants, stay at the 
same hotels and shop in the same stores as whites.  Even if one fully 
credits Bork's concern for the freedom of shopkeepers to deny service to 
whom they wish, the issue must certainly be seen as a balancing of 
liberties (of different sorts, for different people).  Yet Bork's framing of 
the issue cut off this possibility: he presented the matter as a 
straightforward case of moral imposition—which makes the weight of 
"freedom" an entirely one-sided affair.  His description of the purpose of 
ending segregation as the imposition of a moral position was one that 
would certainly not have been accepted by those who supported the 
legislation he wrote in opposition to. 
Within Bork's framing of the issue as the moral imposition of a 
majority on a minority, Bork's central argument was that the proposed law 
was unacceptable because it was an infringement on freedom of 
association.  Bork wrote: 
 
Few proponents of legislation such as the Interstate 
Accommodations Act seem willing to discuss either the 
cost in freedom which must accompany it or why this 
particular departure from freedom of the individual to 
choose with whom he will deal is justified.... There 
seems to be a strong disposition on the part of proponents 
of the legislation simply to ignore the fact that it means a 
loss in a vital area of personal liberty.... The legislature 
would inform a substantial body of the citizenry that in 
order to continue to carry on the trades in which they are 
established they must deal with and serve persons with 
whom they do not wish to associate.... The fact that the 
coerced scale of preferences is said to be rooted in a 
moral order does not alter the impact upon freedom.... 
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The principle of such legislation is that if I find your 
behavior ugly by my standards, moral or aesthetic, and if 
you prove stubborn about adopting my view of the 
situation, I am justified in having the state coerce you 
into more righteous paths.  That is itself a principle of 
unsurpassed ugliness.13 
By sticking to the conception of integration as purely moral issue—
indeed, as an issue that is reduced practically to a matter of taste (Bork 
compares ending Jim Crow with the imposition of "aesthetic" standards, 
after all)—Bork was able to avoid confronting the lived experience of 
African Americans under segregation.  Bork's approach also avoids the 
issue of African American freedom—the freedom of tradesmen to deal 
with whom they wish is discussed, but the freedom of customers to 
likewise is not.  These two omissions combine to a picture of "coercion" 
that is distinctly distorted—and enables the Civil Rights Act to be 
presented simply as a matter of good taste, rather than moral necessity.  
Bork's claim that government intervention to end Jim Crow was "a 
principle of unsurpassed ugliness" (unsurpassed, presumably, by the 
ugliness of segregation) drew much criticism at the time of his Supreme 
Court nomination over two decades later.  Rhetorically, of course, it is 
simply meant as a parallel construction to his earlier admission of "the 
ugliness of racial discrimination," but one can see in context how it 
seemed more heated than Bork's bloodless avowals of commitment to 
race-neutrality. 
Bork also expressed his concern that there is no principle behind 
the legislation which might limit similar legislative efforts.  He criticized 
                                                
13 Ibid., p. 22. 
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Attorney General Robert Kennedy for not "defend[ing] the bill on general 
principles."14  He worries that the law might be extended: 
 
Freedom is a value of very high priority and the 
occasions upon which it is sacrificed ought to be kept to a 
minimum.  It is necessary that the police protect a man 
from assault or theft but it is a long leap from that to 
protection from the insult implied by the refusal of 
another individual to associate or deal with him.  The 
latter involves a principle whose logical reach is difficult 
to limit.  If it is permissible to tell a barber or a rooming 
house owner that he must deal with all who come to him 
regardless of race or religion, then it is impossible to see 
why a doctor, lawyer, accountant, or any other 
professional or business man should have the right to 
discriminate.... It is difficult to see an end to the principle 
of enforcing fair treatment by private individuals.15 
This is the main argument which Bork would later claim was mistaken 
when explaining his change in position, so it is worth noting that this is an 
extension of his earlier argument rather than the entirety of it.  Bork's 
concern for the restriction of freedom (as he saw it) was enhanced by 
what he saw as its lack of an underlying principle (which in turn made 
him concerned that it would be further extended), but it was also 
expressed as a full objection in and of itself.  It should also be noted that 
in Bork's language here we again find a lack of visceral understanding of 
segregation.  It is at best misleading to refer to a refusal to serve African 
Americans as "the insult implied by the refusal of another individual to 
associate or deal with him"; the fundamental structure of Jim Crow, after 
all, was the separation of a class of people by another as a means of 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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maintaining a two-tiered society.  Further, a stronger sense of the history 
of Jim Crow in the nation might well have been sufficient to ease any 
fears about the needless extension of government interference, since it 
certainly would provide grounds for a "logical" limit to what Bork saw as 
the law's pernicious effects. 
After outlining his central argument that the Civil Rights Act was 
an unacceptable violation of principles of liberty, Bork made a number of 
other, briefer arguments, largely replying to arguments by the law's 
proponents (in part to demonstrate what he took to be the dangerously 
unlimited principles behind the bill.)  He attacked the notion that, since 
the institutions in question require government licenses, they are 
essentially public and can be regulated as could government functions, 
since that argument would lead to "discern[ing] the hand of the state in 
every private action."  Bork dismissed the justification for the proposed 
legislation that "barbers, lunch counter operators, and similar 
businessmen" should "serve all comers.... because they 'hold themselves 
out to serve the public,'" arguing that the current discrimination shows 
that "some individuals... do not hold themselves out to serve the public."16  
He attacked the distinction between human rights and property rights that 
some advocates of the bill drew.  And he heaped scorn on the notion that 
passing the law was "necessary to provide legal redress in order to get the 
demonstrators out of the streets"—again, and tellingly, raising the analogy 
of prohibition, saying that those in the Civil Rights Movement were "part 
of a mob coercing, and disturbing other private individuals in the exercise 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
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of their freedom.  Their moral position is about the same as Carrie 
Nation's when she and her followers invaded saloons."17 
Finally, in his antepenultimate paragraph, Bork raised the issue of 
the law's enforcement. Bork clearly stated, however, that this argument is 
not his main concern; "the basic objection is to the law's impact upon 
individual liberty", he wrote, saying simply that "it is also appropriate to 
question the practicality of enforcing a law which runs contrary to the 
customs, indeed the moral beliefs, of a large proportion of the country."  
(There is perhaps a subtle contradiction between his previous implicit 
criticism of allowing popular objections, in the form of demonstrations, to 
compel a law's passage and his concern here that evasion of the law was 
reason enough to question its passage—although Bork might well claim 
that the relevant distinction was between passive evasion and active 
demonstrations with the possibility of provoking violence.)  In any event 
Bork proceeded to question the enforceability of the proposed law, 
arguing that 
 
It is not difficult to imagine many ways in which barbers, 
landlords, lunch counter operators, and the like can 
nominally comply with the law but effectively discourage 
Negro patrons.  Must federal law enforcement agencies 
become in effect public utility commissions charged with 
the supervision of the nation's business establishments or 
will the law become an unenforceable symbol of 
hypocritical righteousness?18 
                                                
17 Ibid., p. 23. 
18 Ibid. 
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Bork then concludes his essay with another invocation of the dangers to 
liberty presented by the proposed legislation, warning about "spend[ing] 
freedom" simply because "an intensely-felt moral principle is involved."19 
In places some of Bork's specific language was perhaps even more 
inflammatory than he intended.  Journalist Ethan Bronner noted that 
Bork's "references in the article to the rights of barbers and chiropodists... 
were especially ill-chosen.  Bork may not have known it, but those were 
codes at the time for the feelings of racists who did not want to have to 
touch blacks."20  Even if Bork's invocation of these racist code-phrases 
was unintentional, however, there is a sense in which they fit the thrust of 
his argument: Bork was, after all, defending the right of racists to act on 
precisely those feelings.  If there was an ugliness in the phrases, it 
mirrored the ugliness of the reality whose legality Bork was seeking to 
preserve.  It is hard to make a case for practices which were grounded in 
admittedly abhorrent attitudes without picking up some of the language of 
those attitudes. 
As previously noted, the editors of The New Republic published a 
collective rebuttal to Bork's essay immediately following the essay itself.  
The rebuttal picked up on Bork's abstraction from the realities of 
segregation, invoking "Justice Holmes' preference for appeals to 
experience rather than logic" in the law; they also invoked the competing 
claims of rights that Bork seemed to pass over.  In perhaps their most 
telling point, they noted that laws requiring innkeepers to serve all 
                                                
19 Ibid., p. 24. 
20 Ethan Bronner, Battle for Justice: How the Bork Nomination Shook 
America.  New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989, p. 68. 
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customers were long established, thereby calling into question the 
existence of (or at least pointing out the pre-existing limits to) the freedom 
on whose importance Bork placed such emphasis. 
This reply elicited from Bork another statement of his views, a 
riposte to their collective parry, in the form of a letter to the editors that 
was published three weeks later, in the September 21, 1963 issue of The 
New Republic.  For the most part this letter was a brief restatement of the 
arguments he had made in his main essay.  Bork wrote: 
 
I find it hard to believe that [the editors] are among those 
who require no license for coercion other than their own 
preferences (read "intense moral convictions" if you 
like).... I suggest that the proposed legislation, which 
would coerce one man to associate with another on the 
ground that his personal preferences are not respectable, 
represents such an extraordinary incursion into individual 
freedom, and opens up so many possibilities of 
governmental coercion on similar principles, that it ought 
to fall within the area where law is regarded as 
improper.21 
The remainder of Bork's letter replied to specific rejoinders made in the 
editors' rebuttal.  He again rejected the distinction between rights of 
property and other rights; he also rejected a comparison the rebuttal had 
drawn between owners refusing customers and employees refusing them 
(on the grounds that the latter could quit, while owners would be unable to 
avoid the proposed law).  Finally, Bork replied to the editors' invocation 
of pre-existing public accommodation statues with the truism that "the 
historical existence of common law duties and local statues paralleling the 
                                                
21 Robert Bork, "Civil Rights—A Rejoinder", The New Republic, 
September 21, 1963, p. 36 (in "Correspondence"). 
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proposed federal law does not in any way demonstrate their wisdom or 
that their principle ought to be extended."22  Nothing in the editors' 
objections—not their invocation of the actual experience of segregation, 
nor their pointing out the competing nature of rights that were at stake—
caused Bork to retreat from his original stance.  The rethinking that he 
would later do on this issue had not yet begun. 
 
Bork's other major essay in opposition to the pending Civil Rights 
Act was an article published in the Chicago Tribune on March 1, 1964, as 
part of a series of opinion pieces the paper was publishing on the 
legislation; Bork's Tribune essay in opposition to the law was paired with 
a pro-Civil Rights Act piece by another law professor.23  As in his earlier 
essay, Bork made clear his personal opposition to segregation, affirming 
without qualification that "racial prejudice is unjust."  In his second essay 
he went farther and condemned those remaining laws which enforced Jim 
Crow (as opposed to its enforcement by individual practice), calling such 
laws "completely unjustifiable" and saying that "it seems certain that all 
of them will meet the constitutional doom they deserve."  Along the same 
lines, he endorsed parts of the proposed Civil Rights Act—specifying "the 
sections on voting rights and desegregation of public education"—saying 
of them that they were "excellent and should be enacted".  But the bulk of 
his essay was, of course, an attack on the bill. 
                                                
22 Ibid. 
23 Robert Bork, "Against the Bill", Chicago Tribune, March 1, 1964, p. 
A1. 
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Bork's Tribune argument was a variation on his New Republic one, 
with differing emphases and a number of additional points.  Bork's own 
outline of the piece listed four arguments, of which the first encompasses 
the major two arguments of his earlier essay, that the law would restrict 
freedom and serve as a precedent for further such restrictions; what had 
been his central concern became in this new presentation simply one of 
several.  Nevertheless, Bork began his Tribune essay with the same 
argument that he made six months earlier, maintaining that the bill would 
be an unwarranted restriction on liberty; in his own words, Bork argued 
that "the intrusion upon freedom [by the bill]... would be of an 
extraordinary nature—for it is extraordinary that government should 
regulate the associations of private persons."24  However, this section of 
Bork's argument is far briefer than the equivalent portion of his earlier 
essay (in both absolute and proportional terms), receiving only a few 
paragraphs rather than the bulk of the argument.  Perhaps as a result of 
this brevity, in Bork's second essay he adopts his earlier framing of the 
issue as an imposition of morality only in passing; for the most part he 
simply decries a restriction on liberty without also characterizing it as an 
imposition of morality. 
As he had in his earlier piece, Bork again followed this argument 
with warnings about possible extensions of the law, giving this argument 
a larger place in his overall essay than he had previously.  Bork wrote: 
 
And this law would set a particularly dangerous 
precedent because of the logical and political 
impossibility of confining its principle of coercing 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
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private associations to the particular areas it covers.... 
The accommodations and employment provisions of the 
civil rights bill cannot be viewed in isolation but must be 
assessed as only a modest first step in a broad program of 
coerced social change.  If, therefore, the principle of 
enforced association which underlies this bill were 
uniformly applied (and, of course, if it is a good 
principle, it ought to be uniformly applied), we would 
have a greatly different society than the one we now 
enjoy.  The new one might possibly be more just and 
moral, but it would quite certainly be far less free.  It 
seems a bad exchange.  We would do better to continue 
to rely upon social change, which is taking place, 
[through] free and uncoerced evolution. 
As in his earlier essay, Bork's argument seems oddly divorced from 
the historical moment in which he wrote it.  It is somewhat strange to 
consider abstract possible extensions of the principles behind the Civil 
Rights Act as if it were being enacted in a vacuum, rather than after ten 
years of intense social struggle over the dismantling of Jim Crow.  Placed 
in that context, fears about the bill's being "a modest first step in a broad 
program of coerced social change" seem less compelling, since the law 
might naturally be seen rather as a culmination of moral and political 
struggle (although Bork might reply with some justice that it is only in 
retrospect that the law's nature as a capstone rather than a step in the 
larger process would become apparent).  It is also somewhat strange to 
refer to the society that would be brought into being by the Civil Rights 
Act as "far less free" without any consideration of the freedom whose 
denial impelled the bill in the first place—given that freedom was, after 
all, the rallying cry of the Civil Rights Movement. 
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The final sentence of the above passage reiterated a common 
segregationist argument, namely, that changes were taking place naturally 
and hence there was no need for legal efforts to dismantle Jim Crow.  
Typically these arguments were a thin cover for those who hoped that 
"slow" would mean beyond the scope of their lifetime, if ever—as some 
of the argument's proponents candidly admitted.  There is no reason to 
believe that Bork made this argument for those reasons, but he did adopt 
the rhetoric and the accompanying assumptions (that Jim Crow would, as 
it were, naturally dismantle itself), of those who did.  This assumption is 
one example of the way in which Bork, in this essay as in his earlier one, 
failed to demonstrate an appreciation of the lived experience of 
segregation, describing it instead in cold, clinical terms. 
Bork's second major argument against the Civil Rights Act in his 
Tribune piece was the question of its constitutionality—an issue which, as 
previously noted, he explicitly disclaimed as his concern six months 
before.  He questioned the bill's grounding in the commerce clause, 
arguing that "if Congress can dictate the selection of customers in a 
remote Georgia diner because the canned soup once crossed a state line, 
federalism... is dead."25  Although he noted that this extension of the 
commerce clause was in fact well underway, Bork argued that the Civil 
Rights Act would be "the last nail in the coffin lid."  He also implicitly 
charged the Congress with hypocrisy, noting that "no one even seriously 
pretends that regulation of commerce is the real motive here."26  Bork then 
went on to discuss what he termed the "perplexing questions" that would 
                                                
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
 171 
arise if the law were based upon the Fourteenth Amendment, due to the 
law's crossing of the boundary between public and private action (in a 
sense, a constitutional expression of his argument about the loss of 
freedom from government regulation of private action.)  Bork also 
worried that the detailed enforcement of the law would require Courts to 
"under[take] political judgments of the most detailed and sensitive 
kinds"—leading, ultimately, to a "government by judiciary."27  In this 
worry, one can see the origins of the line of argument that Bork has gone 
on to champion as one of his chief political causes.   
Bork paid considerably more attention to the issue of the bill's 
enforceability in his second argument against it than he had in his first—
what was previously a tertiary point became one of his central complaints 
with the law.  In addition to his constitutional concerns about the 
boundaries courts would have to cross to enforce the law, he argued that 
the law would be unenforceable as a practical matter, both because of "the 
sheer number of establishments covered" and because of "the fact that the 
law would run directly contrary to the customs and moral beliefs of a 
majority of the population in a large part of the country."28  Either, Bork 
claimed, the law "would completely overload the enforcement 
machinery," or its treatment as a purely symbolic measure, not to be 
actually enforced, would lead to "disrespect for law and loss of faith in 
peaceful solutions to this problem."29 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
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Bork's final concern was that the law would increase racial and 
religious tensions.  He argued that the bill would lead to increased 
litigation, which would result in increased tension.  Further, beyond the 
tension he saw arising from specific new legal battles, Bork argued that 
the Civil Rights Act would "proclaim that law, and hence politics, may 
properly be explicitly racial and religious."30  It is rather bizarre to write, 
at a time before the dismantling of Jim Crow, that something "will 
proclaim that law... may properly be explicitly racial"; he writes as if 
American law had not been explicitly racial for most of the country's 
history—as, indeed, in some areas it still was, a fact he actually noted 
earlier in his essay when he called for laws enforcing Jim Crow to "meet 
the constitutional doom they deserve."  This argument again demonstrates 
Bork's lack of appreciation for the ongoing reality of segregation; it also is 
a further example of Bork's adopting, perhaps unconsciously, 
segregationist rhetoric, for the notion that ending segregation would 
increase racial tension was a standard segregationist argument. 
While his essays in The New Republic and the Chicago Tribune 
were Bork's major forays into opposing the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act, they were not his only ones.  Bork gave Barry Goldwater's campaign 
a position paper arguing against the law which Goldwater used to help 
formulate his own arguments.31  At a time when defenders of segregation 
were increasingly abandoning the fight as lost, Bork, despite his own 
proclaimed abhorrence of segregation, thrust himself into the forefront of 
the debate on the Civil Rights Act as one of its most prominent 
                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 Bronner, p. 69. 
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intellectual opponents.  Adopting a controversial position and arguing 
strongly was hardly a rarity for Bork; throughout his career he often 
adopted controversial positions, at times seemingly delighting in 
provocation.  Yet having argued against the Civil Rights Act was unusual 
in the degree to which it quickly became an unacceptable position not 
only to take, but even to have taken.  For one who was desirous, as Bork 
was, of a role in public, political life, this was a stand which would soon 
come to require explanation. 
 
Bork's first public disavowal of his opposition to the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act occurred in 1973, during the course of hearings before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee on Bork's nomination to be solicitor general.  
Bork was, of course, subsequently confirmed by the Senate and became 
solicitor general (in which capacity he notoriously fired the independent 
prosecutor investigating the Watergate scandal, Archibald Cox, in the so-
called 'Saturday Night Massacre'.)  Bork's 1973 hearings form a marked 
contrast to the hearings on his 1987 nomination, the 21 pages which 
suffice to encompass the entire printed testimony in the former case 
standing in marked contrast to the five thick volumes that make up the 
printed version of the latter.  While it would hardly be fair to call Bork's 
1973 hearing perfunctory, it was routine, and although questions were 
raised, the answers were not treated with skepticism as they would be 
fourteen years later. 
Even in these less controversial hearings, however, the issue of 
Bork's earlier opposition to the Civil Rights Act was raised; Senator John 
Tunney of California asked Bork about his 1963 article from The New 
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Republic, citing Bork's follow-up letter at some length.  In reply to the 
questioning, Bork said, 
 
I should say that I no longer agree with that article and I 
have some other articles that I no longer agree with.  That 
happens to be one of them.  The reason I do not agree 
with that article, it seems to me I was on the wrong track 
altogether.  It was my first attempt to write in that field.  
It seems to me the statute has worked very well and I do 
not see any problem with the statute, and were that to be 
proposed today I would support it.32 
Another senator then interrupted to raise another line of questioning, and, 
with the exception of a brief affirmation on Bork's part that as solicitor 
general he would be willing to "vigorously enforce the Interstate Public 
Accommodations Act,"33 the issue did not arise again during Bork's 1973 
hearing.  
Bork's repudiation of his earlier views was, thus, quite brief.  His 
reference to "some other articles that I no longer agree with" is 
presumably meant to encompass his 1964 Chicago Tribune article on the 
same topic.  Despite its brevity, however, Bork's answer laid the 
groundwork for his later presentation of his earlier article as simply a 
technical error by saying that "it seems to me I was on the wrong track 
altogether.  It was my first attempt to write in that field."  These are the 
words of a person who has made a miscalculation rather than a moral 
                                                
32 Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 
Ninety-Third Congress, First Session, on Nominations of Joseph T. Sneed, 
of North Carolina, to be Deputy Attorney General and Robert H. Bork, of 
Connecticut, to be Solicitor General, January 17, 1963, Washington: U. 
S. Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 14 - 15. 
33 Ibid., p. 16.  The words are Senator Tanney's, asking if Bork would be 
willing to do this, to which Bork replied "Certainly, Senator." 
 175 
misjudgment.  It is also hard to judge what "field" Bork meant when he 
said that his New Republic article was "my first attempt to write in that 
field."  Presumably he meant that it was it was his first foray into 
constitutional law—save that his New Republic article was explicitly 
based upon political principles and not constitutional arguments.  (Such a 
description might fit his Chicago Tribune article, although even there only 
a portion of it was devoted to constitutional worries.)  Bork certainly does 
not here grapple with either the actual arguments he made, nor with what 
problems he had come to see with them.  He simply portrays the matter as 
an immature intellectual effort.  While Bork would later claim to have 
seen the technical mistake he would later describe himself as having made 
by 1973, he did not in fact go into any detail about what the "wrong track" 
he was on was.  We have no reason to doubt his word that his objections 
were unchanged, but he certainly did not spell them out in 1973. 
The other substantive point Bork made in the course of this first 
disavowal was that "the statute has worked very well."  This is, notably, a 
reply only to some of Bork's concerns as expressed in his earlier articles 
on the topic.  Bork did raise questions of enforcement in his New Republic 
piece, but only as one of three basic problems he saw with the law—the 
issue of enforcement was not "the basic objection" which he spent most of 
his article laying out.  In his Chicago Tribune piece, the issue of 
enforcement was given more emphasis; Bork also raised the issue of 
increased racial tensions, another matter to which the practical experience 
of the law having "worked very well" was pertinent.  So perhaps it is fair 
to take this statement of Bork's as an admission that experience had 
shown him to be in error in his previous arguments, as he had come to see 
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that his specific concerns about the law's practical effects had been shown 
to be groundless.  There is no implication, however, that the practical 
benefits of the law helped him see the technical mistake he had made in 
his overall opposition.  One might even see his statement here as evasive, 
enabling him to avoid dealing with his own earlier arguments (the 
majority of which were based primarily on principle and not practical 
concerns), but perhaps such a conclusion is unfair given the brevity of 
Bork's 1973 recanting.34 
At the time of the political battle around Bork's 1987 Supreme 
Court nomination, one of Bork's supporters would say that Bork had 
"acknowledged the insensitivity of his 1963 statement".35  This, certainly, 
Bork's 1973 statement did not do—indeed, nothing Bork has ever said on 
the matter could be fairly characterized as "acknowledging the 
insensitivity" of his earlier article.  Bork's description of his article as an 
intellectual error—that he had been "on the wrong track altogether"—in 
fact implicitly denied any suggestion of insensitivity.  Bork claimed that 
he had made a mistake, not that he had been insensitive.  Being "on the 
wrong track" in a new intellectual field is something that might happen to 
any scholar.  It might be cause for intellectual embarrassment, but it 
certainly carries no implication that one's earlier view had been 
inappropriate, the way an acknowledgment of insensitivity would.  
                                                
34 Though this is how Stephen Gillers interprets this passage (op. cit., p. 
38); Gillers in fact argues that Bork only retracted the practical part of his 
objection, leaving the rest standing.  Given Bork's statement that he had 
been "on the wrong track altogether," I find Gillers' reading unpersuasive. 
35 Gary G. Born, "Robert H. Bork's Civil Rights Record,"  Cordozo Law 
Review, vol. 9, no. 1 (October 1987), pp. 75 - 94; quote on p. 87. 
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Insensitivity implies a quite different view of the way one has been led 
into error, and indeed the kind of error that one was involved in, than 
Bork's statement described.  In 1973 Bork recanted his earlier views; but 
he did not apologize for them. 
 
In the course of the contentious 1987 hearings on Bork's 
nomination to the Supreme Court, Bork's opposition to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 became a far more controversial point.  Bork's record on civil 
rights was one of the central points upon which opponents to his 
candidacy based their opposition.  Civil Rights groups were prominent in 
organizing the campaign to oppose Bork's confirmation.  A talking points 
memo summarizing the case against Bork said that "the primary reason 
for opposing nominee Bork is that he has aligned himself against most of 
the landmark decisions protecting civil rights and individual liberties that 
the Supreme Court has rendered over the past four decades"; one of the 
five categories listed involved cases specifically about racial 
discrimination.36  When the time came for the Judiciary Committee to 
explain its negative recommendation, the issue of civil rights figured 
prominently.37  In this context, Bork's opposition to the most important 
civil rights law of the century was a political flashpoint. 
                                                
36 Cited in Michael Pertschuk and Wendy Schaetzel, The People Rising: 
the Campaign against the Bork Nomination.  New York: Thunder's Mouth 
Press, 1989, p. 127. 
37 In the Judiciary Committee's report on Bork's nomination, they 
criticized Bork's views ten "leading matters" (iii), one of which was Civil 
Rights.  Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be An Associate Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court: Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States Senate, together with Additional, Minority and 
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It was Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts who most 
directly questioned Bork on his earlier opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.  Much of the exchange, it should be said, consisted of speeches by 
Kennedy about the importance of the Civil Rights Movement, and 
decrying Bork for not having supported it earlier.  Kennedy emphasized 
his view that the Civil Rights Movement was "the most significant moral 
test of the country in this century," describing "the terrible burden of 
segregation," quoting his brother Robert Kennedy's description of the 
specific difficulties segregation imposed upon African Americans.38  
Kennedy was, of course, engaged in an effort to block Bork's nomination, 
and his rhetoric was designed for that end.  Yet Kennedy's speeches 
placed Bork's replies in a specific context.  By invoking the Civil Rights 
Movement as a moral contest, Bork's description of his view as a dry 
philosophical belief, a technical error which he had since recalculated, 
was made all the more stark.  Not only did Bork himself not view the 
Civil Rights Movement, and specifically the drive to pass the Civil Rights 
Act, in this fashion, he did not even respond to that view when it was 
expressed to him with a fair amount of genuine rhetorical power. 
Kennedy began by pressing Bork on the question of why it took 
him so long to reverse himself on the issue of the Civil Rights Act.  Bork's 
eventual answer was to say "I do not usually keep issuing my new 
                                                                                                                                       
Supplemental Views.  Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 
1987, pp. 36ff. 
38 Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 
One Hundredth Congress, First Session, on the Nomination of Robert H. 
Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.  
(Serial No. J-100-64).  (5 Volumes)  Washington: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1989, Volume 1, p. 151 - 152. 
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opinions every time I change my mind.  I just do not.  If I re-visit the 
subject, I re-visit it, but I do not keep issuing looseleaf services about my 
latest state of mind."39  Kennedy replied to this by saying that Bork had 
thought the 1964 Civil Rights Act "sufficiently important to publish your 
views" on it, and then said to Bork, "I wish you had been as quick to 
publicize your change of heart as you were to broadcast your 
opposition."40  Bork responded by saying that he had been asked for a 
statement of his views in 1963—the implication being that he did not 
publicize them particularly out of his own motivation, and perhaps that he 
would have publicized his change of view earlier had anyone thought to 
ask.41 
Although a seemingly trivial issue, the question of why Bork did 
not proactively make known his change of view on the Civil Rights Act in 
fact touches on a key issue of how Bork viewed both his earlier and his 
present position.  Bork's reply to Kennedy's question assumes that the 
issue of Civil Rights is just like any other legal issue—a matter for 
intellectual consideration and debate.  If, indeed, it was simply another 
legal question, then Bork's reply was reasonable: he wrote when asked for 
an article, and there would be no reason for him to announce that he had 
altered his position until asked again.  If it was simply a matter of a 
changing political philosophy, or of a technical error in the application of 
                                                
39 Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 
One Hundredth Congress, First Session, on the Nomination of Robert H. 
Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.  
(Serial No. J-100-64).  (5 Volumes)  Washington: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1989, Volume 1, p. 153. 
40 Ibid., pp. 153 - 154. 
41 Ibid., p. 154. 
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a political philosophy, then why would one bother to make public one's 
thinking? 
On the other hand, if one viewed the civil rights struggle generally, 
and the debate over the Civil Rights Act more broadly, as a moral issue—
a crucial moment in the evolution of American values and American 
society—then having taken the wrong stand is not simply a technical 
problem, but a moral fault.  This is, clearly, how Kennedy sought to frame 
the issue—in part for political posturing in a nomination fight, to be sure, 
but also because the debate over civil rights had come to be viewed by 
much of the country in that way: indeed, it could readily be used as 
political posturing because it had become common to view the matter in 
this fashion.  And in that case, someone who had come out on the wrong 
side of the matter would need to make up for having done something 
wrong—and announcing one's change of heart would be part of such an 
act of contrition. 
Bork's blanket statement that he did "not usually keep issuing my 
new opinions every time I change my mind" normalizes the issue of civil 
rights—reduces it, if one has Kennedy's view, to just another domestic 
issue.  His statement that he had opposed the Civil Rights Act because he 
had been asked for his opinion makes perfect sense if it was simply 
another debate on another law; if, on the other hand, it was an attempt to 
finish what the Civil War left unfinished, to correct what has been called 
the 'original sin' of the nation, then having been asked seems an utterly 
inadequate explanation for having publicly and vociferously taken such a 
stand. 
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In addition to responding to Kennedy's questions about why he had 
not recanted his views earlier, Bork also offered a brief history of his own 
thought in order to explain how he had come to oppose the Civil Rights 
Act, and then how he had later come to support it.  Bork testified: 
 
I had come to Yale as an avid free market type.... I made, 
what I now regard as a not uncommon intellectual 
mistake of trying to apply these principles to social 
interactions.... I, at that time, thought that any coercion of 
the individual by government, had to be justified by a 
principle that did not lead government into all kinds of 
coercion that should not be there and I could not see a 
general philosophical principle here that justified this 
coercion.  I also could not see a general philosophical 
principle that would justify segregation by law.  I was 
leaning on the side of individual freedom.  I think that 
was wrong because I do not think any general principle is 
available.  I would now take what I would call... the 
Edmund Burke approach, which is, you look at each 
measure - this is a political matter, not a judicial 
matter,—you look at each measure and ask whether it 
will do more good than harm.  Had I looked at the civil 
rights proposals in that way, I would have, as I later came 
to, recognize that they do much more good.  In fact, they 
make everybody much happier and they help bring the 
nation together in a way that otherwise would not have 
occurred.42 
Bork's description of what he termed "a not uncommon intellectual 
mistake" was rejected by Kennedy, who replied to this history by saying 
that "at a time when men and women in the South and the North, 
Republicans and Democrats, recognized that race discrimination had to be 
outlawed in America, you strongly and publicly opposed civil rights 
                                                
42 Ibid., p. 153. 
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legislation, calling its underlying principle one of 'unsurpassed 
ugliness.'"43  Kennedy rhetorically framed the issue as a moral one: did 
one see the harm done?  Bork, however, presented it as a matter of 
political philosophy, both a switch in which philosophy he held (free-
market conservatism versus Burkean conservatism) and as a question of 
the proper application of that principle—an intellectual realization that, 
since there is no general principle, a simple utilitarian test is required. 
Nothing in Bork's miniature intellectual autobiography indicated 
that he changed his mind on the Civil Rights Act because of any aspect of 
the issue of civil rights, segregation or American race relations per se.  
What he described was a philosophical change in his outlook and a 
change in how he thought about the applications of that outlook—the sort 
of considerations that one might bring to any issue.  This, too, 
demonstrates Bork's normalizing of the matter.  Bork did not even claim, 
in 1987, that the way the law actually worked in practice played a major 
role in his thinking on the matter.  In contrast to his testimony at the 1973 
hearings, Bork invoked the experience of the law in this case only in a 
subsidiary sense: the positive experience is only "recognize[d]" after the 
shift in political philosophy—it is only at that moment that it becomes 
relevant.  Nothing in what Bork said indicated that he had a moral change 
of heart, or that he thought that, given the actual horrors of segregation, he 
had to change his view.  Indeed, by phrasing the matter as a technical 
change of view, he might seem to leave open the possibility of being 
persuaded in the other direction by yet another argument, in a way that 
moral horror would not lend itself to further suasion. 
                                                
43 Ibid. 
 183 
At various points in the course of his exchange with Kennedy, Bork 
defended himself by reiterating that he had personally opposed 
segregation at the time, claiming that he had "said that racial segregation, 
by law, was also of unsurpassed ugliness."44  He also defended his record 
on racial issues by appealing to other aspects of his record, such as his 
work as Solicitor General and as an appellate judge.45  There is, however, 
one way in which such claims represent a continuance rather than a 
repudiation of Bork's earlier views.  After all, Bork had also decried 
segregation from a moral point of view while he was defending its lawful 
existence.  To point out that one always personally opposed segregation, 
even while supporting a legal status quo that would allow it to continue, is 
to imply that such a stance was a reasonable one for an opponent of 
segregation to have taken.  Whereas a narrative of repentance, for 
instance, would have implied an earlier wrongdoing, Bork's stand 
contained the implication that his earlier stand, though mistaken, was 
simply mistaken, and not unreasonable or immoral. 
After Kennedy further pressed Bork on the question of the timing 
of his announcement of his change in views, Bork again defended his 
earlier position—this time emphasizing not the degree to which it was an 
intellectual error, but the reasonableness of having made it: 
                                                
44 Ibid., p. 152; Bork repeated the claim a few minutes later, saying that 
"If you segregate by race, I said that was a principle of unsurpassed 
ugliness, too." (p. 154)  The claim was not strictly true; while Bork did 
refer to the "justifiable abhorrence of racial discrimination" and to "the 
ugliness of racial discrimination," the phrased "unsurpassed ugliness" 
appeared only in reference to the principle of outlawing private 
discrimination, not in reference to the discrimination itself.  
45 Ibid., top of p. 153. 
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The [public expression] of [his] opposition took place 
entirely because I got into an argument with Alex Bickel.  
He wrote frequently for the "New Republic" and he 
asked me to write it up.  I must say that when he saw it, 
he said, your article is a version of liberal thought.  Let 
me say one other thing.  The concern about the rights of 
liberty, as well as equality, was by no means an unusual 
one then.  When Congress came to face the fair housing 
laws, Congress began to make exceptions for Mrs. 
Murphy's boardinghouse because they were worried 
about coercing the individual in that way.  A few years 
after I wrote this article, Justice Harlan dissented in a 
lunch counter sit-in case, talking about the freedom of the 
individual and the rights of equality as being competing 
constitutional considerations.  I think I was wrong there.  
I do not think I was in bad company, with Justice Harlan 
and this Congress, but those are serious matters and it is 
no small thing to coerce generally.  Now, I was afraid 
that the principle of this legislation could lead to coercion 
of association everywhere.  I now realize that we 
legislate partially and never legislate on a general 
principle so that there is no danger that this kind of thing 
would expand into other areas of coercion.46 
Bork came close to once again defending his view here, talking about how 
others found what he had said reasonable as well.  To compare his past 
position with the specific decisions made by Congress in drafting 
legislation no longer even portrays his earlier position as a technical 
mistake but instead as a reasonable position on a continuum; while I 
would not argue that it was intended this way, it might have even 
suggested to some observers that Bork remained open to his old view—
                                                
46 Ibid., p. 154. 
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since Bork was putting forward what the Congress did as a reasonable 
thing to do, and then comparing his old view with that. 
Further, Bork's statement that he later "realize[d] that... there [was] 
no danger that this kind of thing would expand into other areas of 
coercion" raises the question of whether Bork would still retroactively 
support the Civil Rights Act if there were in fact dangers of its expansion.  
(Particularly since Bork among others had protested parallels made 
between racial equality and gender equality—Bork had opposed the 
ERA—and between racial equality and equality for gays and lesbians, a 
cause which Bork had also spoken against.)  Finally, of course, this 
statement showed that Bork still thought of the effects of the Civil Rights 
Act as coercion (rather than, say, liberation), which itself might be seen as 
a ghost of his old views.  For that matter, the phrase "it is no small thing 
to coerce generally" could easily have appeared in either of Bork's attacks 
on the Civil Rights Act. 
I do not mean to suggest that Bork did, in fact, retain his old views.  
People often overreact when they perceive themselves as under attack; 
Bork's defensiveness here presumably led him to say things that he might 
not have with more reflection.  As shall be discussed shortly, when Bork 
returned to this issue once again in the more leisurely context of a book, 
his defense resembled the earlier rather than the later parts of his remarks.  
On the other hand, this sort of slippage might be seen as inherent in the 
type of defense that Bork was making.  A technical mistake is by its 
nature an understandable one—one which it is easy to imagine making 
again.  To defend something as a technical mistake is to say, ultimately, 
that it was a possibility within the realm of reason.  Adding two and two 
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and getting five may be a technical mistake, but adding two and two and 
getting mauve is not.  A miscalculation is a limited sort of error. 
In this regard, it is worth noting what Bork did not say in these 
hearings.  Jeffrey Blattner, an aide to Kennedy at the time of Bork's 
nomination, imagined a possible reply to Kennedy's questioning about 
Bork's 1963 article: 
 
This was Bork's moment, Blattner thought.  All he has to 
do is look straight at the camera and say, "Senator, that 
article was the biggest mistake of my life.  I will go to 
my grave regretting it.  I ask the nation's blacks to forgive 
me."  Bork did nothing of the kind.47 
Blattner, of course, was imagining a political response to Kennedy's 
question; Bork responded with a distinctly academic, even legalistic, one.  
Blattner was imagining Bork adopting what I have termed a repentance 
strategy, viewing his earlier stance as a moral fault; Bork instead 
described his earlier thinking as a technical error—defended it, even, as 
an understandable one.  One does not apologize for a technical error or a 
shift in political philosophy; one simply corrects and explains it.  Whether 
Bork's technique was intellectually valid or not, it was clearly politically 
ineffective, making him look uncaring about one of the central issues of 
twentieth century domestic politics. 
 
It should be noted that Bork's civil rights record was criticized on 
many other grounds as well during the controversy over his Supreme 
                                                
47 Bronner, p. 223. 
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Court nomination.48  Many of these involved his criticisms of attempts to 
remedy de facto rather than de jure segregation, such as affirmative action 
programs, and thus fall beyond the scope of this study; others, including 
Bork's highly controversial criticisms of the Warren Court's 
reapportionment decisions or his critique of the Supreme Court's decision 
overturning a poll tax in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, are 
likewise too complex to get into here, although at the time they were held 
by some to show that Bork continued to hold unacceptable views on civil 
rights issues.  In some cases Bork defended his previously stated views 
head-on; in others, however—such as in the case of Bork's critique of 
Harper—Bork defended his criticisms as critiques simply of the 
reasoning of the decision and not of its result.49  Only on the issue of the 
Civil Rights Act, however, did Bork himself feel a need to so openly 
disavow his earlier positions. 
Yet issues relating to Bork's view of overt segregation did arise in a 
few other contexts.  In one important exchange, the issue of de jure 
segregation also arose when Bork was asked about the case of Bolling v. 
Sharpe.  Bolling was a companion case to Brown v. Board of Education, 
decided simultaneously, which ruled the segregated schools in the District 
of Columbia unconstitutional on fifth amendment grounds (Brown and the 
other related cases dealt with segregation by states, and were based on the 
fourteenth amendment).  Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania raised the 
decision in his questioning—trying to get Bork to admit that some cases 
                                                
48 A useful survey (from the point of view of a supporter of Robert Bork's 
nomination) is Gary G. Born's previously cited article "Robert H. Bork's 
Civil Rights Record"; I have drawn on Born's survey in this paragraph. 
49 Hearings (1989), pp. 154ff. 
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relied upon interpretive methods apart from the intent of the framers.  
After Bork defended Brown on originalist grounds, Specter raised the 
question of Bolling, asking "if you turn to due process and take your 
application of due process of law... how can you justify Bolling v. Sharpe 
applying the due process clause to stopping segregation?"  Bork replied, 
"I do not know that anybody ever has.  I think that has been a case that 
has left people puzzled, and I have been told that some Justices on the 
Supreme Court felt very queasy afterwards about Bolling v. Sharpe." 50  
When Specter then suggested that Bork's acceptance of Brown and 
Bolling meant he was departing from his legal philosophy of relying upon 
'original intent', the following exchange ensued: 
 
BORK.  I do not think I am on Brown v. Board of 
Education. 
SPECTER.  How about Bolling v. Sharpe? 
BORK.  I think there may be a significant difference 
there, and I did not say I sanctioned it.  I think that 
constitutionally that is a troublesome case.  Now it has 
been suggested that if the Supreme Court had struck 
down segregation in all the States under the equal 
protection clause, Congress most certainly would have 
stopped segregation in the District of Columbia.  And it 
would have been a national scandal if they had not.  
Bolling v. Sharpe seems to have been propelled by a 
feeling that if we are going to do this to all of the States, 
we cannot let the federal government do it.  I understand 
that feeling. [...] 
SPECTER: ...but if you start to deal with the needs of the 
nation and you accept in Bolling v. Sharpe to strike down 
segregation in the District of Columbia... what happens to 
your principle? 
BORK: Senator, I did not accept it in Bolling v. Sharpe.... 
                                                
50 Hearings (1989), p. 286. 
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SPECTER: ...Do you accept Bolling v. Sharpe or not? 
BORK: I have not thought of a rationale for it because I 
think you are quite right, Senator. 
SPECTER: You say you have or you have not? 
BORK: Have not... 
SPECTER: Well, I know that you will not reverse 
Bolling v. Sharpe in any event, but it is a very uneasy 
conclusion, Judge Bork.51 
Bork had, flatly, stated that he did not accept Bolling v. Sharpe.  
Under his view of the constitution, it would be perfectly constitutional for 
the federal government to run segregated schools in Washington, D.C.  
This was, politically, an enormous blunder.  As one journalist later 
recounted, "Bork's advisers told him that he could, under no 
circumstances, leave the discussion where it had been.  He must say—and 
loudly, for all to hear—that he would never touch that precedent."52  
Therefore, after a brief recess, Bork asked to "supplement" his answer, 
and stated the following: 
 
I want to make it clear, absolutely clear if I can, that my 
doubts about the substantive due process approach to 
Bolling—and I really think that Bolling said that the 
equal protection component exists in the—we can get 
back to that.  My doubts about the substantive due 
process of Bolling v. Sharpe does not mean that I would 
ever dream of overruling Bolling v. Sharpe... And 
furthermore I should make it clear, as I have said 
repeatedly, segregation is not only unlawful but immoral.  
And I do not want my doubts about a constitutional mode 
of reasoning to be turned into anything other than that...53 
                                                
51 Ibid., pp. 286 - 287. 
52 Bronner, p. 233. 
53 Hearings (1989), p. 288. 
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Yet while Bork stated that segregation was "unlawful," he did not say that 
he thought it unconstitutional—not if done by the federal government: it 
was unconstitutional when done by the states, and unlawful under the 
Civil Rights Act.  But nothing in his view of the Constitution ruled it out 
for the federal government; only morality—and the good sense of 
Congress—did that.  Indeed, Bork has not recanted this view subsequently 
either.54 
In a fundamental sense, Bork viewed the constitution simply as 
law—as a technical matter, no different from any other legal statute.55  In 
such a view there is no room for the simple immorality, or the broad 
structural principles of the constitution, to rule out segregation by the 
federal government.  Particularly in the realm of rights and human 
freedom, Bork's basic philosophy is to emphasize the specifics of the 
constitution.  As one scholar wrote, Bork resists any attempt at "holistic 
interpretation [in which] the reader tries to understand the text as 
something more than an odd assortment of particularized commands."56  
In this sort of "clause-bound" interpretation, there is no room for notions 
of the constitution's fundamental spirit or commitment to liberty, let alone 
to the history of its moral development as a practical instrument. 
                                                
54 He reiterates his arguments against Bolling in his book The Tempting of 
America, for instance. 
55 One (admittedly critical) commentator described Bork's view as one 
which "reduces a constitutional vision to a set of arbitrary and isolated 
decrees."  Ronald Dworkin, "The Bork Nomination", Cordozo Law 
Review, vol. 9, no. 1 (October 1987), pp. 101 - 114, at 109. 
56 Bruce Ackerman, "Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition," Yale Law Journal, 
April, 1990 (99 Yale L.J. 1419); accessed via Lexus/Nexus Academic. 
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Bork's legal philosophy, therefore, leads him to precisely the sort of 
technical approach to the issue of segregation that he offered in his 
hearings—a technical approach which is satisfied to conclude that only 
political will, and not constitutional law, forbid the federal government to 
segregate.  Bork's interrogators saw the question of segregation as a 
fundamentally moral issue, but Bork's legal philosophy has little room for 
fundamentally moral issues.  Bork was presumably sincere when he 
asserted that he viewed segregation as immoral; but he did not think that 
the constitution viewed it that way: it simply outlawed it in certain cases; 
the rest were left open.  Bork's treatment of segregation as simply a 
technical legal issue is intrinsic, not incidental, to his legal philosophy as a 
whole. 
 
Bork gave his other extended explanation of his change of view in 
the book he published in the wake of his tumultuous nomination hearings, 
The Tempting of America.  This book is a defense of Bork's legal 
philosophy of originalism in the form of an overview of legal history and 
legal theory, with a final section explicitly on his nomination battle.  
Bork's explanation of his 1963 New Republic article (he neither mentions 
nor cites his 1964 article in the Chicago Tribune) occurs in the context of 
an extended discussion of Brown v. Board of Education, in which Bork 
argued that the result in Brown was consistent with his originalist 
philosophy, while arguing against various other attempts to justify the 
result, including that in Earl Warren's 1954 opinion (claiming, indeed, that 
the other arguments in support of Brown were not only fallacious but 
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pernicious.)57  In the course of presenting the view of Herbert Wechsler, 
that Brown involved a trade-off between various freedom of association 
claims, Bork digresses to discuss his earlier position on the Civil Rights 
Act, declaring that his error on that issue was comparable to the error he 
came to see in Wechsler's arguments. 
 
The public accommodations provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act were proposed in 1963 as a means of giving 
racial minorities access to restaurants, hotels, and other 
facilities that excluded them.  This was not a 
constitutional matter.  The fourteenth amendment did not 
apply because the discrimination was done by private 
persons, not the state.  The result of the law would be to 
favor the claims of association over the claims not to 
associate.  There seemed to be no generally applicable 
principle of moral or political philosophy available to 
justify the legislative coercion and I opposed the bill on 
that ground.  I was, in a word, phrasing the legislative 
issue much as professor Wechsler had framed the 
constitutional issue.... Since I operated from a 
presumption of freedom and required a general principle 
to justify coercion, I also opposed state-enforced 
segregation as well as state-compelled association in the 
[New Republic] article.  The article was used heavily 
twenty-four years later in the campaign waged against 
my confirmation as indicating that I was or had been 
opposed to civil rights.  Nothing could be further from 
the truth.  The position, as I later came to see, was wrong, 
but the argument proceeded from a concern with the civil 
rights of all persons.58 
Bork went on to explicate what he sees as his earlier error: 
                                                
57 Though as previously mentioned, Bork did reiterate his argument 
against the result as well as the reasoning of Bolling v. Sharpe. 
58 Bork, 1990, p. 80. 
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My position was incorrect because, as I subsequently 
realized, there are no general principles to decide 
competing claims of association and nonassociation.  
There being no correct general answer, the proper 
approach for the legislator is necessarily ad hoc, to ask 
whether the proposed law will do more good than harm.  
What do I mean by "more good than harm"?  I mean that 
society itself will come to see the legislation as beneficial 
and will do so in the relatively short term.  It is a 
pragmatic test, but none the worse for that, and it is the 
only test available for legislation.  The Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 passes it easily.  I said as much at my 
confirmation hearings to be Solicitor General in 1973.59 
Bork then returned his discussion to the issue of the constitutional basis of 
Brown. 
This defense was substantively identical to the one he had 
previously offered at his hearings.  Bork's states that his earlier view was 
mistaken on a technical matter—whether or not legislation ought to rest 
on a general principle, or whether it was perfectly acceptable to view it as 
a specific, pragmatic compromise.  Having rethought this technical 
question (as part of a more general shift in his overall political 
philosophy), Bork now sees that his earlier view was in error.  And that is 
all there is to it. 
Indeed, even some of the defensiveness about the reasonableness of 
such a technical error that he expressed towards the end of his exchange 
with Kennedy reappears in this version of his defense as well.  Just as at 
his hearings, Bork defended his stand by comparing it to a dissent by 
Justice Harlan and some aspects of a Congressional statute (thereby 
                                                
59 Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
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defending the reasonableness of the error even while acknowledging it as 
one), here Bork compares his self-described mistake to the legal reasoning 
of Herbert Wechsler, thereby putting himself in good company—and 
offering a further measure of defense.  It is, the implication is, a perfectly 
reasonable mistake that anyone might have made. 
One difference in emphasis between Bork's explanation of his 
earlier stand in The Tempting of America and the one he gave before the 
Judiciary Committee is that in his book he makes a slight effort to view 
the matter as a moral issue and not simply as a technical one.  Indeed, he 
claims that the concern that motivated him was the same as that which 
motivated those who supported the Civil Rights Act; this is the import of 
his claim that while his earlier "position... was wrong, but the argument 
proceeded from a concern with the civil rights of all persons."  Yet this 
too shows a continuance of a partial defense of his earlier stance: it, like 
the Civil Rights Act, was motivated by a concern for civil rights.  If by 
"civil rights" one means a rather abstract due process of law, then Bork's 
claim has some merit; but if one means instead the problem of American 
race relations, and in particular the long history of a complex web of laws, 
customs and threats designed to keep African Americans as second class 
citizens, then the claim is ridiculous: Bork was earlier opposing civil 
rights in this latter sense, not supporting them.  His explanation for his 
change of view again shows that he mere recalculated, rather than being 
(as it were) overcome by the historical realities of the situation whose 
(partial) continuance he had spoken in favor of. 
Bork's technical defense does not even address his entire earlier 
position.  While it might be considered understandable that a spoken 
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defense, offered in the context of a stressful congressional hearing, would 
be less than entirely accurate in its portrayal of an earlier view, it is hard 
to make that excuse in the more considered context of a book.  Yet even 
this version of Bork's explanation for his technical mistake does not 
capture the various dimensions of the argument he is attempting to 
explain away.  Thus it is not entirely accurate to say, as Bork does here, 
that he opposed the Civil Rights Act because "there seemed to be no 
generally applicable principle of moral or political philosophy available to 
justify the legislative coercion."  As discussed above, the lack of a 
"generally applicable principle" was certainly one of Bork's objections to 
the Civil Rights Act in both its major statements, but in neither was it the 
only one.  Bork also objected to what he described as "coercion" as a 
concern in and of itself—not simply because there was no principle 
behind it.  His explanation of his old view in The Tempting of America 
does not address that aspect of his earlier argument. 
Further, before the passage of the Civil Rights Act Bork had 
practical concerns about its enforcement and even the exacerbation of 
racial tensions—in other words, he feared that it would fail the pragmatic 
test that he here claims that it "passes... easily."  This is perfectly 
understandable as a correction of his views in the light of subsequent 
developments; but Bork does not present the matter that way, or even 
explain that he had practical concerns about the bill at all.  The 
implication from his statement during his 1973 hearings that he had 
learned better from experience is here absent.  Bork would, most likely, 
deny that his perceptivity in matters such as the likely impact of the Civil 
Rights Act could have any bearing on the decisions of a judge; these sorts 
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of intuitions, he would argue, are relevant only for legislators, who make 
law, and not judges, who simply interpret it.  But in the view of his 
opponents, Bork's having been "always on the negative side of the ledger 
by some theory or rationalization"60 showed the same sort of misjudgment 
that he had shown in his estimate of the likely effects of the Civil Rights 
Act; and in their view of the role of a Supreme Court Justice (if not in 
Bork's), this type of lack of judgment was ultimately a disqualifying 
characteristic. 
 
At one point in his exchange with Robert Bork, Kennedy said that 
"lawyers can always make technical points, but a justice ought to be 
fair."61  Bork, obviously, would contend that he had been fair—by which 
he would mean something like "impartial."  But Kennedy's statement 
implied a larger sense of "fair"—a sense of a more fundamental fairness, 
the sort of consideration that first gave birth to the notion of "substantive 
due process" that Bork opposed.  This notion of fairness implies that not 
merely procedural correctness—"technical points," in Kennedy's words, 
which Bork would probably prefer to term being faithful to the original 
intent of the framers—but a minimal set of specific, substantive, 
contentful results are required for a situation to be considered "fair."  
Reversing John Rawls' famous phrase "justice as fairness," the 
implications in Kennedy's use of the word "fair" is the necessity of 
fairness as justice—that without a fundamentally just system, no 
procedural justice will ultimately deserve the name. 
                                                
60 Testimony of Andrew Young, Hearings (1989), p. 1075. 
61 Hearings (1989), p. 158. 
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By 1987, the consensus of mainstream American political culture, 
and the beliefs of the majority of the American people, held that 
segregation was more than merely immoral, more than merely contrary to 
a specific amendment of the constitution.  It was rather a fundamental 
flaw in America's past that had to be mended—a flaw that traced its 
origins to slavery and the very origins of the Republic.  In this context, 
seeing a position on the Civil Rights Act as simply an application of 
political philosophy seems a diminished view.  Bork's "technical points" 
failed to capture the substantive issue of the sweep of American justice—
a sweep in which arguing for the legal maintenance of segregation was 
more than simply a misapplication of a political philosophy. 
As early as 1973, Bork declared that he had been wrong in his 
earlier views.  But he has never declared it wrong to have held his earlier 
views.  In the view of many, this is as deep a misunderstanding as the one 
to which he has long since admitted. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR. AND THE PRO-SEGREGATIONIST 
ROOTS OF THE MODERN CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 
 
One of the main schools of thought in the growing historiography 
of the contemporary American conservative movement—a school of 
thought that both supporters and critics of that movement have put 
forward—holds that the rise of contemporary American conservatism can 
be dated to (or at least was centrally inspired by) the 1955 founding of the 
National Review by William F. Buckley.1  At the time, the argument runs, 
liberal principles were dominant in American life: the Eisenhower branch 
of the Republican party was decidedly moderate, having accepted the 
New Deal that more conservative thinkers still loathed; liberal 
assumptions were dominant in political discourse while conservative ideas 
were marginalized or ridiculed.  Into this vacuum stepped William F. 
Buckley, Jr..  In the National Review, he created a platform for 
                                                
1 The most comprehensive biography of Buckley to date is John B. Judis, 
William F. Buckley, Jr.: Patron Saint of Conservatives (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1988).  A more recent biography from writers with politics 
more consonant with Buckley's own is Linda Bridges and John R. Coyne, 
Jr., Strictly Right: William F. Buckley Jr. and the American Conservative 
Movement (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2007).  In between the first and 
second drafts of this chapter, a searchable online database of all of 
Buckley's writings was put on the internet by Hillsdale College; the 
database can be found at 
http://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/buckley/Standard/index.html.  Also online are 
summaries of Buckley's long-running television program, The Firing 
Line, hosted by the Hoover Institute and available at 
http://hoohila.stanford.edu/firingline/index.php; although, as of this 
writing, the programs themselves are not available at the site. 
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unapologetically conservative ideas.  More importantly, he managed to 
bring together two starkly distinct branches of conservative thought: 
social conservatives, whose beliefs were rooted in the values of 
community, continuity, religion and established order, and libertarian 
conservatives, whose beliefs arose out of a commanding belief in the free 
market as the essential institution for liberty.  Buckley united these two 
branches around the cause whose appeal was most strongly shared 
between them, namely anticommunism.  (Many versions of the story list 
anticommunist conservatives as a separate, third branch which Buckley 
combined along with social and libertarian conservatives.)  Having forged 
an intellectual alliance, Buckley and his colleagues gave crucial 
ideological support to Barry Goldwater, whose 1964 campaign for 
President, despite the magnitude of its loss, inspired many conservatives 
and brought others to the cause—a cause which would eventually find its 
fulfillment in the election of Ronald Reagan, one of Goldwater's most 
prominent supporters, sixteen years after Goldwater's defeat. 
The widespread support for this narrative is due in large part to the 
truth behind it: Buckley did play an important part in forming the ideas, 
ideology and rhetoric of modern conservatism, just as Goldwater's losing 
campaign played an important part in bringing adherents to that cause.  
Yet for all the truth it contains, this narrative is, I believe, too simple—it 
tells only part of a larger, more complex story.  It ignores the connections 
between modern conservatism and conservatism from earlier years; it 
downplays factors such as broader cultural shifts and the impact of 
political happenstance. 
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Despite its oversimplification, the story persists because of its 
extra-historical appeals to three separate groups.  For intellectuals of all 
stripes, this narrative is appealing because it tells of the triumph of a set of 
ideas and arguments—a version of politics in which fiercely-held 
intellectual positions, if long maintained, ultimately triumph: for those 
who care about ideas, and particularly those who care about political 
ideas—and most people who think about such things as the root causes of 
the conservative triumph in American politics will fall into both of those 
categories—this narrative of an idea's ultimate power is obviously 
tempting.  (For conservative intellectuals, who see the narrative as the 
triumph of right-thinking ideas, it is doubly so.)  For contemporary 
liberals, this narrative is appealing because it offers a model to copy—a 
model for success involving the adherence to strongly-held political 
ideals, rather than, say, political compromise or the shifting winds of 
fortune: however unpopular your position now, it seems to say, all can 
change if you are faithful to your beliefs.  This, too, has an obvious appeal 
for those who feel that they are helplessly swimming against a powerful 
ideological and rhetorical tide. 
But the appeal for conservatives is slightly less obvious, though no 
less compelling.  This version of conservatism's triumph—intellectual 
retrenchment in the 1950s, heroic losing battles in the 1960s, followed by 
institutional development in the 1970s and victory in the 1980s and 
beyond—isolates the contemporary conservative movement from earlier 
causes which are now harder to justify, in the contemporary political 
landscape, than anticommunism, social conservatism or adherence to the 
free market.  By beginning the story in the 1950s, for example, the history 
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of conservative isolationism—quite strong prior to Pearl Harbor, and 
maintaining some strength even after the Second World War—is divorced 
from contemporary conservative thought.  Similarly, the history of 
conservative economic thinking, in particular its record of resistance to 
the New Deal is passed over, allowing opposition to the policies of a 
president whose memory has been burnished by time and triumph in war 
to be separated from opposition to the man himself.2  The story even 
manages to elide to some degree the roots of contemporary conservatism 
in McCarthyism, despite Buckley's open embrace of McCarthy (Buckley's 
second book was a defense of the Wisconsin Senator, published in the 
year of his censure by the Senate). 
Above all, however, this version of the triumph of conservatism 
dances around the shift in political demographics that lies at the heart of 
the electoral triumph of contemporary conservatism: the shifting of the 
South from a virtually one-party region united in its support for 
Democrats (albeit generally for conservative Democrats at a time when 
party divisions aligned far less well with ideological ones than has since 
become the case) to a region overwhelmingly dominated by conservative 
Republicans.  It equally avoids the connections of modern conservatism to 
the mainspring of southern conservatism, namely, racial politics.  By 
telling the story of conservatism's roots as involving three branches—
social conservatism, libertarianism and anti-communism—it avoids a 
                                                
2 Openly opposing the New Deal as such, rather than simply promoting 
ideas which run counter to it, has become more prominent in recent years 
with the rise of the "constitution in exile" movement among legal 
thinkers, which holds that the so-called constitutional revolution of 1937 
was fundamentally illegitimate and ought to be reversed. 
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major fourth branch, racial conservatism, that was central to 
conservatism's ideological and demographic triumph.  Even if one accepts 
the contemporary contention of many southern conservatives, that racial 
feelings and a concern for racial policy was not at the heart of the South's 
political shift, it is hard to deny that it was a focus on racial issues that 
laid the ideological and social groundwork for their receptiveness to other 
conservative ideological appeals.3  In contemporary times, racial 
conservatism seems ugly, and it is understandable that conservative 
thinkers would be inclined to tell the story of conservatism's rise in such a 
way as to avoid its historical role.4  
Yet even this preferred story cannot entirely edit out the connection 
of conservative thought to racial politics.  For in the early days of the 
National Review, support for southern segregationists was a recurring 
                                                
3 While the standard narrative as described above remains a powerful one, 
the importance of racial politics to the conservative movement is being 
increasingly written about.  The works of Dan Carter—both his biography 
of George Wallace and his lectures From George Wallace to Newt 
Gingrich—were seminal in this regard.  A more recent work exploring 
these connections is Kevin M. Kruse's White Flight.  And new books 
continue to delve into this history; two works, which are both forthcoming 
as of the current writing, are Allan J. Lichtman, White Protestant Nation : 
The Rise of the American Conservative Movement (forthcoming from 
Atlantic Monthly Press) and Joseph E. Lowndes, From the New Deal to 
the New Right : Race and the Southern Origins of Modern Conservatism 
(forthcoming from Yale University Press).  So while the above 
description of the "dominant narrative" remains correct as of the present 
writing, this dominance is waning, and may eventual erode entirely.  
4 This is, of course, not a phenomenon unique to the political right.  It has 
its parallels in the way that many on the contemporary left seek to play 
down the attraction of communism in the mid-twentieth century, and to 
play down the level of (some) leftists' apologetics for the Soviet Union 
and other communist countries. 
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stance taken in the magazine, and its influential editor was outspoken in 
his support for the segregationist position, albeit inconsistently.  True, 
support for segregation was never as central to Buckley and other writers 
for the National Review's political philosophy as support for free markets, 
anti-communism or other issues.  Yet the stance they took was clear.  And 
the later shifting of political fashions and ideological assumptions left 
them, as it left others, with the task of explaining their earlier positions—
to hostile critics, to supporters and to themselves. 
William F. Buckley's stance on segregationist politics was a 
somewhat fluctuating one throughout his career as a public intellectual.  
Though generally supportive of segregationist stances in the 1950's and 
1960's, he was not entirely consistent in that support, backing down 
slightly from his strongest statement in support of segregation soon after it 
was made, then later saying other things that continued to put him in the 
mainstream of segregationist argument.  At other times, however, he 
would put forward somewhat more vacillating positions—while, at the 
same time, publishing work by less hesitant writers in his magazine.  And 
he was inconsistent in his later explanations of his own previous position, 
at times declaring it mistaken, but usually in evasive ways; on occasion 
Buckley even continued to defend his earlier stances.  This inconsistency 
is all the more remarkable since, in other matters, Buckley was 
remarkably consistent in the political stances he has adopted in his more 
than fifty-year career as a public intellectual.  The cageyness with which 
Buckley in his later career addressed the issue of Jim Crow reflected the 
difficulty that the contemporary conservative movement has in 
confronting head-on its connection to a school of thought now 
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considered—within as well as outside of the conservative movement—
beyond the pale. 
 
William F. Buckley's most prominent statement on segregation 
came in a 1957 editorial on the issue of voting rights and, more broadly, 
the place of African Americans in the South.  (The editorial was unsigned, 
but Buckley later admitted to its authorship in the course of a 1985 libel 
trial.5)  Buckley's editorial was titled "Why the South Must Prevail," and 
was set apart from the usual run of National Review editorials by 
receiving cover billing.6 
Buckley framed his editorial around the issue of jury nullification.  
He began by celebrating a Senate vote "to guarantee to defendants in a 
criminal contempt action the privilege of a jury trial"7 as 
 
...a conservative victory.  For the effect of it is—and let 
us speak about it bluntly—to permit a jury to modify or 
waive the law in such circumstances as, in the judgment 
of the jury, require so grave an interposition between the 
law and its violator.  What kind of circumstances do we 
speak about? ... In some parts of the South, the White 
community merely intends to prevail—that is all.  It 
means to prevail on any issue on which there is corporate 
disagreement between Negro and White.  The White 
community will take whatever measures are necessary to 
                                                
5 Lawrence Feinberg, "Lawyer Puts Buckley on Firing Line in D.C. Libel 
Trial", the Washington Post, October 11, 1985, p. C7. 
6 At the time, the standard format for the National Review's covers was to 
prominently list three articles by title and author, with a list of other 
contributors below; Buckley's "Why the South Must Prevail" editorial was 
unusual in being one of the top-billed pieces. 
7 "Why the South Must Prevail", National Review, August 24, 1957, pp. 
148 - 149. 
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make certain that it has its way.  What are such issues? ... 
The NAACP and others insist that the Negroes as a unit 
want integrated schools. ...if the NAACP is correct... 
[t]he Negroes would, according to democratic processes, 
win the election; but that is the kind of situation the 
White community will not permit.  The White 
community will not count the marginal Negro vote.  The 
man who didn't count it will be hauled up before a jury, 
he will plead not guilty, and the jury, upon deliberation, 
will find him not guilty.  A federal judge, in a similar 
situation, might find the defendant guilty, a judgment 
which would affirm the law and conform with the 
relevant political abstractions, but whose consequences 
might be violent and anarchistic. 8 
Buckley thus ended up approving of jury nullification—at least in this 
case, given the ends at stake—which, as Buckley frankly admitted, was 
the disenfranchisement of African Americans for the purpose of 
maintaining segregation.  An argument approving of an extralegal 
mechanism such as jury nullification might seem a strange one for a noted 
conservative to make—as, indeed, Buckley's brother-in-law, L. Brent 
Bozell, would point out in a reply to Buckley's editorial (discussed in 
                                                
8 Ibid. My ellipses edit out a rather bizarre detour Buckley made, claiming 
that "The South does not want to deprive the Negro of a vote for the sake 
of depriving him of the vote" since, after all, "Political scientists assert 
that minorities do not vote as a unit"—a claim that seemed designed to 
ridicule sociologists as much as to address the matter at hand, since the 
progression of his own argument showed that he himself does not believe 
it (as he went on to deal with precisely the opposite case as the crucial 
one.)  This line of argument may have been intended to demonstrate the 
good will of white Southerners, or it may have been intended to deal with 
potential critics who would deny that African Americans would vote 
differently than whites on issues such as school integration.  In any event, 
he dropped this line of argument and went on to address the issue of 
African American disenfranchisement as if it would make a practical, 
political and cultural difference. 
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detail below).  But of course the historical context placed defenders of the 
law as such in a difficult position if they wished to defend de jure 
segregation as well, because since Brown v. Board of Education the 
federal judiciary had come down firmly on the side of integration.  Of 
course, other arguments, such as the claim that the Supreme Court 
decision itself was unconstitutional or that states could nullify decisions 
they disagreed with were open to conservatives caught in this dilemma 
(and these were made as well.)  So it is perhaps a sign of the seriousness 
with which Buckley took the issue of maintaining segregation that he was 
willing to let it trump issues of formal legality. 
After several paragraphs of dancing around the issue of jury 
nullification, Buckley arrived at the heart of the matter, namely, the 
disenfranchisement of African Americans—and the consequent 
perpetuation of Jim Crow—which were the issues that, in Buckley's view, 
justified jury nullification in the first place.  In words that would become 
somewhat infamous, Buckley wrote the following: 
 
The central question that emerges—and it is not a 
parliamentary question or a question that is answered by 
merely consulting a catalogue of the rights of American 
citizens, born Equal—is whether the White community in 
the South is entitled to take such measures as are 
necessary to prevail, politically and culturally, in areas in 
which it does not predominate numerically.  The sobering 
answer is Yes—the White community is so entitled 
because, for the time being, it is the advanced race.  It is 
not easy, and it is unpleasant, to adduce statistics 
evidencing the median cultural superiority of White over 
Negro: but it is a fact that obtrudes, one that cannot be 
hidden by ever-so-busy egalitarians and anthropologists.  
The question, as far as the White community is 
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concerned, is whether the claims of civilization supersede 
those of universal suffrage.  The British believe they do, 
and acted accordingly, in Kenya, where the choice was 
dramatically one between civilization and barbarism, and 
elsewhere; the South, where the conflict is by no means 
dramatic, as in Kenya, nevertheless perceives important 
qualitative differences between its culture and the 
Negroes', and intends to assert its own. 
NATIONAL REVIEW believes that the South's premises 
are correct.  If the majority wills what is socially 
atavistic, then to thwart the majority may be, though 
undemocratic, enlightened.  It is more important for any 
community, anywhere in the world, to affirm and live by 
civilized standards, than to bow to the demands of the 
numerical majority.9 
More than anything else he ever wrote, Buckley's claim that "the White 
community... for the time being... is the advanced race" would be cited as 
proof of his racism.  His reaction to that charge will be discussed below.  
Yet apart from the odiousness of that particular phrase, it is noteworthy 
that Buckley's argument was quite a standard argument for segregation: 
the notion of cultural superiority—often tied together with notions of 
"tutelage" (which, as we shall see, Buckley addressed later in his essay)—
was one of the common arguments that proponents of segregation used to 
support their case. 
At the same time, however, it is far from the least egregious.  
Buckley did not make simply an argument from freedom of association, 
for example, arguing that whites have a right not to associate with African 
Americans if they so choose.  Nor did he make the argument that 
integration is a communist program—which is particularly noteworthy, 
                                                
9 Ibid.; emphasis in the original. 
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given Buckley's intense, ongoing focus on anti-communism.10  Such 
arguments could at least maintain a pretense of racial neutrality; Buckley's 
arguments, in contrast, were made on what can only be termed explicitly 
racist grounds.  Unsurprisingly, Buckley did not attempt to spell out 
precisely what he might mean by the necessity "to affirm and live by 
civilized standards," nor why he believed that an integrated society would 
make that impossible. 
Buckley continued his essay by arguing that the entire notion of 
universal suffrage is mistaken, citing as among those without the vote 
twenty year olds11 and residents of Washington, D.C.; he also cited the 
fact that many with the franchise do not vote as a count against its 
importance.  (In later years, Buckley would defend his earlier thinking by 
noting, accurately, that he never believed in universal suffrage as a 
principle.)  Buckley then ended his piece with an exhortation to the 
(white) South: 
 
The South confronts one grave moral challenge.  It must 
not exploit the fact of Negro backwardness to preserve 
the Negro as a servile class.  It is tempting and 
convenient to block the progress of a minority whose 
services, as menials, are economically useful.  Let the 
South never permit itself to do this.  So long as it is 
merely asserting the right to impose superior mores for 
whatever period it takes to effect a genuine cultural 
                                                
10 Though this argument had recently been made in the National Review: 
Richard Weaver wrote a piece just over a month before titled "Integration 
is Communization" (National Review, July 13, 1957, pp. 67 - 68) in which 
he argued that "'Integration' and 'Communization' are... pretty closely 
synonymous." 
11 This was, of course, before the ratification of the twenty-sixth 
amendment, which lowered the voting age to 18. 
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equality between the races, and so long as it does so by 
humane and charitable means, the South is in step with 
civilization, as is the Congress that permits it to function. 
This, as noted above, is in part an evocation of the notion of tutelage, 
which was a standard part of arguments on the basis of white cultural (as 
opposed to biological) superiority.  In addition, Buckley made the 
argument for slow, natural, evolutionary change, saying that the South 
was justified in "asserting the right to impose superior mores for whatever 
period it takes to effect a genuine cultural equality between the races."  
This, too, was a standard part of segregationist thought and rhetoric of the 
day—the notion that equality could not be imposed, that it would come 
about gradually in due course.  In his generally quite fair-minded 
biography of William F. Buckley, John Judis noted that this editorial 
"crossed the line between constitutionalism and racism," and that "In the 
political divisions of the fifties, the [National Review] lined up squarely 
with the southern segregationists."12  Yet it is not simply that the National 
Review had put itself on the political side of segregationists: Buckley had 
adopted a position that put him, on intellectual and rhetorical grounds, 
right in the mainstream of segregationist thought of his day. 
Buckley's segregationist stance did not go entirely unchallenged 
within the magazine he founded.  L. Brent Bozell, Buckley's brother-in-
law and his collaborator on McCarthy and His Enemies, published a 
dissent in the following issue.  Yet the ground for Bozell's dissent was not 
the racism at the heart of Buckley's argument.  He signals his possible 
disagreement with this only obliquely, noting in a footnote that "For 
reasons of space, I must reserve comment on some of the editorial's 
                                                
12 Judis, pp. 138, 139. 
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premises, with which I profoundly disagree."13  Given the sentence to 
which this was a note, and the remainder of his argument, it seems quite 
probable that it was Buckley's racist assumptions that Bozell was 
objecting to; but he did not bother to spell out that objection. 
Instead, Bozell objected primarily on legal grounds.  After briefly 
quarreling with Buckley's strange claims that African Americans might 
not vote against segregation, Bozell reached the heart of his argument, 
writing: 
 
...the editorial concedes that much more is at stake than 
the theory of universal suffrage.  There is a law involved, 
and a Constitution, and the editorial gives White 
Southerners leave to violate them both in order to keep 
the Negro politically impotent.  ...the Fifteenth 
Amendment is not mentioned, but familiarity with it may 
be assumed.  By resolving the South's dilemma in this 
way, the editorial calls up the question of how seriously 
NATIONAL REVIEW takes the law and the 
Constitution.  I had always thought our position to be that 
observance of and respect for both is indispensable for 
the well-ordered society, and a minimal requirement for 
the preservation of conservative values.... [and that] the 
American system does not permit private judgment as to 
whether the Constitution should be obeyed.  
Interposition, yes; the Constitution contemplates no final 
arbiter of its meaning, and therefore, in the doubtful case, 
one may choose, as NATIONAL REVIEW has done, 
between the views of the State of Georgia and those of 
the Supreme Court, depending on one's own lights.  But 
where the law is clear, as in the case of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, I have never doubted that NATIONAL 
REVIEW and persons whose objectives we approve 
                                                
13 L. Brent Bozell, "The Open Question," National Review, September 7, 
1957, p. 209. 
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were, equally with the Establishment, bound to 
confirm.... [I]t is not the sanctity, but the majesty of the 
Law that wants affirmation.14 
Bozell's objection, then, was essentially to what he saw as the lawlessness 
of Buckley's framing point about jury nullification.  And Bozell went out 
of his way to state that he was not a stickler for obeying Supreme Court 
decisions, noting that "one may choose... between the views of the State 
of Georgia and those of the Supreme Court,"—hardly the legal consensus 
of the day (although it was the standard segregationist argument).  But the 
blatant unconstitutionality of African American disenfranchisement, and 
the blatant illegality of the means Buckley proposed to uphold it were too 
much for him. 
In response to his brother-in-law's critique, Buckley15 responded 
with an editorial paragraph labeled "A Clarification."  Buckley wrote that 
 
NATIONAL REVIEW believes that a) the doctrine that 
everyone has the right to vote conceivably can, and 
indeed sometimes does, conflict with the right of the few 
to preserve, against the wishes of the many, a social order 
superior to that which the many, given their way, might 
promulgate; that b) a valid distinction exists between a 
culture preeminently white and one which would issue 
upon the political predominance of Southern Negroes in 
their present stage of development; that it is to guard 
against the emergence of the latter via electoral 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
15 Given Buckley's admitted authorship of the original editorial, and the 
fact that he wrote most of the National Review's editorials at the time, his 
authorship of the subsequent unsigned editorial may be assumed (as it is, 
e.g., by John Judis in his biography, p. 139); but to my knowledge 
Buckley has never addressed the issue directly.  I will nevertheless 
proceed on the assumption that he wrote the clarification, just as he did 
the original piece.  
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mechanisms responsive only to quantitative pressure that 
many responsible Southerners refuse to enfranchise the 
marginal Negro; that c) the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution are regarded by much of 
the South as inorganic accretions to the original 
document, grafted upon it by victors-at-war by force; that 
d) the South should, if it determines to disfranchise the 
marginal Negro, do so by enacting laws that apply 
equally to blacks and whites, thus living up to the spirit 
of the Constitution, and the letter of the Fifteenth 
Amendment to it.16 
Buckley, in other words, defended his beliefs about both the cultural 
inferiority of African Americans, and the consequent right (in his view) of 
a minority to disenfranchise the majority to maintain it.  He also 
disparaged, to an astonishing degree, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments.  But granting Bozell's argument about the necessity of not 
promoting illegality, Buckley retreated to the notion that whites as well as 
African Americans could be disenfranchised "equally"—meaning, 
presumably, with criteria that would be applied evenhandedly but which 
would de facto result in predominantly African-American 
disenfranchisement.  Buckley's claim that such an arrangement would live 
up "up to the spirit of the Constitution" seems to refer to the Constitution 
apart from the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments; and his admission 
that this would live up to "the letter of the Fifteenth Amendment" seems 
an implicit acknowledgment that he was suggesting mechanisms 
specifically designed to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment's spirit.  
Despite being challenged to rethink his position by a member of his own 
                                                
16 "A Clarification," National Review, September 7, 1957, p. 199. 
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staff, what Buckley reconsidered was his legal and not his racial point of 
view. 
Buckley's (slightly) reconsidered position persisted for some time.  
In his 1959 book Up from Liberalism—a book that biographer John Judis 
described as "the fullest statement of Buckley's political philosophy that 
he would ever make... [and] a milestone not only in his own political 
development but in that of the political right"17—Buckley repeated the 
arguments made in his 1957 editorial almost verbatim.  (Judis notes that 
the entire book was, in fact, assembled from his earlier writings.18)  
Almost verbatim: Buckley incorporated some of the ideas in his 
"clarification" into the main body of his argument, putting up front his 
belief that "The South should prove its bona fides by applying voting 
qualification tests impartially, to black and white"; the thought that this is 
something other than a defense of a mildly altered status quo is quashed 
by his immediate citation of Alabama as a model to follow.19  (Later, in a 
1968 television interview with George Wallace, Buckley himself would 
mock Wallace's claim that voting was fairly handled in Alabama.20) 
In addition to underlining his belief in a formal, de jure color 
blindness, Buckley made a number of other revisions to his language: his 
notorious phrase "the White community is so entitled because, for the 
time being, it is the advanced race" becomes, in Up from Liberalism, "the 
                                                
17 Judis, p. 167. 
18 Ibid. 
19 William F. Buckley, Up from Liberalism (New York : McDowell, 
Obolensky, 1959); citations from the paperback edition (Honor Books).  
Quotation on p. 129. 
20 Judis, pp. 286 - 287. 
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white community is entitled to put forward a claim to prevail politically 
because, for the time being anyway, the leaders of American civilization 
are white"—a phrase that sounds less like biological racism, perhaps, but 
one which is in context almost identical in meaning.21  Yet the structure of 
the argument is the same, down to the inclusion of a (far briefer) 
invocation of jury nullification as a tactic for ensuring that whites would 
"prevail."  Buckley's incorporation of this editorial shows that he did not 
immediately disavow it, but remained satisfied with its basic line of 
argument for some years at least. 
 
His 1957 editorial was William F. Buckley's most prominent 
support for the segregationist position—and the one which was most 
explicitly wedded to overtly racist arguments.  Yet he continued to 
support the segregationist stance, to varying degrees, until the final legal 
defeat of de jure segregation in the mid-1960's.  This support remained 
within certain limits.  Buckley always denounced the violence of die-hard 
segregationists.  Nor was he an admirer of George Wallace—and although 
some of his disdain was due to Wallace's economic populism, he also 
condemned Wallace's racism on multiple occasions.  Nevertheless 
Buckley's sympathies remained distinctly with opponents of the Civil 
Rights Movement, and, at times, he himself expressed explicit support for 
segregationist positions as well. 
In a 1961 interview with Esquire, for example, Buckley expressed 
the following personal opinions on segregation: 
 
                                                
21 Ibid., p. 127. 
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If I lived in South Carolina, I would vote for segregated 
schools in my community; in Stamford, where I live, I'd 
vote for integrated schools.  I hope that if I lived in South 
Carolina, I would take a position aimed at doing what I 
could to increase the opportunity of Negroes to the point 
where I no longer felt segregation was necessary.22 
Buckley's view here was essentially similar to that which he expressed in 
his 1957 editorial.  He believed in the existence of a cultural gap, and saw 
a necessity for whites to work to overcome that gap; he also seemed to 
believe that the gap was less in Connecticut than in South Carolina.  
Nevertheless, while he eventually ended up endorsing a (technically) race-
neutral position in his 1957 "clarification," here he did not bother: he 
openly stated that in some cases he would support segregation, and he 
certainly seemed to presume that voting upon whether or not schools 
should be segregated is a reasonable way to proceed (rather than, for 
instance, declaring that the Supreme Court had settled the issue with 
Brown). 
But Buckley's attitude was not entirely one-sided; typically 
Buckley's editorials were ambivalent in their commitments.  A 1963 
essay, for example, was essentially a defense of the right of Civil Rights 
protestors to march as a basic First Amendment freedom.  It was 
tempered, however, by questions about whether doing so was "prudential" 
and by considerable attention to the demands of "the need for public 
order," which Buckley asserted is a coequal concern with the right of 
peaceable assembly.  And it was tempered by a great deal of 
                                                
22 Cited in Charles Lam Markmann, The Buckleys: A Family Examined 
(New York: William Morrow & Co., 1973), p. 167. 
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understanding for the roots of the white South's anger.  Thus Buckley 
wrote: 
 
What we need to ponder is why the Southern community, 
made up as it is of men and women who share our 
history, speak our language, fight under the same flag, 
see the same movies and read the same books—why they 
are [so] hostile to these demonstrators... It is because they 
feel that the demonstrators have their eye on the jugular 
vein of Southern life.  Whatever "Southern life" is, and 
there are many disputes about its meaning, that life calls 
for the management of the South's destiny, at least for the 
time being, by the white majority.  The typical 
Southerner sees the demonstrators as agents of forces 
determined to break down the public order.... That is why 
the Southerners lash out with sticks and stones... The 
South has reasons to be deeply distressed, and the 
externalization of deep distress takes ugly forms.23 
It is difficult to imagine Buckley writing that, say, African Americans 
have "reasons to be deeply distressed, and the externalization of deep 
distress takes ugly forms" after the Watts riots—just as it is easy to 
imagine the scorn Buckley would have heaped upon a liberal who wrote 
that sentence in such a context.24  Buckley's visceral identification with 
                                                
23 Wm. F. Buckley Jr., "On the Right: Birmingham and After," National 
Review, May 21, 1963, p. 397. 
24 Indeed, he has expressed sentiments such as these on a number of 
occasions.  In March, 1968, for instance, Buckley wrote about race riots 
that what causes them "isn't segregation or poverty or frustration.  What 
caused them is a psychological disorder which is tearing at the ethos of 
our society as a result of boredom, self-hatred, and the arrogant contention 
that all our shortcomings are the results of other people's aggressions upon 
us."  (Cited in William F. Buckley, Quotations from Chairman Bill: the 
Best of Wm. F. Buckley Jr.  Compiled by David Ranke.  (New Rochelle: 
Arlington House, 1970,) p. 235.)  Buckley expressed no concern for any 
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the white South is palpable, with his extended list of how they "share our 
history, speak our language, fight under the same flag, see the same 
movies and read the same books."  He expresses an immense amount of 
empathy. 
Buckley might even be read as endorsing the fundamental aims of 
those who oppose the civil rights demonstrators.  He asserted that an 
indispensable part of the maintenance of "Southern life" (for all that he 
admits that it is a contested term) is that it "calls for the management of 
the South's destiny, at least for the time being, by the white majority."  In 
this piece, Buckley did not say straightforwardly that this is an acceptable 
or laudatory aim; he merely expressed an opinion that that is what the 
white South wants in the context of expressing understanding of their 
point of view.  Perhaps he would have denied that their aim was 
acceptable if pressed; but he certainly did not deny it in the essay he 
wrote.  Yet all of this is in the context of an essay which—however 
hesitantly, however strewn with caveats about public order and with 
paeans to the good will of those who oppose the demonstrators—
nevertheless firmly declared that the right of peaceable assembly must be 
respected.  So while his sympathies did not lie with the Civil Rights 
Movement—and while he can be read as continuing to endorse the aims 
of its opponents—at least on the immediate issue, the stance taken in his 
essay was to support the Movement. 
In another essay from the same period, however, Buckley took 
what was almost the opposite position—that the methods sought to 
                                                                                                                                       
"reasons to be deeply distressed" or recognition that " the externalization 
of deep distress takes ugly forms" in that context. 
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achieve integration (in this case, federal intervention) were too extreme 
even if the ultimate aim was worthy.  Or at least he appeared to: a close 
reading of his language shows that his embrace of the aims of the Civil 
Rights Movement was almost entirely in the language of stipulation: 
 
Let us take the word of the predominating school of 
social scientists and stipulate that segregation is the cause 
of personality disturbances.... Assume, also that the legal 
and political power is wholly at the disposal of the 
society to effect its point of view in the south.  Assume, 
in other words, that Brown v. Board of Education and the 
supporting decisions of the Supreme Court 
deconstitutionalized segregated public schooling beyond 
the point of argument.... Should the federal government 
then proceed?25 
Even with such stipulations, Buckley expressed some skepticism about 
the ultimate worth of integration, questioning the sociology used in 
Brown, and asserting his belief that, in any event, "the forms of 
segregation, which so much engross us at the moment and which alone 
are within the reach of the law to alter, are of tertiary importance, and of 
transitory nature."26  At the same time, Buckley did refer to the ongoing 
racial problems (or possibly even racial disparities—the context makes it 
ambiguous) as a "cancer" in the course of analogizing federal intervention 
to surgery.27  But Buckley ultimately came down against such 
intervention, declaring that the ends were not worth such means: 
 
                                                
25 "Can We Desegregate, Hesto Presto?" in Wm. F. Buckley, Jr., Rumbles 
Left and Right: A Book About Troublesome People and Ideas.  (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963), p. 123. 
26 Ibid, p. 125. 
27 Ibid. 
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A conservative is seldom disposed to use the federal 
government as the sword of social justice, for the sword 
is generally two-edged... If it is doubtful just what 
enduring benefits the Southern Negro would receive from 
the intervention of government on the scale needed to, 
say, integrate the schools in South Carolina, it is less 
doubtful what the consequences of interposition would be 
to the ideal of local government and the sense of 
community, ideals which I am not ready to abandon, 
even to kill Jim Crow.28 
Thus despite some (highly qualified) sympathy for integration as a result, 
Buckley found the means of federal intervention, and the expansion of 
federal power it would entail, far too drastic to support.  It is important to 
note that, like the position Buckley took in his 1957 editorial, this was an 
extremely common argument from moderate segregationists: the 
rhetorical tactic of claiming to admire the ends but declaring that the 
means were unacceptable—claiming, in fact (as Buckley does as well) 
that there exist no acceptable means—was quite standard.  Despite his 
"assuming" the rightness of the cause of desegregation, Buckley's 
arguments here in fact placed him well within the mainstream of moderate 
segregationist thought at the time. 
At the height of the crisis in Selma which would mark the 
culmination of the Civil Rights Movement, Buckley once again weighed 
in on the Civil Rights Movement—this time staking out a position on the 
very issue, voting rights, that he had written about in such incendiary 
terms eight years earlier.  And while his position had not changed from 
where he ended up after his clarification, his tone had.  By 1965 Buckley 
was straightforward about the need for de jure colorblindness: 
                                                
28 Ibid., p. 126. 
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Of course [African Americans] should have the vote—to 
the same degree that white people and yellow people and 
blue people should have the vote. ... On the single issue 
of whether a Negro in Alabama should be deprived of the 
vote simply because of the color of his skin, it seems to 
me that there cannot be any argument: none moral, and 
certainly none constitutional.29 
There is a conviction and clarity about the need for de jure racial equality 
in this passage which was lacking from his piece on the same topic eight 
years before.  Yet Buckley was still quite hesitant about the idea of 
African Americans voting; and he was still willing to endorse measures 
that would significantly disenfranchise African Americans so long as 
those measures were technically color blind.  Thus Buckley also wrote: 
 
But note the qualifier, "to the same extent."  It may very 
well be that what Alabama ought to do is not to enlarge 
the franchise but to restrict it—irrespective of race, color 
or creed.... [The issue of denying the vote based solely on 
race] is altogether a different question [from] whether the 
State of Alabama would be better governed if every 
single Negro over the age of twenty-one were to 
participate at the polls.... In much of the South, what is so 
greatly feared is irresponsible, mobocratic rule, and it is a 
fear not easily dissipated, because it is well-grounded—
that if the entire Negro population in the South were 
suddenly given the vote, and were to use it as a bloc, and 
pursuant to the directives handed down by some of the 
more demagogic Negro leaders, chaos would 
ensue....True reform in the South would involve raising 
the standards for voting—and raising them impartially, 
for black and white alike. ... For the time being the 
imposition of such a test would undoubtedly mean the 
                                                
29 Wm. F. Buckley Jr., "On the Right: The Issue at Selma," National 
Review, March 9, 1965, p. 183. 
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disqualification of more Negroes than whites, but that is 
merely a mechanical reflection of the existence of a 
disparity in training and accomplishment at the present 
moment which is precisely what the fuss is all about.  
What, after all, does the national association mean when 
it calls for the advancement of colored people?30 
Buckley then closed his essay by noting the difficulty for Southern 
legislators in trying to disenfranchise some of those who currently elect 
them, but nevertheless recommended that "at least the South should 
consider the alternative," ending by raising the specter of 
 
...a suddenly enfranchised, violently embittered Negro 
population which will take the vote and wield it as an 
instrument of vengeance, shaking down the walls of 
Jericho even to their foundations, and reawakening the 
terrible genocidal antagonisms that scarred the Southern 
psyche during the days of Reconstruction.31 
So while Buckley was firm in his insistence upon de jure color 
blindness by 1965, he was unwilling to push it very far.  He still described 
the African American population of the South, collectively, as culturally 
beneath the white South—albeit not in such provocative words as he had 
eight years before.  He still was willing to endorse measures that would 
openly lead to widespread African American disenfranchisement as one 
of their goals, although his fears of African American suffrage have 
mixed with concerns about the suffrage of less-educated whites (he cited 
what he saw as the problems with "The red-neck vote, dominated by 
primitive and earthly passions; and the big-city vote, dominated by 
special-interest manipulation.")  And he is still willing to raise as a horror 
                                                
30 Ibid.; emphasis in the original. 
31 Ibid. 
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the image of a united and empowered African-American population—
doing so in terms which would certainly have been considered insensitive 
if not racist just a few years later (and probably were in 1965 as well).32  If 
his views changed between 1957 and 1965, it can't be said that they 
changed very much. 
 
In addition to Buckley's personal essays, the National Review 
continued to publish pro-segregation arguments by other writers 
throughout the late 50's and early 60's.33  While it is obviously true that no 
single piece in the magazine can be considered to have Buckley's personal 
endorsement nor to reflect his personal thinking, nevertheless his 
magazine was designed to promote a general school of thought (he did not 
publish liberal opinion pieces), so the recurrence of a point of view in the 
journal he edited signifies that it was one which, at the very least, he 
thought represented a serious view worthy of significant consideration, 
whether or not he personally agreed with it.  And, of course, his influence 
as an editor and molder of opinion finally outweighed his influence 
                                                
32 It is also perhaps noteworthy that Buckley speaks so sympathetically of 
the Southern memories of Reconstruction, even referring, rather 
histrionically, to that period as involving "genocidal antagonisms." 
33 In 2000, the avowedly white supremacist journal, American Resistance, 
published an article by James P. Lubinskas entitled "The Decline of the 
National Review" (http://www.amren.com/009issue/009issue.html#cover) 
with the sub-heading "NR was once a voice for whites."  This article 
lamented the National Review's change in attitude towards racial matters, 
citing with approval many examples of the National Review's former 
support for segregation.  While I obviously oppose to the strongest 
possible degree the views expressed, Lubinskas' essay did (along with 
other sources) direct me to some useful examples of the National Review's 
former support for segregation. 
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simply as a writer, so his willingness to publish and promote pieces 
supporting segregation—even if they did not reflect his precise personal 
views—was nonetheless significant. 
To be sure, there were pieces published on the other side as well.  
In particular Garry Wills (who was later to move to the left in part due to 
his response to the Civil Rights Movement) published a number of pieces 
more supportive of the various aspects of African American struggles, 
publishing a positive review of James Baldwin's The Fire Next Time and 
even making an early case for Affirmative Action ("preferential hiring") 
in the magazine.34  But for the most part the articles in the National 
Review were at best skeptical towards the Civil Rights Movement, and 
many were flatly opposed to it or its goals. 
Thus, for instance, Buckley published a number of articles by 
Richmond-based James Kilpatrick in the National Review, including a 
supportive analysis of Orval Faubus's position during the Little Rock 
crisis of 1957, a cover story attacking the proposed Civil Rights Act 
entitled "Civil Rights, Legal Wrongs" and an extended attack on the 
Voting Rights Act under the title "Must We Repeal the Constitution to 
Give the Negro the Vote?"35  He published several defenses of the (white) 
                                                
34 Judis, p. 273.  Judis also notes that it was a 1968 essay sympathetic to 
black militants that eventually caused Wills to break relations with 
Buckley (p. 322). 
35 James Jackson Kilpatrick, "Right and Power in Arkansas," National 
Review, September 28, 1957, pp. 273 - 275; "Civil Rights, Legal 
Wrongs," National Review, September 24, 1963, pp. 231 - 236; and "Must 
We Repeal the Constitution to Give the Negro the Vote?," National 
Review, April 20, 1965, pp. 319 - 322. 
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southern position by Richard Weaver.36  A piece by Will Herberg after the 
Watts riots blamed them on damage to the "secure internal order" caused 
by 
 
the doings of such high-minded, self-righteous "children 
of light" as the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King and his 
associates in the leadership of the "civil rights" 
movement.  If you are looking for those ultimately 
responsible for the murder, arson and looting in Los 
Angeles... they are the guilty ones, these apostles of 
"non-violence."37 
(Note the quotations marks around the words "civil rights"—in the title as 
well as in the passage cited—which implies that in addition to decrying 
the method of the Civil Rights Movement (non-violent civil 
disobedience), Herberg thought little of their aims as well.)  And an 
extended piece by Ernest van den Haag, "Intelligence or Prejudice?", 
argued that African Americans were innately less intelligent than whites, 
and that other scholars got this matter "clearly and overwhelmingly 
wrong" because of their desires to believe the contrary.38 
                                                
36 Richard Weaver, "The Regime of the South," National Review, March 
14, 1959, pp. 587 - 589. 
37 Will Herberg, "'Civil Rights' and Violence: Who are the Guilty Ones?," 
National Review, September 7, 1965, pp. 769-770;; quotation on p. 769. 
38 Ernest van den Haag, "Intelligence or Prejudice?," National Review, 
December 1, 1964, pp. 1059 - 1063; quotation on p. 1060.  Buckley was 
proud of having published this piece; in a 1969 essay in which he 
trumpeted other supposedly scientific findings to this same effect, 
Buckley cited van den Haag's earlier essay, referred to it as "brilliant", 
quoted several paragraphs from it and suggested that those be "committed 
to memory"—though, in fairness, the paragraphs Buckley cited included 
several denying possible implications of this finding (such as unfitness for 
political office); and Buckley concludes by making the "Christian point" 
that "all men are equal in the truest sense of the word."  Wm. F. Buckley 
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All these—and they are just a sample—were in addition to a steady 
stream of unsigned editorials supporting, to varying degrees, the 
segregationist position in the ongoing struggle with the Civil Rights 
Movement.  One National Review editorial declared that Brown had 
reversed a period of improving race relations in the South and expressed 
sympathy for the position of Orval Faubus.39  Another claimed that the 
bill which would become the Civil Rights Act of 1964 might worsen race 
relations and that it was not a situation "about which there is simply no 
doubting the correct moral course"—and that the 1963 March on 
Washington was therefore a bad thing.40  Yet another declared that due to 
communist infiltration of the March, and their support for the Civil Rights 
Movement, those who attended "are indeed morally implicated by the 
coincident Communist purposes."41  In 1964, in the wake of SNCC 
members Chaney, Goodman and Schwerner's disappearance, the National 
Review published an editorial warning against "being seduced by our 
outrage over the act of a few desperadoes in Mississippi" and suggesting 
the disenfranchisement of whites as well as African Americans as a 
solution to the state's problems (a position identical with Buckley's 
previously-cited view).42  On the tenth anniversary of Brown an editorial 
                                                                                                                                       
Jr., "On the Right: On Negro 'Inferiority,'" National Review, April 8, 
1969, p. 350. 
39 "The Court Views its Handiwork," National Review, September 21, 
1957, pp. 244 - 245. 
40 "When the Plaints Go Marching In," National Review, August 27, 1963, 
p. 140. 
41 "Communists and the March on Washington," National Review, August 
13, 1963, pp. 93 - 94. 
42 "Mississippi," National Review, July 14, 1964, pp. 573 - 575. 
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called the decision "bad law and bad sociology" and exclaimed: "what a 
price we are paying for Brown!"43  And the National Review said that the 
situation in Selma in March, 1963 was "not precisely Good Angels vs. 
Bad" and that "the balance in morality and equity becomes so complex 
and confused" that it is hard to judge.44 All these assertions were in 
addition to many other similar stances. 
This is not to claim that the National Review's position was entirely 
one-sided; it regularly condemned the violence used against the Civil 
Rights Movement (though at times merely on the grounds that it was 
counterproductive), and would from time to time mention the justice of 
one or another of the Movement's aims.  This is simply to say that the 
positions taken were—unsurprisingly—practically identical to those 
published under Buckley's name.  But while we cannot know for certain 
which of these editorials Buckley himself penned (although in some cases 
the similarity in phrasing with writings he did sign is so close that it is 
hard to believe he did not write them), these stances, even more than the 
multitude of articles by other writers published in the National Review, 
show that Buckley was not only personally on the side of segregation, but 
that the magazine for which he was the guiding spirit was firmly and 
repeatedly on that side as well.  While in later years Buckley would on 
occasion declare himself to have been "wrong" on this issue, citing it as 
the foremost (or even sole) example of a stance he regretted taking, at the 
time, it was clear which side he was on. 
                                                
43 "The Brown Decade," National Review, June 2, 1964, pp. 433-434. 
44 "The Selma Campaign," National Review, March 23, 1965, pp. 227 - 
228 
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In later years Buckley only occasionally addressed his former 
support for segregation directly.  For the most part Buckley avoided the 
matter, neither raising the issue or addressing the past—an easy enough 
route for a political commentator, since in that role it is perfectly natural 
to focus on contemporary and not historical issues. 
But even in his discussions of contemporary politics, one can see 
one element of Buckley's response to his segregationist past, although an 
unacknowledged one: Buckley's shifting position on certain race-related 
issues.  This shift mustn't be overstated: he didn't shift a great deal.  
Buckley retained his caustic scorn for aspects of the post-1965 Civil 
Rights agenda, such as affirmative action, and expressed it in ways that 
was often harshly critical of the Civil Rights Movement establishment.  
And certainly negative reactions to the latter-day agenda of African-
American leaders occupied a far larger place in his work than any positive 
disposition towards achievements of the past. 
Yet there were a few of the latter.  One notable example was 
Buckley's endorsement, in 1979, of a federal holiday honoring Martin 
Luther King, Jr.  Buckley's view of King during the latter's lifetime had 
been far from positive.  And even in his endorsement of the King holiday, 
Buckley felt obliged to mention what he continued to consider King's 
faults.  He mentioned King's sexual escapades; he decried what he saw as 
King's hypocrisy in selectively condemning persecutions in other 
countries; he mentioned dismissively King's views on Vietnam.  And he 
singled out for criticism the principle for which King is best remembered, 
civil disobedience, claiming that "Using the King formula, you could go 
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on to say that Sirhan Sirhan's assassination of Robert Kennedy was 
nothing more than an act of civil disobedience," evading the question of 
how an act of murder might be justly compared to the tactics of a 
proponent of nonviolence. 45  Yet for all his caveats, Buckley ended up 
endorsing a holiday for King: 
 
Martin Luther King is the black American who 
consummated the civil war Abraham Lincoln undertook, 
largely animated by his belief in metaphysical equality.  
A gesture of recognition—of King's courage, of the 
galvanizing quality of a rhetoric that sought out a 
reification of the dream of brotherhood—is consistent 
with the ideals of the country, and a salute to a race of 
people greatly oppressed during much of U.S. history.46 
Nor is this acknowledgment of King's positive role unique in Buckley's 
work.  Nearly twenty years later, in his "autobiography of faith," Buckley 
singled out King for praise, decrying that the specifically Christian aspect 
of King's message was forgotten; but in the process of focusing attention 
on King's Christianity, Buckley says that for a number of reasons, 
including his leadership of the Civil Rights Movement, King "merit[s] 
admiration and even devotion."47 
Apart from various offhand nods towards the past sprinkled 
throughout his writings, and the above-mentioned rethinking that was 
implied by the (subtle) shifts in his positions, Buckley directly addressed 
                                                
45 Column from January 23, 1979, , collected in William F. Buckley, 
Right Reason, ed. Richard Brookhiser.  (New York: Doubleday & Co., 
1985), pp. 374 - 376; quotation on pp. 374. 
46 Ibid, pp. 375 - 376. 
47 William F. Buckley, Nearer, My God: An Autobiography of Faith.  
(New York: Doubleday, 1997), pp. 37 - 38. 
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his past positions on issues relating to segregation only on a handful 
occasions.  The most extensive of these articulations of his changed stance 
came in a 1988 letter to the Policy Review responding to an essay by Lee 
Edwards.  (Edwards is a life-long conservative activist, with impeccable 
conservative credentials, having served as a speechwriter for Joseph 
McCarthy, been a founding member of the Young Americans for 
Freedom and worked on the Goldwater campaign; he later received a 
doctorate in world politics from Catholic University, made name for 
himself as a historian of the conservative movement and has spent much 
of his recent career at conservative think-tanks, including, as of the 
present writing, the Heritage Foundation.)48 
In its Fall, 1988 issue, Policy Review (a conservative journal 
published by the Heritage Foundation) published an essay by Lee 
Edwards entitled "The Other Sixties: A Flag Waver's Memoir."  While the 
majority of that essay demonstrated Edwards' continued belief in the 
positions he and other conservatives had taken in the 1960's, he did 
express a few regrets, which he termed "conservative second thoughts."49  
The most extensive and heartfelt of these regrets were about conservative 
attitudes towards the Civil Rights Movement.  Edwards wrote: 
                                                
48 Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking 
of the American Consensus (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), pp. 107, 
247; John A. Andrew, The Other Side of the Sixties: Young Americans for 
Freedom and the Rise of Conservative Politics (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1997), p. 5; online biographies of Edwards at the 
Heritage Foundation 
(http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/LeeEdwards.cfm) and the Institute of 
World Politics (http://www.iwp.edu/faculty/facultyID.3/profile.asp). 
49 Lee Edwards, "The Other Sixties: A Flag Waver's Memoir."  Policy 
Review, Fall 1988 (no. 46), pp. 58 - 65; quotation from p. 65. 
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And then there is civil rights.  We were wrong about civil 
rights in the 1960s; legally right, perhaps, but morally 
wrong, and politically wrong as well.  Blacks needed 
legislation in 1964 and 1965 to redress grievances and 
guarantee certain rights, and because our presidential 
candidate and movement leader [Barry Goldwater] voted 
"No" (albeit with the best of intentions) we have been 
castigated as "racists" and "bigots" ever since.  Jack 
Kemp and other congressional conservatives have been 
building bridges to blacks.  They are to be commended 
for reaching out to a group that shares our beliefs in 
family, church, and community.  Conservatism will never 
be the dominant political philosophy of America without 
broad representation of this country's 30 million blacks.50 
It is perhaps noteworthy that Edwards frames his regrets in such a way as 
to justify Goldwater's stance—exempting the question of legal rectitude 
from his mea culpa in contrast to moral and political rectitude, and 
specifying that Goldwater's vote was cast "with the best of intentions."  
Indeed, earlier in the article, in delineating the "ambivalence" that 60's 
conservatives had about Martin Luther King, Edwards had earlier 
discussed Goldwater's stance, insisting at some length that "Goldwater did 
not have a racist bone in his body.... As a member of the Phoenix City 
Council, he voted to desegregate the airport restaurant; he was a member 
of both the Phoenix and Tuscon NAACP," and describes Goldwater's vote 
as "a matter of principle" for which he "suffered serious political 
consequences."51  Goldwater remained a polestar for Edwards in 1988, 
and he takes pains to see him in a positive light—and, hence, clear him of 
the charge of racism.  Indeed, Edwards is an example of a conservative 
                                                
50 Ibid. 
51 Op. Cit., pp. 62-63. 
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who adopted the historical view of contemporary conservatism that I 
sketched at the beginning of this chapter, writing that "the political impact 
of the post-World War II conservative movement can be traced essentially 
to three men—Russell Kirk, William F. Buckley, Jr., and Barry 
Goldwater."52 
The other aspect of Edwards's mea culpa is that he included 
"politically wrong" as a category of conservative error in addition to his 
description (largely uncontested by the time Edwards wrote) of the 
conservative stance on civil rights as "morally wrong."  Edwards based 
this view on the claim that Goldwater's 1964 vote cost him politically, as 
well as on the argument that "Conservatism will never be the dominant 
political philosophy of America without broad representation of this 
country's 30 million blacks."  Yet both of these claims are questionable.  
Perhaps Goldwater's vote hurt him in some areas of the country, but it was 
also a central factor in his victory in five of the six states that he 
captured—the deep south states of Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South 
Carolina and Louisiana.  Given the centrality of the racial issue to white 
voters in those states—and the size of Johnson's victory elsewhere—it 
seems probable that Goldwater's stance in fact helped him vastly more 
than it hurt him, at least as far as the electoral college is concerned. 
And as for the notion that "Conservatism will never be the 
dominant political philosophy of America without broad representation of 
this country's 30 million blacks," that sentiment had probably already 
been proven false by the time Edwards wrote in 1988, and in any event 
was certainly proven false by subsequent events.  Conservatism did 
                                                
52 Op. Cit., pp. 59. 
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"become the dominant political philosophy of America"—arguably by 
1988, and unquestionably subsequently.  Yet African Americans remained 
throughout among the most liberal voters in the country, and very few 
conservative African Americans have played a prominent role on the 
American political stage.  Edwards's eliding of these political facts—his 
portrayal of the conservative stance on civil rights as a matter of principle 
that was politically harmful—ignores the enormous political benefit that 
conservatives have gained from their opposition to the Civil Rights 
Movement.  Whether Goldwater's personal stance was principled, tactical 
or a mixture of both, similar stances have been employed to great political 
gain by his party in subsequent years.  The "Southern Strategy" of the 
GOP—appealing to southern whites alienated by the Democrats' support 
of civil rights—has been central to its political success since the time 
since Goldwater cast his negative vote.  "Morally wrong" the conservative 
stance on civil rights may have been, but it is hard to say that it has 
proven "politically wrong." 
In the light of Edwards's reflections, the editors of Policy Review 
got three prominent conservatives to respond to Edwards's regrets, one of 
whom was William Buckley.  His response consisted of a three-paragraph 
letter which was his most sustained reflection on the issue of the 
conservative stance—and, by extension, his own stance—on the Civil 
Rights Movement.  Buckley opened his consideration of the topic by 
agreeing with Edwards's claims in several respects: 
 
I agree with Lee Edwards that opponents of the Civil 
Rights Bill of 1964 were wrong to the extent that they 
opposed that bill for moral reasons; indeed a state should 
have the right to outlaw Jim Crow laws.  And obviously 
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it was politically wrong to take a position opposed to the 
direct interest of 20 million people about to be 
enfranchised.53 
The first point to notice is that Buckley quite strongly ("obviously") 
seconded Edwards's claim about the political error of opposing the 1964 
Civil Rights Bill.  As previously noted, this was a rather dubious claim, 
and by jumping on it Buckley cleared himself, as well as the movement he 
did so much to inspire, of using its now-admittedly mistaken opposition to 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act for political ends—a use that it did, in fact, 
make.  It is only politically wrong to oppose 20 million people's 
enfranchisement if you do not reap the benefit of many millions' more 
outraged at that enfranchisement; but to recognize this is to undermine the 
notion that the victory of conservative principles was based on their truth 
and morality—indeed, it is to recognize the degree to which conservative 
principles have been victorious for admittedly immoral reasons.  Edwards, 
of course, put this idea out in his original piece, but Buckley seized upon 
it strongly. 
It is also worth noting that Buckley surreptitiously narrowed 
Edwards' admission of error in at least one and possibly two respects.  
There is a significant difference between saying, as Edwards did, that 
conservatives' opposition to the Civil Rights Act was "morally wrong" 
and saying that "opponents of the Civil Rights Bill of 1964 were wrong to 
the extent that they opposed that bill for moral reasons."54  The former 
was an admission that the stance taken was flatly wrong, indeed immoral: 
                                                
53 William F. Buckley, letter to the editor, Policy Review, Spring 1989 
(no. 48), p. 93. 
54 Emphasis added. 
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the implication is that any legal rectitude the conservative position might 
have had was outweighed, and should at the time have been allowed to 
give way to, the moral imperative.  It was, in short, an admission of 
wrongdoing—wrongdoing entered into "with the best of intentions," 
perhaps, but wrongdoing nonetheless. 
Buckley's claim was quite different.  First, rather than framing the 
issue as one of legal versus moral right, Buckley considered motives: 
opposing the Civil Rights Act for moral motives was wrong—but, by 
implication, opposing it for other motives was not.  Buckley did not 
concede that a moral imperative outweighed a legal one; he simply said 
that anyone who viewed opposition to the bill as a purely moral issue was 
wrong to do so (and, at least publicly, hardly any of its opponents did—as 
Buckley presumably remembered.)  Edwards allowed the pall of 
immorality to fall over the entirety of the opposition; Buckley segregated 
it by motive, only critiquing opposition based on moral rather than legal 
principles.  (Note that Edwards himself did not even raise the possibility 
of opposition based on moral motives; that arose in Buckley's take on 
Edwards' passage.)  Further, Buckley even cast doubt on the degree to 
which that opposition was important—the very language "to the extent 
that" implies that the extent was not very great.  Buckley divided morality 
from other issues, and then diminished its importance.  As admissions go, 
it was quite a weak one. 
Buckley was also arguably narrowing the issue at hand.  In 
Edwards's original text, it was unclear whether he was condemning 
simply conservative opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or 
conservative opposition to the Civil Rights Movement more broadly.  
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Edwards did narrow the issue by allowing his discussion to come to rest 
on the fact that "our presidential candidate and movement leader voted 
'No,'" which might be read as implying that he was only talking about 
opposition to the Civil Rights Act.  But I believe the overall passage 
suggested otherwise.  Edwards began by saying broadly that "we were 
wrong about civil rights in the 1960s"—a phrase that implied a broader 
context than merely opposition to a single bill, especially in the context of 
a memoir entitled "the other sixties."  Under this interpretation, 
Goldwater's negative vote on the Civil Rights Act stood in Edwards's text 
simply as a synecdoche for the broader conservative opposition to the 
Civil Rights Movement.  In any event, Buckley unequivocally narrowed 
the issue to one simply of the Civil Rights of 1964, and perhaps the 
Voting Rights Act, certainly eliding any possible consideration of the 
broader conservative record on civil rights—a narrowing that elided other 
troubling issues, including Buckley's own 1957 statement. 
Buckley went on to address his contemporary feelings in the 
remainder of his letter.  Buckley wrote:55 
 
Am I glad the civil-rights law (and its successor) 
passed?  I don't find that question easy to answer.  I can 
be glad, in my heart, that the lynch mob hanged the 
murderer while worried about the strategic effect of 
direct action.  The Supreme Court, after Brown v. Board 
of Education, became a monumental American problem.  
It might have become that in any case.  But before very 
long it had become the principal moral tribunal of the 
                                                
55 This paragraph is preceded by a boldface header reading "Troubling 
Means to Worthy Ends"; but it is unclear if this header is Buckley's or was 
added by the editors—indeed, the latter seems more probable.  So I omit it 
from consideration here. 
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American people.  ("What do I think about busing?" said 
presidential candidate George McGovern in 1972.  "I 
don't have to answer to that.  The Supreme Court hasn't 
ruled on the subject.")  What the reporter wanted was not 
the view of the Supreme Court about compulsory busing, 
but the view of candidate McGovern.  The psychologists 
call it transference, and this the American people—or, 
more accurately, the American clerisy—have done since 
the Supreme Court took over the business of serving as 
principal moral exegete of the law. 
Those who opposed the Civil War did so not, in many 
cases (I think of Sam Houston) because they wished to 
prolong slavery, but because they wished to avoid 
bloodshed en route to manumission.  I don't think it is 
safe to say that the results brought on by the civil-rights 
bill would have been long delayed if Congress had not 
acted, waiting for pressure from the American public, 
and the states.  We have still to catch up with the fallout 
of the French Revolution, and certainly we have still to 
catch up with the fallout of the civil-rights laws.56 
In the first paragraph, Buckley laid out one of the standard 
conservative critiques of post-1965 Civil Rights law: the overactive role 
of the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court.  This was a slightly odd 
response, since the question was not about the propriety of Brown; and the 
Civil Rights Act as such certainly did not lead to the Supreme Court 
becoming "the principal moral tribunal of the American people."  Perhaps 
we might speculate, given Buckley's invocation of psychologists, whether 
a strategy of avoidance might be coming into play: after all busing, which 
remained a topic of some controversy, was far easier ground for a 
conservative movement stalwart to navigate than was the thornier issue of 
                                                
56 Buckley, Policy Review, op. cit. 
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basic civil rights such as access to public accommodations and the 
franchise. 
In any event, Buckley's overall answer did seem to be well-
summarized by the headline given it (whether it was his or not,) 
"Troubling Means to Worthy Ends."  But Buckley certainly did not come 
clearly down on the side of saying—as Lee Edwards had—that the ends 
had been important enough that they should have overcome conservatives' 
concern about the means employed.  Buckley put his thumb on each side 
of the scale, however.  He lessened the urgency of the ends by saying that 
he didn't "think it is safe to say that the results brought on by the civil-
rights bill would have been long delayed if Congress had not acted, 
waiting for pressure from the American public, and the states."  Yet if it is 
not safe to say it would have been long delayed, it is even riskier to assert 
the contrary—particularly if the scenario contemplated is (as here) the 
non-involvement of the Federal Government.  After all, in such a case, 
pressure from the American public as such would have had little effect, 
since the only political force that would have counted would have been 
the voters in each of the several states—in practice, the white voters, since 
the enfranchisement of African Americans was one of the issues at stake.  
Nor is the notion of pressure from "the states" relevant if action by the 
federal government is not contemplated; each state would then act 
independently.  Buckley was asking his audience to believe, in effect, that 
the white voters in the states with the greatest resistance to the 
enfranchisement of African Americans would have swiftly voted on a 
state by state level to allow readier access to the franchise.  He was 
similarly asking his readers to believe that the states with the most 
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entrenched segregation in the areas covered by the Civil Rights Act (such 
as public accommodations) would have, in the course of each states' 
separate political process, outlawed such segregation.  Neither scenario 
seems at all plausible.  The kindest thing to say about Buckley's claim that 
these problems would have been solved without Federal intervention is 
that it seems not to have been well thought through. 
On the other side of the scale—on the issue of the impact of the 
allegedly troubling means—Buckley placed an even heavier thumb on the 
balance.  With the exception of the increased role for the Supreme Court, 
Buckley did not specifically spell out what negative effects he saw arising 
from the various pieces of civil rights legislation.  But the metaphors he 
used to describe its effects were extreme.  He compared the action of 
passing the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act to, in turn, a 
lynching, the bloodshed brought on by the Civil War and (obliquely) the 
French Revolution.  The mildest comparison involves a murder; the most 
extensive one is to the single bloodiest war America has suffered.  In 
addition to the violence of the metaphors, the level of implied illegitimacy 
was strong too: a lynching is, obviously, a crime; the Civil War's legality 
was complex, but it was unquestionably a failure of the governmental 
structure of the nation; similarly, the French Revolution was a radical 
toppling of the old order.  If only in the metaphors he chooses, Buckley's 
sense of the Civil Rights Movement's legal victories as violent and 
illegitimate was quite strong. 
It is also hard to see how such comparisons might be sustained.  
The Civil Rights Act hardly led to the tyranny that conservatives warned 
of at the time.  The level of legal change involved was at most 
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evolutionary rather than revolutionary.  And, of course, any suggestion of 
bloodshed arising from the passage of the Civil Rights Act is fairly 
ridiculous.57  Buckley, of course, might reply that he was not claiming that 
the mid-60's legislation led to bloodshed or the overturning of the 
American governmental structure.  But this begs the question of why he 
invoked these comparisons in the first place.  And certainly his final 
sentence, with its suggestion that the various pieces of civil rights 
legislation might have long term consequences comparable to the French 
Revolution, carried rather direct and heavy implications. 
In any event, by invoking such events as the comparisons, Buckley 
made the issue of whether the passage of the Civil Rights and Voting 
Rights Acts had been worth the price far more complex than it might 
seem otherwise.  In rhetoric, if not in direct argument, Buckley tipped the 
scale strongly against the moral imperative of integration and in favor of 
the justification for conservative's opposition.  Small wonder, then, that 
Buckley found the question of whether he was "glad the civil-rights law 
(and its successor) passed" to be a difficult one. 
It should be noted, in passing, that it is a rhetorical tack of 
considerable gall to compare the passage of the Civil Rights Act to the 
perpetration of a lynching.  Buckley's point may simply have been that 
while the ends were legitimate the means were not.  But since lynchings 
(and the resultant intimidation of African Americans) were one of the 
chief forms by which the Jim Crow regime maintained itself via violent 
intimidation, to compare the legal acts which, in essence, finally ended 
                                                
57 In contrast to the bloodshed caused by some of those who sought to 
block its passage, which is well known. 
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that regime to the overtly criminal means by which it had been sustained 
is an extreme—perhaps even an offensive—analogy.  (Buckley even 
employed a phrase, "direct action," which was usually associated with the 
Civil Rights Movement's nonviolent resistance, and used it as his 
characterization of the lynching.)  The extremity of the rhetoric was, 
arguably, simply an extension of the verbal style that brought Buckley his 
fame and influence; this does not, however, diminish its vulgar shock in 
this particular instance. 
Aside from its shock-value, the analogy also subtly calls into 
question the moral clarity which Buckley seemingly endorsed in his first 
paragraph.  After all, while one might be glad that a murderer was killed 
(and thus received some rough form of justice), lynching can't possibly be 
called a moral act.  If the point of Buckley's letter was indeed to say that 
the Civil Rights Act achieved worthy ends by troubling means, then this 
metaphor cast into serious question the genuine worthiness of the ends—
implying, rather, that while the intended goal (justice) might have been 
worthy, not only the means but the specific ends as well were illegitimate.  
On close inspection, it seems that Buckley's fundamental view had 
changed comparatively little from the time decades before when he had 
declared the trauma of surgery too great to justify the removal of the Jim 
Crow "cancer." 
 
In the final decade of his life, the topic of Buckley's former support 
for de jure segregation arose several times in interviews and published 
dialogues.  On some of those occasions, Buckley was asked directly about 
his previous stances; at other times, he was simply asked about any 
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regrets he might have in a general way, and raised the topic of Civil 
Rights himself.  The latter is perhaps significant: even in a context when 
the issue was not put to him, Buckley himself was willing to raise the 
issue.  Buckley thus marked out his former opposition to Civil Rights as 
one of the central regrets—if not the central regret—about his long career. 
At the same time, it might also be noted that for all that he would 
occasionally answer questions about regrets by raising the issue of 
segregation, he did not see fit to discuss the matter at length.  For 
example, Buckley does not seem to have ever devoted a column to his 
regrets about his one-time support for Jim Crow.  Indeed, Buckley could 
write at length about the history of American debates over segregation 
without noting his own role in those debates.  In a column about the Trent 
Lott affair, "In the Post-Lott World",58 Buckley had a fair amount of 
mockery to offer about hate crimes and the nature of Lott's career 
trajectory, but not a hint that he himself had supported the positions, the 
retroactive endorsement of which Lott was forced to apologize for, far 
later than the 1948 Presidential Bid Lott was nostalgic for. 
And for all that Buckley himself held his former support of 
segregation to have been a mistake, and something he regretted, his 
specific comments about the matter were not always forthright, and 
indeed several of his various stabs at the topic contradicted each other.  
On this issue, Buckley's convictions lacked the clarity which had helped 
turn the country's politics towards his own way of thinking. 
                                                
58 William F. Buckley, "In the Post-Lott World", The National Review, 
January 27, 2003, p. 58 (column dated December 24, 2002). 
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In 2001, Buckley addressed the Civil Rights Act after the topic had 
been raised in an online discussion he participated in with journalist 
Michael Kinsley.59  In the midst of this exchange Kinsley mentioned the 
Act to clarify a point Buckley had made about Affirmative Action.  
Kinsely, after a digression about the complexities of changing ethical 
standards, then "remind[ed]"—whether himself, his readers or Buckley 
wasn't specified—that "many reasonable people--nonracists--did oppose 
the 1964 Act," and briefly summarized some of the arguments against the 
act, in particular Robert Bork's claim that "using the power of the 
government to tell people whom they must do business with really is a 
major imposition on private freedom."  Accepting this argument as a 
general principle, Kinsely then said that, in his judgment, there was "no 
question the imposition is justified--and has been hugely successful," in 
the case of the 1964 bill, but declared that such impositions were "not 
cost-free and ought to be reserved for really special cases."60  Kinsley, in 
short, raised the topic in a way which was extremely sympathetic to the 
former opponents of the legislation which had played a crucial role in 
ending de jure segregation, even partially acceding to some of their 
arguments, while nevertheless coming firmly down on the side of the 
Civil Rights Act's justice and importance. 
                                                
59 The discussion took place from March 26 to 29, 2001, and remains 
available at Slate's web site.  The first of the fifteen entries, with links to 
the subsequent ones, can be found at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2000245/entry/1007357/. 
60 Ibid., in entry 10 (March 28, 2001), available at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2000245/entry/1007381/. 
 243 
In response to these remarks of Kinsely, Buckley described his 
position on the 1964 bill as follows: 
 
At National Review we opined against the bill for 
reasons I suppose are the same as those given by 
Rehnquist and Bork. What interests me at this point is 
your saying that it has been a "success." I agree but 
wonder about the role that retrospective success plays in 
matters of this sort. Before I forget it, we should pause to 
note that that was the same act that Sen. Humphrey 
promised to eat if ever it were adduced as authority to 
deny to nonwhites a civil liberty.  I'd have voted against 
the bill, but if it were out there today, I'd vote for it, 
precisely for the reason you gave. I'd vote with 
trepidation, however, for the obvious reason that 
successful results cannot necessarily legitimize the means 
by which they were brought about. If civil war might 
have been avoided by other of means preserving the 
union and paving the way for minority rights, that would 
have been a good thing, right?61 
Buckley had certainly changed his view since the mid-1960s, as he 
acknowledged.  But it was a change that he was careful to express with 
numerous qualifications—indeed, with "trepidation."  His hesitancy about 
the matter is palpable, and was emphasized at least as strongly as his 
newfound support.  For instance, Buckley's remark that he "wonder[ed] 
about the role that retrospective success play[ed] in matters of this sort" is 
puzzling.  Was he claiming that the retrospective view exaggerates the 
level of success of the Civil Rights Act (as it might seem, given that the 
phrase is used as a qualifier to his agreement with the claim that the bill 
was a success)?  Or perhaps he was justifying his earlier position by 
                                                
61 Ibid., in entry 11 (March 28, 2001), available at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2000245/entry/1007383/. 
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claiming that it was only in retrospect that the Act was—clearly?  at 
all?—justifiable.  The sentence was ambiguous, and Buckley did not 
clarify the matter; but his hesitancy about the position came through 
unmistakably. 
To a significant extent, Buckley's reflections in 2001 were a 
reiteration of the themes from his lengthier considerations of thirteen 
years before.  Certainly many of the themes from his 1988 response were 
repeated, often in almost precisely the same terms.  As he had before, 
Buckley analogized the Civil Rights Act—a piece of legislation—to the 
bloodiest war in American history.  And as before, Buckley was careful to 
place the bill in the context of twenty-first century conservative views on 
Affirmative Action, in this case by mockingly recalling a statement of 
Humphrey's; note also that this statement carries with it the implication 
that the Civil Rights Act was, in fact, "to deny to nonwhites a civil 
liberty."  All of which indicates that while Buckley may have changed his 
position to the extent that he would (in 2001) have voted for rather than 
against the Civil Rights Act, he still considered it a clearly mixed 
blessing, and found what he regarded as its ill effects as equally worthy of 
note as its positive ones. 
Two further occasions on which Buckley directly addressed the 
issue of his former support for de jure segregation both occurred in 2004.  
Buckley gave a number of interviews that year, some to promote his 
autobiography, Miles Gone By, and others occasioned by his relinquishing 
control over the National Review.62  In two of these interviews, one in 
                                                
62 David D. Kirkpatrick, "National Review Founder Says It's Time to 
Leave Stage," The New York Times, June 29, 2004, p. 18. 
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Time and the other in the New York Times Sunday Magazine, the topic of 
his previous stance on Civil Rights again came up.  Both times Buckley's 
responses were brief.  Yet the two answers he gave nevertheless managed 
to be quite different in both spirit and content. 
In the first of the 2004 interviews, with journalist James Carney in 
Time Magazine, Buckley essentially brought up the topic himself, and 
declared rather straightforwardly that he had changed his mind.  The 
exchange reads as follows: 
 
Over the past half-century, you have engaged in virtually 
all the great debates in American politics and culture.  
Have you taken any positions you now regret? 
Yes. I once believed we could evolve our way up from 
Jim Crow. I was wrong: federal intervention was 
necessary.63 
In this interview Buckley was far more straightforward than he had been 
in his earlier retrospective considerations of the topic.  Judging from this 
exchange alone, it appears that he had changed his mind even since his 
previous statements.  Whereas in 1988 he declared he didn't find it easy to 
answer the question of whether or not he was glad that the Civil Rights 
and Voting Rights Act had passed, and in 2001 he imagined himself 
supporting the 1964 only with "trepidation," in this later exchange 
Buckley dealt with the issue directly and forthrightly, coming down 
firmly on the side of the Civil Rights Movement.  The contrasts with his 
1988 statement are particularly striking.  In 1988 Buckley seemed to 
dodge some of the harder aspects of the matter of his own past stances; in 
                                                
63 James Carney, "10 Questions for William F. Buckley", Time, April 12, 
2004, p. 8. 
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the Time interview he himself raised the issue in the context of a question 
about regrets.  And while in 1988 Buckley continued to argue that even 
without the intervention of the Federal Government the issue would have 
resolved itself naturally, in the 2004 interview he stated openly that he 
"was wrong," and that "federal intervention was necessary."  Buckley did 
not directly address the issue of his most controversial earlier statement 
(the 1957 declaration regarding "White community" being the "advanced 
race"), nor did he belabor his regrets.  But he did clearly, even strongly, 
announce that his old position was in error.  Forty years after the fact, 
Buckley came down unequivocally on the side of the dismantling of de 
jure segregation. 
Or so it seemed.  In an interview published just two months later, 
however, Buckley was far more equivocal when asked about the same 
issue, albeit in different terms.  The following exchange took place 
between Buckley and journalist Deborah Solomon in an interview 
published in The New York Times Sunday Magazine: 
 
Some of your most inflammatory comments have been 
made in your essays and columns. In the 50's, you 
famously claimed that whites were culturally superior to 
African-Americans. 
The point I made about white cultural supremacy was 
sociological. It reflected, in a different but 
complementary context, the postulates of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 
What are you talking about? 
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The call for the ''advancement'' of colored people 
presupposes they are behind. Which they were, in 1958, 
by any standards of measurement.64 
Suddenly, Buckley seemed to once again stand behind his earlier position.  
In fact, he went so far as to claim that his 1957 position was parallel to 
that of the NAACP!  This is an answer which, on its face, is startlingly at 
odds with his seemingly unqualified statement of just three months 
before. 
Part of what occurred in this exchange may have been Buckley's 
reaction to perceived hostile questioning.  Buckley was famous for his 
willingness to verbally spar and for the aggression with which he 
defended his ideas and himself.  The question prior to this exchange was: 
"You have made so many offensive comments over the years. Do you 
regret any of them?"—clearly a very provocative question if not an 
overtly hostile one.  (Buckley's reply began with the remark that "I regret 
all spontaneous exchanges"; he then went on to laud the precision of more 
carefully thought-out expressions of his views—overall, a somewhat 
strange reply from someone who hosted a television debate show for 
several decades.)  Buckley might well have been defending himself 
simply as an instinctual reaction to what he perceived, with some 
justification, as a hostile line of questioning.  Yet a debater as talented and 
experienced as William F. Buckley could surely have come up with a 
smoother means of deflecting a hostile querist than to defend positions he 
had come to consider wrong.  At the very least it is noteworthy that 
                                                
64 Deborah Solomon, "Conservatively Speaking: Questions for William F. 
Buckley," The New York Times Sunday Magazine, July 11, 2004. 
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Buckley was willing to defend his 1957 editorial at all, if only to score a 
debating point. 
His defense was also a rather disingenuous one.  (Deborah Solomon 
found it so strange that she blatantly failed to see his point, replying to his 
initial response by asking "What are you talking about?")  The National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People sought, of course, to 
advance the place of African Americans against the barriers of 
discrimination in American society.  While there might be some technical 
sense in which both Buckley and the NAACP saw African Americans in 
need of "advancement" in 1957, Buckley understood the condition as one 
of cultural backwordness, whereas the NAACP saw it as an imposed 
condition of second-class political status.  What made the point so 
especially glib is that Buckley himself surely knew this full well: it was an 
argument of almost calculated perversity to claim that his argument that 
the whites were the "advanced race" in the South had been equivalent to 
the stance of the NAACP. 
Yet it is important to note that this was not the first time that 
Buckley had made precisely this argument.  Recall that in the 1965 
column, cited above, Buckley wrote: 
 
...the existence of a disparity in training and 
accomplishment at the present moment... [between 
African Americans and whites] is precisely what the fuss 
is all about.  What, after all, does the national association 
mean when it calls for the advancement of colored 
people?65 
                                                
65 Buckley, " The Issue at Selma," op. cit. 
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And even earlier, in the section of Up from Liberalism which 
recapitulated his 1957 editorial's arguments, he had made this point as 
well, writing that 
 
It is unpleasant to adduce statistics evidencing the 
median cultural advancement of white over Negro; but 
the statistics are there, and are not easily challenged by 
those who associate together and call for the 
Advancement of Colored People.66 
Thus in raising the notion that his 1957 position was comparable to that of 
the NAACP at the time, Buckley was simply returning to a theme he first 
put forward nearly fifty years before—at a time when he was still 
maintaining the view that, in his Time interview, he flatly declared to have 
been "wrong"—that Federal intervention was unnecessary (indeed, at a 
time when his claim that the "the White community in the South" was 
"entitled... to prevail" presumably still stood).  Any prolific writer and 
frequent debater will, of course, return to effective formulations they have 
used in the past, particularly in a context such as an interview which 
allows little time for reflection; that in itself is not remarkable.  But the 
fact that Buckley would return to this formulation shows that, at the very 
least, some of Buckley's old habits of thought persisted unexamined.  
Buckley's statement to Deborah Solomon might even be reasonably used 
to call into question the sincerity of his latter-day commitment to the 
importance of integration, although I myself would argue that they simply 
show that commitment to be thin and poorly thought-through rather than 
hypocritical. 
                                                
66 Buckley, Up from Liberalism, pp. 127 - 128. 
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One final invitation for Buckley to express regret for his past 
support of Jim Crow came in 2005.  As his biographers, Linda Bridges 
and John R.. Coyne, Jr., write: 
 
In a panel discussion during [the National Review's] 
fiftieth anniversary celebration in October 2005, liberal 
pundit Jeff Greenfield asked Buckley whether he 
regretted his own and his magazine's hard resistance to 
the civil rights movement.  Yes, Buckley said, he realized 
in retrospect that he and his colleagues were relying too 
much on normal political processes as outlined in the 
Constitution to fully incorporate blacks into American 
public life, when in fact the political processes in many 
Southern states simply did not permit blacks to 
participate.67 
Once again Buckley, when invited to, expressed his regret for his old 
support of Jim Crow.  In this case, unlike in (for instance) his 1988 
statement, there seems to have been none of the hesitation, none of the 
strangely conflicted metaphors, that he had earlier used to qualify these 
regrets. 
But even this final expression of his altered views was in some 
ways notably half-hearted.  It certainly defies credibility that a man as 
                                                
67 Bridges & Coyne, pp. 80 - 81.  They go on to cite an 1986 article in 
which Buckley, through quoting a "joke of my youth," recognized the 
barriers to the African American exercise of the franchise in the Jim Crow 
South.  It is unclear whether this context is from Buckley's 2005 remarks 
or is simply brought to bear by Bridges and Coyne themselves.  The 
article in question—"Liberty", part of a commemoration of the centennial 
of the Statue of Liberty (accessed at the Hillsdale College archive, op. 
cit.)—does indeed mention the disenfranchisement of African Americans 
during segregation, but it does not mention either Buckley's own support 
for Jim Crow nor that of his magazine; indeed, it is primarily about other 
topics. 
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involved in politics as William Buckley, who wrote repeatedly about the 
Civil Rights Movement as well as other issues of the day, could have 
failed to understand that "the political processes in many Southern states 
simply did not permit blacks to participate."  More importantly, by 
describing his earlier error in those terms, Buckley portrayed his earlier 
resistance to the Civil Rights Movement as tactical—thinking that its 
goals could be achieved in one fashion when in fact other means were 
necessary.  Obviously, in a twenty-first century context, it was far more 
palatable to admit to having had  tactical qualms about the methods of the 
Civil Rights Movement than fundamental disagreement with its goals.  
And, to be fair, tactical opposition was at least a plausible précis of his 
many editorials on the matter from the 1960's, although it is a summary 
which elides his earlier evident sympathy for the upholders of Jim Crow, 
his partiality for a solution involving wide de facto African-American 
disenfranchisement, and similar issues. 
But it was hardly accurate as a depiction of his overall record on the 
matter of Civil Rights; in particular, it completely ignored his even earlier 
position, which was active support for the ideals of de jure segregation, 
namely, the notion that "the White community in the South is entitled to 
take such measures as are necessary to prevail, politically and culturally, 
in areas in which it does not predominate numerically... because, for the 
time being, it is the advanced race."68  That infamous sentence of 
Buckley's not only demonstrates his contemporary understanding of the 
fact that "the political processes in many Southern states simply did not 
permit blacks to participate;" it actually explicitly supported that very 
                                                
68 "Why the South Must Prevail", op. cit. 
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state of affairs.  In 2005 Buckley presents himself as simply having made 
a misjudgment about the means necessary to achieve what he felt at the 
time was a laudable goal, rather than confronting the fact that, in actuality, 
he had been (at least at times) on the other side. 
It is worth noting parenthetically that Buckley's biographers, 
Bridges and Coyne, characterize Buckley's above-cited "second thoughts" 
as "generous", going on to (partially) defend the younger Buckley given 
"the context of the times," mentioning specifically King's communist 
associates and an extend defense of the concept of "states' rights" by 
segregationist James Kilpatrick in a 1960s essay from Buckley's own 
magazine—both classic tropes from contemporary segregationist 
writings.69  (They do not address at all Buckley's 1957 editorial on "Why 
the South Must Prevail.")  In other words, even Buckley's somewhat tepid 
regrets about his record are a bit too stark for the sympathetic 
commentators who arise from the ranks of Buckley's ideological heirs.  
This can be counted as an example of the phenomenon discussed in 
Chapter 7 below, the resistance of the contemporary conservative 
movement to a full reckoning with its own former support of de jure 
segregation. 
While the above-cited remarks seem to have been the sum of 
Buckley's published reflections about his one-time support for Jim Crow, 
it should be noted that the reports of Buckley's friends and associates 
indicate that Buckley may well have been more fulsome on this topic than 
                                                
69 Bridges & Coyne, pp., pp. 81 - 82.  They also mention the generally 
left-wing nature of the Civil Rights Movement and King's inflammatory 
characterization of Goldwater. 
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he was in public.  At the very least they characterize his position quite 
differently than seems justifiable based solely on the published record.  
Whether this is another example of the phenomenon we have seen 
frequently in the present study, namely the distortion that occurs when 
others describe the subsequent regrets of former supporters of de jure 
segregation (as often through failures of memory as through any 
deliberate exaggeration), or whether Buckley said things in private that he 
did not see fit to publish, is unclear. 
For example, Sam Tanenhaus, a New York Times editor who is, as 
of the present writing, in the process of writing a biography of Buckley, 
summed up Buckley's views on the Civil Rights Movement in an online 
question and answer session in the days after Buckley's death in two 
exchanges: 
 
Q: Did he ever recant his opposition to the civil rights 
movement? —Chris 
A: Yes, he did. He said it was a mistake for National 
Review not to have supported the civil rights legislation 
of 1964-65, and later supported a national holiday 
honoring Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., whom he grew to 
admire a good deal, above all for combining spiritual and 
political values. 
[...] 
Q: Did Buckley ever change his 1950’s pro-Segregation 
stance? —Bill 
A: See above. He did, strenuously. He debated George 
Wallace quite strenuously in the late 1960s. It may seem 
odd, but Buckley, whose parents were both Southerners, 
actually inherited views on race that were fairly 
progressive for his time and place.70 
                                                
70 Sam Tanenhaus, "Q & A on William F. Buckley", New York Times 
Web Site, published February 27, 2008, available at: 
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In addressing the issue of Buckley's possible "recant[ing]" of his earlier 
views, Tanenhaus correctly adduces Buckley's regrets about the National 
Review's opposition to the Civil Rights Act and his later admiration for 
Martin Luther King.  But given that the second question directly 
references Buckley's 1950's support of segregation, it should be noted that 
Buckley seems never to have specifically apologized for or even 
disavowed his 1957 editorial.  And while Tanenhaus's claim that Buckley 
"strenuously" changed his stance is, perhaps, a matter of interpretation, it 
seems a tendentious description given the level of evasion and 
qualification that most (although, admittedly, not all) of Buckley's public 
comments on the issue included.71 
In the course of his researches, Tanenhaus interviewed Buckley 
extensively, so he certainly may in fact have heard Buckley express 
regrets about his past stances on de jure segregation "strenuously".  But 
assuming this is the case, it is notable that someone with the public 
presence that Buckley had—a national column, a television show, a 
magazine to showcase his views in—did not express these comments save 
in personal communications.  Perhaps Buckley genuinely felt 
"strenuously" about his later views, but he did not make this clear in his 
public statements about the matter.  It seems likely that Tanenhaus was 
misremembering the nature of Buckley's later reflections, given how often 
                                                                                                                                       
http://papercuts.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/27/qa-with-sam-tanenhaus-
on-william-f-buckley/?st=cse&sq=buckley&scp=3. 
71 Further, Buckley's 1957 claim that the "White community" was the 
"advanced race" certainly calls into question Tanenhaus's characterization 
of Buckley's views as ones that "were fairly progressive for his time and 
place." 
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this phenomenon has emerged in the descriptions of other figures who 
have shifted away from a former support of Jim Crow. 
 
In addition to the various times Buckley directly addressed the 
issue of his past opposition to the Civil Rights Movement and its long 
struggle to dismantle the legal edifice of Jim Crow, Buckley made 
numerous comments about the Civil Rights struggle in the course of his 
regular commentary about later political events.  Given the importance of 
the Civil Rights Movement as historical background for understanding 
American Politics since the 1960s, it would be surprising if he had not.  
But rather than clarifying the ambiguities and vacillations which we have 
seen in the various more direct expressions of Buckley's later take on that 
history, Buckley's en passant remarks about the Civil Rights Movement 
capture precisely the same contradictions that his overt reflections do.  
Unlike his specific remarks on his one-time support for Jim Crow, 
Buckley's passing references to the history of the Civil Rights Movement 
are too numerous to consider in full, but a few examples will serve to 
show how to variations in approach and tone that are present in the former 
also manifest in the latter. 
For example, in the course of an essay on the nomination of Robert 
Bork, Buckley defended Bork against Ted Kennedy's charge that in 
"Robert Bork's America... blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters" 
in the following terms: 
 
And why would blacks sit at segregated lunch counters?  
Where has Robert Bork defended Jim Crow?  He was 
always opposed to state laws enforcing racial 
segregation, which is different from upholding the right 
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of the state to prescribe conduct—though even on this 
point, libertarian Bork is at one these days with the 
overwhelming majority of voters who would kick out of 
office anyone suggesting any return to Jim Crow even 
privately administered in one's own hot dog stand.72 
On its face, of course, this is a simple defense of Bork against the charge 
of favoring segregation, claiming that "he was always opposed to state 
laws enforcing" it.  But note that Buckley here also excused the notion of 
"upholding the right of the state to prescribe conduct"—in other words, 
opposing the right of the Federal Government to forbid it; in essence, 
defending opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  In the course of 
defending Bork from the charge of being a segregationist, Buckley 
indicated that he saw no problem with having opposed the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, possibly even indicating that such might be a reasonable 
position to take in 1987.  To be sure, Buckley hurriedly points out that 
anyone suggesting such a thing would be voted out of office, by Bork 
among others; but he seems to have had no sense that adopting a legal 
position that states do have the right to enforce segregation is in any way 
problematic, so long as one personally votes against it. 
On the other hand, in the course of a (largely scornful) column 
about Jesse Jackson from 1984, Buckley wrote that 
 
Up do a point, the state can be the effective ally of the 
oppressed.  A convulsive effort, enlisting the police 
powers of the state, was required to liberate black people 
from slavery; another statist effort, 100 years later, to 
                                                
72 Column from July 9, 1987 collected in William F. Buckley, Happy 
Days Were Here Again: Reflections of a Libertarian Journalist, ed. 
Patricia Bozell.  (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 14 - 16.  
Kennedy quoted on pp. 14 - 15; Buckley quote from p. 15. 
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give black people the vote and spare them the humiliation 
of Jim Crow.73 
Buckley, to be sure, goes on to deride Jackson's implication that there 
remains any "calculated [system] to exclude blacks from any position of 
prominence."74  Nevertheless, it should be noted that Buckley forthrightly 
said in this passage that a "statist effort" was "required... to give black 
people the vote and spare them the humiliation of Jim Crow."  Four years 
before Buckley declared his difficulty answering the question of whether 
or not he was glad the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts passed, a full 
two decades before he defended his 1957 wording to a journalist in the 
New York Times Sunday Magazine, Buckley declared that these efforts 
were "required." 
Buckley did not simply change his mind and leave it changed; the 
implications of his 1984 column were in fact stronger in their retroactive 
support for the Civil Rights Movement than was his lengthier 
consideration of the matter from four years later.  As was the case with his 
various direct reconsiderations of his former support for segregation, 
Buckley's casual references to the Civil Rights Movement simply and 
plainly contradict each other, in their implications about his later beliefs, 
and in the tone with which he described that history.  Overall, Buckley did 
not seem to have arrived at a stable reading of the recent past—a past that 
he had not only lived through but participated in.  Certainly Buckley's 
1984 assertion that "the police powers of the state" were necessary to end 
Jim Crow can't be easily reconciled with his 1988 claim that it was not 
                                                
73 Column from Penthouse, July 1984, collected in Buckley, Right 
Reason, pp. 62 - 67; quotation on p. 65. 
74 Ibid. 
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"safe to say that the results brought on by the civil-rights bill would have 
been long delayed" without Congressional action.   
The question then remains: what is one to make of Buckley's 
inconsistency, both about the nature of the history he lived through, and 
about his own later attitudes towards his role in that history?  One would 
think that a man of his intelligence, who had thought so broadly and 
written so voluminously, must surely have considered so central a fact in 
American political life as the Civil Rights Movement fairly often.  Why 
then did he not arrive at any considered opinion about his changed views?  
While we cannot, of course, find a definite answer to that question, 
Buckley's lack of consistency suggests that, contrary to what one would 
otherwise have thought, this is an issue which he did not think through.  
Despite his lifelong career as the ideological compass for the conservative 
movement, on the central domestic political issue of his lifetime Buckley 
did not arrive at a consistent, settled opinion. 
Perhaps it is fair to speculate that this is an issue which Buckley, if 
only on an unconscious level, preferred not to confront.  It reflected, 
among other things, an ideological fissure within conservative thought: a 
commitment to legality and (therefore) legal justice on the one hand, and 
a powerful respect for preexisting social orders and profound resistance to 
change on the other.  Buckley famously wanted to stand athwart history 
and yell 'Stop'; but this implies a belief in the perfection of the past (or, at 
least, in the inevitably deteriorating nature of change) which is at odds 
with other conservative commitments.  To grapple too deeply with the 
issue of why he embraced what he later recognized was the incorrect view 
of the issue of segregation might have forced Buckley to question 
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assumptions—about the instinct to resist change, about the value of social 
continuity as such—that he was too deeply invested in to interrogate. 
Buckley, presumably, would have resisted this line of speculation.  
He might well have insisted that while he got this issue wrong, it was 
simply a matter of a mistaken judgment call, one that did not in any way 
cast doubt on any of his other ideological stances or commitments.  He 
might have—save that he never confronted the issue as deeply as he 
would have had to in order to make such an argument.  We are thus left 
with his contradictions and half-hearted regrets, and led back to the 
speculation which, however distasteful Buckley might have found it, has 
few other explanatory competitors to diminish its appeal. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
"RECONSTRUCTED BUT UNREGENERATE": THE SHIFTING 
STANCES OF HERMAN E. TALMADGE 
 
Herman E. Talmadge's public career spanned almost the entirety of 
the slow elimination of de jure segregation from American public life.  In 
1947, when he briefly (and under somewhat unusual circumstances) first 
became Governor of Georgia, segregation was still largely intact, 
particularly in the South.  There had been some victories against it in the 
previous few decades—for example some of the early cases in the 
NAACP's legal battle against segregated education, such as Gaines v 
Canada.  But for the most part segregation remained firm.  Both Truman's 
order integrating the army and the integration of major league baseball 
were still in the future, to say nothing of such key events as Brown v. 
Board of Education, the various battles of the Civil Rights Movement , 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  By 
the end of Talmadge's long career in the Senate—he was defeated in his 
final re-election campaign in 1980—de jure segregation had become a 
thing of the past.  By the time Talmadge last ran for office, open support 
of segregation was no longer an option for a politician wishing a realistic 
chance of winning statewide election.  And, in fact, by the later stages of 
his career Talmadge had modified his earlier views (or at least his earlier 
rhetoric).  One historian dates his public shift from 1966, when Talmadge 
made a pilgrimage to the Atlanta Hungry Club, "expressed the hope that 
the era of race-baiting was over" and claimed that he "sought 'to represent 
all the people of Georgia,'" and goes on to note that after this visit 
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Talmadge did indeed remain "true to his word".1  After his defeat in 1980, 
Talmadge retired from politics.  In 1987, however, he published 
Talmadge: A Political Legacy, A Politician's Life: A Memoir, 2 written in 
a folksy, laid-back style, in which he discussed, in the course of reviewing 
his career, his views from decades before. 
Herman E. Talmadge was the son of Eugene Talmadge, the 
Governor of Georgia from 1933–1937 and again from 1941–1943.  The 
elder Talmadge won another election in 1946, only to die a few weeks 
later, before assuming office.  In the resultant chaos, the Georgia 
legislature used a technicality to appoint Eugene's son, Herman Talmadge, 
Governor in the elder Talmadge's stead.  This appointment was soon ruled 
unconstitutional by the Georgia Supreme Court, but Talmadge won 
election in 1948 to the remainder of his father's four-year term, and then 
won his own full term in 1950.  Shortly after the Brown decision, the New 
York Times called Talmadge "the South's foremost spokesman of 'white 
supremacy.'"  A year after the end of his term as governor in 1954, 
Talmadge published a polemic against the Brown decision entitled You 
and Segregation. 3 
                                                
1 Stephen G. N. Tuck, Beyond Atlanta: the Struggle for Racial Equality in 
Georgia, 1940 - 1980 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001), p. 193. 
2 Herman E. Talmadge, with Mark Royden Winchell, Talmadge: A 
Politician's Legacy, a Politician's Life: A Memoir.  Atlanta: Peachtree 
Publishers, Ltd, 1987. 
3 Talmadge, 1987; Roger N. Pajari, "Herman E. Talmadge and the Politics 
of Power", in Henderson & Roberts, Georgia Governors in an Age of 
Change; James F. Cook, The Governors of Georgia, 1754 - 1995 (Macon: 
Mercer University Press, 1995).  New York Times cited in Numan V. 
Bartley, The New South, 1945 - 1980 (Louisiana State University Press, 
1995), p. 160. 
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In 1956 Herman Talmadge was elected to the Senate.   While in the 
Senate, he continued to be a prominent spokesman for segregation.  He 
also played a prominent role in the Watergate hearings.  In the 1970s, he 
faced a number of personal crises, including the death of his son, Robert 
Talmadge, a divorce from his wife of many years, and a struggle with 
alcoholism.  He was also censured by the Senate in 1979 for ethical 
violations (involving a padded expense account).  Finally, after a bruising 
primary battle against Zell Miller in 1980, Talmadge went on to lose his 
final Senate race to Republican Mack Mattingly.  After this final loss, 
Talmadge retired from politics.  He published his memoir in 1987, and 
died in 2002 at the age of 88.4  It is Talmadge's memoir which will receive 
the bulk of attention here, as it was his most sustained explication of his 
change of view, and of what he thought about his previous stances in light 
of that change. 
 
One phrase from Talmadge's memoir which encapsulates all the 
complexities of his revised position on segregation was used as the title of 
Talmadge's tenth chapter: "Reconstructed But Unregenerate."  This phrase 
sums up the ambiguity of Talmadge's later position on segregation and the 
stances he took in support of it.  What precisely does it mean, after all, to 
be 'reconstructed but unregenerate'?  If 'reconstructed' is to be now in 
favor of integration, how does that square with being 'unregenerate'?  And 
                                                
4 Talmadge, 1987; Pamela Hackbart-Dean, “‘The Greatest Civic Lesson 
in Our History’: Herman Talmadge and Watergate from a Twenty-five-
Year Perspective.” Georgia Historical Quarterly 83 (Summer1999): 314-
321; Adam Clymer, " Herman Talmadge, Georgia Senator and Governor, 
Dies at 88", The New York Times, March 22, 2002, p. B9. 
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if Talmadge was indeed unrepentant about the stands he took, in what 
way had he been 'reconstructed'?  How could he both have come to 
support a goal and continue to support the actions he took to oppose that 
goal?  There is an obvious—and obviously intended—contradiction in the 
phrase.  So what did Talmadge mean by it? 
Three possible meanings of this phrase emerge.  One possible 
meaning is that while the author came to support integration—was 
'reconstructed'—he nevertheless remained unapologetic for having 
opposed it (unregenerate) because of the circumstances of the times.  
While support for segregation came to be clearly wrong, it was formerly 
reasonable: support for it was either unavoidable for a politician, or 
understandable for someone raised in that culture; or perhaps it was even 
correct at the time.  A second possible meaning would say, similarly, that 
Talmadge came to support integration, but nevertheless continued to 
believe that the principles which led him to oppose it, or the grounds on 
which he opposed it, remained correct; that while these principles might 
have been misapplied, or might no longer be pertinent to the question of 
integration, nevertheless they remained important and pertinent in other 
areas.  Therefore Talmadge would be 'unregenerate' because he continued 
to hold, and believe in, the principles according to which he had defended 
segregation, whether these genuinely explained his former belief in 
segregation or whether they had been instrumentally or circumstantially 
invoked in its defense.  On this reading the lack of apology applied not to 
the issue, but to the principles behind (or before) it. 
A final possible meaning of the phrase is that its author was 
reconstructed only through necessity.  This meaning is suggested by the 
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term 'reconstructed.'  The obvious reference is to Reconstruction, which 
was a recurring reference point for Talmadge, and which, in Talmadge's 
view, involved the illegitimate imposition of a governmental structure and 
moral order upon the South by the North through force—"at bayonet 
point," in Talmadge's phrase.5  In the context of Talmadge's recurring 
invocation of this understanding of Reconstruction, his description of 
himself as "reconstructed" carried at least the suggestion that his shift in 
views was imposed by force (moral or social force, presumably); that this 
shift was in some sense unnecessary or even illegitimate; and that, in the 
privacy of his own thoughts, he remained committed to his earlier 
views—just as in his view southerners during Reconstruction might have 
been forced to go along with northern principles and schemes, but never 
truly believed in them.  Thus, in this third possible interpretation, 
Talmadge implicitly continued to hold his former views, and was thus 
"unregenerate", being "reconstructed" only because he had no choice. 
Talmadge himself never clearly identified his phrase or his position 
with any of these three possibilities; while he announced that his views 
had shifted, he did not detail how, when or why they did so, and only 
tersely laying out his new positions.  On an overt level, Talmadge seemed 
to careen back and forth between the first two interpretations described 
above.  That is, he claimed that he had come to believe in integration, and 
no longer believed in segregation, but shifted back and forth between the 
idea that the principles he had invoked to defend segregation with 
remained unaltered, and had therefore been previously misapplied, and 
the contrasting idea that their previous application was in fact correct, and 
                                                
5 Ibid., p. 144. 
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that segregation itself had been understandable, perhaps even correct, in 
previous eras, even circumstances had changed so that it no longer was.  
Talmadge also shifted back and forth within each of these two positions, 
implying at various points that segregation was previously understandable 
if wrong, previously unavoidable (and thus not blameworthy), or even 
previously correct.  He similarly shifted between the idea that the 
principles he previously invoked in segregation's defense had been 
correctly applied at the time (but for various reasons no longer implied 
segregation's validity) and the idea that they had been misapplied in 
segregation's defense, but were and continued to be valid when correctly 
applied.  Thus Talmadge never clarified the precise sense in which he saw 
himself as 'unregenerate'—and, consequently, the sense in which his 
readers should take his claim to have been 'reconstructed'. 
This ambiguity, as much as the associated connotations with the 
word he choose for his title, raises the possibility of the third 
interpretation: that his 'reconstruction' was just lip service, forced upon 
him by changing social mores, and that his 'unregenerate' nature began, as 
it were, just below the surface of his professed beliefs and continued all 
the way down.  Talmadge himself would presumably have denied—
probably even taken offense at—this notion, as it implies that his claims 
to have changed his mind were untruthful if not hypocritical, even 
cowardly.  But of course the logic of this position would require him to 
say this, at least publicly: that is inherent in the nature of paying lip 
service to something.  So this notion cannot be dismissed on the grounds 
that he would unquestionably have denied it.  And while, unlike the other 
two possibilities, Talmadge never said anything which would explicitly 
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imply the truth of this third interpretation, the internal logic of his 
positions, and the rhetoric with which he defended them, suggested it 
strongly at times. 
Yet I do not mean to suggest that, ultimately, Talmadge necessarily 
held (in his later career) a single, particular set of beliefs about the 
morality and justifiability of his earlier views.  In fact, given that he never 
addressed this issue clearly and head-on, and did suggest different things 
at different times, it seems to me likely that he did not.  People's ideas on 
such matters are often inconsistent.  We ordinarily do not bother to think 
through our ideas to the point of consistency—particularly ideas which 
are either painful (since they imply old immorality) or embarrassing 
(since they imply departures from currently held ideas); it is typically 
easier to let them be, existing in their naturally contradictory state.  In the 
act of describing discarded patterns of thought we are liable to fall back 
into them find ourselves unable to say precisely how far that 
reidentification goes; emotions can trump thought and sway us in one 
direction, while a moment later thought might reign in emotion and sway 
us in another direction.  A focus upon one aspect of an issue will reinforce 
something that one might, in more reflective moments, have come to 
profess, even while focus upon a different facet will nevertheless resurrect 
older ideas, out of emotion or loyalty or habit. 
And, as shall be examined in detail below, throughout Talmadge's 
memoir, these three possible positions (as well as the different variations 
within them) exist in tension with each other.  He never settled on any one 
of them, but said things which suggest different ones in various places—
or even in the same place, since a single passage frequently suggests (or 
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supports) multiple interpretations.  I shall argue that Talmadge's later 
position was not, in the end, a single, stable one, but rather one existing 
within a framework of uncertainty and vagueness, with aspects of 
contradictory positions emerging and retreating, since Talmadge never 
thought the issue through well enough to smooth them into a consistent 
whole. 
So while I think it is possible that Talmadge never genuinely 
changed his mind about the issue of segregation (that is, that his 
professions to have altered his view were in fact merely lip service to the 
newly dominant consensus), I am inclined to doubt that it was that simple.  
I believe that emotions and rational thought, conflicting and poorly 
thought through beliefs, habits of thought old and new all vied within 
him, with now one aspect, and now another, coming to the fore.  This is a 
question that has no single, clear answer in this case.  Thus in analyzing 
the various different things Talmadge said about his positions old and 
new, I will attempt to show the very contradictions within them—
representing, as I read them, unresolved contradictions within Talmadge's 
own thought.  The phrase 'reconstructed but unregenerate' is, finally, a 
good phrase for Talmadge's stance not despite but because of its 
ambiguities. 
 
Talmadge said in his memoir that at the time he was writing he 
supported the ideals of integration.  While this was usually a parenthetical 
remark, not discussed at length, nevertheless Talmadge was pretty clear 
about his latter position.  At the beginning of his discussion of the 
 268 
Democratic White Primary6 Talmadge said that "viewed from the 
perspective of the 1980's... [it] seemed downright indefensible", and later 
referred to it as "discriminatory"; he also noted that he was contemplating 
voting for the extension of the Voting Rights Act prior to leaving the 
Senate.7  In his discussion of Brown v. Board of Education, he noted that 
"I have since changed my views about the wisdom of segregated 
education."8  Later he said that "In those instances where segregation was 
used to keep blacks in an inferior position to whites, it violated 
constitutional law and elemental principles of human decency"; shortly 
thereafter he remarked that supporting something as "a blow against racial 
prejudice" is "a very noble sentiment."9  He described keeping some 
people out of businesses as "a malicious and bigoted action," and said that 
"I have no doubt that we are better off living in an integrated society than 
in a segregated one."10  Elsewhere he described himself as "a white 
politician with a segregated past"—implying that it was past.11  And, in a 
paragraph of summation at the beginning of his Epilogue, he listed the 
fact that "In my native South every child, regardless of his race or the 
circumstances of his birth, now has the chance to get a good education 
and become a productive citizen" as one of the good things he'd seen 
happen along with economic progress and the moon landing.12  With all of 
                                                
6 I shall capitalize the phrases "Democratic White Primary" and "White 
Primary" to accord with Talmadge's usage. 
7 Talmadge, 1987, p. 144. 
8 Ibid., p. 155. 
9 Ibid., p. 182. 
10 Ibid., p. 183, 184. 
11 Ibid., p. 205. 
12 Ibid., p. 357. 
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these claims, I think it is fair to state that Talmadge presented himself 
clearly as a man who had come to be against segregation—
"reconstructed", to use his word. 
Yet these statements, and a few others, are more or less the sum 
total of Talmadge's reflections on the moral import of integration.  It is a 
point Talmadge made as an aside, not one he presented at length; his 
statements seemed to come with an implied "of course" before them—as 
if there remained no possibility that someone could any longer support 
segregation.  And it is true that, as this study has argued, no prominent 
politician could continue to support segregation by the time Talmadge 
wrote his memoir.  Yet the nature of his "of course" was thin indeed.  He 
continued to oppose nearly all of the measures designed to promote 
integration that he had opposed during his days in office.  He condemned 
the use of segregation to promote inferiority, but described with gusto his 
attempts to block actions that would have ended segregation (and without 
any suggested alternatives).  He said that southerners had good race 
relations in the era of Jim Crow, without taking into account the realities 
of violence and oppression that elsewhere in the memoir he condemned.  
Talmadge changed his professed views to the minimum extent possible. 
Both the thinness of his support for integration and the absence of 
any regret for his earlier stances were enabled by Talmadge's avoidance of 
any direct account of how, why or when he changed his position on 
segregation.  Any description of the process of changing his mind would 
necessitate portraying what was erroneous about his old ideas; describing 
the factors which led to the change would naturally lead to questions 
about to why he didn't see such factors earlier.  By passing silently over 
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this transition, Talmadge managed to portray his new view without 
dwelling on any faults in the old.  It allowed him to try to claim the moral 
benefits that arose from supporting integration in the political climate of 
the 1980s without having to pay the price of detailing what he thought he 
might have done differently, or what if anything he might have done 
wrong. 
Another of Talmadge's rhetorical maneuvers—possibly one which 
was less a deliberate attempt to distract his audience than it was a genuine 
ambiguity with which Talmadge fooled himself—was to maintain  an 
ambiguity about the temporal location of his moral judgments.  Talmadge 
often commented on the Civil Rights Movement, and the actions he had 
taken in support of segregation, without making clear whether the 
judgment expressed in his memoir was merely meant to reflect his old 
thinking or if it also represented his latter view.  (His other comments 
were ambiguous enough to support both readings.)  By obscuring the 
historical position of his moral judgments, he was able to present old, pro-
segregationist stances without having to reconcile them (for the reader, 
and possibly for himself) with his stated views about his present beliefs.  
This allowed his historical judgment a safe ambiguity: was he (in his 
view) right then, and subsequently times simply changed?  Or was he in 
fact wrong even at the time (but it was understandable, and it's merely to 
communicate that understanding the case is presented so forcefully)?  Or 
did he continue to believe what he said then, denials notwithstanding? 
Thus in interpreting Talmadge's claim about Hubert Humphrey's 
1948 speech to the Democratic National Convention (in which Humphrey, 
as Talmadge puts it, "gave a right impassioned speech" supporting Civil 
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Rights legislation) that "the South had not just been defeated, it had been 
humiliated,"13 it is impossible to tell how broadly those words are meant.  
Would Talmadge have still agreed in 1987 that a speech supporting Civil 
Rights "defeated" and "humiliated" the South?  Or was he simply saying 
that he and others had felt that way at the time?  Since he didn't 
temporally locate his moral judgments, he didn't have to say; whereas if 
he had clarified the temporal position from which that phrase was 
expressed, he would have had to grapple more clearly with the question of 
what the Southern delegates should have (in an ideal world) done in 
1948—to what degree their 'humiliation' had been justified and to what 
degree it hadn't.  It was, in many ways, a very convenient ambiguity. 
Apart from the brief asides cited above and a few others in the same 
spirit, the only other passages in his memoir where Talmadge seemed to 
address his changed views were those in which he extolled his attempts to 
help African Americans, and discussed his recognition for those attempts.  
For example, in the headnote14 to the chapter "Reconstructed but 
Unregenerate," Talmadge told the following story: 
 
On October 10, 1985, I was awarded an honorary 
Doctorate of Humane Letters from Morris Brown 
College in Atlanta.  As senator I had helped get books for 
the school library and had assisted in making it a 
depository of public records.  I had always gotten along 
well with the school's president, Dr. Robert Threatt, and 
knew that he appreciated my efforts on behalf of his 
                                                
13 Ibid., p. 148. 
14 Talmadge began each chapter of his memoir with a headnote, a single 
story or anecdote to set the tone for the whole chapter, typically consisting 
of a single paragraph and set off from the rest of the chapter by being 
placed in italics. 
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college.  But I was surprised when the school gave me 
that degree and declared me Georgia Man of the Year for 
1975. ... I've received more honors than I can remember 
during my years in public life, but this one was kind of 
special.  You see, Morris Brown is a predominately black 
college.  It had been over twenty years since the NAACP 
had declared me an "enemy of the Negro people".  We've 
all come a long way since then.15 
Talmadge related this story as a way of indicating that he had changed his 
views.  But, of course, the anecdote did a number of other things as well.  
Most importantly, the "we" in "we've all come a long way since then" is 
distinctly ambiguous.  It could refer to southern whites, or southern white 
politicians, describing how the Civil Rights Movement successfully raised 
their consciousness and changed their point of view.  But it seemed to 
imply that the NAACP (if not the broader African-American community) 
itself had "come a long way," just as Talmadge had.  This perception is 
bolstered by the remainder of the paragraph.  Talmadge began by praising 
the good work he had done for Morris Brown College, speaking of his 
having "helped get books for the school library and had assisted in 
making it a depository of public records," and also speaking of his 
friendship with Morris Brown's president, while at the same time 
emphasizing that he did not expect the award.  The paragraph implied, 
without saying it directly, that Talmadge's earlier good deeds for the 
African-American community were (unjustly) ignored.  This lends weight 
to the reading that the "we" who have "come a long way" encompassed 
the African-American community as much as it did Talmadge himself. 
                                                
15 Talmadge, 1987, p. 177. 
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Was this paragraph, then, Talmadge's admission that his views had 
changed?  It seems to be, and was probably meant to be, at least in part.  
But it can be read equally as a lament of the 'bad rap' that Talmadge felt 
he got during the Civil Rights Movement.  Here again, we can see the 
power of Talmadge's failure to locate his telling precisely in temporal 
space.  Was Talmadge saying that he had changed in those twenty years, 
and thus was no longer an "enemy of the Negro people"?  Or was he in 
fact including this anecdote to undermine (if not refute) the notion that he 
ever was?  Talmadge left this ambiguous.  Thus while the paragraph 
serves to chart his change—the fact that he, like others, has "come a long 
way"— at the same time it also partially undermines his earlier self-
critiques. 
In fact, in the least charitable interpretation, the paragraph might be 
read not as charting Talmadge's retreat from his segregationist position 
but rather as his affirmation of it.  One standard line of pro-segregationist 
argument (one that, as will be detailed below, Talmadge returned to) was 
the notion that African Americans were, in fact, reasonably content with 
segregation, and the claim that the governments of the segregated South 
served their needs; a related line of argument denied that pro-
segregationist views derived from racist views or antipathy towards 
African Americans.  Thus, on this reading, Talmadge was simply re-
asserting the old segregationist line that pro-segregationist politicians did, 
in fact, have good will towards the African American community 
(represented in this passage by his friendship with Robert Threatt and his 
efforts on behalf of Morris Brown), that the segregated governments did 
work for the good of the African American community (again, 
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represented by Talmadge's work on behalf of Morris Brown) and that the 
protests—represented here by the statement of the NAACP—were, in 
fact, unwarranted and unfair. 
I do not think that Talmadge deliberately wrote this paragraph as a 
way of covertly sticking to his segregationist views.  As I read the 
paragraph, Talmadge himself seems to have believed that he had "come a 
long way".  But I even though by 1987 he was willing to state that 
segregation was wrong, he seems to have retained the sense that it was not 
as bad as all that, that it was not motivated by malice, and that statements 
such as the NAACP's had been unfair.  In other words, I think that the 
ambiguity—of thought, of emotion, of position—existed in Talmadge's 
view, and was accurately reflected in the paragraph, rather than the 
paragraph exhibiting any attempt to deliberately include an esoteric 
message under an exoteric one (as if it were a Struassian philosophical 
text.)  Rather, I think that in his sincere attempt to show that he had "come 
a long way," Talmadge demonstrated, at least to a certain extent, the 
opposite as well. 
 
While Talmadge claimed in his memoir to support the ideals of 
integration, he continued to oppose nearly all of the concrete measures 
that, historically, actually brought about a measure of integration to this 
country.  He continued to write vehemently against both the Civil Rights 
Act and the Voting Rights Act—although, in another example of temporal 
ambiguity, he does not clarify whether those passages expressed only his 
earlier views or his later ones as well, and in at least one place suggested 
that he had changed (or was in the process of changing) his views about 
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the Voting Rights Act.  He offered only a mixed defense of Brown.  
Further, while Talmadge's admissions about the "wisdom" of integration 
were generally passed over in an off-hand phrase, his defenses of his 
earlier positions (or, at least, the principles behind them—sometimes it 
was the former, sometimes the latter, sometimes it is not clear) were made 
with fire and passion.  The defenses were presented not only without 
apology, but with utter and powerful conviction.  Indeed, Talmadge's 
admissions that he no longer supported segregation—or that there were 
some problems with it (leaving conveniently open the question of how far 
that admission goes)—often occurred as preludes to, or within the context 
of, his longer defenses of his old views.  The overall approach Talmadge's 
memoir took towards issues in the orbit of the Civil Rights Movement 
was to make a rhetorically slight concession on the basic issue—the 
justice and "wisdom" of integration— and then follow it with a rousing, 
passion-filled defense of other, technical aspects of the conflicts (the 
actual content of 'state's rights') without any acknowledgment that the 
former and the latter had anything to do with each other. 
Thus, a quite typical Talmadge sentence was the following, 
summing up his feelings, from the perspective of 1987, about his 1955 
book You and Segregation: "Although I have since changed my views 
about the wisdom of segregated education, many of the points made in 
that book are as valid today as when it was written over thirty years 
ago."16  The presentation of his changed views about segregation are 
presented in the weakest form possible: they are in the subordinate clause, 
tossed off with an "although" that clearly marks them as an aside on a 
                                                
16 Talmadge, 1987, p. 155. 
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secondary issue.  Talmadge (in 1987) said that he had changed his mind 
on the "wisdom" of segregated education—and not on (for example) its 
justice, its morality, its decency; "wisdom" is, in context, a very weak 
word.  And, of course, it's only segregated education that he disavowed 
here; the sentence would have worked just as well questioning 
"segregation"—but it doesn't.  On the other hand, Talmadge's defense of 
the 1954 book was expressed strongly: in the main clause, described with 
broader terms: "many of the points" (and not 'some') are "as valid" (and 
not somewhat valid, still relevant, or understandable in historical 
context)—and are "as valid" (no sense here of any retreat, they are valid 
rather than, say, having some validity).  And Talmadge did not grapple 
with an important, implicit contradiction.  Talmadge's 1955 book was 
about segregation, announcing itself as such up front and boldly in its 
title; segregation was not a subsidiary or partial topic of his polemic.  One 
wonders how a book about segregation—about which Talmadge claimed 
to have changed his mind—could have been right about so many things. 
And, crucially, it is the latter issue—his "many" "valid" points—
that Talmadge then went on to discuss, not the "wisdom" of segregation.  
This cements the impression that it is the book's continued validity, not 
any sense of regret or rethinking, that Talmadge had strong feelings and 
solid convictions about.  The larger context of the sentence cited above is 
as follows: 
 
The decision implementing the ruling in Brown versus 
the Board didn't come down until 1955, which was after I 
was out of office [as Georgia's governor].  So, that was 
one battle I didn't have to fight.  My one notable 
contribution to the debate over the Brown decision came 
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in the form of a little book called You and Segregation.  
This book was published by the Vulcan Press in 
Birmingham, Alabama, in November 1955.  Although I 
have since changed my views about the wisdom of 
segregated education, many of the points made in that 
book are as valid today as when it was written over thirty 
years ago.  There were two primary legacies of the 
Brown decision.  One was the integration of schools.  
The other was the transformation of the Supreme Court 
from a judicial to a quasi-legislative body.  History has 
shown the first legacy to have been beneficial.  The 
second has been an unmitigated disaster.17 
It is worth noting that Talmadge was being somewhat disingenuous when 
he said that he didn't need to get involved in the Brown decision because 
he was out of office.  During his time as Georgia's governor, Talmadge 
had taken steps in advance of an anticipated ruling against segregated 
schools to try to prevent integration in Georgia, first by greatly increasing 
state spending on African-American schools in an attempt to bolster the 
doctrine of 'separate-but-equal' by more closely approximating its latter 
half (Talmadge praised this spending increase in his memoir without 
mentioning its motive), and second by passing a bill to eliminate state 
funding from any integrated school.18  To be sure, these actions were in 
part motivated by earlier anti-segregation court decisions, such as Sweatt 
v Painter; yet they were also taken in view of future decisions—the trend 
was clear—and some time before the Brown decision was handed down 
Talmadge knew that the issue was working its way through the legal 
system.  So Talmadge had already taken a few shots in the battle over 
school integration well before he wrote his 1954 book on the subject. 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 Tuck, Beyond Atlanta, p. 77. 
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Even from the vantage  point of 1987, however, Talmadge's 
commitment to integration remained at least rhetorically weak.  Talmadge 
identified two legacies that he saw arising from the decision in Brown, 
one of which he claimed to approve.  But it's clear which one he felt was 
more important: integration was merely "beneficial", while the change in 
the role of the Supreme Court "has been an unmitigated disaster."  And, in 
the following page and a half, it was the latter theme that Talmadge 
continued to hammer home.  After a paragraph decrying the changing role 
of the Supreme Court and its having "effectively wiped out the 
sovereignty of state governments", Talmadge continued: 
 
...the situation is not so much judicial tyranny as tyranny 
by the judiciary.  It wasn't enough to set aside other 
branches and levels of government, the Supreme Court 
also began ignoring the decisions of earlier courts.  What 
was important was not the separation of powers and the 
tradition of constitutional law, but the political and 
sociological opinions of the justices. ... [The Warren 
Court] reversed the decision of the Supreme Court 
rendered in 1895 [sic] in the case of Plessy versus 
Ferguson, a decision that for nearly sixty years had held 
that separate-but-equal schools were not in violation of 
the fourteenth amendment.  And what great authority on 
the United States Constitution enabled them to see that 
the federal courts had been in error for over six decades?  
It was a Swedish sociologist by the name of Gunnar 
Myrdal, who took it upon himself to tell black and white 
Americans how they ought to live together.  Yankee 
carpetbaggers were bad enough, but at least they were 
fellow Americans.  You would think that a Swedish 
sociologist would have enough to study in his own 
country, which has got to be the biggest cesspool of 
social pathologies this side of the Iron Curtain.  But the 
Warren Court laid more store in what he had to say than 
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in the political processes and legal scholarship of our 
own country.19 
Of his claim to see benefit in Brown and his claim that his old arguments 
were still valid, Talmadge's heart was clearly in the latter.  His venom 
towards the Warren Court—accusing them of "tyranny," of ignoring "the 
political processes and legal scholarship" of the United States—was 
obvious; his venom towards Gunnar Myrdal (to say nothing of the people 
of Sweden) was even stronger.  None of this proves that Talmadge was 
lying when he said that he had come to support integration.  But it does 
indicate that he had not thought through very clearly what that meant—in 
particular, what that meant for his perspective on 1955.  His emotional 
reaction to the issues, while certainly toned down from the histrionics in 
his 1955 volume, continued to resonate with his old views and not with 
his purported new ones.  He was able to expound his views on "judicial 
tyranny" at length—indeed, one might imagine that he was hardly able to 
refrain from doing so.  He made his views on integration clear, and then 
dropped the subject. 
Yet he returned to it.  While it's true that Talmadge did not 
habitually suggest alternatives to the Civil Rights events he continued to 
decry, in a few cases he at least hinted at what he saw as the preferable 
alternatives.  Following his lengthy denunciation of judicial tyranny, 
Talmadge wrote: 
 
The Supreme Court was so strong on the utopian ideal of 
integration that it forgot that you can't alter the customs 
and mores of a people overnight, and you can't change a 
                                                
19 Talmadge, 1987, pp. 156 - 157.  Talmadge errs in his dating of Plessy v. 
Ferguson, which was of course decided in 1896. 
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man's heart at the point of a bayonet.  I suspect that the 
Southern position on this great moral issue was best 
expressed in the following statement: "Ideally there 
should be brotherhood among human beings; God is our 
Father; we are adjured to love each other and be each 
other's keepers. ... In the Southern states there are special 
conditions of comparative numbers of Negroes and 
whites and inbred psychological attitudes and customs 
that constitute as deep-seated a problem as the tangled 
situations in Ireland, Palestine, and India.  Time and tact 
are necessary parts of the cure."  That eloquent statement 
was not made by Herman or Eugene Talmadge.  It was 
not made by Orval Faubus or Strom Thurmond or any 
other white defender of segregation.  It was made by the 
black educator Joseph Winthrop Holley.  No man did 
more for the black people of Georgia during the first half 
of this century, and no man was more committed to the 
future progress of the black race.  But Dr. Holley knew 
something that Gunnar Myrdal and Earl Warren and 
Hubert Humphrey never learned—"You Can't Build a 
Chimney From the Top."  (That was Dr. Holley's motto 
and the title of his autobiography.)  Unfortunately, the 
judges and bureaucrats and "social engineers" thought 
otherwise.  As I left Georgia for the United States Senate 
in January 1957, court-ordered chimneys were under 
construction all over the South.20 
It hardly needs to be said that Holley's quote meant something quite 
different coming from his own point of view (where it commended 
patience in a just but difficult struggle) and from the point of view of 
Herman Talmadge (where—at least in 1955—it suggested that a brake be 
applied to the success of that struggle).  It's also worth noting that 
Talmadge's claim that "you can't change a man's heart at the point of a 
bayonet" was refuted rather than upheld by the success of the Civil Rights 
                                                
20 Ibid, pp. 157 - 158. 
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Movement—and was arguably refuted by Talmadge's own experiences.  
These points aside, however, this passage does at least imply an answer to 
the question of what route to his now-favored position of integration 
Talmadge would have promoted, namely, a voluntary change of heart 
among Southern whites and patience among African Americans until 
then. 
What, then, is the change of view that Talmadge would attribute to 
himself?  It is true that he was no longer is claiming that "God Advocates 
Segregation" as he had in his 1955 manifesto; nor was he still presuming 
that "the mere idea of a fully integrated society was enough to discredit" 
forces supporting the Brown decision, as one historian aptly characterized 
his earlier position.21  But the practical change seems to be limited to the 
fact that, in the slow struggle to change Southern hearts, Talmadge would 
say that one heart had been changed: his.  There does not seem to be any 
other suggested method of promoting his newfound views.  How these 
views were supposed to succeed in the face of the opposition that they in 
fact met without the backing of the federal courts (and the consequent 
backing of the executive branch)—particularly given the long time that 
was required for them to be implemented with this backing—was not 
something Talmadge addressed.  The fact that one of the leaders of that 
opposition was Talmadge himself—and that saying that the problem with 
the Court intervention was the opposition it met was something close to a 
tautology—was not something Talmadge wrestled with at all. 
                                                
21 Herman E. Talmadge, You and Segregation.  Birmingham: Vulacan 
Press, 1955, p. 44; Numan V. Bartley,  The Rise of Massive Resistance: 
Race and Politics in the South During the 1950's.  Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1969, p. 238. 
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Talmadge's understanding of the American past—especially the 
history of American race relations—was central to his views, both during 
the period in which he supported segregation and in his later phase as 
represented by his memoir.  This conception was one that had been quite 
common among supporters of segregation.  Talmadge, however, seems 
not to have changed his thinking about the historical and social issues 
when he decided that segregation was no longer something he supported.  
The ambiguity in Talmadge's memoir about his precise views about 
segregation, past and present, was crucially enabled by his maintaining 
historical beliefs that were deeply entwined with segregationist 
arguments. 
Central to Talmadge's view of the past was his conception of 
Reconstruction.  Talmadge's view was one that, while once widespread 
among historians, has since been discredited by scholars.22  Talmadge 
portrayed Reconstruction as a fundamentally illegitimate attempt by the 
North to control or "terrorize" the South; there was no sense at all that the 
South had been in any way morally culpable.  Early in his memoir, in the 
course of complaining about one southern politician who was portraying 
the South in an unfavorable light, Talmadge wrote that: 
 
[The South] sure as hell didn't need our governor 
traipsing around the nation bad-mouthing us to the very 
people who were responsible for our plight.  Ellis might 
have told them that General Sherman destroyed our 
                                                
22 Eric Foner's Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863 - 
1877 (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), the standard survey, also 
presents this rebuttal to the earlier views. 
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civilization and perpetrated some of the worst civilian 
atrocities in the history of warfare.  He might have told 
them that Reconstruction crushed our economy and made 
a mockery of our political system.23 
Talmadge's belief that the state of the southern economy in the 1940's was 
still ascribable to northern actions speaks to how present the past was for 
him.  Talmadge's emotional tone—his use of words like "plight", 
"crushed" and "mockery"—showed this as well, but also showed the 
centrality of his view of history in forming his political views.  (One is 
reminded of William Faulkner's oft-quoted line that "The past is not dead; 
it's not even past.")  This emotional focus also explains how Talmadge 
could have written that Sherman's march to the sea involved  "some of the 
worst civilian atrocities in the history of warfare" in the same paragraph in 
which he referred to World Wars One and Two. 
Nor is this passage unique.  Elsewhere, Talmadge wrote: 
 
During Reconstruction, some of the best educated and 
most responsible white citizens were disenfranchised at 
bayonet point, and our local and state governments were 
turned over to Yankee carpetbaggers, white Southern 
scalawags, and barely literate freed blacks.  Our 
experience with blacks in politics was that they were 
manipulated by outside forces that wanted to exploit us 
socially and economically.24 
And a few lines later: 
 
The threat to local self government had passed with 
Reconstruction.  But we just didn't want to take any 
chances....  Maybe they weren't sending the occupying 
                                                
23 Talmadge, 1987, p. 86. 
24 Ibid., p. 144. 
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army back in, but the whole business smacked of Yankee 
imperialism.25 
Talmadge referred in passing to Republicans having "exploited the South 
socially and economically during Reconstruction"26 elsewhere in his 
memoir as well.  It is also important to note that his view of 
Reconstruction surfaced throughout Talmadge's text.  For example, in the 
passage quoted above about the Brown decision, Talmadge referred in 
passing to "Yankee carpetbaggers"—whether in reference to the events of 
the Reconstruction era or as a term for what he saw as modern analogues 
is not clear, but in any event Talmadge's use of Reconstruction—and the 
particular view of it which he endorsed—clearly remained a reference 
point for him, not only in the 1950's, but even in 1987. 
A great many of Talmadge's Reconstruction references occurred in 
the context of comparisons with the Civil Rights Movement and the 
actions of the federal government in support of it.  These references had 
been common during the period of Massive Resistance.  But while 
Talmadge was no longer engaged in massive resistance to integration—
indeed, by 1987 he claimed to be a supporter of it—his view of 
Reconstruction, and the relationship between the federal government and 
the South that he drew from it, had not changed along with his views on 
segregation.  Thus his later views of the Jim Crow period continued to be 
informed by a (tendentious and fundamentally flawed) view of 
Reconstruction that had been arrived at in the context of supporting 
segregation.  The contradictions, omissions and problematics of 
Talmadge's professed later views were informed and enabled by this 
                                                
25 Ibid., p. 145. 
26 Ibid., p. 302. 
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questionable view of the past, which in turn was buttressed by Talmadge's 
understanding of more recent history. 
Another crucial feature of Talmadge's understanding of American 
race relations was his belief that relationships between African Americans 
and whites were better in the South than in the North—not only in the 
post-Movement era, but also during Jim Crow times as well.  This claim 
was made frequently in Talmadge's memoir.  In a chapter about his 
childhood, Talmadge wrote about a childhood friend of his: 
 
A black boy named Thad and I were particularly close.  I 
couldn't count the number of meals I had at his house.  
But when it came time to go to school, we went our 
separate ways.  We were still friends, but on a different 
social standing.  I never thought to question the practice 
of segregation, and I doubt that he did either.  Up North, 
where segregation didn't exist, there were fewer close 
friendships between black and white.  I'm not talking 
about cause and effect, just social reality.  If we are just 
now beginning to understand the War Between the 
States, it may take a hundred years for us to understand 
the way race relations have changed in my lifetime.27 
While Talmadge's thought about our lack of understanding about changes 
in race relations was left at that (he moved onto other topics following 
that sentence), the implication seems to have been that race relations may 
well have deteriorated due to the changes he witnessed.  He was, to be 
sure, quite careful not to say that explicitly; he hinted at its possible truth 
in oblique terms, while leaving explicit a statement which is hard to 
disagree with (that historical change becomes clearer with greater 
distance).  This sentence also served, along with the rest of the context, to 
                                                
27 Ibid., p. 13. 
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undercut Talmadge's denial that he was "talking about cause and effect": 
Talmadge hinted, again without saying so explicitly, that segregation had, 
in fact, helped to promote close friendships, although he hid the claim 
behind a vaguer claim about "social reality".28 
This sense that he was, contrary to his claim, "talking about cause 
and effect" was strengthened by the context of the larger work, for this 
passage was hardly unique.  On the contrary, it was one of a number of 
similar passages about the greater degree of friendship and social ease 
between Talmadge and African Americans particularly and between white 
and African American southerners more generally.  Talmadge's headnote 
to his chapter "A Time to Build"—one of the central chapters in which he 
discussed the issue of race and race relations in the South—contained a 
similar story: 
 
When I was an officer in the United States Navy, I served 
aboard ship with another white Southern officer, Mack 
Perry, and quite a few black enlisted men.  These blacks 
were from the North, and they were mostly stewards, 
cooks, orderlies, and the like.  Although their immediate 
superiors in the chain of command were Northern whites, 
they would never go to these officers with their 
problems.  Instead, whenever they were in trouble or 
needed help, they would seek out Mack Perry or myself.  
                                                
28 There are a number of other things to note about this passage.  
Intentionally or not, Talmadge's mention of the countless meals he had at 
his friend's house contrasts strongly about the utter silence about any 
meals his friend might have had with his, Talmadge's, family.  (He did not 
say, after all, "at each other's houses," which is in some ways the more 
natural phrase in this situation; the topic is left distinctly omitted.)  The 
tension between the phrases "we went our separate ways" and "we were 
still friends" is also worth noting, as is Talmadge's evident comfort with 
the idea that they were friends "on a different social standing." 
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They knew that we lived in a segregated society, and they 
probably had been taught that in the South blacks were 
"second-class citizens".  But they somehow sensed that 
Southern whites would have a concern and understanding 
for them that they couldn't find in their Yankee officers.  
In talking to white Southerners who served in other 
branches of the military, I have learned that this was a 
common phenomenon.  that may suggest why, twenty 
years after the civil rights upheavals of the sixties, race 
relations are generally better in the South than in the 
North.29 
(It is worth noting that Talmadge served in the military in World War 
Two, when it was still segregated.)  As in the previous passage, Talmadge 
was coy but clear in his suggestion that segregation left a positive legacy, 
contrasting the better race relations in the South than in the North in the 
context of information about segregation and the concern of white 
southerners for African Americans in the military (and not mentioning, 
for instance, the effects of the Civil Rights Movement itself, or of 
demographic realities, or any other factors.)  Talmadge again started out 
with a personal story, and extrapolated on the basis of his personal 
experience to the larger issue of southern race relations. 
These stories and claims were, of course, themselves a kind of 
justification, both retroactive and present-day.  To the extent that they 
were retroactive, they formed part of an argument that segregation had 
been supported by African American southerners as well as white 
southerners—or, at least, that it had not been so bad (hence not so 
strongly opposed) as has been claimed.  At the same time, they were an 
attempt to claim that segregation and its support—in particular, 
                                                
29 Talmadge, 1987, p. 199. 
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Talmadge's own support for it—had not been motivated by racism.  
(Talmadge, like many supporters of segregation, had an extremely limited 
notion of what constituted racism; in a 1986 interview, Talmadge claimed 
that a racist was (only) someone who "hates blacks or hates Chinese or 
hates white people or Indians or somebody else", and notes that he never 
"saw more than two or three of them in my life, and I always thought they 
were somewhat nutty."30)  This claim seems to have been intended to cast 
both Talmadge's past and his present in a particular light—that, by his 
support among (some) African Americans, his friendships with African 
Americans, and the like, it was demonstrated both that he had not been 
motivated by racism while supporting segregation and that he was not, at 
the time of writing, a racist.  This is, of course, an idea that has been 
reduced to a ridiculed cliché ("Some of my best friends are black") in 
popular discourse; yet it seems to be the one which Talmadge was 
making, his rhetoric approaching the cliché if never quite settling upon it. 
Intertwined with this belief about the quality of southern race 
relations was a deep sense of, and resentment about, northern hypocrisy in 
their approach to race.  Many of his more general claims of better 
southern than northern race relations were made quite explicitly in this 
context.  In the paragraph that directly followed the one cited above, 
Talmadge wrote: 
 
One of the reasons why Northerners find it so difficult to 
understand race relations in the South is that Yankees 
tend to see the race before they do the individual.  In fact, 
                                                
30 Mel Steely and Don Wagner, interview with Herman Talmadge, March 
14, 1986, at 
(http://www.westga.edu/~library/depts/gph/conhtintgeo.html). 
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someone once said that the tendency in the North is to 
love the race and hate the individual, whereas in the 
South it's just the opposite.  In Margaret Mitchell's great 
Southern novel Gone With the Wind, there's one 
memorable scene where some officious women from 
Maine become absolutely aghast when Scarlett O'Hara 
suggests that they hire a black woman to look after their 
children.  Not only do they not want to get that close to a 
black person, but they also act right condescending to 
one of Aunt Pittipat's faithful old black servants.  This 
gets Scarlett so indignant that she thinks: "What 
damnably queer people Yankees are! ... They didn't 
understand negroes or the relations between negroes and 
their former masters.  Yet they fought a war to free them.  
And having freed them, they didn't want to have anything 
to do with them, except use them to terrorize 
Southerners.  They didn't like them, didn't trust them, and 
yet their constant cry was that Southerners didn't know 
how to get along with them."  Those lines were written in 
the 1930's to describe the situation during 
Reconstruction, but they remain largely true today.31 
It is, perhaps, not surprising that Talmadge held the historical views he 
did when he cited Gone With the Wind as providing the most apt 
description of race relations in the North versus those in the South, for a 
period of time ranging from Reconstruction through the novel's writing to 
the writing of Talmadge's own memoir.  (Note also that the phrase 
"remain true" (my emphasis) endorsed the entire passage, including the 
notion that (white) southerners were being "terrorized" by the North.) 
The assertion that race relations were worse in the North than in the 
South also contains the notion that it was in the post-segregation era, not 
in the era of Jim Crow, that race relations had grown problematic.  In one 
                                                
31 Talmadge, 1987, pp. 199 - 200; ellipsis is Talmadge's. 
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of his passages about the transformation of Civil Rights laws into 
Affirmative Action laws, Talmadge wrote: 
 
Civil Rights have created new racial tensions and a 
special-interest mentality that is tearing this country 
apart.  But, ironically, that is more true in the North than 
in the South.  Blacks and whites in the south have had to 
learn to live together in a new way.  Up north, they're 
getting acquainted for the first time.32 
Although the passage ended there, one can detect at least a hint of 
schadenfreude in this final statement—as if northern hypocrites were 
finally getting their own.  In a similar spirit, Talmadge said later that 
"About the only good that forced busing has done is expose a lot of self-
righteous Yankees for the hypocrites they really are."33  Such 
statements—anger or sarcasm about northern hypocrisy, both during the 
time of the Civil Rights Movement and more recently—occurred 
relatively frequently in Talmadge's memoir. 
Part of what these claims demonstrate is the hold that the emotional 
logic of segregationist arguments still had on Talmadge.  His irritation at 
perceived northern hypocrisy, his nearly-audible bellows of outrage, 
seethed with emotion.  This does not necessarily belie his claim to have 
changed the views behind those arguments: emotional attachment to a 
position can outlast intellectual conversion to its opposite, as the raw 
nerves of the past continue to flare.  I think that some of Talmadge's 
contradictions were of this sort, where old habits of thought, intellectual 
                                                
32 Ibid., p. 184. 
33 Ibid., p. 211. 
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as well as emotional, continued to remain unweeded despite a genuine if 
shallow conversion to positions that contradict them. 
These passages also played an important role in Talmadge's view of 
Civil Rights legislation.  In 1987 he continued to make a standard 
segregationist argument from the 1960s, namely that Civil Rights 
legislation was not really about improving the lot of African Americans, 
but about a (white) northern assault on (white) southerners.  For this 
argument to ring true—probably even to Talmadge himself—he had to 
convince his audience that the laws had been unnecessary (thus making 
the search for a hidden, hypocritical motive seem plausible).  Conversely, 
Talmadge saw the existence of northern racism, not as showing the need 
for greater Civil Rights protections than the ones which had been passed, 
but as demonstrating that those which were passed had nothing to do with 
the protection of African American rights to begin with. 
Closely related to this notion that race relations were better in the 
South than in the North—even during the time of legalized segregation—
was another element of Talmadge's historical view, namely, his belief that 
segregation had not been as bad as later memory would suggest.  This 
Disney view of segregation was practically necessitated by the idea of the 
South's more positive race relations: a more realistic picture of 
segregation, after all, would immediately have called this idea into 
question (if not flat-out discredit).  Yet the causation can just as easily 
have gone the other way: a rosy picture of segregation naturally created an 
image of good race-relations—one that colored (at the time as well as in 
retrospect) actual interactions that Talmadge may have had during his 
youth.  I do not believe that Talmadge adopted either view instrumentally; 
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they were both part of a larger historical vision that both helped create and 
was created by the contradictions between Talmadge's earlier stances and 
his later ones.  
Nevertheless, Talmadge's upbeat view of segregation is quite 
striking.  At one point in his memoir he wrote: 
 
When I was growing up in the South, it probably would 
have come as a shock to ninety-five percent of the white 
people and a substantial majority of the blacks to learn 
that some folks thought it downright immoral for persons 
to prefer associating with others of their own race.  To us 
in the South, that seemed about as natural as chittlin's, 
okra and country music.  It was simply a matter of taste, 
custom, and individual preference.  As long as 
segregation was not used as an excuse for inequality, it 
really had no moral significance whatsoever.  Of course, 
any honest person would have to admit that from the time 
of Reconstruction on, segregation had often been used as 
a means to assure the inequality of blacks.  Nevertheless, 
as a principle, the notion of a "separate-but-equal" 
society was sound.  I think most Southern blacks would 
have preferred that kind of society to dealing with the 
animosities created by outside forces trying to impose 
integration on the South.34 
There is a great deal to be said about this passage.  First, it is important to 
note that here, as elsewhere, Talmadge hewed closely to traditional 
defenses of segregation from the 1950's and before,35 describing it as a 
                                                
34 Talmadge, 1987, p. 200. 
35 Of course, as has been noted, many of Talmadge's arguments are almost 
indistinguishable from earlier defenses of segregation, including his own.  
What makes this passage different, however, is that it is an argument 
directly about race relations and the nature of segregation that reads 
almost as if written thirty years earlier than it was, rather than an 
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matter of personal preference, as having been desired by African 
Americans as well as whites, and as not necessarily a marker of 
inequality—all frequent arguments from defenders of segregation. 
Talmadge, in 1987, reiterated these views practically unchanged: 
describing a system constructed by law and inequality of property rights 
and enforced by terror as a matter of "individual preference", asserting 
that the system was supported by African Americans at the time, and so 
forth.  This latter claim he buttressed through a false choice between the 
persistence of segregation and the imposition of white animosity, ignoring 
the origin of that animosity not in integration itself but in the reaction of 
whites to it—a reaction which included, at least in small part, Talmadge's 
own past actions. 
There is, of course, that single anomalous sentence standing out 
from the rest of the passage, the acknowledgment that "any honest person 
would have to admit that from the time of Reconstruction on, segregation 
had often been used as a means to assure the inequality of blacks."  This 
sentence stands out in the context the rest of the passage—a bit of honesty 
nestled inside old arguments without their contradictions being ironed out.  
It was not a sentiment expressed in Talmadge's 1955 tract; to that degree, 
this passage departed from his earlier views.  Yet Talmadge was again 
conveniently vague here.  He did not go into detail about the ways in 
which he believed segregation has been used to ensure inequality—and 
therefore was not forced to confront the fact that these structures were, in 
fact, coterminous with segregation as a whole; he was also thereby freed 
                                                                                                                                       
argument about structural issues such as "states' rights".  The line here is 
even thinner. 
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from confronting the accuracy of describing segregation in terms of 
"private" associations, and the ways in which those supposedly-private 
associations manifested themselves in other people's lives. 
The anomaly is striking.  How can it be that African Americans 
were largely happy under segregation—would, indeed, have preferred it 
to federal intervention—if "segregation had often been used as a means to 
assure the inequality of blacks"?  For that matter, what is the relationship 
between that "often" and Talmadge's claim that "as a principle, the notion 
of a "separate-but-equal" society was sound?"  Was Talmadge claiming 
that segregation was a good idea that has never been fairly tried, much as 
socialists have often claimed for socialism?  I think these contradictions 
remained within Talmadge's thought as contradictions—an awareness, 
perhaps forced by unwelcome facts or perhaps forced simply by political 
expediency, that segregation was "often" unjust, but a deep emotional 
conviction that the good people of his youth, people who liked "chittlin's, 
okra and country music," could not have been the maintainers of an unjust 
system. 
These contradictions were not fully reconciled; one element that 
took a step towards resolving them, however—or, perhaps, simply 
enabled Talmadge to simultaneously hold such contradictory beliefs—
was yet another of Talmadge's historical convictions, namely, his belief 
that the segregated South was moving towards equality within the 
framework of segregation—the achievement of a genuinely "separate-but-
equal" society.  Shortly after the passage cited above, Talmadge wrote: 
 
Inequality, not segregation, was the major problem that 
plagued blacks from the time of Emancipation until the 
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gains of the recent past.  In the period immediately 
following World War II, that inequality was starting to 
break down even as segregation remained firmly in place.  
Blacks had previously been held back by a lack of 
political and economic power.  However, in the late 
forties and early fifties, they began voting in record 
numbers, and the economy of the South began to expand.  
So white politicians began courting the black vote by 
using some of the funds generated by this economic 
boom to upgrade the facilities serving black citizens.  In 
other words, we began moving toward an equal, as well 
as separate, society.  Whether white officeholders were 
helping blacks out of the goodness of their hearts or 
simply to gain political advantage is beside the point.  
What is important is that significant progress was being 
made without federal intervention and without forced 
integration.... As governor I did more for the black 
people of Georgia than any of my predecessors, and 
probably more than all of them put together.36 
What Talmadge says about African Americans' lack of political and 
economic power was, of course, true, although it is hard to imagine how 
he could explain it as separable from the realities of segregation rather 
than as part and parcel of them.  It is equally hard to separate out any 
progress towards a more equal society (insofar as it existed) from the 
early stirrings of the Civil Rights Movement which Talmadge seems to 
have believed was made moot by that progress.  And, of course, 
significant political power, at least as measured by voting, was only 
gained by the struggles which brought about the Voting Rights Act—by, 
in other words, "federal intervention"—while economic power still 
remains a problem to this day.  It was particularly disingenuous for 
Talmadge to claim that the matter had been resolving itself without 
                                                
36 Talmadge, 1987, p. 201. 
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federal intervention, since at the time—particularly during his term as 
Governor of Georgia—Talmadge was, in fact, actively involved in not 
only the maintenance of segregation but its retrenchment after a brief 
period of progress.37 
By describing—and perhaps believing—a fantasy of retreating 
segregation, and by maintaining the belief that segregation was not so dire 
in any event (keeping this belief carefully segregated from whatever he 
knew about the realities of African American life at the time), Talmadge 
allowed himself to, if not resolve, then at least maintain many of the 
contradictions in his own thought.  If, contrary to historical fact, federal 
intervention had not been necessary to end the inequalities in the South, 
then Talmadge's defense of "states' rights" as an abstract principle would 
have been easier to reconcile with a stated belief in equality of 
opportunity and human dignity.  If conditions for African Americans in 
the segregated south had actually been as good as Talmadge seems to 
have believed they were, then a slow, 'natural' approach to integration 
might have made moral sense, and the moral justification for Civil Rights 
laws might more readily have been reasonably seen as simply a front for 
other motives.  If segregation had not been motivated by racism, if it had 
not disadvantaged African Americans, and if African Americans had 
indeed been content with it, then the idea that "as a principle, the notion of 
a 'separate-but-equal' society was sound" might be at least arguable.  
Needless to say, these hypotheticals were simply not true.  It's unclear 
whether this was willful blindness, genuine ignorance, or a deliberate 
attempt to deceive his reader.  Whatever motivated it, Talmadge's 
                                                
37 Tuck, Beyond Atlanta, pp. 74 - 80. 
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distorted view of the past made his contradictory positions hang together 
in a way they could not have if he had confronted the historical realities 
behind segregation. 
These passages of historical justification of segregation led 
Talmadge almost to the point of saying that he would have continued to 
support segregation even in the 1980s if it were implemented in a fashion 
consistent with equality (which Talmadge claimed it could be).  He didn't 
quite say so: saying that a principle "was sound" leaves open the 
possibility that it is no longer sound; it is also not quite the same thing as 
endorsing it.  If one were to read charitably, one could view his comment 
that he had come to see the "wisdom" of integration as suggesting he 
would not have.  But taken in isolation, these passages seemed to suggest 
that Talmadge did, in fact, simply remain in favor of segregation. 
Yet this sort of justification—in which race relations in the South 
were improved by segregation, in which Reconstruction was simply 
northern aggression, and so forth—was not the only view of the recent 
past which one finds in Talmadge's memoir.  He also used the past as an 
excuse—a justification for why he, and other white southerners, had held 
the views that they had.  These moments of excuse—not of apology, for 
he did not apologize—implied a different view of the past.  By explaining 
his and others' views as due to their times, he suggested that those views 
had been wrong, as they were in need of explanation. 
This apologetic view of the past, as one might call it, predated 
Talmadge's memoir.  During the primary race in his final, 1980 campaign 
for Senate, Talmadge responded to attacks from his political opponent 
about his segregationist past by saying (in a speech to an African-
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American church in Atlanta), "I've been accused of being a segregationist 
twenty-five years ago.  It's true.  Do you know any white folks in Georgia 
who weren't segregationists twenty-five years ago?"38  And this attitude 
towards his past surfaced in his memoir as well. 
These passages were briefer than the passages that seemed to ratify 
the history of the Jim Crow South, just as Talmadge's claims to have 
changed his mind about the "wisdom" of integration were briefer than his 
justifications of the philosophies purportedly behind his old, now-
abandoned positions.  As with his statements declaring his abandonment 
of the segregationist position, they generally occurred within a larger 
passage justifying or excusing his old views, not lamenting them.  
Nevertheless they were there.  At one point, Talmadge admitted that "I'm 
sure that our Southern opposition to civil rights was largely shaped by the 
customs and mores of our region.  We sincerely believed that we had 
devised the best means for organizing race relations...."39  In this passage, 
unlike the ones cited earlier, there was a genuine sense that he might have 
been wrong.  To be sure, one might read the notion that "customs and 
mores" shaped the opposition to civil rights as saying that it had only been 
due to the customs and mores of the South that they had held the (correct) 
principles, enabling them to take the moral stance.  But that isn't the tone 
of the passage.  Instead, it seems to have been a (brief) admission that the 
customs and mores led them to take a stance that they might not otherwise 
have taken—that was not, for instance, readily reachable simply from the 
                                                
38 Cited in Richard Hyatt, Zell: the Governor Who Gave Georgia HOPE 
(Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1997), p. 208. 
39 Talmadge, 1987, p. 181 
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point of view of principle.  Talmadge never said that Southern means for 
organizing race relations (i.e. segregation) was not the best, and indeed 
went on to fulminate against northerners who tried, hypocritically, to 
impose their views on the South.  Nevertheless, the phrase "we sincerely 
believed" carries the implication that "we" were wrong: it is a phrase of 
justification, not of triumphalism.  To be sure, it was an excuse: we were 
not motivated by ill-will, the phrase seems to be saying—by, for instance, 
racism; we sincerely believed we were correct.  But such a sentiment 
logically carried within it a recognition that they were, in fact, wrong. 
Elsewhere Talmadge seems to have been appealing for historical 
sympathy.  In his discussion of the "White Primary," he began by 
admitting its indefensibility to modern sensibilities, and then asked for an 
act of historical imagination: 
 
Viewed from the perspective of the 1980's, that 
institution seems downright indefensible.  (Before I left 
the Senate, I was even favoring extension of the federal 
Voting Rights Act.)  So it may take a good deal of 
memory (or imagination) to envision Georgia as it 
existed forty years ago.  I suppose that Southerners have 
always looked more to the past than the future.  As a 
result, we have produced more than our share of 
historians and literary folk.  But we have also been slow 
to change.40 
This passage introduced a longer, justificatory argument.  But it is hard to 
miss the implicit admission that Georgia of four decades prior was at 
moral fault.  The old Georgia needed the aid of imagination to gain 
sympathy: not because it required imagination to create a past which was 
                                                
40 Ibid., p. 144. 
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justifiable on its own terms, but because imagination was required to see 
how such moral errors were at least understandable.  Being "slow to 
change" was held up as a character trait, which, while having good 
qualities (such as producing historians and "literary folk"), also led to less 
desirable results.  It was an excuse: but we only excuse what we recognize 
to have been (otherwise) a fault. 
 
At a number of points in his memoir, Talmadge engaged in 
extended defenses of some of his long-held positions.  Most of these 
defenses were attempts to define a politics of 'States' rights' which was 
separable from the issue with which it had been most closely and visibly 
linked for decades, not least by Talmadge himself.  Other defenses, 
however, touched on issues more closely related to segregation.  In both 
cases, Talmadge relied upon all his rhetorical devices to convince his 
reader—and perhaps himself—of the validity of his viewpoint without 
quite making it seem to be an explicitly pro-segregation view: he elided 
the question of whether he was engaged in a defense of his old positions 
and of whether he continued to hold them; he relied upon a fantasy image 
of segregation as a system supported by African Americans as well as 
whites, one which had legitimate uses apart from its role in maintaining 
racial hierarchy; he combined brief admissions of the immorality of 
segregation with lengthy, heated defenses of supposedly separable 
principles. 
One such defense occurred in Talmadge's passage describing the 
institution of the Democratic White Primary, the opening of which is cited 
above.  He continued his defense of the institution at some length, 
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however.  First he set the institution in the context of white southerners' 
memories of Reconstruction: 
 
During Reconstruction, some of the best educated and 
most responsible white citizens were disenfranchised at 
bayonet point, and our local and state governments were 
turned over to Yankee carpetbaggers, white Southern 
scalawags, and barely literate freed blacks.  Our 
experience with blacks in politics was that they were 
manipulated by outside forces that wanted to exploit us 
socially and economically.  These forces invariably 
belonged to the Republican party.  So in the wake of 
Reconstruction the two political forces most feared by 
the typical white Southerner were blacks and 
Republicans.  The Democratic White Primary was 
designed to exclude both.41 
Here Talmadge's Margaret Mitchell-esque image of Reconstruction was 
used to explain why white southerners might reasonably wish to exclude 
African Americans and Republicans.  By combining these two categories, 
he managed to conflate a racist institution (the exclusion of African 
Americans from voting) with a perfectly ordinary one in American 
politics (a primary in which members of another party are not allowed to 
vote.)  Talmadge then pushed this conflation further in his next paragraph: 
 
Ignoring the racial aspect for a moment, it's not hard to 
see why a political party might want to restrict the sort of 
people who pick its candidates in the general election. ... 
Even today, quite a few states limit participation in party 
primaries to registered members of that party. ... In the 
spring of 1986, a couple of followers of Lyndon 
LaRouche got on the general election ballot as 
Democrats in Illinois because the regular Democratic 
                                                
41 Ibid., p. 144. 
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Party was asleep at the switch during the primary.  If an 
invading army had come into Illinois for the express 
purpose of installing those LaRouchites into public office 
and throwing the existing office-holders out, and if the 
situation had existed for over a decade, you might expect 
the people of Illinois to take precautions against that 
happening again.  That's the way Southerners felt about 
blacks and Republicans in Georgia.  Originally, the 
Democratic White Primary was simply a means of 
assuring that people would have an opportunity to vote 
for someone who was both white and a democrat.  There 
was no provision, nor should there have been, to prevent 
blacks and Republicans from voting in the general 
election.42 
By focusing the reader's attention on the extreme hypothetical about 
military occupation of Illinois by the followers of Lyndon LaRouche,43 
Talmadge elided the differences between ensuring that "people would 
have an opportunity to vote for someone who was... a democrat" (by 
keeping Republicans from voting in the Democratic primary) and 
ensuring that "people would have an opportunity to vote for someone who 
was... white".  He also, of course, passed over the fact that, in the 
segregated south, there was no Republican party of any significance, and 
thus a vote in the general election was, practically speaking, meaningless.  
(This was highlighted even further when Talmadge claimed, as will be 
discussed below, that the Democratic Party was "a private organization".) 
In the passages so far cited, Talmadge was completely unclear 
about whether he was making an excuse (for what he had come to see as a 
                                                
42 Ibid., pp. 144 - 145. 
43 A hypothetical which was itself quite revealing about the 
decontextualization  of Reconstruction, in particular the elimination of 
any question of race or racial justice from Talmadge's conception of it. 
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moral error) or a justification (of a practice he continued to see as 
perfectly acceptable).  Talmadge addressed—but did not answer—this 
question in the next paragraph.  He wrote: 
 
In looking at things with the clarity of hindsight, I have 
to admit that the Democratic White Primary was not only 
discriminatory but unnecessary.  The threat to local self 
government had passed with Reconstruction.  But we just 
didn't want to take any chances.  Moreover, the fact that 
it was the federal courts that struck down the White 
Primary sort of stuck in our craw.  Maybe they weren't 
sending the occupying army back in, but the whole 
business smacked of Yankee imperialism.  This sort of 
intrusion into the affairs of a private organization, which 
is what the Democratic Primary was, made the vast 
majority of white Georgians see red.  There was no major 
politician in the state at that time who really wanted to do 
away with the White Primary.  The question was whether 
we should fight to keep it.  The Talmadgites wanted to 
restore the White Primary in a way that would pass 
constitutional muster, and the anti-Talmadgites simply 
wanted to knuckle under to the court's ruling.  When the 
people voted for Papa in 1946 and me in '48, they made it 
clear that the fight was to continue.44 
Talmadge established his credentials as opposing the disenfranchisement 
of African Americans by admitting that the Democratic White Primary 
was "discriminatory"; but the admission was buried within a side phrase 
("not only..."), and the structure of his sentence gave priority to the fact 
that the institution was "unnecessary."  The "not only.. but [also]" 
structure made the "unnecessary" the decisive factor, the "discriminatory" 
merely one to mention in passing.  This sidelining of the moral issue was 
furthered by the fact that it was his judgment that the Primary was 
                                                
44 Ibid., p. 145. 
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"unnecessary" rather than "discriminatory" that Talmadge went on to 
expound upon.  Further, even that "unnecessary" occurred in the context 
of an argument making the case that, while "unnecessary," the institution 
of the Democratic White Primary was nevertheless understandable.  By 
focusing solely on its being "unnecessary," Talmadge did not need to 
clarify whether the larger argument was an excuse or a justification—
whether its being "discriminatory" should have been enough for him (and 
others) to do away with it, indeed whether this seemed sufficient to him 
even in 1987. 
Talmadge also managed to slip into this paragraph his rhetorical 
trope of using the past as an excuse.  The claim that "There was no major 
politician in the state at that time who really wanted to do away with the 
White Primary.  The question was whether we should fight to keep it" 
implicitly excused Talmadge for not opposing the White Primary—since 
no white politicians in the state did, it would be unreasonable to ask him 
to have done so.  Further, by framing the issue as a question of whether to 
fight for what they had all believed in, Talmadge managed to make the 
struggle for an institution he admitted in the very same paragraph was 
discriminatory sound courageous.  His opponents wanted to "knuckle-
under" (they were weak or cowardly).  The Talmadgites wanted to 
"restore" the White Primary—a lofty word that gives the struggle a touch 
of nobility—and to do so "in a way that would pass constitutional 
muster," ignoring the fact that to try to keep a whites-only primary was 
necessarily subverting the Court's ruling, to say nothing of the 
constitution.  Finally, Talmadge passed off the onus of the decision onto 
the citizens of Georgia (or rather the white citizens, although he didn't 
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point that out here) by noting that the "people... made it clear that the fight 
was to continue", which nicely avoids any question of the morality of 
running a campaign on that basis (and in the process swaying people in 
that direction). 
Talmadge's only other passage addressing the "discriminatory" 
nature of the Democratic White Primary was his opening remark, quoted 
above, that by 1987 it seemed "downright indefensible," and that he had 
been in favor of the 1982 extension of the Voting Rights Act.  In other 
words, he had come to see the institution as so clearly wrong that in order 
to end it he was willing support the sort of government actions that, not 
only in the past but repeatedly throughout his memoir, he argued against.  
Yet he did not acknowledge this sense that there was a genuine 
immorality in the position he and others had taken in his discussion of that 
position; his entire presentation of it was presented as a defense of having 
done so. 
 
If Talmadge's defenses of his earlier positions on the White Primary 
and  Brown were at least somewhat equivocal, including some 
acknowledgment that on the underlying issue justice was on the other 
side, his defense of his prior position on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was less so.  His analysis of the Civil 
Rights Act was phrased in the rhetoric (standard in conservative discourse 
by the 1980s) of "special rights," a term more typically used to oppose 
either Affirmative Action or Civil Rights statues for gays and lesbians.  
This notion of "special rights" was, as I have argued, part of the central 
rhetorical maneuver used by former supporters of de jure segregation to 
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adopt themselves to an integrationist stance by presenting their goal as 
race-neutrality: seizing upon the shifting focus of the Civil Rights 
Movement from combating de jure to de facto segregation, former 
supporters of Jim Crow used the earlier rhetoric of the Civil Rights 
Movement to combat its later goals, in the process discarding their own 
discredited arguments in favor of de jure segregation.  But Talmadge was 
going beyond that particular rhetorical pivot.  He was, in fact, continuing 
to oppose the entire apparatus of Civil Rights law (without openly 
supporting segregation). 
A key step in Talmadge's rhetorical strategy was his concept—
probably sincerely held—that, as a legal matter, racial equality was an 
established fact.  Talmadge wrote that 
 
It was a tragic mistake to have instituted slavery in this 
country in the first place.  It was also a mistake not to 
have extended the full rights of citizenship to black 
people once they were freed.  But that situation was 
largely corrected by the thirteenth and fourteenth 
amendments to the Constitution.45 
This was of a piece, of course, with Talmadge's notion that 
Reconstruction was an illegitimate power-grab (rather than an imperfect 
and unfinished move towards racial equality); if the situation had already 
been perfectly resolved, then Reconstruction was necessarily illegitimate; 
conversely, Reconstruction can only be understood as illegitimate by 
denying the genuine issues that remained.  Thus Talmadge asserted that 
after 1868, when the Fourteenth amendment was passed, no further action 
was required.  The issue of enforcement mechanisms for the Fourteenth 
                                                
45 Ibid., p. 182. 
 307 
Amendment was conveniently omitted—if the issue had been raised, then 
its non-enforcement, and the view that the Civil Rights Act was itself an 
implementation of (rather than an addition to) the Fourteenth Amendment, 
would have to be broached.  This was particularly pressing in the case of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which, in contrast to many constitutional 
amendments, was extremely general in its language. 
(Two other points should be noted about that passage.  First, by 
speaking of both slavery and the ongoing second-class status of African 
Americans as a "tragic mistake," Talmadge bypassed any moral judgment: 
it was not a crime, but a mistake—something done by good people with 
genuine good will.  Second, Talmadge's omission of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, which secured (at least de jure) the right of African 
Americans to vote, was particularly telling, especially in the context of 
Talmadge's own efforts in his career to continue the disenfranchisement 
of African American Georgians.46) 
Having claimed that Civil Rights laws were legally unnecessary 
freed Talmadge to find an ulterior motive for them: 
 
Under our form of government, blacks had every right to 
demand equal treatment under the law.  In those 
instances where segregation was used to keep blacks in 
an inferior position to whites, it violated constitutional 
law and elemental principles of human decency.  But the 
so-called "civil rights" laws that were proposed in 
Congress from the late 1940s to the late 1960s had little 
to do with equality under the law.  They were designed 
primarily to force a mixing of the races at every level of 
Southern society and to punish any Southerner who 
valued the right to associate with persons of his own 
                                                
46 See Tuck, Beyond Atlanta, pp. 74 - 77. 
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choosing.... "Civil rights" laws... [although] usually 
drafted in neutral language... are intended to confer 
special privileges upon certain groups of people precisely 
because of their race or some other distinguishing 
characteristic.  Rather than limiting the power of 
government over the private life of the individual, civil 
rights laws greatly expand the power of government to 
enforce the special privileges of some favored minority 
group.47 
Once again, Talmadge's single admission of the immorality of 
segregation—that there were "instances where segregation was used to 
keep blacks in an inferior position to whites" which "violated 
constitutional law and elemental principles of human decency" was 
separated from any context which might have raised doubts concerning 
his larger narrative about the Civil Rights Act being legally unnecessary.  
It is in fact something of a puzzle what Talmadge might have thought he 
meant—since he had already justified most of the formal system of 
segregation.  Presumably, however, this was not something Talmadge 
thought through: having accepted a general principle that there were such 
injustices (and condemned them), he did not press his memories or beliefs 
to detail what those were or how they differed from the normal practice of 
segregation.  And while Talmadge did admit that such instances existed, 
he also seemed to be against any remedy for them—save, perhaps, for 
individual legal action to deal with individual cases. 
It is also worth noting in passing Talmadge's continued use of 
language straight out of pro-segregationist arguments, in particular the 
phrase "a mixing of the races," with its deliberate ambiguity and its 
suggestion of miscegenation, as well as the employment of the phrase 
                                                
47 Talmadge, 1987, p. 182. 
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"associate with persons of his own choosing" to describe public acts of 
discrimination.  Interestingly, this language was used right beside quite 
modern rhetoric about "special privileges" for "some favored minority 
group"—showing in a single paragraph the evolution of this particular 
strand of conservative argument.  (It hardly needs to be said that "favored 
minority" was a strange phrase to use in the context of a group as 
disenfranchised and oppressed as African Americans were under Jim 
Crow.) 
This mixing of both quite obsolete with quite modern rhetoric was 
sustained in Talmadge's next two paragraphs.  He first continued his 
"special rights" rhetoric with a passage about the tendency of people to 
see themselves as members of groups and the prevalence of the politics of 
victimhood that, apart perhaps from its invocation of Prohibition as an 
example, would have sounded perfectly up to date in 1987: 
 
Back in the 1950's and '60's folks supported civil rights 
legislation because it was seen as a blow against racial 
prejudice.  That's a very noble sentiment, to be sure.  So 
was the sentiment that got Prohibition passed right after 
World War I.  The world would no doubt be a lot better 
place without booze or racial prejudice.  But when you 
try to outlaw either one, you create more problems than 
you solve.  We all know what a travesty Prohibition was.  
The damage done by the philosophy of civil rights is not 
so apparent, but it's been every bit as harmful to the 
social fabric of this country.  Over the last twenty to 
thirty years, too many Americans have stopped thinking 
of themselves as individual citizens who stand equal 
before the bar of justice.  They see themselves as 
members of special-interest groups, as "victims" of 
society who deserve preferential treatment.  They look at 
those of us who don't fall into some government 
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approved minority group and say: What are you going to 
do for me?48 
Note that Talmadge totally elided the issue of the reality of racial 
prejudice.  I suspect that even Talmadge, if pressed, would have admitted 
that under the system of segregation, African Americans were hardly 
"individual citizens who [stood] equal before the bar of justice."  By 
claiming that opposing racial prejudice was a noble sentiment, Talmadge 
freed himself to oppose the historical mechanisms that undid, at least de 
jure, legally inequality—and that were doubtless responsible for 
Talmadge's own transformed thinking, his protestations about the 
impossibility of outlawing prejudice notwithstanding. 
Also, by comparing Prohibition and the Civil Rights Movement, 
Talmadge passed over the fact that Prohibition largely failed because far 
too few people did think that "the world would... be a lot better place 
without booze"—thinking instead that (say) "booze" was fine if not taken 
to excess—whereas by the 1980s most people would have agreed that 
racial prejudice should be eliminated entirely, not simply taken in 
moderation.  Further, Talmadge did not confront the historical reality that 
the Civil Rights Movement was much more successful at eliminating 
racial discrimination (for all that nevertheless remains) than Prohibition 
was in eliminating liquor, to say nothing of the lack of an organized crime 
resurgence to import bootlegged discrimination.  (There is a certain 
unavoidable irony in this comparison given that Talmadge was (as he 
detailed in his autobiography) an alcoholic—and that he seemed no less in 
                                                
48 Ibid., pp. 182 - 183. 
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denial about his racist past as for many years he was about his 
alcoholism.) 
After having reached a very modern-sounding argument against 
Civil Rights legislation, however, Talmadge went on to make an old 
segregationist argument about the impingement of such laws on private 
property rights: 
 
With the extension of "civil rights" to so many different 
groups in society, the property rights of individuals have 
largely become a thing of the past.  Owning property 
used to mean being able to do what you wanted with it so 
long as you didn't endanger public health or safety.  That 
included the right to do things that other folks might 
regard as stupid or unfair.  If I wanted to rent an 
apartment and the landlord said, "I'm sorry, I don't rent to 
people who smoke cigars and chew tobacco," that would 
be a malicious and bigoted action on his part.  But since 
it's his apartment, he's got the right to be malicious and 
bigoted.  Unless, of course, he's discriminating against a 
government approved minority group. 
Talmadge here glided over the question of when he would have begun 
viewing such actions as "malicious and bigoted," and what forces brought 
him to that point.  And while in his memoir he was willing to state that 
such actions are morally wrong, he still made a standard segregationist 
structural argument (in favor of private property rights) which had been 
used to maintain them. 
At the end of his attack on Civil Rights laws, Talmadge argued that 
the two rhetorical streams he employed were, in fact, closer than most 
modern conservatives would be willing to admit: 
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Neoconservatives argue that such things as forced busing 
and racial quotas are perversions of civil rights.  That's 
nonsense.  They are logical outgrowths of the sort of 
special-interest politics that lies behind all the civil rights 
initiatives of the post-war era.  In the Brown decision, the 
Supreme Court said that separate-but-equal schools 
violated the constitution because Gunnar Myrdal thought 
they might have an adverse psychological effect on black 
children.  You have to have racial balance to make the 
sociologists happy and keep the children well adjusted, 
even if it means destroying the concept of the 
neighborhood school.  If integration in the workplace is 
desirable, racial quotas are the next logical step, even if 
they mean trampling on the rights of white workers with 
better qualifications and more seniority.  I have no doubt 
that we are better off living in an integrated society than 
in a segregated one, but I'm also convinced that we 
would have eventually gotten there without federal 
intervention. 
Talmadge may have claimed to "have no doubt that we are better off 
living in an integrated society than in a segregated one," but the reader 
might easily doubt the sincerity of such a claim given his absolute 
objection to all the means by which such a society had been (imperfectly) 
achieved—and the means by which Talmadge himself came to that belief, 
if indeed he had.  Yet given Talmadge's distorted view of the past and his 
rosy picture of segregation, I think it at least plausible that he managed to 
sincerely convince himself that he did support integration while opposing, 
indeed ridiculing, the methods by which it was brought about—methods 
which, had Talmadge had his way decades prior, would have failed, and 
with them the achievement of whatever degree of integration this country 
can now claim. 
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Talmadge's argument against the Voting Rights Act was, by 
comparison, brief; indeed, he argued somewhat less fervently against it 
than he did against the Civil Rights Act (perhaps in keeping with his 
claim to have been leaning towards supporting its extension before 
leaving the Senate), although he claimed that it, too, was unnecessary.  He 
also argued that it was hypocritical, since it was applied only to the South.  
He wrote: 
 
Now, if there was any doubt that "civil rights" was 
primarily an exercise in baiting the South, it was laid to 
rest with the 1965 Voting Rights Act.  For years prior to 
that act, barriers against black voting had been coming 
down all over the South, and blacks were registering and 
voting in record numbers.  Moreover, this trend seemed 
destined to continue and even accelerate in the coming 
years.  You would think that the civil rights activists in 
Washington would have been delighted to see this 
voluntary progress on our part.  But that's not the way the 
liberal mind operates. ... liberals are never happier than 
when they're puttering around trying to fix unbroken 
things. ... What the 1965 Voting Rights Act did was to 
put local election laws in the South under federal control.  
That way, when the expected increase in black voting 
took place, the Yankee liberals in Congress and the 
Department of Justice could claim credit for it. ... That 
legislation seemed a trifle harsh.  But we would have 
been much more inclined to accept it if its benefits had 
applied to the nation as a whole.  We didn't want to be 
selfish and hog the assistance of those helpful federal 
bureaucrats. ... [But] all attempts to apply the provisions 
of that act nationwide have been soundly defeated.49 
                                                
49 Ibid., pp. 209 - 210. 
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Talmadge's claim about the inevitability of African-American voting 
expansion in the South was, of course, at odds not only with the historical 
record but with his own record as an enabler of racially-based 
disenfranchisement.  But his argument about liberal hypocrisy would 
probably be accepted by some radicals; as Numan V. Bartley writes, "the 
hypocrisy of white northern liberals was probably the only thing that 
patrician James J. Kirkpatrick, radical Stokely Carmichael, and rabble-
rouser George Wallace agreed on."50 
 
Talmadge segued from his discussion of the Voting Rights Act into 
a critique of the post-1965 Civil Rights program, focusing on busing and 
affirmative action.  He began with a passage which contradicted, to an 
extent, his oft-expressed sense that liberal hypocrisy included their 
exempting themselves from Civil Rights laws: 
 
Now, a person inclined to cynicism might jump to the 
conclusion that equal rights were meant to be unequally 
enforced.  But that wasn't the case.  The recent trend in 
civil rights that I mentioned awhile ago extended the 
blessings of federal coercion across the length and 
breadth of this fair republic.  We first saw this happening 
when federal judges started looking at the Brown 
decision and saying, "This Swedish fellow doesn't think 
that our black children will have a very positive self 
image unless we get them going to school with whites.  
Now, up there in the North, you folks have got what we 
call de facto segregation.  That means that your 
neighborhood schools are predominantly white or 
predominantly black. ... Put a bunch of your black 
                                                
50 Numan V. Bartley, The New South, 1945 - 1980 (Louisiana State 
University Press, 1995), p. 466. 
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children on some [busses] and a bunch of your white 
children on others, and bus 'em to each other's schools.["] 
...  Many rich folks get out of it by sending their kids to 
private school where de facto segregation (or at least 
racial imbalance) exists because of income rather than 
geography.  Working class whites (whom liberals always 
feel free to malign) don't like busing because it 
undermines the social integrity of their neighborhoods.  
Blacks (who are supposed to benefit from it) often see it 
as a form of benign racism. ... About the only good that 
forced busing has done is expose a lot of self-righteous 
Yankees for the hypocrites they really are.51 
Once he turned his attention to the post-1965 era, Talmadge's arguments 
became indistinguishable from that of a great many conservative 
politicians.  The rhetoric against liberals—that they are hypocritical, that 
they are against the genuine interests of working-class whites, that they 
are in fact racist in their good intentions—are quite familiar.  At the same 
time, he abandoned the notion (which he ascribed to "a person inclined to 
cynicism", for all that he expressed it repeatedly elsewhere in his memoir, 
including on the previous page) that Civil Rights was a northern plot 
against the South: now it was transformed into a liberal plot against both 
working class whites and blacks.  In this small section of text, Talmadge 
recapitulated the phylogeny of much conservative thought, moving from a 
purely race-based and regional analysis to a class-based and purportedly 
race-neutral one.  The only difference is that while many modern 
conservative historians, as I will discuss in a later chapter, have tended to 
obscure the roots of contemporary conservative thought in earlier 
segregationist thought, Talmadge was up-front about the connections. 
                                                
51 Talmadge, 1987, p. 211. 
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Talmadge had a similar analysis of affirmative action, again 
sticking close to many other contemporary conservative politicians, save 
that he made explicit the connections between segregationist thought and 
anti-affirmative action thought which others might have wished to pass 
quickly over: 
 
Over the past few year busing has had to take a back seat 
to racial quotas as the most flagrant abuse of civil rights 
in this country.  Call it affirmative action, goals and 
timetables, or compensatory hiring, it amounts to pretty 
much the same thing—reverse discrimination.  It all goes 
back to the habit of stressing the group and ignoring the 
individual.  Here again, racial balance is seen as the 
overriding goal.  Unlike busing, however, this is a game 
where there are winners as well as losers.  ...  [B]y trying 
to compensate a group for past injustices, affirmative 
action rewards people who have suffered no individual 
harm and does so at the expense of those who have done 
no individual wrong.  Most of the white males who 
support affirmative action are so well established in their 
professions that they will never have to suffer its 
consequences... But what of the fireman or the 
construction worker who is passed over for a promotion 
to which he would otherwise be entitled?  And what of 
the young person who can't gain admittance to the 
graduate or professional school of his choice or get a 
good job simply because of his race and sex?  Is it justice 
or even compassion to rob one group of people in order 
to bestow undeserved benefits on another?  Not in my 
book it isn't.52 
Here again Talmadge shifted into a populist mode familiar from 
conservative movement rhetoric.  It is a rhetoric that does, of course, have 
deep roots among Southern politicians, even self-avowedly conservative 
                                                
52 Ibid., p. 212; emphasis in the original. 
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ones.  But its presence in Talmadge's text unveils its historical roots.  Yet 
for Herman Talmadge—who said in reaction to the Brown decision that 
"there aren't enough troops in the whole United States to make the white 
people of this state send their children to school with colored 
children"53—to worry without a hint of irony about "the young person 
who can't gain admittance to the graduate or professional school of his 
choice or get a good job simply because of his race and sex" was rather 
remarkable. 
Talmadge rounded out this excursion into opposition to the 
contemporary Civil Rights agenda by protesting that he did, in fact, 
support the advancement of African Americans: 
 
Obviously, I have serious reservations about some of the 
laws and court rulings that have been promulgated on 
behalf of "civil rights".  But that doesn't mean I want to 
see blacks held back.  Far from it.  I just happen to think 
that genuine racial progress will come about only when 
people succeed or fail on the basis of their individual 
merit, not the color of their skin.  Specifically, we need a 
society in which blacks can compete in the job market 
without the stigma of affirmative action and rise to 
positions of political prominence without setting one race 
against each other.  To the surprise of many, we've made 
much more progress towards these goals in the South 
than in the North.54 
For Talmadge—whose electoral success (at least in his early 
political career) depended upon race-baiting as a central component—to 
look for a society in which African Americans can "rise to positions of 
                                                
53 Quoted in Clymer obituary, op. cit., The New York Times, March 22, 
2002. 
54 Talmadge, 1987, p. 213. 
 318 
political prominence without setting one race against each other" might be 
read, generously, as a sign of genuinely changed views.  Perhaps his 
professed belief that "genuine racial progress will come about only when 
people succeed or fail on the basis of their individual merit, not the color 
of their skin" might be read similarly.  But Talmadge showed no self-
consciousness about the fact that this is an ideal he had actively fought 
against.  Nor did he give any sign of sensing the contradiction even in the 
views expressed in his memoir.  As discussed above, Talmadge repeatedly 
claimed that segregation was ending without federal intervention—in 
other words, that "racial progress" was being made even absent such 
interventions as the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act; yet this 
directly contradicted the notion that "genuine racial progress will come 
about only when people succeed or fail on the basis of their individual 
merit, not the color of their skin"—at least when combined with 
Talmadge's professed view that the move towards an integrated society 
was racial progress.  In the space of a few pages Talmadge turned fully 
around, and adopted standards for the present which flatly deny the 
historical reality he believed existed in his own recent past. 
 
Since he did not discuss the matter, there is little evidence about 
what caused Talmadge to finally abandon his segregationist position.  But 
some speculations seem fairly well-grounded.  As with  many pro-
segregationist politicians who wished to continue to serve in office past 
the mid-1960s, a calculated political advantage was almost certainly a key 
component in his transition.  After the passage of the Voting Rights Act, 
Talmadge was obliged to seek African American votes more diligently 
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than he had previously.55  It is not always an easy thing to profess a view 
one does not believe in; elements of belief can creep in even if one starts 
out doing something for purely instrumental reasons.  Another common 
aspect of segregationist transitions that was probably also part of 
Talmadge's story was the historical reality that the issue simply became 
moot.  The major Civil Rights acts, including the Voting Rights Acts, had 
passed; de jure segregation had been largely abandoned.  And, finally, 
Talmadge—prompted by changing information from the media, from 
constituents, and elsewhere—may have indeed rethought his position to a 
certain extent based on the merits. 
But Talmadge clearly remained emotionally connected to his earlier 
positions.  At times this manifested itself as passionate defenses of the 
ideological grounds upon which those positions were defended at the 
time—without thinking through the conflict between his new beliefs 
about the morality of segregation and his old commitment to principles 
such as the idea that beliefs cannot be changed "at bayonet point."  At 
other times Talmadge's emotional connection to his earlier positions led 
him to a sense that it made sense then, whatever is said now—without 
thinking through what the notion that "it made sense then" might mean or 
how it might be reconciled with his later beliefs.  And at times this might 
spill into a feeling that, hell, what was wrong with segregation anyway?, 
as he came, temporarily, to re-credit his old defenses.  Talmadge applied 
new standards to present-day issues and old ones to old issues without 
thinking through the contradictions therein.  He changed but did not 
                                                
55 Although he claimed, in his memoir, to have always sought out African 
American votes (Talmadge, 1987, pp. 202, 203). 
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repent, and seems to have lived with this contradiction happily enough.  
This was, doubtless, enabled by his ongoing belief in old untruths, such as 
the notion that African Americans were perfectly happy under 
segregation—were, indeed, just as happy with segregation as whites were. 
Talmadge exemplifies what was doubtless a common pattern 
among defenders of segregation who abandoned their views: say enough 
to convince others—and perhaps oneself—that one has changed one's 
views, but do not bother to think through the consequences of those 
changes, enabling old ideas to persist in contradiction with the new, and 
enabling old emotions and positions to resurface when considering the 
past, even if they do so in muted form or in the company of ritual denials.  
Admit error without admitting wrongdoing; change one principle without 
considering related principles one continues to hold.  Whether motivated 
by practical considerations, genuine (if shallow) conviction, the 
insurmountable facts of irreversible change or simple exhaustion with the 
topic, move on to other issues.  The times have changed: what need is 
there to consider what the old times meant, and how one acted then?  
Accept new ideas, if one must, "at bayonet point"—be reconstructed—but 
remain unregenerate: do not apologize, even within one's own mind.  Do 
not think things through too thoroughly, nor seek to explain, lest the 
contradictions within one's own thoughts prove too sharp to bear. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE UNYIELDING: ONGOING ADVOCACY OF DE JURE 
SEGREGATION IN THE AGE OF INTEGRATION 
 
Up until this point in this study, I have focused on individuals in the 
mainstream of American political life.  Indeed, it has been central to my 
argument that within a decade of the mid-sixties climax of the Civil 
Rights Movement, any individual or organization wishing to participate in 
political life (save at the fringes) had to have rejected, if only implicitly, 
de jure segregation (and, conversely, accepted de jure integration).  And I 
have focused on the differing ways in which different figures have made 
the transition from their pro-segregation stances to the pro-integration 
ones necessary to keep them within the new political consensus.  And 
among mainstream political figures, such a transition was more common 
than not—since such figures typically wish to continue their involvement 
in political life. 
But, of course, not everyone made this transition.  Through 
whatever combination of conviction, stubbornness, lack of desire for the 
advantages that changing their positions would yield, inability to find a 
palatable way to change their positions, and various other factors, some 
advocates of segregation continued to maintain their pro-segregation 
positions years after this ceased to be an acceptable position within 
American political discourse.  They accepted the marginalization that this 
persistence brought, and, whether bitterly or resignedly, relentlessly or 
tepidly, continued to advocate a position that, for all practical purposes, 
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had ceased to be an option—had, really, ceased being seriously 
considered. 
For a study such as this one—whose focus has been on the 
mainstream of American political ideology and the transition that political 
figures needed to make in order to stay within its boundaries—there is an 
unavoidable difficulty in seeking to look at segregationists who never 
renounced their views.  It is fundamental to my argument, after all, that 
the very notion of figures who both continued to support de jure 
segregation through the 1970s and played a prominent political role in 
American life is a contradiction in terms, as opposing it had become a 
prerequisite for participation in the mainstream of American politics.  
Thus if this study is to examine any figures who remained steadfast in 
their segregationist convictions, this will necessarily involve looking at 
more marginal figures than have hitherto been examined—or, at least, 
figures who became increasingly marginal as time progressed. 
Yet such a departure from a focus on more prominent figures is 
necessary, for any picture of the multiple ways in which segregationists 
reacted to the changing moral and political landscape is fundamentally 
incomplete without a consideration of those whose reaction was to stick to 
their guns.  While it is true that—as I shall detail below—this very 
steadfastness marginalized them, they are nevertheless a crucial (albeit 
minority) part of the response of Jim Crow's political supporters.  Those 
who moderated, obfuscated, denied or radically altered their political 
stances did so in the context of those who did not.  Those who changed 
saw the fate of those who did not; and, to whatever degree, this 
doubtlessly affected their decisions to reexamine their views and 
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pronouncements.  To truly understand the transition made by 
segregationists who accepted integration (in whatever fashion and to 
whatever extent), we must look at one who did not.  One element of 
American political discourse is that there are those who allow themselves 
to fall out of it.  In this chapter, therefore, I shall examine a figure who, 
despite the changing consensus about Jim Crow, continued to profess his 
belief in segregation: Georgia Governor Lester Maddox.  Maddox 
remained constant in his segregationist positions, and was, over time, 
marginalized as a result.  On this issue he was unwilling to yield. 
As with practically every category in this study, the term 
'unyielding' is slippery.  People are not necessarily consistent in how they 
represent their past views to others—even to the same individuals, let 
alone when considering various representations to different individuals, 
groups and institutions.  Nor are people consistent even in how they 
represent their past views to themselves.  Some of those previously 
examined in this study have, at various times and to various degrees, let 
slip continued sympathy for their old views.  Others have continued to 
hold what might reasonably be considered genuinely segregationist 
stances while making concessions to the new consensus—continued to 
oppose the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act as legislation while 
claiming to believe in the desirability of integration, for example.  While 
figures such as these obviously have been 'unyielding' to an extent, I have 
considered them elsewhere.  Maddox, in contrast, maintained his 
segregationist views in close to the same fashion in which he had earlier 
maintained them: with some modification of tone resulting from the 
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changed views of his audiences, but with his basic beliefs stated in more 
or less the same manner. 
 
Before discussing someone who maintained his old views even in 
the face of changing times, it is worth pausing to note one set of figures 
who might equally be deemed unyielding, but who will necessarily not be 
examined: those who never moderated their position simply because they 
did not live long enough so that the new moral consensus forced them to 
confront their old positions and react to the disjunction.  These are 
segregationists who died before the new consensus was fully in place, and 
thus were able to avoid deciding between changing their views and paying 
the price for failing to do so.  I have already cited former German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl's comment about "the grace of late birth" that 
some Germans enjoyed.1  This phrase encapsulates a complex sense of the 
interaction  between identity, morality and history.  It captures the truth 
that, while we make moral choices out of our own consciences, and are 
responsible for those choices, the design of our consciences is itself a 
process that takes place within the flow of history; that there are some 
choices we are fortunate not to have to make, since we could not be 
certain that we would have chosen well, even though we now find the 
right choice obvious.2 
                                                
1 Quoted in Jay Howard Gellar, "Germany, Federal Republic of", in 
Richard S. Levy, ed., Antisemitism: a Historical Encyclopedia of 
Prejudice and Persecution, Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 2005, vol. 1, p. 
271. 
2 One Christian school of thought points to the phrase from the Lord's 
prayer, "lead us not into temptation," as showing that while our behavior 
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In speaking of segregation's advocates, one might coin a counter-
phrase to Kohl's, and speak of the damnation of early death.  It is clearly 
far too facile to say that even the most determined of segregation's 
defenders would necessarily have continued to speak on its behalf had 
they lived deeper into the second half of the twentieth century.  We cannot 
say of (for example) Senator Henry F. Byrd that he would necessarily 
have remained an unrepentant advocate of segregation had he lived 
beyond 1966, even though it was he who coined the phrase "massive 
resistance," and even though his last major effort in the Congress was 
fighting the Voting Rights Act the year before his death.  This is not to 
say we can know for certain that he would have changed his mind, of 
course; it is simply that he did not have an opportunity to make that 
choice in the new environment in which segregation was no longer 
deemed within the realm of arguable positions. 
Many of those whom we have examined previously in this study 
would appear quite differently from history's vantage point if they had 
died earlier. Although George Wallace's main legacy remains that of one 
of segregation's most ardent defenders, this legacy is blurred in a way that 
it would not have been had he been killed and not merely injured by 
Arthur Bremmer in 1972.  So we have no choice but to reserve judgment, 
at least to a certain extent, on those who died too soon to be compelled to 
adapt to the new environment, as we have no way to know which of them 
would have changed, or how. 
                                                                                                                                       
in the face of temptation is on our own consciences, avoidance of 
temptation is a form of grace. 
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But, of course, the converse is true.  In considering the unyielding, 
it is hard not to reflect that they would look different in retrospect had 
they not lived so long.  About hard-line segregationists who died earlier 
we can at least speculate that they might have moderated their positions if 
they had lived; with those who did live but did not change, we know for a 
fact that they did not.  Coining another phrase after Kohl, we can say that 
they lacked (as perverse as it sounds) the grace of early death, which 
would at least have given them a more ambiguous legacy.  We know that, 
had a greater number of segregationists lived a longer time, the unyielding 
would have counted more among their number; but we can never say 
precisely who they would have been, save for those who lived to 
demonstrate it of themselves.  Praise them for their steadfastness in their 
convictions or damn them for their moral obtuseness, those who remained 
unyielding deep into the new era now appear to us differently than any 
who even might have changed their minds. 
 
For a brief period, Lester Maddox was the most famous 
segregationist in the country.3  Maddox, owner of the Pickrick restaurant 
                                                
3 There is no comprehensive, non-partisan biography of Lester Maddox.  
Most of the non-partisan biographies cover only part of Maddox's career: 
Justin Nystrom's excellent article "Segregation's Last Stand: Lester 
Maddox and the Transformation of Atlanta" (Atlanta History, volume 
XLV, no. 2 (Summer, 2001), pp. 34 - 51) focuses solely on Maddox's 
career before becoming Governor; journalist Bruce Galphin's The Riddle 
of Lester Maddox (Atlanta: Camelot Publishing Company, 1988) was 
written halfway through Maddox's tenure as Georgia's governor; Bradley 
Rice's article in Georgia Governors in an Age of Change, "Lester Maddox 
and the Politics of Populism", does not cover Maddox's time as Lieutenant 
Governor (nor his later career).  The one comprehensive biography, Bob 
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in Atlanta, Georgia, resisted the integration of his business even after 
Lyndon Johnson had signed the 1964 Civil Rights Act on July 2 of that 
year.  The day after the law was signed, three African American divinity 
students attempted to eat at Maddox's restaurant.  Maddox confronted 
them with a crowd of supporters at his back, and ended up driving them 
off with an axe-handle in his hand; at one point in the confrontation he 
brandished a gun.4  An Associated Press photograph of Maddox, pistol in 
hand, with his son beside him wielding a baseball bat, resisting the 
integration of the Pickrick, appeared on the front page of the July Fourth 
edition of the New York Times.5  Later that summer, Maddox, who had 
repeatedly sworn that the Pickrick would never be integrated, closed his 
restaurant when a court threatened to begin assessing steep fines for each 
day he failed to operate his restaurant on an integrated basis.  Maddox 
decided would rather go out of business than serve African Americans at 
his restaurant.  Due to his prominent and aggressive defiance of the new 
law, and his final evasion of any integration, Maddox had become the 
                                                                                                                                       
Short's Everything is Pickrick: the Life of Lester Maddox (Macon, 
Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1999), was written by a former aide 
and press secretary to Maddox with the explicit intention of rehabilitating 
his reputation.  These four sources, however, along with Maddox's own 
autobiography, Speaking Out: the Autobiography of Lester Maddox (New 
York: Doubleday & Company, 1975), are the primary accounts of 
Maddox's life and career. 
4 The Civil Rights Workers claimed Maddox directly threatened them 
with the pistol; Maddox claimed he held it but did not actually threaten 
them with it. 
5 Nystrom, "Segregation's Last Stand", p. 43.  Nystrom notes that the 
Atlanta Constitution, seeking to put a positive spin on Georgia's reaction 
to the law, put the photograph on page two. 
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symbol of last-ditch resistance to integration.  On the strength of his 
reputation, Maddox became governor of Georgia in 1966. 
At the time of his greatest fame, Maddox could hardly be said to be 
a 'mainstream' figure.  Maddox had previously run three times for public 
office: twice for Mayor of Atlanta, in 1957 and 1961, and once for 
Lieutenant Governor of Georgia, in 1962.  For all this exposure, however, 
he was still viewed by many in Georgia as a distinctly marginal figure—
indeed, to some degree because he had already lost three races, he was 
assumed not to be a serious candidate.  In the words of former Georgia 
Governor Herman Talmadge, who notes that he regards Maddox as a 
"personal friend," Maddox was thought of as a "three-time loser who 
[was] considered something of a crackpot by the newspapers and the 
established political powers."6  During two preliminary stages of the 
election—the original Democratic primary, and the all-but inevitable run-
off that followed—cross-over voters voted for Maddox on the theory that 
he would be easier for the true candidate to beat: some supporters of 
liberal Democrat Ellis Arnall voted for Maddox in the first round, 
thinking that Arnall would beat Maddox in the run-off election; 
Republican supporters of Goldwater-disciple Congressman Bo Callaway 
crossed over during the run-off election to vote for Maddox, betting that 
Callaway (who at that time was favored to win the election7) would find it 
                                                
6 Herman Talmadge, Talmadge: A Political Legacy, A Politician's Life, 
pp. 304 - 305. 
7 Callaway had been elected to the U. S. Congress in the wake of 
Goldwater's campaign in 1964.  Despite the solidly Democratic history of 
Georgia, by 1966 it was thought that the tide had turned and that a 
conservative, Goldwater Republican (who was also a supporter of 
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easier to defeat Maddox than he would Arnall.  Both times, strategic 
voters outsmarted themselves and underestimated Maddox.  If Maddox 
had not been a mainstream figure when he closed his restaurant, he had 
been made one by the voters of Georgia.  Any doubt as to his mainstream 
status was put to rest when, after a term as Governor and unable to legally 
run for re-election, he ran for and handily won election as Georgia's 
Lieutenant Governor. 
 
Maddox fell into both demographic categories that most strongly 
supported segregation in Atlanta: the white working class and the small 
businessmen.  Maddox was born in 1915 to a poor family, and dropped 
out of high school without getting a diploma.  In due time, however, 
Maddox came to own and operate his own business, the Pickrick 
restaurant.8 
It was as a restauranteur that Maddox first built his reputation.  Two 
years after opening the Pickrick in 1947, he began running a weekly series 
of advertisements to promote his restaurant.  The ads were formatted to 
look like opinion columns, and were interspersed with information about 
                                                                                                                                       
segregation) would win the election.  See Galphin, chapter eight, and 
Rice, in Georgia Governors, pp. 199 - 200. 
8 The name was more or less random; as he testifies in his autobiography, 
Maddox had had the name "Pickwick" suggested to him (apparently 
without any sense of its Dickensian precedent) , found that another 
business in Atlanta already used the name, and came up with "Pickrick" 
as a replacement, combining "Pick", the syllable from his discarded name, 
with "Rick", a slang term meaning "to pile up or to heap".  He then made 
a slogan out of the name, giving its etymology at the bottom of each of his 
weekly advertisements: "You pick it out... We'll rick it up." (Maddox, 
1974, pp. 25 - 28). 
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the restaurant; they ran in the Saturday Atlanta Constitution and the 
Atlanta Journal, the largest newspapers in Atlanta.  According to a 
reporter for the former, the ads were "among the most widely read items" 
in either paper.9  At first, these advertisements were largely-non political, 
but as the 1950's wore on and the Civil Rights Movement increased in 
both profile and successes, Maddox wrote more and more about politics.10  
By the 1960s, the ads were a paid-for weekly political column, with only 
a brief advertisement of the day's specials and Sunday's menu to connect 
it with his business.  As regular items in the major Georgia newspapers, 
the ads as much as his political runs had made Maddox a familiar figure in 
the state. 
But it was in his defending of his restaurant against integration that 
Maddox truly made his name.  There had been a few cursory attempts by 
activists to integrate the Pickrick prior to the signing of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, but Maddox had driven them off without too much trouble.  
Once the Civil Rights Act was passed, however, the pressure turned from 
purely social to legal as well.  Maddox's legal claims that the Civil Rights 
Act did not apply to his restaurant, and was in any event unconstitutional, 
were quickly dismissed.  (He was also hauled into court for brandishing a 
pistol, although those charges were eventually dropped.)  A few weeks 
after the initial segregation challenge, Maddox closed his restaurant rather 
than integrate it.  He re-opened it immediately as a souvenir stand, selling 
his own writings and recorded speeches, other books (including None 
Dare Call it Treason), souvenir "Pickrick drumsticks", flags, and the like.  
                                                
9 Galphin, p. 18. 
10 Galphin, pp. 21 - 22. 
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(He offered this merchandise on an integrated basis.)  A few further 
attempts to evade the law, such as opening his restaurant under a new 
name, claiming that his refusal of service was on the basis of ideology and 
not race (he said he refused to serve "integrationists") and trying to claim 
that his restaurant was not engaged in interstate commerce were all 
quickly squashed. 
But if he lost his legal battles, he gained a national reputation from 
them.  To many, of course, this was a powerfully negative reputation; but 
Georgian segregationists admired his aggressive stand against integration.  
The image of Maddox confronting Civil Rights workers, axe-handle or 
pistol in hand, boosted his reputation as a man of strong conviction; and 
his decision to close his restaurant rather than go against his beliefs (at, as 
he would remark, great personal financial sacrifice) made him seem to his 
supporters like a man of personal integrity.  Even his rather theatrical 
antics were successful in promoting his image. 
This reputation helped him stand out in his fourth run for public 
office, the 1966 race for the governorship of Georgia, a race crowded with 
segregationists—most of whom, however, were more mild-mannered than 
Maddox.  The tenor of the political times was also in Maddox's favor, as 
white Georgia was in the midst of a backlash against the recent successes 
of the Civil Rights Movement.  In the Democratic primary, Maddox 
pulled ahead of a crowded field which included several other 
segregationists (in addition to a then-unknown state senator named Jimmy 
Carter) to win a place in the run-off election against Ellis Arnall.  Beating 
Arnall in the run-off, Maddox faced the Republican congressman Bo 
Callaway.  Callaway had been expected to beat the liberal Arnall, but 
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Maddox drew away hard-line supporters of segregation whom Callaway 
had thought he would attract; at the same time, Maddox ran as an 
economic populist, supporting issues (such as the minimum wage) that the 
Republican Callaway did not.11  Unable to choose between two such 
unappealing candidates, liberals staged a write-in campaign for Arnall.  
This drew away enough votes that neither Callaway nor Maddox won an 
outright majority, which meant, by Georgia law, that the election would 
be decided in the legislature.  As this was still overwhelmingly 
Democratic, Maddox won handily, despite having won fewer votes than 
Callaway.  The circumstances were strange enough that his election could 
be seen, years later, as a "political fluke";12 at the time, however, it 
seemed like an endorsement of political backlash. 
Unsurprisingly, Maddox's tenure as governor displayed some of the 
hostility towards African Americans, and in particular towards Civil 
Rights protestors, that had made him infamous a few years before.  
During his tenure, Maddox supported (albeit tepidly) last-ditch efforts at 
resistance to school integration, and encouraged the growing trend of 
segregation through white abandonment of the public school system in 
favor of private schools.  In one infamous incident, Maddox, while in 
Washington D.C. to testify against an extension of the Voting Rights Act, 
encountered African American Congressman from Michigan, Charles 
Diggs, Jr., and ended up saying that Diggs was "acting more like an ass 
                                                
11 Galphin, pp. 119 - 120, 142. 
12 Jim Tharpe, "Lester Maddox: 1915 - 2003", The Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, June 26, 2003, p. A1.  Tharpe does not mention the obvious 
comparison with the circumstances surrounding the 2000 presidential 
election. 
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and a baboon than a member of Congress."13  Above all, Maddox was 
widely criticized for his handling of Martin Luther King's funeral, which 
occurred in Atlanta during Maddox's tenure as governor.  Maddox took a 
number of steps seen as deliberate snubs of King (whom he had long 
derided): he kept the Capitol open on the day of the funeral, threatened to 
have the flags there raised back to full staff (although he never did so), 
and declined either to attend or to even send a representative of the state 
government to the funeral.  Even worse, he gave orders to police 
defending the Capitol building that, if any rioting occurred, they were to 
"shoot them down and stack them up," though fortunately this threat never 
materialized and only became known after the fact.14 
In fairness, it must be noted that Maddox's tenure as Georgia's 
governor was somewhat more mixed than those who knew him largely as 
an infamous axe-handle wielding segregationist feared it would be.  
Maddox was spurred to begin a process of prison reform by an encounter 
with four escaped African American prisoners.  He promoted some 
programs to help the poor, which helped the African American poor as 
well as the white.  Former congressman Charles Weltner, who had 
declined to run for re-election in 1966 rather than fulfill a pledge to 
support the democratic candidate once it became clear that that candidate 
would be Lester Maddox, later said that "He really is for the poor folks, 
and when you do things for the poor folks, it involves black people."15  
                                                
13 Rice, in Georgia Governors, p. 207 - 208. 
14 Galphin, pp. 208 - 209. 
15 Rice, in Georgia Governors, p 209.  Ironically, in the same election 
Maddox refused to fulfill his pledge and support liberal Democratic 
candidates, including SNCC activist Julian Bond (Galphin, pp. 135 - 136.) 
 334 
And Maddox's record at hiring African Americans for white-collar jobs, 
and appointing African Americans to draft boards and state commissions, 
was far better than previous governors, even those whose stance on racial 
matters was outwardly less hostile to African Americans.  Among others, 
he appointed Georgia's first African-American state trooper, who said of 
Maddox that he "opened the doors for people of color to enter state 
government."  On the other hand, Maddox appointed few African 
Americans to prominent or powerful positions; and he always seemed 
comfortable with African Americans in subservient roles, particularly as 
employees.  (Maddox had always prided himself on his willingness to 
employ African Americans in his restaurant.)16 
Georgia law did not permit Maddox to run for reelection to the 
governorship in 1970.  Rather than retire from politics, however, Maddox 
ran for Lieutenant Governor and easily won (winning the Democratic 
primary without a runoff despite a multi-candidate field).  Serving as 
Governor during Maddox's term as Lieutenant Governor was Jimmy 
Carter.  Unsurprisingly, given Carter's comparatively liberal political 
leanings, it was a contentious relationship; one Carter biographer called 
Maddox "Carter's biggest headache throughout his tenure" as governor.17 
                                                
16 Rice, in Georgia Governors, p. 203; Jim Tharpe, "Lester Maddox: 1915 
- 2003", The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, June 26, 2003, p. A1; editorial, 
"Maddox a Man of His Time, But Not of the Future", The Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution, June 26, 2003, p. A18. Quotation taken from 
Tharpe.  Maddox's pride in his African American employees was 
mentioned frequently in his "Pickrick Speaks" advertisements, as well as 
in his autobiography (1975) and elsewhere.   
17 Peter Bourne, Jimmy Carter, p. 204. 
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After his term as Lieutenant Governor, Maddox once again ran for 
Governor.  Although Maddox did well enough in the first round of the 
Democratic primary to be one of the two run-off candidates, he lost in the 
run-off to George Busbee (who would go on to win the Governorship).  
During the campaign, Maddox played the race card, referring to Busbee 
as being "own[ed]" by civil rights activist Julian Bond.  Busbee, in 
contrast, actively courted the African American vote.  After the election, 
Maddox ascribed his loss in part to, in the words of his biographer, his 
"refusal to lower the state merit system standards so blacks could get 
more state jobs."18  The 1974 Governor's race was not Maddox's final 
campaign; he waged somewhat quixotic campaigns thereafter—for 
President in 1976, for Governor of Georgia again in 1990.  But the 1974 
governor's race was the last one in which Maddox was a serious candidate 
for public office.19 
After his 1974 electoral loss, Maddox wrote his autobiography, 
entitled Speaking Out.  In this volume, Maddox neither retreated from his 
segregationist views nor apologized for any intemperate language or 
actions.  He stuck to his guns (or his axe-handle), defending his views, his 
words and his actions.  He would continue to do so in occasional 
interviews for the remainder of his life.  Lester Maddox never backed 
down. 
 
Throughout his life Lester Maddox remained remarkably consistent 
in his views, his defense of his position and the terms in which he 
                                                
18 Short, Everything is Pickrick, pp. 140 - 149; quotes on pp. 144, 149.   
19 Short, pp. 177 - 180 and 191-192.  
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described and defended segregation.  Early and late, his defense of 
segregation was based primarily on three things.  First, Maddox claimed 
repeatedly and frequently that it was his fundamental property right (and 
others' rights, though he most often put it in personal terms) to serve only 
those whom he wished to serve in his restaurant, and to bar others from 
entering.  Secondly, Maddox associated integration with communism and 
socialism.  And thirdly, Maddox argued—far less prominently and far less 
often than he made the first two arguments—that he believed, as a matter 
of principle, that the races should be kept separate, and that this state of 
affairs would be best for both races. 
Maddox's most deeply-felt argument was that integration violated 
his property rights.  Most often, this was a contention that he made briefly 
or in passing, with the simple assertion that integration would violate his 
property rights.  When he picketed the White House in the wake of the 
Pickrick's closure, his sign read "Mr. President, I Want My Private 
Property Rights Now!"20  He described the potential result of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as one in which the government might  "take 
everything" from him; and he described a potential Supreme Court ruling 
on the matter as the possibility of "the Supreme Court rul[ing] against the 
right of free enterprise."21  Ever the showman, after the close of his 
restaurant Maddox built a giant monument with "In Memory of Private 
Property Rights" inscribed on its base.22  At times, however, Maddox 
                                                
20 Maddox, Speaking Out, photograph between pp. 40 - 41. 
21 Short, p. 60. 
22 Maddox, 1975, photograph between pp. 16 - 17. 
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made the argument at greater length.  In one of his columns shortly after 
the signing of the Civil Rights Act, Maddox wrote:  
 
I want to thank my relatives, friends, customers and 
employees[...] You inspire me to continue to fight for the 
survival of my business, the American Free Enterprise 
System, and the survival of our civilization and freedom 
and liberty. [...] 
This business and property is valued at $500,000.  It does 
not belong to the government; the Communists; the 
Mayor of Atlanta; the President of the United States; the 
news media; Martin Luther King, etc.  It belongs to me, 
my wife and children—"Free Americans," and we are 
sole owners. 
We did not go to Washington, or Moscow, to get 
permission to buy our property; build our building; open 
our business; hire our employees; select our customers 
and become a part of the great American Free Enterprise 
System.  We did not have to do so because of the United 
States Constitution and States Rights and individual 
freedom. [...] we stand on the United States 
Constitution... first, Amendment II [...] Second, 
Amendment V, "...nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation."  As of this time 
the government has not paid me a dime, or offered to buy 
my property, and until it does so, the U. S. Constitution 
says that my private property "...shall not be taken for 
public use."  [...] Nothing [sic] but stupid fools, 
Communists, and would-be dictators would say that 
"Some Americans have a right to buy from those they 
please, and other Americans do not have the right to sell 
to those they please."23 
                                                
23 Lester Maddox, "Pickrick Says" advertisement; The Atlanta 
Constitution, July 11, 1964, p. 9.  Ellipses in brackets are mine; other 
ellipses are Maddox's. 
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For the most part, of course, this is less an extended argument than an 
extended repetition of his basic point that integration violates his private 
property rights.  It is, however, a testament to the strength of his feelings 
on the matter that he goes on at such great length about it.  Further, there 
are certainly the bare bones of an argument in the passage: he equates 
"select our customers" as part of business on a par with "build our 
building" and "hire our employees"; he suggests that a "right to sell to 
those they please" is a basic freedom of action. 
Maddox's other frequent argument against integration was the 
association of the pro-integration position with communism (and, to a 
lesser degree, socialism—like many Americans, Maddox did not seem to 
differentiate greatly between the two, save insofar as reactions to the 
former were more negative.)  This argument, like the previous one, 
frequently did not deserve the appellation; Maddox most often simply 
used 'communist' as an epithet.  Indeed, he almost never wrote about civil 
rights advocates without employing the term, and he quite frequently 
employed it when speaking simply of supporters of integration, however 
passive.  The phrase "race-mixers and socialists and communists" is a 
frequent one in Maddox's writing; he sticks it in without regard for 
awkwardness—eager, presumably, to add the emotional (and even 
intellectual) negativity which the term packed at the time.  There was 
hardly a reference in Maddox's columns to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
that Maddox did not preface with the phrase "communist-inspired" (or, 
occasionally, "communist-supported").  A fair amount of the time, it 
seems that Maddox uses the term simply as an insult.  As essayist Calvin 
Trillin wrote of another incident during the Civil Rights Movement, "[t]he 
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sheriff was not accusing the student of following the line put forth by 
Marx and Engels and Lenin; he could have as easily called the student a 
yellow dog"; the point was simply "to say something mean."24  When, in 
the wake of a court order to allow integration, Maddox confronted Civil 
Rights workers outside his restaurant for the final time, his opening 
sentence was "You sorry, no-good Communists."25  The term was simply 
one of abuse. 
But "communist" was not an epithet chosen at random; though at 
times he simply hurled it as an insult, it was the insult he chose because of 
another deeply held belief, namely that Communism was the ultimate 
support and inspiration for the Civil Rights Movement.  This is why 
Maddox tried, at every turn, to link the two.  And within that association 
of communism and integration lay several arguments against integration, 
each of which Maddox would make explicitly from time to time.  The first 
argument was, simply, that integration was a part of the communist party 
platform and, hence, a communist idea.  Thus, in his column of June 27, 
1964 --Maddox's final column prior to Johnson's signing the Civil Rights 
Act six days later—Maddox wrote: 
 
Where do you stand?  Read the Communist Party 
platform for racial amalgamation of America, as 
published by the United States Communists in 1928, and 
then answer as to whether you are supporting the 
                                                
24 Calvin Trillin, Remembering Denny.  New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 
1993, p. 183. 
25 Maddox, Speaking Out, p. 65. 
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Communist Party for racial integration and the ruin of 
America.26 
Maddox then went on to quote six provisions of the 1928 platform, 
including those advocating "abolition of all laws which result in 
segregation of Negroes" and "full and equal admittance of Negroes to all 
railway station waiting rooms, restaurants, hotels and theaters."  Maddox 
then continues: 
 
The above platform has almost been completed by the 
Communists, fellow travelers and good American 
citizens who have unknowingly given their support and 
endorsement to the Communist program.  Compare the 
above program with the U. S. Supreme Court ruling of 
1954 on school desegregation, and the Civil Rights Bills 
of 1957, 1960 and 1964.  Remember, too, that the 
Communists are not interested in Negro Americans, but 
are using this method to bring hate, strife, death, property 
destruction and the end of constitutional government in 
America... only for the purpose of capturing this great 
country and killing many of our people and enslaving the 
rest.27 
The argument in this passage is severalfold.  First and most prominently, 
Maddox simply takes the fact that communists had advocated integration 
to be an argument—in his mind, a dispositive argument—against it.  
Simply by lining up the communist party platform and the program of the 
Civil Rights Movement, he believes their similarity discredits the latter.28  
                                                
26 Lester Maddox, "Pickrick Says" advertisement; The Atlanta 
Constitution, June 27, 1964, p. 16. 
27 Ibid.  Maddox's ellipsis. 
28 Indeed, the similarity is quite striking.  (W. E. B. DuBois reprinted the 
relevant section of the platform in  The Crisis, September 1928, and the 
wording is the same as Maddox gives; reprinted at 
http://itc.utk.edu/itc/grants/twt2000/modules/ebledso1/historical/communi
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To be sure, Maddox is also making the argument that integration is a 
"method to bring hate, strife, death... and the end of constitutional 
government in America", but this is quite clearly a secondary argument, 
as his phrasing demonstrates: "remember, too" Maddox writes (emphasis 
added); it is an additional point, not the only one.  (In other columns 
Maddox made the argument that the Civil Rights Movement had, in fact, 
increased crime in the United States.) 
In addition to the notion that integration was (or should be) 
discredited because it was part of the communist party platform, and the 
notion that it was simply a "method" to destroy "constitutional 
government", there was a third argument implicit in Maddox's association 
of Communism and integration, one which connected back to his first line 
of argument, namely, that integration of the sort required by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 violated property rights, which Maddox would then 
inflate to 'destroying' private property, as for example in the passage cited 
above—and, of course, communists were against private property.  Thus 
the attack on private property that Maddox saw in the Civil Rights Act 
was a communist goal, not only because they said so or because it would 
ruin the country, but because the destruction of private property was a 
communist goal as such. 
Maddox's final argument for segregation differs from the previous 
two in that it was spoken rather than roared.  At times implicit rather than 
explicit, it was an argument which he advanced less forcefully and less 
often than he did his arguments from property rights and communist 
                                                                                                                                       
sts.htm).  Of course, to modern ears, that reflects well on the communist 
party rather than poorly on integration! 
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connections: this is the argument that integration was, in and of itself, a 
bad thing.  This was not the argument he would place on monuments, or 
inscribe on the placards that he carried as he picketed the White House or 
elsewhere.  But if he was comparatively reticent on this point, it was only 
because of the extreme forcefulness with which he expressed his other 
defenses of segregation.  Maddox believed that "racial segregation, racial 
pride, racial initiative and racial preservation" were positive values—
indeed, were essentially synonymous.29 
The central notion of Maddox's substantive defense of segregation 
was that it would inevitably lead to intermarriage and thence to the 
intermingling of what he saw as ideally separate groups; he often spoke of 
wanting to "preserve" the races.  In his first column of 1964, Maddox 
wrote, "ALL HISTORY proves that the only way to have true integration 
is through racial amalgamation and mongrelization, which leads 
inevitably to national and racial ruin.  No negro, or white, American 
should want that.  Race mixers—where are your brains?"30  As with the 
notion that anything supported by communists was ipso facto wrong, the 
notion of intermarriage and "racial amalgamation" were taken to be self-
evidently horrific; as with the supposed communist plot to destroy the 
United States, the "national and racial ruin" Maddox warns of is clearly an 
additional disadvantage, rather than an argument against intermarriage.  
Nor, of course, is any argument made for this connection itself.  Similarly, 
                                                
29 Lester Maddox, "Pickrick Says" advertisement; The Atlanta 
Constitution, January 18, 1964, p. 12. 
30 Lester Maddox, "Pickrick Says" advertisement; The Atlanta 
Constitution, January 4, 1964, p. 16.  The capitalization used above is 
Maddox's. 
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in one column Maddox says that Atlanta's "swimming pools... are almost 
segregated, again, as all of the sensible whites have long ago quit going to 
the pools."  Although he follows this with a phrase about "property 
owners" being the victims of "the race mixers", Maddox's sentiments 
about "sensible whites" cannot be interpreted as being about the rights of 
property owners; he is simply stating that no sensible white would share a 
pool with an African American.31 
Maddox justified—usually implicitly, occasionally explicitly—his 
substantive defense of segregation through his religious beliefs.  A deeply 
believing Christian, Maddox thought that integration was ungodly and un-
Christian, terms that he applied to it less often than he did "communist" 
and "communist-inspired", but still quite frequently.  Occasionally 
Maddox would make this argument at greater length.  By the late 1950's, 
most Christian denominations were supportive of integration;32 Maddox 
was aghast at this, and many of his Christian defenses of segregation 
occur as responses to statements of more liberal clergymen.  In one of his 
advertisements, Maddox wrote that 
 
HIS Word, the Holy Bible, does not say that segregation 
is a sin.  Rather, God demanded that even animals 
produce after their own kind.  Will the moral leader 
please show us in the  Holy Bible where God even 
suggests that racial integration and racial amalgamation 
is Godly?33 
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For the most part, however, Maddox's religious claims for segregation 
were limited to adding "ungodly" or "unchristian" to the long list of other 
negatives (un-American, communist, and so forth) that he applied to 
integration. 
In most of his arguments, Maddox would be careful to keep his 
language neutral as to the issue of inferiority or superiority, in accord with 
his standard line that he was a segregationist but not a racist.  Indeed, at 
times he went to great lengths to talk about his support from African 
Americans, about his gratitude for the work of his restaurant's (African 
American) staff, and so forth—the implication being that keeping the 
races separate was in everyone's best interest.  At times, however, his 
visceral dislike of African Americans would break through.  In a 'Pickrick 
Says' ad from 1961, Maddox responded to a critic by saying "I do hope 
you will get your integration wishes—a stomach full of race-mixing, and 
a lap full of little mulatto grandchildren, so you can run your fingers 
through their hair."34  On another occasion, Maddox complained that "law 
and order is no longer important—lives and property of our citizens must 
be ignored as we build an 'image' that will please the beasts of Africa and 
the unGodly (sic) and the bloody Communists."35  (This last sentence is 
typical of Maddox's writing in that all of his beliefs—integration as a 
violation of property rights and communist-inspired, segregation as 
Christian and visceral horror at African Americans—were all jumbled 
together in a single screed.  While I have separated his various arguments 
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out for analytical purposes, Maddox tended to rick them up as if he were 
serving food at the Pickrick.)  Maddox's facade as a man who believed in 
"separate but equal" had more than a few cracks in it. 
It is important to emphasize that Maddox's substantive belief in 
segregation was genuinely (and strongly) held since it has been at times 
suggested that Maddox's resistance to integration was solely a matter of 
insistence on his personal rights.  Maddox himself, for all that he was 
frequently open and straightforward about his belief in segregation as a 
positive good, would at times shade his views in this direction, or 
emphasize his formal, rights-grounded arguments so strongly as to 
obfuscate the fact that he also believed in doing what he was asserting a 
right to do.  It is not a matter he lied about—he was too candid for that—
but one about which he dissembled.  And, importantly, others were at 
times taken in.  Thus one obituary for Maddox concludes by saying: 
 
Maddox said until the end he never regretted any of the 
stands he took. But those who worked for and supported 
Maddox said his stand on segregation was more an 
expression of his eccentric individualism than any hatred 
of blacks. 
 Former Georgia House Speaker Tom Murphy, who 
was Maddox's floor leader in the House during his term 
as governor, told the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, "He 
had a reputation as a segregationist, but he told us he was 
not a segregationist, but that you should be able to 
associate with whoever you wanted. He went on to do 
more for African-Americans than any governor of 
Georgia up until that time."36 
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It is hard to imagine Maddox—who wrote "I am a segregationist" in his 
autobiography, and repeated it in numerous interviews for more than 
thirty years after his Governorship—would have genuinely said that he 
"was not a segregationist."  But he did at times emphasize his rights-based 
argument to the point where it is understandable how someone might have 
gotten this impression. 
In the arguments he made, Maddox was fairly typical; 
segregationists in his day commonly made all of them, and his emphases, 
while to a certain degree his own, were by no means unusual.  In his 
contemporary study of segregationist speeches from the Deep South, 
Ronald Harry Denison noted that "[t]he most commonly used argument 
was an implied one... that since the United States Supreme Court's 
usurpation of power and the N.A.A.C.P.'s program were Communist 
directed, segregation was justified."37  While Maddox tended to downplay 
his charges that the Civil Rights Movement and the Congressional 
usurpation of power were communist directed—he was usually careful to 
note that many of those he deemed "fellow travelers" were people of good 
will—he nevertheless held that the overlap in the Civil Rights and 
communist programs justified segregation.  Many other arguments that 
Maddox employed Denison also found to be common.  Maddox's fear of 
"racial amalgamation" was, unsurprisingly, a frequent factor in 
segregationist's speeches.  The charge that integration led to crime, and 
the argument which Denison describes as "[t]he non sequitur of 'lose the 
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battle for segregation and you lose all rights,'" were also in essence 
Maddox's positions.  (Maddox, however, did not as such make the 
common argument that "the Negro is inherently inferior... and therefore 
should not be mixed with them;" instead Maddox argued against "racial 
amalgamation" without broaching the question of inferiority.)38  So 
Maddox's arguments were, at the time, not unusual.  What was unusual 
was that Maddox continued to make these claims long after most others 
had abandoned them. 
 
In later years, Maddox continued to make all of the arguments 
about segregation and integration that he had made at the height of his 
conflict with the government over the Pickrick.  Maddox, for instance, 
made all of these arguments in his 1975 autobiography, Speaking Out.  In 
that book he proudly declared that he is still a segregationist, writing: 
 
I believed then, as I do now, that it was my right under 
the Constitution to serve whomever I chose to serve in 
my place of business.  I am a segregationist and I chose 
to operate my restaurant on a segregated basis.  Because 
of this I was called a racist, although the words are far 
from synonymous.  A segregationist is an individual—
black, white, or any other color—who has enough racial 
pride and racial integrity and love for his fellow human 
beings to want to see all races protected and preserved.39 
In this, Maddox emphasized the third argument detailed above, namely, 
his belief in the correctness of segregation.  He implied that "racial 
integrity" is a virtue, and that "protect[ing] and preserv[ing]" races—as, 
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39 Maddox, 1975, p. 54.  Emphasis in the original. 
 348 
presumably, separate entities—is not only a positive virtue, but one that 
arises out of "love for his fellow human beings."  Nor did Maddox 
moderate these views in later years.  In an interview just a few years 
before his death with his biographer (and former aide) Bob Short, Maddox 
used almost precisely the same words to express his beliefs.  Agreeing to 
Short's summary of his view (that he was a segregationist but not a racist), 
Maddox went on to say: 
 
You know what I think a segregationist is? Someone who 
has racial pride and racial integrity that want their races 
preserved and the races of other people preserved.  My 
segregation includes opposition to amalgamation, which 
would wipe out the races.  My fight at the Pickrick was 
for the right [of] private property, the right of free 
enterprise for every human being in this country.40 
In yet another interview, in 2001, Maddox said that "I want my race 
preserved... and I hope most everybody else wants theirs preserved. I 
think forced segregation is illegal and wrong. I think forced racial 
integration is illegal and wrong. I believe both of them to be 
unconstitutional."41 
Maddox also continued to harp on the dangers of communism in his 
autobiography, although less incessantly than he had a decade before.  He 
still made passing references to the communist inspiration he saw behind 
the Civil Rights Movement, if not quite so frequently as he had before.  
He also tended to view the problem of communism more broadly—
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ascribing much of contemporary liberalism to communism and 
socialism—rather than focusing his ire on the dismantling of segregation.  
Yet his concern that politicians are making decisions "in too many 
instances... from political pressure rather than from what may be right, 
and for far too long the pressure has been coming from the socialist, the 
communist, the bum, the criminal, and the special interest groups" would 
certainly have fit directly into one of his old "Pickrick Says" 
advertisements.42  Maddox also went so far as to blame communists, 
indirectly, for the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr.: 
 
I felt then—and I feel now—that the man who fired the 
shot was merely an instrument.  Dr. King's professed 
non-violent philosophy had bred violence.  This was 
compounded rather than combated by the actions of the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations.  The proponents 
of violence, the Communists and other radical leftists, 
knew that Dr. King had outlived his usefulness to them, 
and he was now more valuable to them in death than in 
life.  He was sacrificed not for the cause of freedom, but 
for the cause of anarchy.43 
More than a decade later, Maddox was still of the opinion that 
 
...the biased, prejudiced, dishonest, uninformed, and 
misinformed members of the NAACP, ACLU, Southern 
Regional Council, Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, and various other liberal and socialistic 
groups, as well as the Communist Party U.S.A. and the 
Communist Party International, waged a full-time war 
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against Lester Maddox, the truth, freedom of choice, 
private property rights, and constitutional government.44 
If Maddox was slightly less inclined to drop the word "communist" into 
every sentence he could, there was no question that he stuck to his beliefs 
about the communist roots of integration and liberalism more generally. 
And Maddox also repeated his assertions about the death of private 
property rights.  He did not make this argument at length in his 
autobiography, as he did at times in his columns; but just as he frequently 
did in earlier years, he made a number of side comments to that effect.  In 
describing the final closing of his restaurant, for instance, he described the 
act of hanging a "CLOSED" sign on the door as "a sad and tragic 
moment... the sign was symbolic of the door that had been closed to 
individual opportunity and private property rights all over this land."45  
When responding to a reporter who asked him, in the wake of his loss in 
the 1974 gubernatorial race, what he said to people who thought that he 
and what he believed in "represent a bygone era," Maddox identified his 
beliefs, and what he stood for, most fundamentally with the rights of 
property, saying that if his beliefs really did represent a bygone era, then 
 
... America will soon be of a bygone era.  Morality will 
be eclipsed by immorality, private enterprise will soon be 
replaced by socialism and communism, God by atheism.  
Rights of private property, as we have known them, will 
have ended.  God forbid that these principles and faith I 
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hold so dear will in reality become principles and faith of 
a bygone era.46 
If the "faith" referred to in this answer was Christianity, then the 
"principles," quite clearly, referred primarily to private enterprise and 
property rights.  And when, in his penultimate paragraph, Maddox 
pleaded for the "youth of America" to stand up for what is good in the 
world, the list that he gave of things under attack was "God, private 
enterprise, capitalism, private property rights, and our constitutional 
government."47  It was noteworthy that while God and the constitution get 
one mention each, the economic rights Maddox held so dear were referred 
to in three separate ways. 
Only once in Maddox's life did he seem to retreat from his defense 
of segregation at all, and that was in his foredoomed 1990 Gubernatorial 
bid.  Maddox—never a serious candidate in the race—put together his 
own campaign material.  He then showed the material to "a trusted, 
former aide" who found that it contained "the same old positions Maddox 
had espoused in the 1960s: the fight against Communism, school 
integration and the 'socialist, power-mad politicians in Washington."48  
The aide managed to convince Maddox to downplay his old views.  
Asked about segregation, Maddox dodged the issue, saying that "I don't 
think the racial issue ought to be part of this campaign."49  At one point, 
Maddox, again pressed on the issue, even backed off his long-time views: 
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I was born... in a segregated society.  The city of Atlanta 
licensed my restaurant to serve whites only, and I abided 
by it... The media keeps talking about race, race, race.  It 
doesn't have anything to do with my candidacy, but the 
news media keeps bringing it up... It was wrong when 
whites practiced it; it is wrong now when you have 
affirmative action and job quotas in the other direction.50 
From Maddox this was a rather astonishing statement.  Here, as never 
before, he is defensive about his old views, attributing them to his birth 
not to conviction, and even going so far as to criticize segregation—even 
if only to score a rhetorical point against present-day programs designed 
to help African Americans.  Yet this one statement seemed to be largely a 
fluke; he didn't stick by it.  After losing the race, he went back to saying, 
whenever asked, that he was a segregationist, that he believed it was right 
and had always believed that.  Maddox's aide and biographer, Bob Short, 
summed up Maddox's record on the issue (not withstanding the quote 
above) by saying that he "never renounced his own views on segregation.  
To this day, he espouses the benefits of segregation regardless of its 
political death as an issue."51  Maddox's one moment of wavering did not 
count, with himself, his friends or his foes; though it was, perhaps, telling 
that, in the press of a political moment, even he did waver, if only briefly. 
Yet it would be slightly inaccurate to say that Maddox's defense of 
his segregationist stand was wholly unaltered between his wielding of an 
axe-handle and penning of his autobiography.  Certainly the content of his 
arguments remains the same; certainly the details of his beliefs are not 
hedged.  In many cases, even some of the wording remains the same.  But, 
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in its overall effect, there was a change in Maddox's tone.  Even if certain 
passages were nearly identical, the context in which they were situated—
their diminishing density as a factor in his prose, the lighter material 
surrounding them—changed the overall effect that the words had. 
During the early 1960's, and in particular during Maddox's own 
confrontation with attempts to integrate his restaurant, Maddox defended 
his segregationist views in a heated and emotional fashion.  This was true 
most famously, of course, in his actions, as the photograph of his wielding 
a pistol in order to "defend his property" testifies.  Then there were his 
various stunts: putting a mannequin with a knife in its back in the Pickrick 
and declaring it "represent[ed] what happened to the American free 
enterprise system"52; building a three-story monument to dead property 
rights outside his closed restaurant; picketing the White House.  But it 
was equally true of his verbal arguments—made, presumably, with more 
reflection, and without the impetus of a heated moment to fire his words.  
Maddox's words burned with as much fire as he could pour into them: 
 
AND GET THIS and I don't care whether you like it or 
not.  THOSE WHO ARE SUPPORTING THE 
UNGODLY "CIVIL RIGHTS" LEGISLATION 
PENDING BEFORE CONGRESS ARE 
UNINFORMED, STUPID OR ELSE PLACE THEIR 
OWN WELFARE AHEAD OF THE PUBLIC 
WELFARE AND AMERICA.  ... All sensible and 
patriotic Americans who have the facts, know that 
passing the proposed legislation now pending before 
Congress will mean the finis of freedom and liberty and 
constitutional government in America.  If by now I have 
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a few of you race mixers boiling—then go ahead and 
blow up!53 
Maddox's level of hysteria did not quite survive into the 1970s.  In 
part, of course, this is because Maddox's fight was no longer quite so 
personal, nor so immediate.  But in large measure, Maddox simply 
couldn't sustain that level of hysteria because all his predictions 
concerning the end of "freedom and liberty and constitutional government 
in America" had not yet come to pass.  Maddox's language is not free, 
even later, of the apocalyptic tone that coursed through his columns, 
speeches and actions in the mid-1960s.  But a decade later the apocalypse 
has been postponed: the end of freedom may be coming, but it is not yet 
upon us.  Thus Maddox writes in his autobiography that "[u]nless there is 
a reversal of this trend toward complete control over our children, our 
schools, our businesses, our lives by the federal government, we are 
inevitably headed toward that day when our nation will cease to be a free 
republic."54  Maddox now warned of oncoming but not imminent disaster; 
his picture was one of corrosive rot rather than an almost-existent police 
state. 
Maddox was also at even greater pains in later years to insist that he 
was not a racist.  While Maddox's line that he was a segregationist but not 
a racist was hardly new, he seemed to feel even more need to stress it 
once segregation itself had passed beyond the pale of mainstream 
American political ideology.  Maddox, therefore, makes the point several 
times in his autobiography.  As he had in the past, he used the fact of his 
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employment of many African Americans at his restaurant as evidence that 
he could not be a racist.  (And, as he had previously, he castigated what he 
saw as liberal hypocrisy on this issue, describing how the Atlanta 
Constitution had "only an occasional black pushing a broom.  There were 
no black secretaries, office workers, or reporters."  This was, Maddox 
writes, typical of many people "in business, government, education, and 
even in the church, where so many of these leaders preach one thing and 
practice the opposite."55)  In describing his own record as Governor, 
Maddox was at pains to stress what he did for African Americans, 
boasting about an early meeting with African American leaders, the 
number of African Americans he appointed to various positions, even 
finally arguing that he had helped "to break new ground in promoting 
racial peace and harmony."56 
So even the unyielding Maddox moderated his tone and grew more 
defensive about his views later in his life, at least when speaking in a 
public forum such as his autobiography.  Yet as noticeable as these 
changes are, it is astonishing how mild they are.  If the hysteria is 
lessened, it is not by any means gone.  If the arguments are not quite as 
thick on the page as they were in the heat of the battle, the same 
arguments are still there, often in the same words.  Maddox is more 
resigned later in his life, but his beliefs are unchanged, the grounds for 
them constant, and the defense of them still strong.  If Maddox moderated 
his tone, he did so only slightly; if Maddox felt defensive about his views, 
he certainly never hid them nor felt embarrassment about them.  
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Maddox was also disappointed in those who did moderate their 
beliefs as well as their tone.  Late in his life, in an interview with his 
former aide Bob Short, Maddox discussed his relationship with George 
Wallace, and "made it perfectly obvious that the two old friends and 
political pals were not close when Wallace passed away."  Maddox added 
that "I was disappointed with Wallace that he campaigned for something 
he didn't truly believe in.  He gave up his ideals and joined his enemies."  
Whatever the truth of Wallace's changing convictions, Maddox clearly 
believed that Wallace, like himself, remained a committed segregationist.  
Maddox, unyielding, was not particularly understanding of those who (in 
his eyes) yielded to political pressure and hid their continuing belief in 
segregation.57 
 
If it is fair to say that Maddox remained unyielding, holding to and 
reiterating his earlier beliefs where many others abandoned, or at least 
silenced, theirs, why did he?  What about his character or position in life 
enabled or led him to hold fast to such broadly abandoned guns? 
One key factor that enabled Maddox to hold to views which 
became, in and of themselves, marginalizing, was a willingness to be 
marginalized.  National figures who wished to remain national figures—
even those who (to all outer appearances) did not change their core 
beliefs—were forced to (at a minimum) remain silent about their 
segregationist values, and in many cases were forced to forthrightly 
abandon them.  Maddox, however, had no such national (or even 
Georgian) ambitions—at least none he was not willing to sacrifice. 
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Maddox's history as a once-marginal figure who had stepped 
briefly into the limelight is almost certainly important here.  Maddox was 
not a man whose ambition in life had long been politics; his ambition had 
always been business.  Maddox said he "grew up as an American with a 
lifelong dream and goal of becoming a successful businessman,"58 and 
that he only later considered going into politics.  At least according to his 
own testimony, Maddox had "never given serious consideration to being a 
candidate for elective office"59 prior to his first campaign, and he got 
involved in politics when he felt his principles and issues he cared 
strongly about were at stake.  For someone for whom issues had always 
been primary—or who at least conceived of himself in that fashion—it 
was perhaps easier to abandon politics than to abandon the positions he 
believed in. 
Even more important, however, is that in ways apart from his racial 
views Maddox had always had a self-conception of himself as a marginal 
figure.  He expressed great pride in his lack of connections to the Georgia 
establishment, both before and after his governorship.  He said that his 
decision to seek public office the first time was motivated by a desire "to 
see what one man outside the political establishment could do to promote 
a government of, for and by the people."60  He continued to run because 
he was "absolutely convinced that a man unfettered by political debts of 
any sort could make a positive contribution to good government."61  Nor 
did he think that later on he had joined the establishment.  Referring to his 
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fourth run for public office, in which he was elected Governor, Maddox 
wrote that: 
 
I was ignored as a candidate and condemned as an 
outsider by the entire political establishment.  I had no 
political organization.  I was not adequately financed. ... 
On a personal basis, I didn't know the incumbent 
governor, nor more than ten members of the General 
Assembly, or other state officials.  Neither did I have an 
acquaintance with elected officials who ran Georgia's 
city halls and its 159 county courthouses.  I knew not one 
leader in the news media on a personal basis, not one 
spokesman for the banks, industry, business, labor, 
religion, education, agriculture, nor did I know the 
spokesmen for the professionals in medicine, science and 
elsewhere. ...the political establishment in Georgia and 
other states declared war on Lester Maddox, his family, 
his friends, and his supporters.  My supporters and I were 
held in contempt and scorned by media leaders 
throughout Georgia, the United States, and much of the 
world.62 
And in describing his defeat in the 1974 Governor's race, Maddox wrote 
that "[t]he power structure had triumphed."63 
Someone who prided himself as being unwilling to compromise 
with establishment figures in other areas is perhaps more likely to decide 
to stick to his guns on issues so dear to him as segregation clearly was to 
Maddox.  Furthermore, his unwillingness to cater to the Georgia 
establishment had, in his view, already cost him his political career; there 
was no motive for him to dissemble his racial views for the sake of 
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preserving something he already viewed as lost for other (albeit related) 
reasons. 
Maddox did not see his outsider status on political corruption and 
connections and his (increasing) marginalization on the issue of 
segregation as separate; indeed, he viewed them as intimately connected.  
Maddox believed that one of the primary motivations of integrationists 
was a deliberate sell-out to keep their political careers and to line their 
pockets; in one of his "Pickrick Says" advertisements, he described 
supporters of integration as having "sold... out in exchange for votes and 
dollars;"64 he later speculated that Johnson's "sins" were "rooted in the lust 
for power, in greed for fond memories in the minds of historians, and in 
too great a willingness to compromise the freedoms of the majority to 
appease the anger of a militant and ungrateful few."65  Maddox thought 
that the elites who bought and sold favors in the corridors of power were 
the same ones who were most committed to integration.  Maddox was a 
self-described conservative, but he was a conservative populist: like 
George Wallace—and, indeed, in a model that was to becoming 
increasingly central to conservative politics over the coming decades66—
Maddox viewed political liberals and economic elites as connected, and as 
out to get 'the little guy', including him.  While liberals might conceive of 
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the Civil Rights Movement as standing up for the disenfranchised 
(namely African Americans), Maddox viewed it as an elite imposition 
upon the disenfranchised (namely, poor whites).67 
Maddox's self-image as a populist and an outsider was central to his 
non-racial views; his segregationist views were central to his worldview 
and to his political motivations.  Maddox saw the triumph of political 
liberalism under Johnson, and its continuation under Nixon, as of a piece 
with the triumph of the Civil Rights Movement.  In Maddox's view, he 
became marginalized because he refused to sell out his principles and join 
the liberal elite—what he saw as the gradual descent of America into 
socialism.  Perhaps George Wallace could separate his segregationist 
beliefs from the rest of his conservative populism sufficiently to apologize 
for the former in order to continue his political career and promote the 
latter.  But Maddox would not.  Having always viewed himself as 
marginalized, he retreated to the margins, unhappy with the direction of 
the country but not willing to compromise on any part of what he saw as a 
unified world view.  Rather than integrate his restaurant, Maddox had shut 
it down; rather than support integration, Maddox shut down his political 
career. 
 
                                                
67 Maddox's belief that liberal elites were hypocritical on matters of 
integration—as in the example cited earlier in which he excoriated the 
Atlanta Constitution for its hypocrisy in supporting Civil Rights but not 
themselves hiring African Americans—fit naturally into this worldview.  
Liberal elites wished to impose a negative (integration) on the 
disenfranchised (poor whites and small businessmen) but would never 
themselves submit to it. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
THE PLACE OF SEGREGATIONISTS IN CONTEMPORARY 
CONSERVATIVE MEMORY 
 
Recent histories of the conservative movement, when written by a 
member of the movement or by one sympathetic to their views, tend, 
understandably, to be triumphalist.  After a half-century in which 
conservative ideas moved from the margins of American political 
discourse to a dominant position in both political power and the framing 
of public debate, the conservative movement can feel a lot of justifiable 
satisfaction about its accomplishments.1 
Successful political movements rarely attribute their success to 
fortune, happenstance, or the errors of others; they tend to believe they 
were successful because of the quality of their ideas (and to some extent 
the quality of those ideas' advocates).  Psychologically, a group 
advocating a certain set of ideas is simply most likely to believe that they 
have converted others because of the inherent quality of those ideas.2  
                                                
1 This doesn't mean, interestingly, that they always do; it has been often 
noted that Conservative ire seems only to grow, not lessen, with their 
dominance.  See, e.g., Thomas Frank, "What's the Matter with Liberals?", 
The New York Review of Books, May 12, 2005. 
(http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17982) 
2 One of the most powerful aspects of the theory of "memes", which has 
gained quite a bit of currency since the term was invented by Richard 
Dawkins in his 1976 book The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, new ed. 1989) is that it divorces questions about the success of an 
idea (in the sense of its convincing people and becoming widespread in a 
culture) from the questions of its truth, pointing out that ideas often 
succeed for reasons entirely divorced from their quality—catchiness, 
simplicity, resonance with preexisting biases, and so forth.  Truth, in this 
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Thus in the course of writing the histories of the rise of conservative 
thought in contemporary America, conservatives tend to attribute their 
success to the fact that conservatism is right about the major issues of the 
day. 
Yet there is a counter-tendency in contemporary political ideology 
which exists in tension with this natural inclination.  As I have argued, 
across the political spectrum (save for a few on the far-fringes of political 
discourse) people are in agreement that the Civil Rights Movement, at 
least in its early (pre-1965) stage, was fundamentally correct in its 
arguments and goals and that, conversely, segregation's defenders were 
fundamentally wrong if not flatly immoral in theirs.  Yet the Civil Rights 
Movement was, unquestionably, a left-wing movement, with its adherents 
spanning the political spectrum from mainstream liberals to the far left.  
And segregation's defenders were equally clearly conservatives: they 
called themselves such; they were accepted as such at the time; they 
advanced arguments which stand clearly in the historical development of 
the ideas of contemporary conservatives.  Since the rightness of the Civil 
Rights Movement is presently broadly acknowledged—even by 
contemporary conservatives—a dilemma remains: if the natural tendency 
of contemporary conservatives is to assert that their rise over the past fifty 
years has been due to the truth of their ideas, how do they reconcile this 
inclination with the fact that they were, by their own contemporary 
admission, wrong about one of the major social and political issues of the 
post-war period? 
                                                                                                                                       
model, becomes simply one more advantage that an idea can have, which 
may or may not prevail over others. 
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This problem is, in essence, a movement-wide extension of the 
individual problems faced by particular politicians and political thinkers 
in the transition from the time when the issue of de jure segregation was 
still a 'live' issue in the American political spectrum to the time when it 
was, by consensus, a settled issue.  In the same way that individuals 
needed to come to terms, both for themselves and for others, with their 
previous backing for a cause they no longer could support (at the price of 
exile to the fringes of political discourse), the conservative movement as a 
whole can be said to need to come to terms with its past—or, at least, 
those within its ranks who reflect upon that past do. 
As I have documented above, individuals who found themselves 
caught in the switch from a time when support for segregation was 
publicly acceptable to a time when it was not, used a variety of strategies 
to address this dilemma: they have denied their views, downplayed them, 
distorted them and dodged them; they have repented them with varying 
degrees of thoroughness and diverse levels of conviction; they have 
attempted to shift focus onto other, still-controversial issues (such as 
busing or affirmative action); they have simply changed quietly, failed to 
address the issue and (presumably) hoped that no one would notice.  
Similar strategies can be seen at work among historians, both academic 
and popular, who express the self-understanding of the past of the 
conservative movement (as will be discussed in detail below). 
A movement is not a person, of course, and there are differences in 
what sort of strategies might be adopted and how they would be 
implemented.  But one difference might be noted immediately: compared 
to the choices confronting individuals, the path of denial is easier.  This is 
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true because a person's career is inevitably a more unified entity than is a 
movement's ideological history.  Previous statements an individual made 
can be twisted, ignored or even flat-out denied, but their relevance to the 
individual's thought is hard to escape.  In the history of movements, on the 
other hand, one can emphasize certain earlier figures while de-
emphasizing others.  This can be done, of course, in distorting or even 
dishonest ways, but the connection is, in any event, less absolute.  Even 
for figures whom one wishes, without question, to include in one's 
historical pantheon, there seems more justifiability in claiming that some 
actions and statements of theirs are more relevant than others.  In addition, 
movement histories tend to focus on certain ideas and issues, and thereby 
entire topics—in this case, segregation—can be avoided without obvious 
awkwardness in a manner not possible when individuals deal with their 
own histories. 
If the path of denial is generally easier for movements than for 
individuals, it is particularly so in the case of the conservative movement 
and its connection to the pro-segregation forces.  This is true owing to a 
particular historical happenstance: the broad shift in party loyalty among 
precisely that segment of the American population—white southern 
conservatives—who were the most avid supporters of segregation.  This 
shift in party loyalty was a long process, arguably beginning as early as 
the 1948 election in which a significant group of southerners, not yet 
ready to embrace the Republican party, split off from the main 
Democratic party to run their own 'Dixiecrat' ticket; it continued slowly 
through the 1950's, taking a step forward with Republican Barry 
Goldwater's winning of several southern states despite the magnitude of 
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his overall loss.  And the shift in party loyalty was arguably not 
completed until the 1990's and the Gingrich revolution.  Nevertheless, the 
profound partisan re-alignment among white southern conservatives 
centered on the events of 1954 - 1965 and the Democratic party's slow but 
increasing embrace of the Civil Rights Movement.  Yet this realignment 
gives what politicians refer to as "deniability" to the conservative 
movement's roots in segregationist activism.  Again, this is true for the 
movement as a whole in a way that it is not true for individuals.  Even if 
individuals switched parties—as of course many did, from Strom 
Thurmond on down—this hardly adds any distance between them and 
their earlier pro-segregation stands; on the contrary, it arguably highlights 
their commitment to the segregationist cause insofar as their party-
switching was motivated by the Democratic party's increasing 
commitment to civil rights.  For the movement as a whole, however, it 
provides a distance between contemporary conservatives, almost 
unanimously Republicans, and earlier, pro-segregationist conservatives, 
largely if not uniformly Democrats. 
If the path of denial is easier for a movement than for an individual, 
another path, that of repentance, is correspondingly more difficult.  If 
repentance is to be made, then acknowledgment of the sins in question is a 
necessary prerequisite; and while each individual can choose to 
acknowledge or deny their own segregationist past without any influence 
on another's, one conservative's recognition of their movement's 
complicity in opposing the Civil Rights Movement naturally conflicts 
with the denials of others.  Even if outright denial is not contemplated, 
repentance serves to draw more clearly a connection which, as I have 
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argued, is in any event less clear for ideological and political forebears 
than it is for an individual's own past: any repentance, then, is as likely to 
stir up resentment which might not otherwise exist (or which might 
otherwise be a marginal issue) as it is to cleanse the political and moral 
slate.  Even aside from these issues, there is the problem of what 
repentance might mean for a movement.   
Individuals are generally felt to have the moral power to apologize 
and atone for their own misdeeds; the apology of a movement leader for 
the errors of others is less obviously valid.  The very tenuousness of 
connection that makes denial easier makes any expression of remorse less 
convincing. 
Thus while the problem of an individual political figure confronting 
their own past is roughly analogous to that of an ideological and political 
movement's confronting of its roots, the details do vary: different 
strategies will be emphasized and those strategies will unfold in differing 
ways.  In this chapter I will survey some of the responses of contemporary 
conservatives to the history, not of their own individual segregationist 
pasts, but to the past of the movement that they (otherwise) believe in 
strongly.  These confrontations will generally be less detailed than those 
of individuals, since the felt need is less, and since the strategies leaned 
towards (denial, evasion, silence) are in any event among the less 
intensive approaches than the ones avoided (repentance, justification).  
Yet an examination of a spectrum of strategies nevertheless remains an 
important component in understanding the overall conservative reaction to 
the history of defending segregation. 
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One fairly straightforward version of the denial strategy occurs in a 
column by conservative pundit Ann Coulter.  Her column was written in 
the wake of the controversy that surrounded then-Majority Leader Trent 
Lott's praise of Strom Thurmond.  In confronting this controversy, Coulter 
portrays the history as follows: 
 
Back when they supported segregation, Lott and 
Thurmond were Democrats.  This is something the media 
is intentionally hiding to make it look like the Republican 
Party is the party of segregation and race discrimination, 
which it never has been.  In 1948... [Thurmond's] party 
was an offshoot of the Democratic Party.  And when he 
lost, he went right back to being a Democrat.  This whole 
brouhaha is about a former Democrat praising another 
former Democrat for what was once a Democrat [sic] 
policy.  Republicans made Southern Democrats drop the 
race nonsense when they entered the Republican Party.  
Democrats supported race discrimination, then for about 
three years they didn't, now they do again.  They've just 
changed which race they think should be discriminated 
against.  In the 1920s, the Democratic platforms didn't 
even call for antilynching legislation as the Republican 
platforms did.  [...]  Thurmond went on to reject 
segregation, become a Republican, and serve his country 
well as a U.S. senator.3 
Coulter's narrative is, at best, wildly tendentious.  It is of course true that 
the Democratic party was the home of the most ardent segregationists; it 
was also, however, home to the most ardent integrationists in the post-war 
period.  Republicans hardly "made Southern Democrats drop the race 
nonsense when they entered the Republican Party;" the "race nonsense", 
to the extent that it was dropped at all, was dropped because the 
                                                
3 Ann Coulter, How to Talk to a Liberal (If You Must): the World 
According to Ann Coulter.  New York: Crown Form, 2004, p. 145-146. 
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overwhelming tide of both law and public opinion were against it.  
Further, southern Democrats—in particular Strom Thurmond—switched 
to the Republican party out of frustration with the Democrat's embrace of 
civil rights (there were other issues, but civil rights was paramount). 
Coulter is simply exploiting a strange historical fact, namely, that 
over the course of the Twentieth Century the Democratic and Republican 
parties, in essence, traded coalitions and political philosophies.  While the 
specifics of this exchange are extraordinarily complex, the broad outlines 
are quite clear.  African Americans began to vote Democratic soon after 
the establishment of the New Deal coalition, although their move to the 
Democratic party was not cemented until the mid-1960s (until which time 
many were excluded from voting in any event); southern whites, who had 
been reliable Democrats since the end of Reconstruction, slowly split with 
the Democratic party in the middle of the Twentieth Century.  And, of 
course, the event that was most responsible for the movement of southern 
Democrats into the Republican party was the Democrats' belated embrace 
of the Civil Rights Movement.  The political heirs of the Civil Rights 
Movement are Democrats; the political heirs of the segregationists are 
Republicans—in many cases, "heirs" is even a misleading word since the 
very same individuals continued to be active in politics for many years.  If 
Coulter tried to rewrite her narrative using the words "liberal" and 
"conservative" (or "liberal" and "right", the words she uses in her title) 
instead of "Democrat" and "Republican", it would fall apart completely. 
What makes this a strategy of denial (and not, say, simply an 
egregious misreading of history) is that Coulter knows this perfectly well.  
This is shown by the few references to civil rights in her earlier book, 
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Slander.4  In her conclusion to Slander, in the midst of a paragraph 
detailing why "liberals have been wrong about everything in the last half-
century", she includes the sentence that liberals "were wrong about the 
Civil Rights Act (which was never going to be used as an instrument of 
discrimination against whites)."5  This, of course, represents a different 
strategy than that of denial, the shifting of focus onto later, still-
controversial issues (to be discussed in more detail below).  But it also 
makes no sense as a charge without the recognition that the Civil Rights 
Act was a liberal cause, and opposition to it a conservative one.  Later in 
her conclusion, Coulter makes a similar point: 
 
...liberals prefer to keep reminiscing about the last time 
they were giddily self-righteous.  Like a senile old man 
who keeps telling you the same story over and over 
again, liberals babble on and on about the "heady" days 
of civil rights marches.  Between 1995 and 2001, the 
New York Times alone ran more than one hundred articles 
on "Selma" alone.  I believe that we have revisited this 
triumph of theirs sufficiently by now.  For anyone under 
fifty, the "heady" days of civil rights marches are 
something out of a history book.  The march on Selma 
was thirty-five years ago.  ...the country is as different a 
place today compared to 1965, as it was in 1965 
compared to 1930.  What civil rights do people lack 
now?  What bus is anyone not allowed to ride on?6 
                                                
4 Ann Coulter, Slander: Liberal Lies About the American Right.  New 
York: Crown Publishers, 2002. 
5 Coulter, 2002, p. 197. 
6 Coulter, 2002, p. 199.  Coulter's claim, incidentally, is false.  The liberal 
web log associated with the journal The American Prospect, TAPPED, 
investigated Coulter's statistic about The New York Times, and found only 
70 articles that even mentioned Selma, Alabama in the context of the civil 
rights march, and notes further that "in our judgment only 16 were 
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While there is certainly plenty of scorn here for liberals' being "giddily 
self-righteous," there is at the same time an acknowledgment that the 
Civil Rights Movement was a "triumph of theirs".  Indeed, her final two 
rhetorical questions even implicitly acknowledge the moral rightness of 
the Civil Rights Movement.  (Needless to say, this particular line of attack 
also blatantly contradicts her earlier claim that liberals were wrong about 
"everything" for the past half-century.)  Given this earlier evidence of 
Coulter's understanding of the historical record about liberalism and 
conservatism's stances on civil rights, it seems fair to deem her later 
article an outright example of a strategy of denial. 
Coulter's level of mendacity is rare; in conservative histories the 
strategy of denial is usually practiced along with other strategies, and is 
confined to off-hand and misleading but not forthrightly deceptive 
comments about Democrats and Republicans' record on civil rights.  (An 
example, from the recent book A Patriot's History of the United States, 
will be discussed below.)  Yet Coulter is not unique in her use of the 
strategy of denial.  Another example is provided by David Frum in his 
book Dead Right.  While Frum does lament the National Review's 1957 
defense of segregation, he adds that: 
 
...since the early 1960s American conservatives have 
distinguished themselves by an adamant color-blindness.  
                                                                                                                                       
centrally concerned with historic happenings at Selma from the civil 
rights era. The other 54 contained brief mentions of Selma and civil rights 
but appeared in articles on different topics."  They also point out that "that 
the famous 1965 'Bloody Sunday' march was from Selma to Montgomery, 
not a march 'on' Selma." (Note at 
http://www.prospect.org/webfeatures/2002/07/tapped-s-07-26.html; 
emphasis is in the original.) 
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Barry Goldwater voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
not because he was a bigot but because, in the words of 
the late M. E. Bradford, he refused to accept that 'the 
tradition of restricted Federal authority... must give way 
because [of] the grievances and misfortunes of one 
segment of the population."7 
Even if one concedes that Goldwater's principled vote was without 
stain—ignoring, for instance, his unprecedented (for a Republican) 
victories in the South in a year in which his presidential campaign was 
otherwise soundly defeated: victories which resulted in large part from 
admiration from those who appreciated Goldwater's 'principled' vote on 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act for reasons perhaps less admirable than those 
for which he cast it—Frum's claim that "since the early 1960's American 
conservatives have distinguished themselves by an adamant color-
blindness" is only plausible if by "conservatives" Frum means 
"Republicans"—and Republicans as of the early 1960s at that.  Certainly 
the southern Democrats who opposed the 1964  Civil Rights Act—many 
of whom later switched to the Republican party in no small measure 
because of the Democrats' stance on Civil Rights—were anything but 
color-blind, and they were certainly—philosophically, by their own 
description and that of others at the time—conservatives.  (Interestingly, 
Frum says this despite quoting, earlier in the same book, part of an 
interview with Jack Kemp—discussed further below—which is one of the 
few examples of genuine repentance for the role conservatives played, or 
failed to play, in the civil rights movement.8) 
                                                
7 Frum, p. 129.  His critique of the National Review is on pp. 128-129. 
8 The Kemp quote is on Frum, p. 96. 
 372 
Indeed, the strategy of denial has recently been echoed in official 
Republican efforts at outreach to the African-American community.  
These outreach efforts have included a newspaper ad proclaiming that 
"throughout the history of America, the Republican Party has been at the 
forefront of the fight for civil rights" and a "2005 Republican Freedom 
Calendar" with the slogan "celebrating a century and a half of civil rights 
achievement by the Party of Lincoln" on its cover.9  The strategy of 
denial, clearly, is a recurring one. 
 
An alternate strategy is one which might be termed the strategy of 
evasion.  This is a tactic where neither the leftist origins nor the 
fundamental justice of the movement to end de jure segregation is directly 
questioned; rather, the topic is swiftly glossed over with later, more 
controversial issues—usually political issues involving challenges to de 
facto segregation, such as busing to integrate schools, affirmative action 
and the like—receiving the bulk of an author's focus.  One element of this 
strategy is to focus attention on the historical process by which the later, 
still-contested issues arose out of the struggles over the earlier ones.  This 
adds a patina of moral uncertainty to the earlier struggles without directly 
questioning their justice.  Sometimes this is done to rather directly 
undermine the retrospective moral clarity that currently attaches to the 
issue of de jure segregation; at other times it is done by authors who have 
no intention at all of questioning the fundamental justice of the struggle 
against de jure segregation, but who nevertheless wish to slightly lower 
                                                
9 Peter Wallsten, "Recasting Republicans as the Party of Civil Rights," 
The Los Angeles Times, January 29, 2005, p. A17. 
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the moral image of those who participated in it.  This strategy involves, 
essentially, moving a discussion to more comfortable ground—a familiar 
strategy of argument in every sphere, and not one necessarily done with 
any attempt to deceive, or even consciously; yet this does not change the 
fact that it involves (to varying degrees) an evasion of uncomfortable 
issues. 
One particularly stark example of the strategy of evasion may be 
found in one of the recent spate of avowedly conservative histories of the 
United States, Thomas E. Woods's A Politically Incorrect Guide to 
American History.10  Woods's book has been—generally but not 
unanimously—warmly received by the mainstream of the contemporary 
conservative movement.  It comes praised on its cover by Congressman 
Ron Paul of Maryland, and its author received a warm welcome on 
conservative talk shows such as "Scarborough Country" and " Hannity 
and Colmes".11  There were, however, some voices equally within the 
mainstream of the contemporary conservative movement who rather 
strongly rejected Woods's work; in particular, it was disavowed by 
reviewer Max Boot in the influential journal The Weekly Standard.12  But 
it was hardly considered, even by Boot, as a fringe work.  Woods's book 
                                                
10 Thomas E. Woods, Jr., A Politically Incorrect Guide to American 
History.  Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2004. 
11 "Scarborough Country", December 22, 2004; transcript at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6759081/.  "Hannity and Colmes", 
December 8, 2004; transcript at 
http://blog.lewrockwell.com/lewrw/archives/006795.html. 
12 Max Boot, "Incorrect History", The Weekly Standard, at 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/24
6eaokp.asp. 
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also had popular appeal, appearing on the New York Times' weekly list of 
best-selling books. 
Despite the positive reception Woods's book received from at least 
some in the conservative movement, Thomas Woods's views are distinctly 
out of the political mainstream—a fact which can be seen in his work, 
particularly by those somewhat versed in the topics he discusses, although 
his arguments in his Politically Incorrect Guide to American History are 
deliberately phrased to blend in more with mainstream ideas.  According 
to the research of Eric Muller, however, Woods was a founding member 
of a southern nationalist organization known as "The League of the 
South," with views bordering on the secessionist.13  This movement of 
Woods's fringe views into the mainstream of contemporary conservative 
discourse is, alas, not an isolated phenomenon.  Journalist David Neiwert, 
who has done extensive reporting on American neo-Nazi and white 
supremacist movements, has written about how "the line between right-
wing extremists and 'the conservative movement' has been increasingly 
blurred in the past 10 years," in part due to what he terms "transmitters," 
that is, "ostensibly mainstream conservatives who seem to cull ideas that 
often have their origins on the far right, strip them of any obviously 
                                                
13 Eric Muller, "What You Should Know About the Author of the NYT 
Bestseller, Politically Incorrect Guide to American History", History 
News Network, February 2, 2005, at http://hnn.us/articles/10007.html.  
Muller cites comments by Woods that shows that his book was, indeed, a 
deliberate attempt to reach a more mainstream audience with more radical 
ideas—is, in Woods's words, "being pitched to precisely those who need 
it most." 
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pernicious content, and present them as 'conservative' argument."14  In this 
sense Woods is part of a larger trend—a trend which, if taken to its 
ultimate conclusion, may even some day render the fact of de jure 
segregation's being unacceptable within the mainstream of American 
political discourse purely a historical phenomenon.  For this reason, 
among others, Woods's book seems important to include in this survey, 
since it represents an example of how those who might wish to cast doubt 
on the immorality of de jure segregation would present their views to 
those who still agree with integration as a principle.  
The strategy of evasion does not, of course, mean utterly ignoring 
the Civil Rights Movement, since it is simply too important, on everyone's 
account, to ignore in any work which purports to tackle the basic history 
of the U.S. in the twentieth century.  And, indeed, Woods includes a full 
chapter entitled "Civil Rights", in which he discusses the history of the 
Civil Rights Movement.  Yet despite Woods's devoting a chapter to the 
topic, he nevertheless practices to a startling degree a rather pure version 
of the strategy of evasion.  Indeed, he acknowledges up front that his 
account will pass over what he terms "important episodes" in the Civil 
Rights Movement, including "Rosa Parks and the Montgomery bus 
boycott; the forced integration of Little Rock's Central High School [and] 
the desegregation drive in Birmingham in 1963."15  He does not say why 
he is not going to discuss these "important episodes," although he implies 
                                                
14 David Neiwert, "Rush, Newspeak and Fascism: An Exegesis", August 
30, 2003, available at 
http://www.cursor.org/stories/fascismintroduction.php; quotations from 
section vi. 
15 Woods, p. 195. 
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that he is correcting an imbalance in the topic by focusing on an ignored 
aspect of the Movement—its legal ramifications—rather than those well-
covered topics.  This is an implication that is hard to credit, however, 
since the topics he chooses to discuss are Brown v. Board of Education, 
busing, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and affirmative action—hardly 
neglected issues!  (Further, his book is filled with oft-covered topics—as 
is only natural for a book whose stated purpose is to be "an introduction to 
some of the more controversial aspects of American history.")16  It is hard 
to escape the conclusion that Woods is avoiding topics which are 
extremely difficult to fit into his arguments and preconceptions—topics 
which are hard to relate in such a way as to valorize conservatives, 
condemn liberals or correct what Woods sees as an overly critical view of 
the United States from other histories. 
But simply ignoring issues is only part of Woods's strategy of 
evasion; he also pursues it in the topics he does cover in his "Civil Rights" 
chapter.  The topics on which he chooses to focus he describes as "the 
legal ramifications of the civil rights movement".  In practice, Woods's 
chapter divides into two basic parts.  The first is a treatment of school 
integration in which he begins by discussing Brown v Board of Education, 
and then segues into later Supreme Court cases involving more 
controversial desegregation plans, in particular those upholding busing as 
an integration strategy.  The second part of Woods's chapter begins with a 
discussion of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and then moves quickly into a 
discussion of the issue of affirmative action. 
                                                
16 Woods, p. xiv. 
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In his choice of emphasis Woods practices another form of evasion, 
focusing his discussion on issues relating to de facto integration around 
which an ideological consensus never formed—issues in which the 
conservative viewpoint remains well within the political mainstream—
while giving short shrift to issues involving de jure integration which are 
harder to fit into a conservative narrative.  In this case, he does so not by 
ignoring topics, as he does with issues relating to his undiscussed 
"important episodes", but by following the historical movement whereby 
issues of de jure integration led to controversies over de facto integration, 
allowing his discussion even of the former to be centered on the politics 
of the latter.  By discussing how (in his view) Brown led inexorably to 
busing, and the 1964 Civil Rights Act similarly led to affirmative action, 
he can invoke the political controversies surrounding the later policies in 
order to dodge the consensus around the earlier ones without actually 
confronting them head-on. 
But let us examine Woods's discussion of the two signal legal 
events of the Civil Rights Movement which he does discuss, Brown v 
Board of Education and the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  In his discussion of 
Brown, Woods makes two basic arguments.  First he questions Brown's 
legal reasoning.  He starts off with a quick sleight of hand: 
 
The justices were obviously anxious to declare 
segregated schooling, which existed by law throughout 
the South, to be unconstitutional.  But the Court could 
not simply argue that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal 
protection clause prohibited segregated schools, since 1) 
the Court had ruled in Plessy that it did not, and 2) the 
same Congress that drafted and passed the Fourteenth 
Amendment had also approved segregated schooling in 
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the District of Columbia.  If anyone should know the 
intent of the amendment, it would be those who had 
voted on it.  Another line of reasoning would have to be 
pursued.17 
The chief sleight of hand here is Woods's slip from any possible 
interpretation to that of a particular school of constitutional interpretation.  
Woods jumps from the idea that "the Court could not simply argue that 
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause prohibited 
segregated schools"—that is, from the idea that that the Fourteenth 
Amendment under any prevailing legal theory could not support such a 
claim—to the notion that, since the Congress that ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment approved segregated schools in Washington, D.C., such an 
interpretation was ruled out because "if anyone should know the intent of 
the amendment, it would be those who had voted on it."  The latter, of 
course only rules out an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
under the "original intent" school of constitutional interpretation—a 
school which did not, in fact, gain widespread currency in the federal 
judiciary until a few decades after Brown.  Indeed, the latter fact doesn't 
even necessarily rule out an "original intent" argument that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits segregation; as we have seen, Robert Bork, one of 
the intellectual founders of the movement for interpreting the Constitution 
according to the "original intent" heuristic, makes precisely such an 
argument. But in any event the notion that the Constitution must be 
interpreted according to the intent of its framers is only one school of 
constitutional interpretation; Woods, however, by basing "could not 
simply argue" on "the intent of the amendment" implies it is the only such 
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school—or, at the very least, implies that it is the only such valid school 
without even acknowledging the existence of any disagreement on this 
point. 
There are lesser, but equally telling, sleights of hand in this passage 
as well.  Woods cites the existence of Plessy as an insurmountable 
obstacle—eliding over the fact that precedents can certainly be reversed 
by the Supreme Court, albeit with some reluctance (as Plessy, of course, 
was overruled by Brown).  He later goes on to say that "the Court avoided 
the charge that it had brazenly defied precedent by claiming that the 
justices who had decided the Plessy case could not have known of the 
sociological information that 'modern authority' had now made available 
about the effects of segregation".18  What Woods obfuscates is the fact 
that this was a political compromise forged within the Court.  Some 
members of the Court wished to simply declare that Plessy was wrongly 
decided originally, while others were uneasy with that; the final opinion—
which indeed many legal scholars, liberal as well as conservative, have 
criticized as an example of poor legal reasoning—was the result of Chief 
Justice Earl Warren's efforts to find a line of reasoning that could be 
presented unanimously, owing to his recognition of the controversial 
nature of the holding.   
Woods goes on to critique the psychological studies cited in Brown, 
as well as to make indirect critiques of the entire line of reasoning.  His 
criticisms include attacking the sociology that Brown cited, mentioning 
the success of Chinese and Japanese students in segregated schools in 
California in the 1920's and the fact that, in the present day, Korean 
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students are less likely to identify themselves as "good at math" than 
Americans despite scoring higher on standardized tests.  Both of these 
points disprove, in Woods's view, that self-esteem is relevant (or at any 
rate crucial) to education.  Woods's title for this subsection—"Instead  of 
law, sociology"19—itself is designed to cast doubt upon Brown as a legal 
matter: while he never explicitly says that Brown is baseless given his 
critiques of the sociology, the implication is strong. 
The second argument Woods makes about Brown is that it was, in 
any event, unnecessary.  He cites several sources about the burgeoning 
Civil Rights Movement that predated Brown, and then cites Michael 
Klarman to the effect that "Brown was not necessary as an impetus to 
challenge the racial status quo".  (He does not cite Klarman's further 
conclusion that "in temporarily retarding the cause of racial change in the 
South, Brown set in motion a sequence of events that soon culminated in 
the emergence of a national commitment to eradicating southern Jim 
Crow.")20  There are a number of counter-arguments one might make to 
the thesis that the preexisting Civil Rights Movement made Brown 
unnecessary.  But what Woods does not deal with is that the very forces 
that he claims made it unnecessary were part of a quintessentially liberal 
movement, one fiercely opposed by conservatives at the time. 
After discussing later court cases involving integration—Green v. 
County School Board and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
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(Jun., 1994), pp. 81-118; first quotation at p. 89 (cited in Woods at p. 
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Education—Woods discusses what he sees as some of the negative 
consequences of integration: loss of community schools for African 
Americans, failure to improve African-American performance, and white 
flight to suburban and public schools.  This discussion is considerably 
longer than his analysis of Brown.  In the course of discussing these 
issues, Woods makes fairly standard conservative arguments on these 
topics.  What is relevant to the strategy of evasion is that Woods uses 
these arguments to retroactively cast doubt on Brown without directly 
confronting the issue of the morality of legally-mandated segregation.  
Thus Woods writes: 
 
Some have argued that Green represented a radical 
departure from the reasoning employed in Brown.... Yet 
the reasoning employed in Green was already implicitly 
contained in Brown.  According to Brown, what made 
segregated schools inherently inferior was precisely that 
blacks did not have white classmates.  Green, nearly a 
decade and a half later, merely took up where Brown left 
off.21 
Similar rhetorical moves occur in Woods's discussion of busing.  He 
declares that "such forced mixture would increase racial animosity, not 
alleviate it"; his writing is full of language such as "let's force those kids 
together", "tearing children away from their familiar surroundings" and 
"the busing fiasco", even suggesting that one judge should apologize for 
his desegregation order.22  He finally concludes that 
 
By any measure, forced busing worsened the very 
condition its proponents had claimed to want to 
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improve.... Although busing was more coercive in some 
cities than in others, and other factors contributed to the 
disappearance of whites from urban schools, a non-
Hispanic white majority is not to be found in the public 
school system of a single big city in America today.  That 
is what government programs intended to mix the races 
have to show for themselves.23 
The argument that Brown ultimately worsened public school 
conditions, even for African Americans, has of course been made by 
people from across the political spectrum.  What is noteworthy here is that 
it is by no means clear what is intended to be included in the phrase 
"government programs intended to mix the races,"  Given Woods's 
insistence that Brown directly entailed later desegregation measures, and 
his overall structuring of his analysis, it seems he might be including 
Brown among his "government programs intended to mix the races."  
Woods, of course, does not say clearly that segregation was a good thing, 
or that we ought to reinstitute de jure segregation.  But by running the 
issues together, Woods tries to create doubt about the morality of de jure 
integration by playing on his audience's concerns about more 
controversial programs. 
Woods then discusses the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  He first claims 
that it was unnecessary, citing Thomas Sowell to the effect that African 
Americans' representation in "high-level positions" advanced more in 
certain years prior to the act than subsequent to it.24  He cites statistics 
regarding only a few years, and none later than 1967, after the act had 
been in effect only three years; nor does he address the possibility that 
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progress might otherwise have stalled.  And Woods does not address the 
merits of any of the numerous provisions in the act not related to 
employment in "high-level positions".  He does claim that the act 
"extended federal authority over private behavior to an extraordinary 
degree."25  Beyond these claims, Woods does not directly address the 
question posed in his section title, "The Civil Rights Act of 1964: how 
necessary or desirable was antidiscrimination legislation?"; but he leaves 
little doubt that in his view it was clearly unnecessary.26 
To reach the claim that the act was "undesirable" Woods segues 
quickly from a discussion of the Civil Rights Act to a discussion of 
affirmative action.  Indeed he claims that "the logic of antidiscrimination 
legislation leads directly to affirmative action"—a sentence he places 
entirely in italics.  Woods goes on to discuss a number of other court 
cases, including Griggs v. Duke Power Company, Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke and U. S. Steelworkers v. Weber.  In his 
discussion of these cases, Woods argues that the Civil Rights Act leads 
inexorably to affirmative action—that is, in his view, it leads to 
discrimination.  Indeed, he argues that even voluntary affirmative action, 
of the sort permitted in Weber, ultimately derives from the Civil Rights 
Act: 
 
The fiction that affirmative action programs in the private 
sector are 'voluntary' dies hard, but fiction it is.  Private 
firms and organizations typically adopt affirmative action 
programs in order to protect themselves from federal 
lawsuits alleging 'discrimination' on the basis of innocent 
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and unintentional disparities between the proportion of 
minority employees they have on the payroll and the 
proportion of minorities in the surrounding population.  
There is nothing 'voluntary' about doing something in 
order to prevent the federal government from bringing 
you up on charges and destroying your business.27 
Woods is, of course, prejudging these cases through his assertion that the 
disparities are "innocent and unintentional," and from his sarcastic 
quotation marks around 'discrimination'.  But the key point here is that, in 
Woods's view, antidiscrimination legislation inevitably leads to 
discrimination.  One might argue that, if discrimination is therefore 
inevitable (since a lack of antidiscrimination legislation obviously led to 
discrimination as well), it might as well be done fairly.  But Woods's 
intent, rather, is to use the contemporary instinct that discrimination is 
unjust to cast backwards doubt upon the Civil Rights Act and the 
movement which led to its passage—to use, in other words, the 
contemporary instinct that discrimination is unjust to subtly undermine 
(without directly saying so) the notion of ending racial discrimination.  
Just as he did in shifting the discussion from Brown to later busing 
decisions, Woods not only moves his history rapidly along until he 
reaches more comfortable ground, he structures it so as to cast doubt 
where he is unable (or unwilling) to raise it openly. 
Overall, Woods's strategy for dealing with the place of segregation 
and segregationist arguments in the history of the conservative movement 
is comparable to Herman Talmadge's strategy of coming to terms with his 
own personal past.  There is one major difference between them, however, 
for while Talmadge is careful to at least state quite clearly that he has 
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come to favor integration, Woods never says openly that segregation was 
wrong or that he opposes it in principle.  He never openly argues for 
segregation either, however, and does make a number of arguments 
against various specific racial policies on the grounds that their outcomes 
are unfavorable to African Americans.  Given the overwhelming 
presumption in today's political climate that segregation was, in fact, 
wrong, and that all people of good will today oppose it, these two facts—
his failure to say the opposite, and his professed concern for African 
American welfare—are almost certainly enough to make the casual reader 
presume that Woods opposes segregation.  He might well, given his 
association with southern nationalist organizations,28 have taken such an 
approach in order to appear moderate—in favor of de jure equality—
while hiding actual segregationist leanings;  this is, however, impossible 
to verify either way. 
Woods's failure to openly support de jure equality (however 
tepidly) is, to be sure, a significant difference between his stance in his 
history and Talmadge's in his memoir.  There remain substantial 
similarities, however, particularly if one grants that Woods is attempting 
to appear pro-integration, or at least is attempting to let readers who care 
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about such things make that assumption.  As with Talmadge, Woods's 
professed concern for African Americans does not lead him to support 
any of the major victories that helped establish de jure integration in the 
middle of the previous century; they both share a continued opposition to 
both Brown v Board of Education and the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  Like 
Herman Talmadge, Woods slips readily from discussing issues of de jure 
integration to ferocious attacks on later legal strategies of the Civil Rights 
Movement such as busing and affirmative action.  Ultimately, both 
Talmadge and Woods dance around issues of supporting or opposing the 
measures which established de jure integration, while harping at length on 
the injustice of measures which, whatever one thinks of them, were 
undertaken to try to achieve a measure of de facto integration. 
 
A similar strategy to Thomas Woods's, although pursued in a far 
more balanced fashion, is employed in Paul Johnson's work A History of 
the American People.29  Johnson's work is far more scholarly and 
judicious than Woods's; it was, in fact, recommended by Max Boot in his 
critical Weekly Standard review of The Politically Incorrect Guide to 
American History as a respectable conservative history for "conservatives 
looking to inoculate themselves or their children from liberal 
indoctrination" to read in place of Woods's book.30  And, indeed, in 
contrast to Woods, Johnson covers the protests of the Civil Rights 
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Movement as well as the legal strategies thereof, and does so with some 
admiration. 
But Johnson, like Woods, sets up his discussions of the Civil Rights 
Movement in such a way that he moves swiftly from a discussion of the 
earlier movement to a more critical discussion of subsequent stages.  His 
initial discussion of the Movement (the portion which involved, in 
Johnson's words, "physical activity" and not "the legal position") occurs 
in a sub-section entitled "Civil Rights and Campus Violence."31  As this 
title indicates, Johnson closely links his discussion of the earliest protests 
of the Movement—he begins with the Montgomery bus boycott—to later 
protests against the Vietnam War and other things, and in particular to the 
violent protests of the later 1960's as well as to a broader "degradation of 
authority" that that decade saw—a degradation Johnson ascribes in part to 
"men in authority breaking and running at the first whiff of student 
grapeshot."32  Johnson expresses some genuine admiration for the 
Movement, in particular for Martin Luther King, Jr.  But by structuring 
his discussion so as to move swiftly from the Civil Rights Movement to 
later violence and "degradation of authority", he implicitly qualifies his 
admiration.  Nor does he discuss in much detail the resistance to the Civil 
Rights Movement, which might be a trickier subject; while he 
acknowledges the white violence that greeted many of the Civil Rights 
protestors, the violence he highlights as most destructive is that which 
came from those whose goals or grievances aligned with the Civil Rights 
Movement, not those who reacted against it.  He also says that the "Civil 
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Rights Act gave blacks much more than they had ever had before, but not 
everything"—with a seeming implication that it really ought to have been 
enough.33 
Johnson's other section on the Civil Rights Movement, devoted to 
its legal aspects, is titled—tellingly—"the Sinister Legacy of Myrdal."  
This "sinister legacy", in Johnson's view, is government by the courts and 
not by the legislature.  Johnson's discussion of the Civil Rights 
Movement's legal victories is largely framed by this conception of the 
Court's usurping power.  Johnson writes: 
 
The result [of Myrdal's influence] was perhaps the most 
important single Supreme Court decision in American 
history, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954), 
in which the Court unanimously ruled that segregated 
schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteeing 
equal protection under the law, and thus were 
unconstitutional.  It is notable that, during the arguments, 
one of the justices, Robert Jackson, laid down: 'I suppose 
that realistically the reason this case is here is that action 
couldn't be obtained by Congress.'  Thus the judges were 
consciously stepping in to redeem what they saw as a 
failure of the legislature.  The next year, in a pendant to 
the case, the Court issued guidelines for desegregating 
schools and vested federal courts with authority to 
supervise the process, urging that it take place 'with all 
deliberate speed.'  By setting itself up as an enforcement 
agency, the Court was thus substituting itself for what it 
regarded as a failed executive too.  In short, in Brown the 
Court not only made law, but enforced it, and the 
enforcement was no small matter...34 
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Johnson does not explicitly address the question of whether or not 
segregated schools were in fact constitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but by saying that the Court "made law" he seems to imply 
that, in fact, they were: that the Court was taking an unjustified step in the 
Brown decision.  While he never says anything to imply that he disliked 
the result in Brown, he is so incensed by what he sees as the Court's 
overstepping its bounds that he doesn't say anything positive about the 
result, either.  A page later, Johnson quotes a number of legal experts on 
the negative aspects of Brown—that it "sacrificed neutral legal principles 
for a desired outcome," that it led to "race, quickly followed by ethnicity... 
displacing citizenship as a badge of identity" and that, in any event, it 
didn't work, as the deterioration of American urban schools showed.35  
Johnson does not offer any dissenting views to these negative opinions 
about Brown, leading to the strong impression that he agrees with them 
entirely. 
After his initial discussion of Brown, Johnson leaps into a 
consideration of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which he approves of to a 
much greater degree—again, largely on procedural grounds: Congress, he 
writes, "exercise[d] its proper constitutional function, and the Act itself 
was the result of democratic compromise in the legislature."  He also says 
that "the Act was, on the whole, a notable success."36  Yet he immediately 
begins to emphasize what he sees as the Act's distortion into the policy of 
affirmative action.  After the briefest possible mention of the successes of 
the Civil Rights Act, Johnson goes on (within the very same paragraph) to 
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decry the "impos[ition] of quotas in defiance of the Act"—something 
which he says "was the real beginning of Affirmative Action."37  Even if 
the Civil Rights Act was itself a good thing—arrived at through an 
appropriate procedure, paramount in Johnson's view, and presumably 
aimed at good ends—Johnson seems far more concerned with what he 
sees as its baleful outcome than with any positive effects. 
The real combined effect of Brown and the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
in Johnson's account was the replacement of citizenship as "a badge of 
identity" by race and ethnicity—a process Johnson describes as 
"introducing inequality before the law", which in turn "helped to 
undermine the legal process itself."38  Indeed, Johnson writes, "America 
became in danger of embracing a caste system, like India or, worse still, 
of obliging itself to set up the juridical infrastructure of a racist state, like 
Hitler's Germany"39—a process furthered by the increased number of non-
white citizens that resulted from the 1965 loosening of immigration 
quotas.  Just as Woods dealt at much greater length with the problems (in 
his view) of busing and affirmative action than he did with the specific 
results (or antecedents, for that matter) of Brown and the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, Johnson devotes far more space, as well as far greater passion, 
to the rise of "inequality before the law" that resulted, in his view, from 
affirmative action and related programs and ideologies.  Nowhere does he 
seem to recognize the slightest irony in saying that as a result of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act America was in danger of "embracing a caste system" or 
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"set[ting] up the juridical infrastructure of a racist state".  It seems that, in 
Johnson's view, the segregated South was not itself "a caste system", and 
the racially bound justice therein was not itself "the juridical infrastructure 
of a racist state". 
Johnson does not cast doubt upon the basic justice of the Civil 
Rights Movement to the same degree as does Woods—at least, not on the 
1964 Civil Rights Act; Johnson makes a particularly strong distinction 
between court-ordered desegregation, which he seems to feel is 
fundamentally wrong, and congressionally mandated desegregation, 
which he approves.  But while he does claim to support the latter, he 
spends his energy and passion decrying not the segregation which the 
Civil Rights Act ended, but the legal racial segregation which, he 
believes, it began.  Like a magician waving one hand to distract an 
audience from the other, he decries loudly the legal recognition of racial 
distinctions that constitute affirmative action, but does little to recognize 
the legal racial distinctions that constituted segregation—distinctions 
which even affirmative action's opponents must admit were far more 
consequential in terms of their effect on Americans and American society. 
 
The recent book by Larry Schweikart and Michael Allen, A 
Patriot's History of the United States,40 pursues a number of different 
strategies for addressing the reality of conservative support for 
segregation in a narrative explicitly designed to present a conservative 
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view of the American past—one written as a deliberate counterpoint to 
Howard Zinn's bestselling People's History of the United States.  It 
includes some examples of the strategy of evasion followed by both 
Woods and Johnson; it also contains hints (if only hints) of the sort of 
denial presented by Ann Coulter and David Frum.  In other places, 
Schweikart and Allen use still other strategies in their consideration of the 
Civil Rights Movement as well.  But unlike Woods and Johnson, they 
never seem to forget the genuine necessity of racial equality nor to 
downplay the genuine achievements of the Civil Rights Movement.  
While they do not quite confront head-on the conservative nature of 
opposition to integration, or the left-wing roots of the struggle to achieve 
it, they do document that struggle's importance even while questioning 
some of its results and methods. 
Schweikart and Allen do present—as is, after all, their stated 
purpose in their history, beginning with its title—a distinctly conservative 
view of the civil rights movement.  Several of their criticisms are familiar 
from both Woods and Johnson. Schweikart and Allen do make the 
familiar conservative point that, by stating that "segregation 'generates a 
feeling of inferiority' by blacks within the community", the Supreme 
Court staked out a position where only "sit[ting] next to whites" could 
improve African American self-esteem.  They also claim that this position 
led to a situation where there needed to be a "preordained proportion of 
races" lest these feelings of inadequacy be seen to re-emerge.41  And just 
as Woods and Johnson do, Schweikart and Allen see school desegregation 
as "ultimately... requir[ing] a perversion of the apparatus of the state in 
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order to get people to act reasonably and justly."42 Schweikart and Allen 
also argue that the continuing chain of cases formed a slippery slope: 
 
...the steady encroachment of government into race 
relations later raised difficult issues about freedom of 
choice in America.  Black economist Walter Williams 
has referred to 'forced association laws,' noting that the 
logical outcome of defining every business as 'public' 
increasingly restricts a person's freedom to choose those 
with whom he or she wishes to associate.  In cases of 
genuinely public facilities, the issue is clear: all citizens 
pay taxes, and thus all citizens must have access without 
regard for race or color.  But where was the line drawn?  
Private clubs?  ... Likewise, the firewall of states' rights 
also deteriorated in the civil rights clashes.  A phrase 
used all too often by racist whites, the fact is that 'states' 
rights' still represented a structural safeguard for all 
citizens of a state against direct federal action.43 
So no less than Woods and Johnson do Schweikart and Allen criticize 
both the methods and some of the ultimate results of the legal methods 
that brought about the end of de jure segregation. 
Yet Schweikart and Allen do so in a distinctly different context.  If 
they still see court-ordered desegregation as "a perversion of the apparatus 
of the state", they also see it as "required... in order to get people to act 
reasonably and justly."  They make it clear that they see "the moral issues 
in the initial civil rights cases in the 1950s and 1960s" as "crystal clear".44  
They present with a fair amount of detail (given space limitations and 
their attention to comparable topics) the "continued injustice of a 
segregated society".  While they still present standard conservative 
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critiques of various Civil Rights Movement legal victories and of the 
ultimate result of some of the processes instituted by the Movement, they 
do not do so to the exclusion of what almost everyone would today admit 
was the ultimate, overriding moral urgency of ending de jure segregation. 
Schweikart and Allen also hint—if only hint—at the sort of denial 
that Ann Coulter exemplified.  In their discussion of the passage of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, they go out of their way to note that it was passed 
 
with a higher percentage of Republicans than Democrats 
voting for the bill.  Among those voting against it were 
prominent Democratic senators Albert Gore Sr. of 
Tennessee and a former member of the Klan, Robert 
Byrd of West Virginia.45 
This, unquestionably, is vastly less tendentious than Coulter's bald claim 
that segregation was a "Democrat" policy which "Republicans made 
Southern Democrats drop... when they entered the Republican Party."46  
Yet these sentences are offered in something of the same spirit.  The point 
of noting that "a higher percentage of Republicans than Democrats" voted 
for the 1964 Civil Rights Act is clearly to cast the contemporary 
Republican in a good light on the issue of civil rights and to cast the 
contemporary Democratic party in a correspondingly poor one.  Yet while 
their statement is perfectly correct, it is slightly disingenuous, since it was 
in large measure due to this very bill that many of the segregationist 
Democrats left the Democratic party to become Republicans, even while 
they gave up the fight to maintain de jure segregation as a lost cause. 
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This contemporary focus is driven home by Schweikart and Allen's 
second sentence, singling out Senators Gore and Byrd as voting against 
the Civil Rights Act.  As a comment about 1964, it is a rather random 
selection of opponents to mention; Gore and Byrd were hardly the most 
prominent pro-segregation Democrats.  As a distinctly partisan jab from 
forty years later, however, it is readily understandable: Gore's son and 
namesake, of course, was the Democratic candidate for President in 2000, 
while Robert Byrd, still in the Senate, was one of the Bush 
administration's most vocal, stentorian critics, particularly on the issue of 
the Iraq war.  Singling them out for their (unquestionably immoral) 
segregationist past, despite the sentence's historical context, is intended as 
a partisan blow—one narrowly tailored to the very specific time of the 
book's publication.47 
A similar hint of a strategy of denial comes, ironically, when 
Schweikart and Allen make a standard leftist critique of liberalism.  After 
a brief mention of "Confederate flag-wavers, white-robed Ku Klux 
Klansmen... and potbellied southern sheriffs", they go on to note that 
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Equally dangerous to blacks, though, were well-meaning 
whites, especially northeastern liberals, who practiced a 
quiet, and perhaps equally systematic, racism.  These 
northern white elites would enthusiastically and 
aggressively support the fight for civil rights in the South 
while carefully segregating their own children at all-
white private schools.  They overwhelmingly supported 
public school systems with their votes and their 
editorials, but insulated their own children from exposure 
to other races by sending them to Andover or Sidwell 
Friends.  Few had personal acquaintances who were 
black, and fewer still, when it was in their power, 
appointed or promoted blacks to corporate, church or 
community positions.  Not surprisingly, this subterranean 
prejudice was at its worst in liberal meccas such as 
Hollywood and New York City, where television 
production headquarters selected the programming for 
virtually all TV broadcasting in the 1950s and early 
1960s.  With the notable exception of the radio show 
Amos and Andy—whose actors were actually white!—
black television characters were nonexistent except as 
occasional servants or for comic relief or as dancers.48 
This is, for the most part, entirely fair: the racism of white, northern 
liberals was, of course, often noted at the time by participants in the Civil 
Rights Movement, and many among them would probably have agreed 
that it was "equally dangerous to blacks"—Martin Luther King, for 
instance, famously wrote in his "Letter from Birmingham Jail" that he had 
"almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great 
stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen's 
Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate."49  Yet it 
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seems slightly imbalanced to devote nearly two paragraphs to the racism 
of the white liberal, when the ""Confederate flag-wavers, white-robbed 
Ku Klux Klansmen" rate only a brief mention (not counting later, vague 
references to anti-African American violence.)  Nor would King, or any 
other civil rights leader, have advocated greater conservatism as the 
antidote to this problem!  In the context, it is hard not to conclude that 
Schweikart and Allen are trying—delicately, and by making a perfectly 
valid (indeed, important) point—to focus the charge of racism onto 
liberals as a way of deflecting it away from conservatives. 
(It is also worth noting, parenthetically, that this passage too seems 
to be written with a distinct eye toward scoring present-day political 
points.  To write of the racism of northern liberals might be simply an 
accurate description—but why specify "northeastern liberals"?50  To be 
sure, even in the 1960s Richard Nixon fumed against northeastern 
liberals; but it is an attack far more familiar from, and consonant with, the 
politics of the early twenty-first century than that of the period under 
discussion.  The point is even clearer when Schweikart and Allen write of 
"northern white elites."51  Racism was an issue among northern whites (as 
among southern whites) of all classes—indeed, working-class racism 
would become a pressing issue in the late 1960s and, especially, in the 
1970s as clashes between working-class whites and African Americans 
arose over issues such as busing.  Why, then, specify elite racism?  Again, 
a look at present-day conservative politics, which centrally vilifies 
                                                
50 Emphasis added. 
51 Emphasis added. 
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liberalism as the politics of the elite,52 answers the question in a way that 
historical circumstances do not.  Similarly, describing the racism of the 
mid-Twentieth Century media is an important historical point; to describe 
this as the racism of " liberal meccas such as Hollywood and New York 
City"—particularly to say that this was the location of the "worst" of 
liberal racism—seems intended, primarily, to invoke the anti- elitist, 
populist political rage of the present day.)53 
Despite these various rhetorical strategies which, in varying ways, 
deflect attention from the conservative support for segregation and the 
liberal impulses behind the movement against it, it must be reiterated that 
Schweikart and Allen do present a fair if not balanced narrative of the 
Civil Rights Movement.  Whereas some of the claims made by Coulter 
and Frum, for example, involve outright distortions, Schweikart and Allen 
present an opinionated but clearly defensible interpretation.  If their 
emphasis on liberal racism seems overstated compared to their passing 
remarks on conservative racism, this is perhaps understandable in a book 
explicitly designed as a conservative retelling of American history.  It 
does, perhaps, fail to fully confront the connections between 
segregationist thought and the contemporary conservative viewpoint; but 
at least it gives due attention to the importance of the former. 
 
                                                
52 See Thomas Frank, What's the Matter With Kansas? New York : 
Metropolitan Books, 2004, for a powerful description of this dynamic. 
53 The suspicion also arises that the specifying of "Sidwell Friends" is an 
example chosen due to that school's recent fame as the high chosen by 
Hilary and Bill Clinton as their daughter's high school, although this is 
probably impossible to prove. 
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Some conservatives do forthrightly admit that the Civil Rights 
Movement was both a positive and a liberal achievement.  This strategy 
involves not attempting to deny or evade the issue of liberalism and 
conservatism's records' on the issue of civil rights, but to confront it 
honestly—conceding, as it were, this particular moral high ground to 
liberalism, attempting perhaps to put it in perspective but nevertheless 
admitting the fundamental justice of the liberal case.  At times this 
involves an attempt to justify some of the conservative principles involved 
in the support of segregation, while still condemning the support itself as 
morally unacceptable. 
A good example of this strategy can be found in a book by 
conservative columnist George Will.  Will says, forthrightly, that 
 
The most admirable achievements of modern 
liberalism—desegregation, and the civil rights acts—
were explicit and successful attempts to change (among 
other things) individuals' moral beliefs by compelling 
them to change their behavior. [...]  To a gratifying extent 
the civil rights laws worked.54 
For the most part this is an example of gracious admiration for another 
political philosophy's genuine insights and achievements.  Rather than 
hedge the question, shift focus or obfuscate the issue, Will defuses it by 
simply admitting that desegregation was "admirable", a liberal 
achievement which should not be gainsaid.  
Yet even Will hedges matters slightly.  He does so by presenting 
government-imposed desegregation as not a simple triumph of right over 
                                                
54 George Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does.  New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, p. 87. 
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wrong, but as a clash of rights.  A page before, Will sets up the 
philosophical conflict thus: 
 
Before Lester Maddox was Governor of Georgia, he was 
proprietor of the Pickrick Restaurant in Atlanta.  One of 
the most defensible, indeed most unmixedly good, deeds 
of modern government was in taking away one of the 
rights Maddox valued most.  When black persons tried to 
claim a right to be served in the Pickrick, the proprietor 
respond by wielding an ax handle, and by handing out ax 
handles to kindred spirits.  The right he was exercising 
was a real right—an enforceable entitlement, and an old 
one: the right of a proprietor to restrict his custom.  In 
many times and places the right was, and is, acceptable.  
But in the United States it had too often been exercised in 
a way that affronted an entire class of citizens.  And in 
the United States in 1964 that right had become 
intolerably divisive.  So Congress undertook a small but 
significant rearrangement of American rights.  It 
diminished the rights of proprietors of public 
accommodations, and expanded those of potential users 
of those accommodations. [...]  Congress was coming to 
the conclusion that a right exercised meanly, with ugly 
consequences, should yield to another, better right.55 
Will for the most part accepts what was the liberal argument of the time: 
that the dismantling of segregation was not only right but was "indeed... 
unmixedly good"; he accepts that the civil rights act not only changed 
people's behavior patterns but their "moral beliefs"—the precise thing that 
conservative arguments at the time said could not happen. 
But in one key respect Will retains a strongly conservative view in 
his presentation of the conflict.  He accepts the segregationist argument, 
as articulated by Lester Maddox, that the right to deny service to an 
                                                
55 Ibid., pp. 86-87. 
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African-American customer was both ancient and "a real right".  He does 
not say, as a liberal might, that this was as such an illegitimate thing to do.  
He does say that it was "a right exercised meanly, with ugly 
consequences"; but he insists that it is still a right.  By setting up the 
circumstance as a contest of rights, in which a more pressing right yielded 
to a less pressing one, Will maintains a conservative philosophical 
outlook that both legitimates the underlying conservative argument and 
worldview as well as raises a high barrier against any attempt to extend 
the liberal argument (to, for example, women or gays and lesbians.)  Will 
thus makes what is the smallest possible concession to a liberal 
philosophy of governance consistent with both an honest reading of 
history and a commitment to integration—one which, while giving some 
credit to "modern liberalism" for its support of the Civil Rights 
Movement, does so without ceding any significant philosophical ground. 
I do not mean to imply that Will writes this disingenuously, nor that 
he is taking this stance out of purely strategic considerations or that his 
commitment to integration is anything less than genuine.  But a strategy 
conceived in good faith and honestly followed is, nevertheless, a strategy; 
and concessions made in good conscience are, nevertheless, concessions.  
Will provides a model of a well-thought out, fully conservative 
understanding of the history of the Civil Rights Movement in relation to 
the liberal and conservative political tendencies—a model that others, out 
of conviction or calculation or some inseparable combination, might well 
follow. 
Will, for all his admiration of the Civil Rights Movement, does not 
go so far as to express regret that conservatives did not embrace it more 
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fully, or suggest that conservatives have something to learn from their 
failure to do so.  Indeed, for the reasons laid out above, the strategy of 
repentance—admitting conservatism's roots in segregationist thought, 
declaring it wrong, and vowing (in one fashion or another) to do better—
is rare.  But it is not unheard of.  A few conservatives have gone so far as 
to say that, on this issue, not only were liberals right, but conservatives 
were wrong. 
One of the few examples of such an argument was made by Jack 
Kemp, later the 1996 Republican Vice-Presidential candidate.  In a 1993 
interview, Kemp discussed at some length the Republican party's, and the 
conservative movement's, history with regards to civil rights: 
 
I don't think Barry Goldwater is, or was, a racist.  I think 
he cast the wrong vote... But there weren't many 
conservatives on the side of the civil rights movement. 
And I'm convinced that the civil rights movement was 
necessary.  You don't have to agree with every tactic, or 
everything that happened, to recognize that the civil 
rights movement in America was a necessary reform of 
our laws to bring us closer to the original meaning of our 
Declaration of Independence. ... 
I'm sure there were many fine men and women in the 
Republican party all for civil rights, but the party as a 
whole was not associated with it.  I give credit to the 
Democratic party for its role.  I don't necessarily agree 
with everything it did, but I recognize that some of the 
errors came out of championing civil, human, legal, and 
voting rights for all people.  The Democrats had a terrible 
history, and they overcame it. 
We had a great history, and we turned aside.  We should 
have been there with Dr. King on the streets of Atlanta 
and Montgomery.  We should have been there with John 
Lewis.  We should have been there on the freedom 
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marches and bus rides.  We should have been there with 
Rosa Parks in Montgomery, Alabama, in December of 
1955. 
... I think the whole idea of Kevin Phillips's Southern 
majority is a disgrace.56 
Kemp does insert a few qualifiers in his statement—he implies that he 
disagreed with some tactics of the Civil Rights Movement; he says that 
"there were many fine men and women in the Republican party all for 
civil rights," and that the Democrats made some "errors" in the course of 
supporting civil rights.  But this statement is, unquestionably, a forthright 
recognition of a troubled past.  Kemp does not equivocate about the fact 
that "there weren't many conservatives on the side of the civil rights 
movement," and even recognizes that "the [Republican] party as a whole 
was not associated with" the movement—an explicit contradiction of the 
strategy of denial which, as was seen earlier, is followed by many. 
Kemp does not even restrict himself, as do many conservatives—
including George Will in the passage quoted above—to the legal aspects 
of the Civil Rights Movement.  Rather, he explicitly embraces the protest 
tactics, delineating several: the Montgomery bus boycott, the freedom 
rides, the work of SNCC under John Lewis.  Finally, Kemp disavows the 
'southern strategy'—implicitly recognizing that it was precisely 
conservative opposition to integration upon which recent Republican 
majorities have been built.  (He does, naturally, think that Republicans 
can appeal to African Americans and other supporters of civil rights while 
continuing to appeal, for other reasons, to white southern voters.)  Kemp 
                                                
56 Fredric Smoler, "We Had a Great History and We Turned Aside: An 
Interview with Jack Kemp by Fredric Smoler."  American Heritage, 
October 1993, pp. 53 - 59; quotation on pp. 55-56. 
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confronts, up to a point, the contradiction between his party's professed 
belief in the Civil Rights Movement and its electoral benefiting from the 
backlash to that movement. 
No less than for individuals, the conservative movement as a whole 
has a wide range of possible strategies from which it can choose how it 
wishes to approach its connections to its segregationist past.  As we have 
seen, more than one of these strategies involve a measure of evasion or 
denial.  But there is also more than one strategy with which conservatives, 
without abandoning their own core political values, can approach the 
history of this era with both historical accuracy and moral consistency.  
Kemp, like Will, provides a powerful model for those who wish to 
employ such strategies. 
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CONCLUSION: 
ACCEPTING EQUALITY 
 
In the spring of 2008, there was a brief media furor over the 
proposed design of the planned statue of Martin Luther King, Jr., for the 
National Mall in Washington, D.C.  The secretary of the United States 
Commission of Fine Arts, in critiquing the design, said (among other 
criticisms) that the statue was too "confrontational".  He elaborated, "I 
don’t know that most people would say, ‘Dr. King, he was really a 
confrontational guy.’"  The secretary was soon forced to express his 
regrets for the word as the blatant historical absurdity of his claim was 
widely pointed out, among others by the late civil rights leader's nephew.1  
But the claim that King was not confrontational, inaccurate as it was 
about the historical realities of King's career, was accurate about the way 
King is remembered—or, more accurately, the way some segments of the 
American polity wish to remember him.  Writing about the statue 
controversy, columnist Eugene Robinson summed up the desired 
memories of King as follows: 
 
It's clear that some people would prefer to remember 
King as some sort of paragon of forbearance who, 
through suffering and martyrdom, shamed the nation into 
                                                
1 Michael E. Ruane, "Unhappy With 'Confrontational' Image, U.S. Panel 
Wants King Statue Reworked", The Washington Post, May 9, 2009, p. 
A1; Shaila Dewan, "Larger Than Life, More to Fight Over", The New 
York Times, May 18, 2008, Week in Review, p. 4.  The Commission also 
expressed concern over the style of the statue, which they compared to 
socialist realism; still others have been concerned because the sculptor 
was both Chinese and noted for his creation of sculptures of Mao Zedong. 
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doing the right thing. In truth, King... was a man of 
action who used pressure, not shame, to change the 
nation.2 
The genuine historical realities of King's career—over a decade of intense 
confrontation, through a career of "pressure, not shame"—requires a very 
different story than the hagiographic version so often offered in 
contemporary American discourse.  A narrative of King as a purely 
religious figure, one who transformed the country through soul force 
rather than political action (albeit couched in religious terms), can be a 
story without antagonists, a tale of a preacher who successfully called a 
ready nation to repent.  A portrait of King's career as a political struggle 
inevitably requires some account of those he was struggling against.  
Which, in turn, damages the national narrative of complete and 
uncomplicated repentance for America's racial sins: that Jim Crow is an 
era that is over, not so much politicked away as almost religiously 
transcended. 
The presence of antagonists in historical memory is particularly 
dangerous for events which are still so recent.  The events of the 1960's 
are still frequently referenced in contemporary political debate.  Were 
King still alive, he would be in his seventies—quite possibly an ongoing 
participant in the civil realm (just as, in fact, many of his key allies and 
lieutenants still are).  It is easy to tell a story of believers in politically 
untenable positions when the adoption of those positions can be ascribed 
the tenor of long-past times, and when the proponents of the now-
unthinkable are, in any event, long gone from the political scene.  It is a 
                                                
2 Eugene Robinson, "King as He Was," The Washington Post, May 20, 
2008, p. A13. 
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more difficult story to tell when the erstwhile opponents are still on the 
political stage. 
Describing King as "confrontational" raises the question of whom 
he was confronting; which, in turn, raises the question of where those who 
challenged the now-unchallengeable King have gone. 
As this work has examined, King's opponents remained ensconced 
within the American political system, both as lawmakers and as opinion-
makers, for years to come—in some notable cases, for many decades.  
Due to the Civil Rights Movement's moral victory—the shift in widely-
held moral beliefs that led to its moral calculus (at least on the issue of de 
jure segregation) becoming the default, and the nearly universal, 
American political position—those opponents rarely held on to their 
oppositional views.  As this work has explored, they sought various ways 
to explain away, to apologize for or to ignore their now-discredited 
political positions.  Given the moral opprobrium that—quickly, in 
historical terms—attached to the support of Jim Crow, it was a difficult 
feat to accomplish.  Those who wished to see King as non-
confrontational—since who would confront such obviously ethical 
goals?—had to deal with their own confrontation of him. 
It is worth noting how little political price was paid by those who 
had supported a position that even they had come to view as immoral. 
Setting aside Lester Maddox—who remained steadfast in his 
support for his earlier views—few of the subjects in this study paid any 
significant political price for their support of Jim Crow.  Prominent 
political spokesmen for de jure segregation such as Strom Thurmond, 
Herman E. Talmadge and George Wallace, continued their careers to their 
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natural termination with hardly any disruption from their previous 
segregationist stances.3  William F. Buckley's career as an influential 
political pundit did not suffer from his invocation of white southerners as 
the "superior civilization" (aside from a few negative remarks from 
observers unlikely to sympathize with his views in any event).  Nor has 
the conservative movement which he championed paid even a rhetorical 
price for its roots in the politics of segregation's defenders. 
Of the figures examined in this study, only two—Robert Bork and 
Trent Lott—paid a political price for their former support of segregation.  
And in both cases the significance of that price was debatable.  In the case 
of Robert Bork, his opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act—and the 
bloodless way in which he claimed to have changed his view—was one of 
the factors which cost him a seat on the Supreme Court, but it was only 
one of the factors, and it is hard to disentangle it from the broader 
campaign against his nomination.  While in the case of Trent Lott, the 
political price he paid was limited to his leadership role—which, had he 
not chosen to retire, he might even have recaptured a few years later.  In 
neither case was the support for a political position which the supporter 
                                                
3 It is arguable that Wallace's national political ambitions were, 
eventually, diminished by his earlier segregationist positions.  But, of 
course, there were other factors in his lack of national political success as 
well—his serious wounding by Arthur Bremer in particular.  And, of 
course, Wallace's very opposition to integration—and the broader politics 
of conservative populism he built on top of it—were in fact the reason he 
had any national political hopes in the first place.  Wallace's political 
career was ultimately far more furthered than hindered by his notorious 
defiance of integration. 
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himself had come to agree was wrong a career-ender, or anything close to 
it. 
One of the key factors allowing proponents of de jure segregation 
to survive in political life after the discrediting of their ideas was the 
change in political rhetoric that preceded the Civil Rights Movement.  
While in popular memory Jim Crow was dismantled by the Civil Rights 
Movement in the 1950's and 60's, scholars have long appreciated the 
many challenges to the system that existed prior to the more famous 
events of the mid-50's and beyond.  Even more than the practical victories 
that occurred in the decades prior to the remembered start of the Civil 
Rights Movement in 1954, however, there were ideological and rhetorical 
shifts that occurred in those decades as well.  For all its enduring power, 
overt racism had been comparatively discredited in much of the country 
by the time of the Brown v. Board of Education decision.  (As has been 
frequently noted, the decision itself, rather than a counter-majoritarian 
action by an activist court, was an attempt to impose the will of a national 
majority over a regional majority.)  This was particularly true not in 
popular feelings—where racism has survived (if not exactly thrived) long 
beyond the Civil Rights Movement—but in the more elite sectors of 
American political and journalistic discourses.  Thus there was a distinct 
shift in the publicly articulated defenses of Jim Crow in the decades prior 
to the Civil Rights Movement.  By the mid-1950's, prominent defenders 
of de jure segregation no longer defended their political positions by 
appealing to explicitly racist ideas.  Rather, their defense was most often 
couched in various ways which served as ideological euphemisms for 
now-unspeakable motives.  Opponents of integration spoke more often of 
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state's rights and communism than of any belief in the inherent value of 
separating the races.  This change was, naturally, a slow and partial one, 
filled with exceptions, outliers and throwbacks, even at times from 
carefully polite defenders of Jim Crow.  Nevertheless it was a distinct 
shift. 
Which made it far easier for those who defended an explicitly 
racial, and inarguably racist, system to pivot once that position was no 
longer tenable.  Having defended an indefensible social system by appeals 
elsewhere (such as to federalist principles), they could change their minds 
without too strongly contradicting their earlier rhetoric, if not beliefs.  The 
majority of the support for de jure segregation had already distanced itself 
(rhetorically) from the cause it was supporting; this made it all the easier 
to (rhetorically) disown the cause once it was politically necessary.4 
Even given the prior rhetorical distance that the nature of pro-
segregationist rhetoric in post-war America provided its erstwhile 
                                                
4 This is a key difference between the situation of former supporters of 
Jim Crow and former supporters of another discredited political position, 
Nazi supporters in post-war Germany, to which I have referred a few 
times.  The fall of segregation as a tenable public position was slow, and 
the ideological space which was fully discredited was comparatively 
narrow (however fully that narrow slice was in fact discredited).  In 
contrast, the fall of National Socialism as a tenable public position was 
both rapid and absolute.  Thus Nazi supporters had no cushion of 
ideological hedging to fall back upon (although, in contrast to supporters 
of Jim Crow, they had both far more dramatic events—defeat in war—and 
presumptively unknown revelations—about the Holocaust—that they 
could use to justify their ideological pivot.)  For more on the latter, see 
Konrad H. Jarausch's fascinating new study After Hitler: Recivilizing 
Germans, 1945 - 1995, trans. Brandon Hunziker (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
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adherents, little was in practice actually required of segregation's 
supporters in order to be, for most purposes, given a clean slate.  
Supporters of segregation had to drop the issue: ongoing open advocacy 
of de jure segregation would result in political marginalization.  But in 
most cases not even an expression of regret was required; former 
supporters of segregation could simply hold their peace, and the issue 
would be considered closed. 
This was not because the support for de jure segregation was 
considered a reasonable position to have taken; despite the little that was 
required to shed oneself of a seemingly disreputable past, the national 
consensus on this point was quite strong.  Rather, little was required 
because of the strong desire among others in the political discourse to put 
the issue behind them—a desire which led to the eager seizing upon the 
slightest evidence to create far stronger narratives of renunciation than the 
facts on the ground warranted. 
Consider the following statements, all previously quoted in this 
study: 
Robert Bork had "acknowledged the insensitivity of his 1963 
statement" in opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  Strom Thurmond 
said "Look, I'm a changed man, I was wrong in the past, this is how I'm 
going to right it now."  George Wallace "acknowledged his bigotry."  
William F. Buckley "strenuously" recanted his position on the southern 
segregationists.5 
                                                
5 Gary G. Born, "Robert H. Bork's Civil Rights Record,"  op cit; Trent 
Lott's BET Interview, op cit; Lewis, "Forgiving George Wallace", op cit; 
Sam Tanenhaus, "Q & A on William F. Buckley", op. cit. 
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The first two of those sentences are untrue; the third is possible but 
dubious; the fourth is at best a highly tendentious reading of scattered 
remarks which (at least in public) were typically qualified.  In each case 
they ascribed far more acknowledgment of wrongdoing than their subject 
actually made.  But all were said, and accepted, because they accurately 
reflect the way Americans wish to believe the country has changed since 
1965.  American political discourse—and, most likely, the majority of 
Americans—now take for granted the notion that de jure segregation was 
wrong.  So the wish to believe that Americans still active in our political 
life have acknowledged that wrongness is strong—strong enough to 
overread, and exaggerate (even if unconsciously) admissions of 
wrongdoing. 
Apologizing for an error which has come to be regarded as a moral 
mistake—and not simply a practical misjudgment, a technical 
miscalculation or an erroneous forecast—is difficult.  It puts into question 
one's basic outlook on the world, one's basic judgment and integrity, in a 
way which is very difficult to confront.  Even more, for a political figure 
to make such an admission opens them up to dismissal in a way that can 
be distinctly hard to evade: having gotten such an issue wrong, how can 
their judgment be trusted again?  So, in the actual confrontation with one's 
now-abandoned, now-discredited stance, the temptation to quibble, to 
evade, to qualify, to understate is strong.  It makes it easier to live with 
oneself; it makes it harder for political opponents to use one's words for 
their own purposes.  Then, having addressed the issue, it is easy to set it 
aside as a previously concluded topic. 
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But the desire to believe that raw racial discrimination—the sort 
that is no longer supported in the twenty-first century, at least not by 
public figures—is not only past, but is the dead past; is history not only in 
the technical sense, but in the popular sense of discardable—is strong as 
well.  So, whether consciously or not, evasions are remembered as 
forthright admissions of wrongdoing, hedged apologies are quoted as 
fully-throated repentance, qualifiers are themselves qualified, complex 
feelings are edited to the popular will. 
All that is necessary for this embrace of reconciliation, this 
eagerness for absolution, is a small hook to hang it on.  Even silence will 
suffice.  Only if one obstinately sticks to one's guns—as did the 
stubbornly implacable Lester Maddox—is the contradiction too stark to 
swallow.  Otherwise, public perceptions of former supporters of de jure 
segregation are quite flexible.  However nuanced the apology, however 
qualified the regret, however minimal the concessions to the moral reality 
of the injustice of segregation, people have been willing to fully classify 
former supporters as "former"—to judge the issue as buried in the past—
as long as there was some hook to hang the past tense on.  Any expression 
of regret, or of a change in position, was instantly adopted—indeed, often, 
understood—as a full recantation.  In American political understanding, 
and historical memory, political figures are divided into two camps: open 
supporters of de jure segregation, and everyone else.  Distinctions are not 
made within the latter category.  Any accusations of racism are forgiven 
as long as there is something that can be construed as an apology. 
Former supporters of segregation could not continue to insist upon 
its morality and remain in political life—as we have seen from the 
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example of Lester Maddox.  But silence, equivocation and half-hearted or 
inconsistently expressed repentance were all received as full recantations. 
There are numerous reasons for this.  Among the most important is 
partisan unity.  From the cynical perspective of practical politics, it 
obviously does Republicans no good to denounce Strom Thurmond, nor 
for conservatives to censure William F. Buckley.  It is perhaps notable 
that the most prominent utilizer of the strategy of repentance, Wallace, 
was one of the southern conservatives who stayed in the Democratic 
party—where the calculus of partisan advantage was far more complex, 
and required a larger confrontation given the changing demographics of 
party identification in the south.  And Robert Bork—one of those who 
arguably paid a genuine price for both his support of the legal structure of 
de jure segregation, and his bloodless recantation of that position—got 
into trouble only when confronted with an aggressive partisan from the 
other side of the political spectrum.  But for many of those who supported 
segregation, colleagues were unlikely to call them on it out of sheer 
partisan loyalty. 
But in fact this loyalty went farther than simple inter-party loyalty 
or the bands of ideological unity.  There was also a fair amount of unity 
among the American political class as a whole—class loyalty that 
transcended ideological and partisan lines.  All things being equal, 
journalists and politicians are unlikely to rebuke members of their own 
guild on past mistakes, since they sympathize with each other.  This 
loyalty is, obviously, far less strong than partisan loyalty, and certainly 
breaks down in the face of partisan struggles for power (such as happened 
when Democrats made political hay over Robert Bork's history of support 
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for de jure segregation), or when journalists pursue their craft and push a 
political figure for answers on an uncomfortable topic.  But it is telling 
that the Democratic politicians and liberal journalists and Strom 
Thurmond's 100th birthday party were no more inclined to castigate Trent 
Lott over his then-shocking nostalgia for the cause of Jim Crow than the 
Republican politicians and conservative journalists were.  Only when 
outsiders to the political culture—particularly internet writers who neither 
identified nor socialized with Lott or his friends and allies in both 
Congress and the media—pushed the issue into the public spotlight, and 
kept it there through dogged perseverance, was Lott deserted by both his 
class allies and his more narrowly partisan ones.  And Thurmond himself 
had served for decades beyond his open support of de jure segregation, 
well into the days when it was politically beyond the pale, and while the 
odd journalist had asked him about it, he was not really pressed hard over 
it, nor challenged by his fellow politicians.  If he was willing to let it drop, 
so were they. 
A further unity which would be threatened if segregation's 
supporters were challenged too fiercely was the unity between political 
spokesmen and their constituents.  In some cases—again, Wallace is a 
telling example—the shifting nature of a political figure's constituency 
meant that more explanations were called for (although, as I have argued, 
even those have been exaggerated by a mixture of memory and desire to 
seem more munificent than they really were).  But in many cases, political 
figures who supported Jim Crow were continuing to appeal to those who 
had made a similar ideological journey.  Thurmond was elected by many 
who had supported segregation when the battle over it was being fought 
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long after that cause had been lost; too strong a recanting would risk their 
support.  And the conservative movement rose to its electoral triumph in 
no small measure on the support of those who were embittered by the 
success of the Civil Rights Movement, so perhaps it is no surprise that 
William Buckley did not trumpet his change of heart on the notion that 
"the White community... for the time being... is the advanced race", since 
doing so might alienate those who continued to hold that belief—silently, 
perhaps. 
And, of course, in this the quibbles, half-hearted recantations, 
ideological and factual contradictions were also useful, if perhaps not 
consciously so.  After all, it was presumably not only highly visible 
supporters of segregation who felt themselves to be "reconstructed but 
unregenerate".  A great many people, undoubtedly, did not bother to 
reconcile even a genuine change of heart on the morality of de jure 
segregation with the persistent reality of old feelings of bitterness or racial 
spite, or simply the ongoing sense that the cause was somehow well 
fought and nobly lost.  Thus the quibbles and evasions of political figures 
were in a sense reflective of those they sought to represent, whose 
opinions they sought to shape and whose votes they needed to attract.  
Similarly, the conservative movement, while abandoning its support for 
de jure segregation, nevertheless retained a lot of passionate feelings on 
issues such as state's rights or opposition to busing and affirmative action 
whose historical roots were in the ideological struggle over Jim Crow.  
The conflicting emotions behind these positions were hard to reconcile—
and the logical contradictions were, perhaps, easy to ignore, particularly 
when part of them were in the eagerly-forgotten past. 
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But strong as all of these ties were—the ties of partisan advantage, 
of class-based feeling and of constituent representation—there were other 
ties which also led to the misremembering (deliberate or unconscious) of 
silences and evasions as apologies and requests for repentance: and those 
are the broad ties of the overall American story. 
Excessive expressions of guilt for their former support of 
segregation would do more than implicate political leaders themselves—
would do more, even, than implicate their followers.  Such expressions 
would implicate the country as a whole.  They would remind us that the 
Civil Rights Movement was not an uplifting moment of transcending, but 
a bitter battle repairing a long and deep fault.  The public memory of the 
Civil Rights Movement, at the moment, is something to feel good about: 
our country includes good people like Martin Luther King, and has nobly 
transcended a now bygone racism.  If expressions of regret were to go too 
far, they would remind people that Martin Luther King had to be 
confrontational, for there were a great many people who opposed his 
goals (even in the time of his life when those goals were things now 
considered mainstream, rather than later in his life when King's focus 
turned to goals, such as ending the Vietnam War and addressing poverty 
in a comprehensive fashion, that are still considered radical).  It would 
taint a simple, feel-good story about America as a place that moves 
forward and expands freedom: it would bring into an overly harsh light 
the America that resists such changes, an America, indeed, which is not so 
long ago that its legacies aren't still living among us. 
In hearing silence as regret and hedged expressions as fulsome 
apologies, we do more than forgive those who fought longest and hardest 
 418 
against integration.  We forgive ourselves— allowing the ideal America 
we prefer to imagine to shine undimmed. No one wants to examine the 
grittiness of the past, particularly if that past is all-too-close to the present. 
In the end, we believe it because it feels good—and, thus, because 
it sounds true—not because it is.  We hear anything but ongoing open 
avowal of support for de jure segregation as its recantation because that is 
the story about ourselves that pleases us most.  The fuzziness of memory 
and the ambiguity of changed hearts lets us believe that we are a more 
fully transformed country than, perhaps, we really are. 
But it may be that this very ambiguity—shading, at times, into 
willful amnesia—is the price of the unanimity of the public perception of 
the immorality of Jim Crow.  A society can't unite behind a moral change 
unless a very broad moral amnesty is given to those formerly on the other 
side.  If former opposition is held out as a permanent moral stain, then 
sheer political survival and truculence will inevitably create a push-back. 
The implicit political bargain seems to have been that former 
opponents of de jure segregation will not only drop their opposition but 
indeed actively endorse integration, and in return they will receive not 
opprobrium for their former segregationist words so long as they meet 
these minimal requirements of allegiance to the new political and moral 
order. 
This bargain is written into many of the forces detailed above.  If de 
jure segregation is to be considered immoral, beyond the realm of 
acceptable political discourse, across party lines and throughout the 
ideological spectrum, then the price of this is that it can't be used too often 
as a political gotcha in partisan wars.  (If it were, there would likely be a 
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revival of support for segregation simply as a means of partisan push-
back.)  Similarly, if the political class (journalists and politicians alike) is 
to agree that this particular politics is off-limits, they can't be constantly 
reminding some figures of their number of past sins—lest old divides 
once again fracture the elite consensus into warring factions. 
And, above all, if we, as a nation, are to agree that de jure 
segregation was flatly immoral, if we are to embrace the cause of the 
(early) Civil Rights Movement as our national consensus, then the 
demands of patriotism are likely to require that that goodness be broadly 
shared.  The American way of conceiving that Jim Crow was ethically 
wrong was to call it un-American—against the deepest and best and truest 
aspects of America's meaning.  To be sure, this formulation raises all sorts 
of powerfully obvious questions; after all, if Jim Crow wasn't American, 
what on earth was it?  But just as during the Civil Rights Struggle, the 
invocations of an idealized America—the claim that their goal was the 
fulfillment of America's meaning—was a powerful force in the hands of 
those fighting for an integrated society, the very successes of that 
movement required the adoption of the notion that, with the (idealized) 
success of the movement, we can agree that it was all-American.  Its 
failures, therefore, are better ignored. 
In short, the very process by which Jim Crow moved beyond the 
political pale seems to have required passing over in relative silence the 
forces which so recently sought to uphold it. 
If we are to be a country which has moved on from support for de 
jure segregation—a country in which the immorality of Jim Crow is an 
unquestioned public postulate—perhaps we need to forget that this 
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immorality was only recently, and is only partly, acknowledged.  The way 
American political discourse has dealt with the persistence of supporters 
of segregation has been a lot closer to "forgive and forget" than to "truth 
and reconciliation".  It requires seeing figures who devoted their lives to a 
now-widely despised cause as respected elder statesmen.  It requires 
seeing the leading ideological movement of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries as having its roots in things other than reaction 
against the Civil Rights Movement.  And it requires that we think of 
ourselves as a country where racism—at least of the sort upheld by de 
jure segregation—is not just dead, but dead and gone. 
Of course this very amnesia hides many other things—the political 
links between the former supporters of segregation and the current voters 
for conservative candidates; the political uses of coded racial appeals that 
have replaced the now-abandoned overt appeals to segregationist feelings; 
the ongoing place of racism in American life and politics; the persistence 
of de facto segregation long beyond the ideological discrediting of its 
government sanctioning—that would, perhaps, be better recalled, or 
which could, at any rate, be more forthrightly dealt with if their historical 
roots were seen.  But to tie any of those features of American life too 
deeply into the recent but now discredited past would be to risk a renewal 
of the political, cultural and social battles we have decided, as a nation, to 
put behind us. 
A political bargain has been struck: unanimity of condemnation for 
silence and amnesia.  It is a bargain which puts one aspect of America's 
sordid racial history fully to rest at the cost of allowing its connection to 
ongoing racial problems to remain obscure. It is a balance sheet whose 
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bottom line is complex, and whose moral calculus is beyond the scope of 
the present project.  But like all bargains, it is one with costs as well as 
benefits.  Put otherwise, it is an armistice, one which, like all armistices, 
ends strife at the cost of leaving issues unresolved.  Even in a cultural war, 
victory requires a certain amnesia on the part of the victors if battle is not 
to flare up again.  This amnesia may simply be the price of a powerful, 
and morally important, consensus on the place, or lack thereof, of racial 
segregation in American society. 
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